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Secret-Ballot Receipts True Voter-Verifiable Elections David Chaum.

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Presentation on theme: "Secret-Ballot Receipts True Voter-Verifiable Elections David Chaum."— Presentation transcript:

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2 Secret-Ballot Receipts True Voter-Verifiable Elections David Chaum

3 Main Points WOTE I and Standardization workshop (Focus on polling-place elections) Don’t have to trust computers with integrity Four system examples –Janken –High-registration printing –Subtractive light –Additive light Mixing with bitmaps and its audit Provisional voting & adjudication Comparison of current proposals (Paper instruments can be modified before recount)

4 OUTLINE Introduction WOTE and WEST Polling-place election background Receipt system introduction Educational example receipt system Three example receipt systems Comparison with non-receipt systems Comments on Standardization

5 Secret-Ballot Technology Paradigms (core of elections) Manual counting of objects in container Mechanical counting of human interaction Electronic counting of objects in container Electronic counting of human interaction (some with printed record!) “Computers voting” Something new: “People Voting” Same basis Same basis A&R A A A

6 Vote-counting mechanisms Hand countMechanical counter Electronic counterMultiple-trustee Crypto

7 Alan Newberger Andrew Neff Ari Renvall Arnaud Sahuguet Arto Salomaa Atsushi Fujioka Baraani-Dastjerdi Ben Davenport Berry Schoenmakers Birgit Pfitzmann Brandon William DuRette C. C. Tai C. Lei Choonsik Park Chung- chieh Shan Colin Boyd Fumiaki Miura G. Poupard H. Imai H. Nurmi Holger Petersen J. M. Fischer J. Borrell J. K. Jan J. Pieprzyk J. Rif J. Stern Jason Woodard Joe Kilian Jong-Hyeon Lee Josh Cohen/Benaloh Kaoru Kurosawa Kazue Sako Kazuo Ohta Kazutomo Itoh Kenneth R. Iversen L. Chen L. Santean Lorrie Faith Cranor M. Burminster M. Merritt M. Waidner Mark A. Herschberg Markus Michels Masayuki Abe Matthew Franklin Michael Ben-Or Michael Ian Shamos Michael J. Radwin Miyako Ohkubo Moti Young N. Lynch Nathan Linial V. Niemi P.A. Fouque Patrick Horster Q. He R. DeMillo R. H. Lin R. Safavi-Naini Rafail Ostrovsky Ron K. Cytron Ronald Cramer Steve Chien Steven Myers T. Asano T. Matsumoto Tatsuaki Okamoto V. Niemi W. Juang Y. Afek Y. Matias Z. Su “Computers Voting” Known Systems: Mix-Net, Homomorphic, Blind-signed Voting Plaintext Votes (different order) Encrypted Votes

8 “Secret Ballot” Principle Definition —Voter must not be be able to convince others of how he or she voted (a kind of “involuntary privacy”) Rationale —To prevent “Improper Influence,” such as vote selling and various kinds of coercion

9 “Unconditional Integrity” Definition —Even infinite computing power should not allow incorrect tally (except with negligible probability) – privacy may have to be computational… Rationale —Integrity should take priority over privacy (since changing outcome allows privacy rules to be changed!)

10 OUTLINE Introduction WOTE and WEST Polling-place election background Receipt system introduction Educational example receipt system Three example receipt systems Comparison with non-receipt systems Comments on Standardization

11 Two truisms are false 1.Receipts including who you voted for violate the “Secret Ballot” principle. Not if they are readable in the voting booth but unreadable once taken outside. 2.The computers used to vote and to tally the votes must be trusted with the correctness of the tally. Not if copies of encrypted votes on voters’ receipts can be posted along with proofs of corectness for the tally process.

12 First True “Voter-Verifiable” Election System Voters can directly verify that their votes are included in the tally without needing to trust any procedures, computers, or cryptography used by those conducting the election

13 The new scheme presented is of practical interest Integrity is much higher but less costly –Reduced need for physical security, audit, observing, testing, etc. Robustness is much higher but less costly –Receipts sufficient to count the votes Hardware cost may even be lower –“Ordinary” hardware costs less than “special” –Though, printer/viewer has additional cost Example system parts will be demoed

14 OUTLINE Introduction WOTE and WEST Polling-place election background Receipt system introduction Educational example receipt system Three example receipt systems Comparison with non-receipt systems Comments on Standardization

15 Rules of Janken  Each of two people chooses one hand symbol and shows it at the same time  Winner is determined by arrows (same symbol requires retry)

16 Audience participation packets Each bag has all three hand symbols divided into two envelopes (randomly for each bag) The sealed white envelope has one symbol inside (shown transparent); the clasp- fastened manila has two

17 Voting instructions 1.Unseal the plastic bag and remove the manila envelope (leave the white one in the bag). 2.Open the clasp and look inside the manila envelope without showing its content to anyone. 3.To vote “Yes” take the winning hand symbol out; to vote “No” take the other symbol out. 4.Place the hand symbol you’ve chosen in the bag facing out so its easy to see from outside. 5.Leave the bag in the hat at the front of the room.

18 Counting Rules Each bag is counted as a “Yes” vote if the symbol in its sealed envelope wins over that revealed by the slip facing out of the bag. Bags are counted as “No” when the symbol in the white envelope loses to that displayed. (All sealed envelopes must be opened, whether bag voted or not.)

19 Your vote was encrypted (neat thing #1) Everyone could see the symbol you chose Symbol encodes your vote Still, only you know how you voted! You have just used an “encrypted vote”

20 The dealer could not cheat (neat thing #2) Each bag has two envelopes with correct number of slips—easy to see No duplications per bag –Within envelope (voter sees) –Across envelopes (at count—depends on vote) Distribution of “hands” uniform –Each hand should appear in sealed envelopes the same number of times

21 “Bulletin Board Voting”— Beyond the “room voting” model “Not what they do, just what they post” Applies to real polling place elections Booths are watched to ensure the desired degree of ballot secrecy

22 OUTLINE Introduction Example receipt systems 1. High-registration systems 2. Subtractive optical systems 3. Additive optical systems Overview of properties/mechanisms Comparison with non-receipt systems Comments on Standardization

23 Summary of Overall Process 1.Machine accepts votes from voter 2.Machine prints receipt and lets voter see it 3.Voter randomly chooses a pattern to be printed that will hide the info on the receipt 4.The pattern is printed as background on the receipt, which is then provided to the voter 5.Receipts—as taken by voters—are published 6.Outcome is determined only from published receipts and its correctness is proven to any interested party through posted data Per voter Per election

24 High-resolution system The letter “e”

25 The cleartext backgrounds trick

26 Subtractive System LaminatedTop LayerBottom Layer IEEE Security & Pivacy Jan/Feb 2004 or (related to Naor Shamir Visual Cryptography)

27 Additive System Newsweek, March 29, 2004 print edition “The Future of Digital Voting” by Steven Levy

28 Example two-stripe symbology

29 Example three-stripe symbology

30 After the polls close Batches successively published on the web once polls close

31 After the polls close Then a randomly chosen half of the transformations are “opened”

32 Introducing the properties (proofs in the paper at

33 Properties [1 of 4] If your receipt is properly posted, you can be sure that your vote is included in the final tally [see also property 3] If your receipt is not properly posted, you should be able to demonstrate this (because it should have document security attributes including a digital signature)

34 Properties [2 of 4] No matter how incorrectly a system operates, there are only two ways it can change a correctly-posted ballot without being detected: –printing text from a guessed pattern and hoping that the voter chooses that pattern; or –incorrectly performing a step among the tally process steps and hoping that this step is not among the half selected for audit.

35 Properties [3 of 4] Changing n ballots means: Chance that no cheating is detected is at most 1/2 n Chance of getting caught cheating is at least 1–1/2 n

36 Properties [4 of 4] Your receipt cannot be decrypted by anyone, or otherwise linked to your vote [more later], except by decrypting with (or breaking) sufficiently many secret keys (of which each trustee has its own).

37 Two mixes per trustee Trustee n Batch 2 n –1 n n +1 Trustee n

38 Links opened afterwards (inspired by Jakobsson, Juels, & Rivest) Trustee n Batch 2 n –1 n n +1 Trustee n

39 A Mix Network as a Black Box message 2 message 3 message 1 message 4 Mix network

40 Basic Three Mix Cascade Trustee A Trustee B Trustee C x y z

41 Processing the Bitmaps Trustee m2 m3 m1 m1z1y1x1m1z1y1x1 x1x1 y1y1 z1z1 x2x2 y2y2 z2z2 x3x3 y3y3 z3z3 m2z2y2x2m2z2y2x2 m3z3y3x3m3z3y3x3 y3y3 z3z3 m3z3y3m3z3y3 y2y2 z2z2 m2z2y2m2z2y2 m1z1y1m1z1y1 y1y1 z1z1 x3x3 x2x2 x1x1 z2z2 m2z2m2z2 m1z1m1z1 z1z1 z3z3 m3z3m3z3 y2y2 y1y1 y3y3 z2z2 z1z1 z3z3

42 OUTLINE Introduction Example receipt systems Comparison with non-receipt systems –Four classes of non-receipt systems –Table of properties: Integrity, Privacy, Secrecy, Robustness and Costs –Additional features/properties Comments on Standardization

43 VoteMeter & PrinterFace State-Level controls (including version #s) Better blind voter integrity Open interface standard See VoteMeter.com

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47 Other aspects for comparsion 1.Adjudicating which ballots to count 2.Reliably capturing voter intent 3.Preventing Ballot-style fraud 4.Creating/repairing voter confidence

48 OUTLINE Introduction Example receipt systems Comparison with non-receipt systems Comments on Standardization

49 Standardization thoughts Clearly defined technical rating system for multiple attributes –At least include measureable/clear functional attributes (e.g., main rows of chart: integrity, privacy, reliability costs…) –Minimums should be the only involvement of political processes in the standardization Role of Federal Government?—“Provable” systems could change everything!

50 Conclusion

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