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© Nicholas Noppinger 5/6/14. Class concepts  Why Gettysburg?  Was Vicksburg the key?  Was Little Round Top important to the battle?  A review of logistics.

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Presentation on theme: "© Nicholas Noppinger 5/6/14. Class concepts  Why Gettysburg?  Was Vicksburg the key?  Was Little Round Top important to the battle?  A review of logistics."— Presentation transcript:

1 © Nicholas Noppinger 5/6/14

2 Class concepts  Why Gettysburg?  Was Vicksburg the key?  Was Little Round Top important to the battle?  A review of logistics  A review of strategy, operations and tactics  No shoes- if you review Hill’s and Heth’s battle reports it was a reconnaissance in force  1863 was the last opportunity for the CSA to win militarily, if they ever had that ability  1864 would be the last year they could win it politically

3 Why the shooting? o We have all been told that the war was inevitable o House Divided o Slave and Free would eventually clash o This was a fight which should have been averted back at the time of the Constitution o America was not living up to its ideals… All men are created equal o The Civil War was all about freeing the slaves?

4 Dogmatic Statements- The Historical Paradox  The South seceded because of slavery. They wished to protect the institution where it existed and more importantly allow it to expand in the West and in areas outside the United States. (Cuba, parts of Mexico)  States rights issues alone, outside of slavery, were not enough to unite the South into a singular union.  The South was quite prepared to violate Northern states rights in the furtherance of slavery.  The South was concerned about GOP political patronage in the South.  The Southern system was based upon the idea of white supremacy.

5 Dogmatic Statements- The Historical Paradox  On the other hand, the North was not prepared in 1861, if ever, to end slavery where it existed.  However, they did not wish to see slavery expanded beyond where it already existed.  They were resentful of the power of the slaveocracy.  Most Northerners were as racist as Southern whites. Most wished to exclude blacks from their local areas.  Most Northerners fought to preserve the Union.

6 The Problem for Blacks  A choice, if you could call it that, is one between chattel slavery in the South or  Secondary status in the North and South, without the ability to vote*, some restrictions on movement, serving on a jury, etc.  *VT and MA allowed black suffrage, in theory, but in practice black participation was extremely limited.

7 Many of today's historians get it wrong  They inject late 20 th -early 21 st Century social mores (Post Civil Rights Era) into the historical equation. Thus their histories tend to be biased.  “[Antebellum Republic] Grounded in ruthless ideas of inequality of race, class and gender.” The Age of Lincoln, Orville Vernon Burton (498)  “If preserving the Union was the war’s deepest meaning, then it merely restored the status quo Antebellum.” Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era , Walter A. McDougal ( )  “a goal [fighting for the Union] too shallow to be worth the sacrifice of a single life.” Barbara Fields, interview in Ken Burn’s The Civil War, 1989.

8 Many of today's historians get it wrong.

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10 What the Union meant for Northerners and Southerners  “for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us[sic];” John Winthrop-City Upon a Hill Later taken up by JFK and Reagan.  Heightened sense of American Nationalism and American Exceptionalism  For the North: Maintenance of the Union was always the top goal.  A Union that must be held against the selfish actions of slaveholders, who lost an election.  The United States was an example to a world suffering from oligarchy.  On the other hand- The South viewed themselves as the wronged party.  That they were the true inheritors of the American ideal of liberty and freedom.

11 An Imperfect Union  Modern historians judgment.  While women and blacks were not considered equals to white men, is today's society that much better? Will we pass the test of future historians?  Show me a perfect country or people group.  The people of the Civil War era understood their problems, but viewed themselves as distinct from the rest of the world.

12 The Antebellum global context  A point often forgotten  Adds to the idea of American Exceptionalism  Failures of the 48’s- Wave of “classically liberal” Revolutions in Europe  The birth of political “isms”  The “temporary” failure of the ideas of the French Revolution (liberty, equality, and fraternity)… distinct from the American model  Followed by violent reactionary counter-movement.  The ’48’s come to America (Carl Schurz, Franz Sigel)

13 Revolutions in Europe 1848

14 Europe 1850

15 The Unexamined Civil War  As we tend to glamorize the war, it is largely forgotten or ignored that:  Many Union and Confederate soldiers- enlisted for reasons other than ideology, largely financial.  That many people in the country simply wished to live their lives, with only a minimal interest in the war, with the hope that their lives were only minimally disrupted.  Gary Gallagher The Union War (5.)

16 The Proper Role of Historians  “the supreme task of the historian, and the one of most superlative difficulty, is to see the past through the imperfect eyes of those who lived it.” “The ultimate fault of modern [Civil War] historiography is that ‘we credit Lincoln and his Republican allies for accepting a war, whose magnitude they could not [and did not] know, and for choosing results which they could not [and did not] foresee.’” David M. Potter, The South and the Sectional Crisis. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1968) 246.  Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates, Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 359; Potter, 245.  Unfortunately, historians today like to use modern morals to bludgeon the people of the past, particularly those of the South.

17 Back to the modern historian  De-emphasis on Union.  View that the Civil War and Reconstruction were a correction on the American Revolution  A correction that did not come to full fruition until the 1960’s  And is still going on today.  Views anything remotely critical as being neo- Confederate.  Egalitarian, leftwing, activist view of history that distorts the past as much or more than corrects it.

18 The Lost Cause  Confederate generals such as Lee and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson represented the virtues of Southern nobility and fought bravely and fairly. On the other hand, most Northern generals were characterized as possessing low moral standards, because they subjected the Southern civilian population to indignities like Sherman's March to the Sea and Philip Sheridan's burning of the Shenandoah Valley in the Valley Campaigns of (Not true-ignores Confederate atrocities)  Losses on the battlefield were inevitable due to Northern superiority in resources and manpower. (ignores other factors, such as Union generalship)  Battlefield losses were also the result of betrayal and incompetence on the part of certain subordinates of General Lee, such as General James Longstreet, who was reviled for doubting Lee at Gettysburg, and George Pickett, who led the disastrous Pickett's Charge that broke the South's back (the Lost Cause focused mainly on Lee and the eastern theater of operations, and often cited Gettysburg as the main turning point of the war). (Too narrow of a focus)  Defense of states' rights, rather than preservation of chattel slavery, was the primary cause that led eleven Southern states to secede from the Union, thus precipitating the war. {The South was quite willing to forget dogmatic states rights in order to achieve its aims)  Secession was a justifiable constitutional response to Northern cultural and economic aggressions against the Southern way of life. (Arguably true)  Slavery was a benign institution, and the slaves were loyal and faithful to their benevolent masters. (Not if you were black)  Without slavery, the slaves would have taken control of the South. (Questionable)

19 The problems of both sides  Ignores, minimizes or cherry picks the information from the people who lived at the time.  Presents a distorted view of history even if some parts of it contain elements of the truth.

20 The Civil War today  Heroism  Freedom  Racial Equality  Overemphasize the positive  Re-enactments- movies like Gettysburg, Gods and Generals, Glory, Gone With the Wind  They forget that it transformed the role of the Federal Government, particularly that of the President, for good or bad.  That it brought the greatest suffering ever faced by this country.  That it brought want, destruction, starvation, death, pestilence, fear and every other kind of evil that comes hand in hand with war.

21 The Real Civil War Cost between 600,000 to 630,000 dead, over 6 million today The Bloodiest Day Sharpsburg [Antietam] September 17, percent chance of being casualty

22 The Real Civil War $10 billion dollars over $200 billion today, officially. Some estimates place the dollar figure over One Trillion.

23 A question of Union  Wasn’t the Declaration of Independence an article of political secession?

24 Slavery and Secession  Neither were new concepts in 1860.

25 New York’s Ratification of the US Constitution July 26, 1788  …That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution….  …That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well- regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state….

26 Rhode Island’s Ratification of the US Constitution May 29, 1790  …III. That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness….

27 Virginia’s Ratification of the US Constitution June 26, 1788  WE the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, DO in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore no right of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives acting in any capacity, by the President or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes: and that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.

28 The Missouri Compromise 1820  Maintained the balance of power between the Slave States (11 before adoption) and the Free States (also 11 before adoption)  Admitted Missouri (Slave) and Maine (Free) into the Union.  Slavery prohibited north of 36°West 30°North. (Arkansas boundary.)  Maryland supported.

29 Something Northerners would like to forget, The Hartford Convention  Delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont and Connecticut met to discuss such items as how to get around various unpopular laws like the Embargo Act of 1807 and Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, and lastly secession.  Secret sessions  This was during the War of  New England states allowed their merchants to openly trade with the British. New England foodstuffs were the primary source of food for their Canadian garrisons.

30 Union ArmyDivisionBrigade RegimentCompanyDivisionBrigade

31 Confederate ArmyBrigadeRegimentCompanyRegimentBrigadeRegiment

32 Army Organization  During the 18 th Century battles of 50,000 plus were rare  French Revolution levee en masse (Nation in Arms)  Dramatically increases the sizes of armies  Organized into Departments and Districts

33 Confusing rank structure  Confederate- only 6 officers in the Regular Confederate Army all with the rank of General, the rest were commissioned Provisional Army plus state militias and state troops  Union – US Regulars- US Volunteers, State Militias- State Troops or Volunteers  It is possible for a Union officer to have 4 ranks at the same time. 1 in the Regular Army, 1 in the US Volunteers, I brevet for each  For example George Armstrong Custer was on Jan 1, 1865 a Major USA, Brevet Major General USA, Brigadier General USV, Brevet Major General USV

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35 Louisiana Tigers

36 14 th New York NYSM, aka 14 th Brooklyn, Officially 84 th New York

37 A question of flags

38 Lincoln as Commander in Chief  Novice at the beginning  A well schooled beginner that increasingly grasped the basics of military strategy, if not the complexities.  After a rough start became an effective commander in chief  Arguably, by the end of the war, was more effective than Jefferson Davis  Consummate politician and consensus builder

39 Military Strategy  There is usually more than one correct path to military victory.

40 The role of the President  Articles 1 gives Congress the sole power to declare war, but…  President’s including Lincoln have taken a rather broad meaning when it comes to the use of military forces.  Many Presidents have taken action, technically illegal at the time of action, that were retroactively approved by Congress.  Lincoln the birth of the Imperial Presidency?

41 The role of the President  Article 2 Section 1-The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

42 Clausewitzian types of war  Limited war- a war of limited goals, such as taking a territory.  Unlimited war- a war of complete conquest or one that attempts to break the enemy’s will.  Wars of Attrition/Annihilation- target military forces.  War of Exhaustion- target enemy means of production or enemy will.  Hybrid of both

43 American Civil War Confederate wish for independence US wish to maintain the integrity of the Union

44 National Policy Grand Strategy Military Strategy Operations Tactics

45 National Policy  The basic and supreme war aim of the nation.  Restoration of the Union.  Everything else subordinate and considered tools to achieving the all encompassing national policy.  For the United States- restoration of the seceding states to the Union by peaceful or coercive means.  For the South separation and independence.  Political in nature.

46 Grand Strategy  The mobilization of a nations, political, military, social, cultural, religious, and economic forces to achieve the national policy.  Military planning at its most basic- {a decision to invade the South). Some overlap with military strategy.  Centers of gravity.  Center of gravity could be a geographical point or the enemy’s army(ies). There can also be more than one.  Grand strategy includes such things as emancipation.  While it identifies centers of gravity, it is less military in nature, as it includes all of the factors.

47 Military strategy  The more detailed planning and employment of military forces in an attempt to carry out the grand strategy and national policy.  “Arrows on maps”  For example- The Anaconda Plan.  Military in nature- the importance of other aspects still present but diminishing.  Concentration in time  Concentration in space

48 Operations  The planning and employment for a particular campaign.  The management and organization of an army  For example, prior to the Peninsula Campaign the decision to land at Fort Monroe or Urbana.

49 Tactics  The employment of troops in a specific battle.

50 The Presidency  Obvious role in National policy and grand strategy.  Constitutional role in military strategy, but what is the role operations?  Problematic if a President involves himself in tactics.

51 National Policy Grand Strategy Military Strategy Operations Tactics

52 Changing Confederate Military policy  Cordon defense  Offensive-defensive  Interior lines  Limits of a Fabian Strategy  Limits on Confederate ability to maneuver  Limits to interior lines and the myth of Confederate mobility  Union Navy

53 Limits  The daunting geographical size of the Confederacy was largely irrelevant; the Union military simply did not need to conquer all 736,604 square miles. The heart of the Confederacy, the areas that produced the most agriculture and industrial products, and contained the largest portion of its population, consisted of the areas east of the Mississippi, excluding Florida. This heartland consisted of only 43% of the geographical area, yet it contained, including parts of Louisiana east of the Mississippi, 84% of the white population, 92% of the South's industries, and 73% of its agricultural production. Texas alone significantly distorts the size of the Confederacy, yet many regions of that state were sparsely populated and incapable of sustaining meaningful production. Ibid,  Robert Tanner's Retreat to Victory is the current standard on examining the effects of the Confederacy's geography on military operations.

54 Railroads  Union-central control  Confederate-decentralized cotnrol  Union cost plus adjustable fee allowing for profit  Confederacy-cost plus fixed rate- sensitive to inflation

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57 Limits to a Fabian Strategy  In order for the Confederacy to adopt a primarily defensive stance, it would require that they start with the majority of their country intact. Their armies must be able to beat back, with little or no loss in territory, Union incursions. If, by following this strategy, the Confederacy lost too much territory, it could create a cascade that would eventually prove irresistible and unstoppable. The Northern populace would be encouraged, while the popular will of the South would wither. Foreign recognition would not be forthcoming if Great Britain and France perceived military and political weakness. In addition, the initiative would be forever surrendered to the Union, who could pick a time and place of attack faster than the Confederacy could respond. Loss of territory would lead to a loss of resources, which would make it increasingly difficult for the Confederacy to field armies. Lastly, internal realpolitik (slave owners) would not allow the South to surrender land, which would destroy the servile institution upon which the Confederacy was based. Joseph Harsh stated that, "[slave owners] instinctively understood the delicate nature of their institution. Joseph L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998) 7.  They knew an area occupied by Federal troops, even if the occupation was short and the area was later reclaimed by Confederates, it would never be the same."  Ibid, 15.  Ibid.  Ibid, 18.

58 Guerilla Warfare  Not consistent with the temperament of most of the Southern population  Union occupation would result in the destruction of slavery

59 Offensive-Defensive  Allowed the Confederacy the ability to switch to the offensive after the benefit of defense was obtained  Suited the temperament of the Confederate population  Aimed at striking Northern public opinion  Inconsistently applied  Failure in application does mean it was a flawed theory

60 Confederate Departmental System  Pipeline  No strategic reserve  Concentration in time  Concentration in space  Commanders often refused to cooperate with each other  Commanders missed the big picture by overvaluing their areas

61 Davis as Command in Chief  Often acted as his own GinC  Was picky about his prerogatives  Did not like for Sec of War to use initiative

62 Civil War Combat  What can you tell me about the effectiveness of the rifled musket?

63 Civil War Tactics  Myth  The rifled musket completely revolutionized firepower, particularly lethality over distances  The military on both sides continued to use outmoded tactics that led to much higher casualties  The Civil War was much bloodier than previous conflicts because of the rifled weapons.  Rifled Muskets allowed musket fire for ranges up to 600 yards.  The Civil War made the tactical offensive obsolete.  Reality  The rifled musket was only marginally more effective on the battlefield than the smoothbore. It was the adoption of breech loading repeaters that made linear formations obsolete.  The militaries of both used the 1858 (Hardee) manual which loosened up the linear formation, which also increased the use of skirmishers. The Army was well aware, as early as 1853, of the potential of the rifled musket. Then US Secretary of War Jefferson Davis authorized a detailed study to modernize the US Army.  The Napoleonic Wars were every bit as bloody and perhaps bloodier using smoothbore weapons. The Mexican War casualty rate was proportional to the Civil War.  There are few examples of sustained effective musketry fights during the Civil War greater than 300 yards, which itself was rare and only done by specialized (Berdan) troops. Most Civil war firefights took place at 140 yards or less.

64 Civil War Combat continued  The average Civil War firefight was only a little more than 20 yards greater than previous wars. This was because the officers were trained to use terrain as a concealment when applicable.  The heavy smoke and confusion of the battlefield often made it difficult to see objects at a great distance, even on flat ground.  Tactical offensives succeeded in the American Civil War, when properly executed. The failure rate is about the equivalent to the Napoleonic Wars.  The rifled musket only marginally increased firepower on the battlefield and because of its limited firepower linear tactics were still needed for command and control. And its role has been greatly overestimated.

65 The Rifle Musket  Many Union and Confederate soldiers were still equipped with smoothbore muskets. The Union Army of the Potomac being the best equipped overall followed by the Army of Northern Virginia.  Armies in the West (Union and Confederate) had to make due with smoothbores well into 1863 (Union) and 1864 (Confederate).  With a few exceptions, very few soldiers were trained for aimed musketry fire  On average a soldier would have to fire 84 times before he hit another soldier  Soldiers carried usually 60 rounds into battle

66 Comparison of Casualties  Napoleonic Wars  Battle of Wagram 330,000 combatants, 80,000 casualties 24%  Battle of Borodino 250,000 men, 90,000 casualties 36%  Battle of Waterloo 190,000, 57,000 cia 30%  Battle of Austerlitz 133,000, 43,000 cia 32%  American Civil War  Battle of Gettysburg 165,000 men, 50,000 cia 30%  Battle of Antietam 132,000, 23,000 cia 17%  Battle of Second Manassas 112,000, 19,000 cia 17%  Battle of Chickamauga 130,000, 36,000 cia 28%

67 Comparison of Casualties  American Revolution about 15%  War of 1812 about the same  Mexican War 17%  There are other factors (use of artillery), but it is clear that the Civil War was not substantially more lethal than previous wars.

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72 Why do many CW historians get it wrong?  They are not military historians.  The lack perspective or context  Do prominent Civil War historians also research and write about the Napoleonic era, the eighteenth century, or other wars of the 19th century? Almost none - but the rare men who do are the ones who give us the greatest insight into Civil War combat. How can you understand Civil War tactics without perspective, without studying what Civil War generals studied, without comparing Civil War weapons to those that came before and after? You cannot! How can you understand Civil War tactics by looking solely at the infantry? Many Civil War historians attempt just that, getting bogged down in the minutiae of battles instead of gaining perspective by researching other eras. Because of this, many historians don't fully understand why Civil War combat was indecisive. And because of their lack of background, when historians specializing in the Civil War have seen Civil War generals write of "Napoleonic" tactics, firstly - they may not have understood what Napoleonic tactics were - something more than men fighting shoulder to shoulder - and secondly, it didn't occur to them that "Napoleonic" might refer to another Napoleon, Napoleon III. (The Bloody Crucible of Courage, Brent Nosworthy)

73 Civil War Combat  The last of the old  Evolution not revolution  More in common with the 18 th Century than with 20 th Century  Great hunting skills and shooting skills do not necessarily translate to the battlefiled

74 Civil War Tactics  Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics  Von Moltke RR story  Most documentaries, many histories, including popular ones forget the mundane issues like supply and logistics or cultural issues.  For example. I could win the Vietnam War if I simply ignored the will of the American people.  Most Civil War generals understood, or at least thought they understood these concepts.  It is not easy to move armies, unlike drawing arrows and lines on a map.

75 Major Campaigns

76 Napoleonic Strategy  Strategy of the Central Position- Used if considerably inferior in numbers

77 Napoleonic Strategy  Single or double envelopment

78 Napoleonic Strategy  Penetration

79 Napoleonic Strategy  Battalion Caree

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84 Union Military Strategy  Modified Anaconda Plan  Control of the Mississippi River  Capture of Chattanooga, Atlanta axis  Capture of East Tennessee/ West North Carolina –support the Unionists  Blockade  Destruction of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia  At least keep the Operations below the Rappahannock River.  Eventual capture of Richmond  Discourage foreign intervention-military operations in Texas. Red River Expedition.

85 Principal Campiagns

86 Lincoln-Military strategy for 1863  Army of the Potomac-hold the ANV look for opportunities  Army of the Cumberland move to Chattanooga  Army of the Tennessee and supporting forces (Army of the Gulf) take the Mississippi

87 Why the Mississippi?  Lincoln was under enormous pressure from Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Loyal Kentucky, Iowa farmers to open Mississippi to their products.  Belief that cutting the Confederacy in 2 will have a major impact on the Confederate ability to wage war.  Opens up potential future operations into Texas- French involvement in Mexico (Monroe Doctrine)

88 Confederate options  Lee invades Pennsylvania  Lee stays still in Virginia  Lee takes a portion of his army to Tennessee for offensive operations  A Portion of Lee’s Army (at least Pickett’s Division) goes to Mississippi to help Vicksburg

89 Jefferson Davis to Joe Johnston  In response to Johnston telling Davis that it was impossible to hold Tennessee and Mississippi  TO HOLD THE MISSISSIPPI LINE IS VITAL  In a choice between Richmond and the Mississippi, Davis felt that the latter was more important because it gave the Union a solid base for future operations, it would turn New Orleans into an economic resource for the North and it was a political sop to the farmers and politicians of the old Northwest. Whereas, Richmond's fall would merely be a blow to foreign public opinion and the loss of vital manufactories. O.R.52/2,

90 Vicksburg  "Vicksburg is the nail head that holds the South's two heads together...Vicksburg is the key."  Lincoln -Davis

91 Vicksburg  Davis' contemporaries did not value Vicksburg as highly as the Confederate president did. Lee, Longstreet, Joe Johnston, and Beauregard viewed Vicksburg, in and of itself and not including Pemberton's army, as economically, militarily and logistically unimportant.  Source Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 375.

92 Why Vicksburg was not important  The last large scale transfer of troops from the Trans-Mississippi to the east was in May of 1862 (Earl van Dorn’s Army and Sterling Price’s Missouri Division)  Union control of Memphis (June of 1862) and New Orleans made large scale transfers problematic

93 Why Vicksburg was not important  Prior to ,000 tons per year was shipped from Northern states to New Orleans for shipment to the Eastern ports or overseas  After the opening of the Mississippi- Union trade only reached 60,000 tons by 1865  The expansion of the Northern railroads took up the slack.

94 Why Vicksburg was not important  Once Memphis and New Orleans fell to the Federal armies, communications with the Trans-Mississippi was, in the words of the leading historical expert on Confederate supply, "little more than a theory."  Source Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969), 58.

95 Why Vicksburg was not important  The Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Texas Railroad only stretched from the Mississippi eighty miles to Monroe, Louisiana and the road network in the rest of the state was so primitive that no large resource transfers were able to take place. While the Richmond Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordnance Bureaus were optimistic for supplies from west of the Mississippi, particularly beef on the hoof, the Confederacy met with very limited success in transferring these materials to support its much larger armies in the East. Ballard, 25.  Goff, 153.

96 Why Vicksburg was not important  The Confederate Commissary General Lucius Bellinger Northrop stated repeatedly about the difficulties of transferring beeves across the Mississippi in large numbers and the absolute impossibility of them being brought to supply the armies in Virginia and Tennessee, largely because of their emaciated condition in traveling the Texas and Louisiana backcountry.  The sources from which beeves in large numbers were to be gotten were Texas and Florida, and complete arrangements were made for securing a supply from both states, and large numbers have been obtained from both, together with a large quantity of pickled beef from Texas. Arrangements were made in , to bring cattle from Texas and put them on the grasslands of Virginia and Tennessee, but the long drive [inadequate roads], want of good grass on the way, caused the attempt, which was made with a few droves, to fail.  O.R.4, 2,  Lucius Bellinger Northrop, "Report of Commissary General Northrop," Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. II, p.99.

97 Why Vicksburg was not important  The armies East of the Mississippi acquired beef using Florida cattle of through the illicit cotton trade that was sometimes sanctioned by both sides.  “retreatin Joe” – Clifford Dowdey  Contemporary views- The Army’s most skillful retreater.’  As Archer Jones and Thomas Connelly remarked, "Johnston seemed content to let the government see that their strategy would bring disaster. Convinced that his command status and the government strategy were both wrong, he seemed almost determined to prove his point, and during the spring [1863] he spent much time sulking." Connelly and Jones, The Politics of Command, 117.  Richard McMurry- Joe Johnston would fight the decisive battle of the Civil War at Key West.  *****The combined totals that Pemberton and Johnston possessed in Mississippi equaled the numbers the Grant had immediately with him. The 2 CSA commanders were simply out generalled.*******  Maintaining a threat in being, threatening Grant’s ability to supply himself

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99 Confederate Railroads  Confederate railroads were a perishable commodity.  By 1863 it was becoming increasingly difficult to transfer large numbers of troops over great distances.  Troops moved often had to take out of the way routes to reach their destinations because of the unreliability of CS RR’s

100 Lee in Tennessee  Dysfunctional Army of Tennessee  Lee and his prima donnas' in the ANV  What would they do?  PGT Beauregard's imaginative plan  Kentucky- the Kentucky Bloc  What caused the high command of the Army of Northern Virginia to gel around a single leader, if not the character and leadership of Lee? In other words, the advantage Lee had of a gelled high command was one of his own making, just as the disadvantage of an ungelled high command from which the Army of Tennessee suffered was mainly the product of Bragg's abrasive personality and chronic incompetency.  Castel.

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104 Virginia  VA and the Carolina’s comprised 37% of the CSA’s white population thought it was only 20% of the land mass  VA and the Carolina’s, with VA being having the longest by far, held 57% of the CSA’s track mileage  VA, alone, produced 1/3 of the CSA’s manufactured products

105 Virginia  Tredegar Iron Works was North America’s 2 nd largest factory, and the only facility in the South capable of producing locomotives.  Tredegar produced half of the CSA’s cannon.  The Richmond Arsenal produced 40% of the CSA’s small rounds and artillery shells.  Tredegar was one of only 2 facilities in the Confederacy to produce RR car axles. The other Etowah Iron Works in Georgia.

106 Virginia  To quote the historian Charles Roland, "Richmond was Washington and Pittsburgh in one." Charles P. Roland, "The Generalship of Robert E. Lee," in Lee, the Soldier, ed. by Gary W. Gallagher (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) 164.  The Southern Armies would not have been able to stay in the field without the products of Richmond and Virginia.  The CSA suffered the loss of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans and Vicksburg with no appreciable loss on combat power for 2 years.

107 Military considerations  A move north of the Potomac threatened the Union Center of Gravity.  In other words, Lee understood that, while the South could and was, at that time, losing the war in the West, it could only win or influence its outcome in the East. The Eastern Theater was quite simply the United States' center of gravity. A victory in the Eastern Theater, partly through public perception, was magnified disproportionately to a comparable victory in the West.  Reid, ; Bowden and Ward,

108 The Army of Northern Virginia  In spite of the tragic loss of Stonewall Jackson, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the morale of Lee's army was at an all time high. They understood the numerical disadvantages they were facing and they wished wholeheartedly to carry the war into the North. As a body, they wished to see Northern citizens suffer the depravations that had been affecting Southern civilians from the commencement of hostilities. They also had the utmost confidence in the generalship of Robert E. Lee.  Ibid; Bowden and Ward, 21.

109 Army of the Potomac  No confidence in its leadership  Lincoln- "My God! My God! What will the country say?“  Tired of defeats  A third of the Army’s enlistments were expiring to be replaced by the 1 st draft o draftee’s and less thought of replacements.  80% of the soldiers who could went home.

110 Slavery  Lincoln publishes Emancipation Proclamation after Antietam  Aug 22 letter to Horace Greeley  I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views  Democrats make gains in Nov elections  Ridiculed in the Army of the Potomac  McClellan and the new policy on slavery

111 Reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation  "For every Yank whose primary goal was emancipation were to be found several whose chief goal was the Union and the system of government that it represented." Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997)

112 Reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation  There is an astonishing number of letters that show not only an intense hatred for blacks, but also a marked disgust with both the Republican Party and Abolitionists. While Abolitionist sentiment did exist, they were in the decided minority throughout the war. Even soldiers who supported Lincoln found that they detested Lincoln's Proclamation and, more importantly, the recruitment of black soldiers. A survey of immediate post-war regimental histories show that Northern white veterans downplayed black military service, while at the same time echoed views that would be considered extremely racist by today's standards.  Gallagher, The Union War, 101,  Ibid.

113 Reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation  As Stephen Sears noted, "Emancipation promised a revolution that few were ready for; a war for union was one thing, a war to end slavery seemed something very different." Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996)  Reactions against GOP officials  Noted increased cruelty shown to blacks

114  After the Emancipation Proclamation was made public on August 14, 1862 to a black delegation  “Even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race, on this broad continent not the best single man of your race is made the equal of the worst single man of ours…I cannot alter if it I would. It is simply a fact that Negroes are inferior to whites.” Lincoln on the black race

115  He held a position, while racist today, that was at the forefront of his time. He was on the dynamic end of a direction that was moving toward freedom and eventual equality. Many pro-Southern historians have unfairly castigated the man for having contemporary views.  “[the black race] was entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence; the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness…In the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hands earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.”  Most whites including Douglass, barely viewed blacks as human beings. In defense of Lincoln

116 Lee the strategic thinker  Lee, in a letter to Secretary of War James Seddon, stated a desire that every military operation "should bring us near to the great end which it is the subject of this war to reach." Lee, Wartime Papers,  Lee was looking forward to the 1863 state elections and 1864 elections.  Lee, in an April 19, 1863 letter to his wife, was far more prescient, "If successful this year, next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the north. The Republicans will be destroyed and I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis." Ibid,

117 Lee the strategic thinker  In a June 10, 1863 letter to Jefferson Davis, " The goal was to end the fighting with the Confederacy still in existence. If that meant allowing misguided northerners to indulge the mistaken belief that a compromised peace would restore the Union, so be it.“  Lee hoped that a successful move North would result in severe panic in Northern cities hurting both social and economic institutions.

118 New York Draft riots July 13-16, 1863  Up to 120 dead  $1.5 Million in damage  Over $100 million today  Middle and Upper class, in addition to street gangs

119 Lincoln and Civil Rights  September 24, 1862, Lincoln suspends Habeas Corpus throughout the country, increasing resistance to enlistment  Clement Vallandigham, January 14, 1863, Lincoln Administration was fighting not for the Union but for abolition, country has become one of the worst despotisms on earth ever, the only trophies of this unconstitutional war are defeat, debt, taxation, sepulchers, the suspension of Habeas Corpus and violation of freedom of the press and speech.  May 2, Vallandigham arrested and exiled to the Confederacy  Copperhead sentiment increases, particularly after conscription  Lincoln “Must I shoot a simple minded soldier boy who deserts, whilst I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert.”

120 Increasing opposition to the war North and South  Copperheads  Peace Democrats  Riots in the South

121 Supply considerations ignored  ANV only southern army in 1863 to cut meat rations.  Grain crop failure in 1862  Lack of horse fodder meant that Lee had to spread his army from the Shenandoah Valley tot eh Great Dismal Swamp to feed his armies horses.  The army grain shortage reached critical stages in the spring of They were only receiving tons per day, when the minimal need was 600 tons to maintain optimal battlefield mobility.  Cattle facing severe fodder shortages and lack of ability to graze.  Richmond Bread Riots April 2, 1863

122 Supply considerations ignored  The conclusion is that if the Army did not move north of the Potomac it would starve to death in the winter of 1863/1864.

123 Military considerations  Lee felt that weakening his army would produce a situation not unlike the Peninsula Campaign which would mean that the army would lose its ability to maneuver.  Lee did not trust the other generals to use his troops properly.

124 All I learned about Gettysburg I got from the History Channel  The Aliens who built the Pyramids fought with the Union. They used particle beams to defeat Pickett’s Charge. They were joined by Bigfoot, the Loch Ness Monster, and the Jersey Devil.  The CSA was unable to decipher the Da Vinci Code. The Freemasons and Knights Templar’s were divided.  Nostradamus and Mayans with their Long Count Calendar predicted it all.  You can buy souvenirs of it all at the Pawn Star’s shop.

125 Order of Battle example  A Regiment starts at 1000 men, by the time of battle attrition has reduced it to  A Brigade is made up of two or more regiments about men  A division is made up of two or more Brigades, men plus artillery  A corps is made up of two or more divisions 10,000 to 35,000 men  An army is made up of two or more corps 35, ,000

126 Numbers  Army of the Potomac  7 infantry corps  1 cavalry corps  93,921***  360 guns  Army of Northern Virginia  3 infantry corps  1 cavalry division  71,699 men  280 guns

127 Commanders

128 I Corps AOP  I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson, and Abner Doubleday.

129 II Corps AOP  II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, with the divisions of and Brig. Gens. John Gibbon, John C Caldwell, Alexander Hays

130 III Corps AOP  III Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys

131 V Corps AOP  V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Sykes, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James Barnes, Romeyn Ayres, and Samuel W, Crawford.

132 VI Corps AOP  VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Horatio G, Wright, Albion P. Howe, and Maj. Gen. John Newton.

133 XI Corps AOP  XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow, and Adolph von Steinwehr, and Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.

134 XII Corps AOP  XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary.

135 Cavalry Corps AOP  Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. John Buford, Judson Kilpatrick and David M. Gregg.

136 First Corps ANV  First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Including the (the divisions of Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood and Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, and Lafayette McLaws.

137 Second Corps ANV  Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen., with the divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, and Edward Johnson.

138 Third Corps ANV  Third Corps Commanded by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill with divisions commanded by Maj. Gens. Richard Anderson, William Dorsey Pender, and Henry Heth.

139 Cavalry Division ANV  Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. With brigades commanded by Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee, WH.F. "Rooney" Lee, Wade Hampton, William "Grumble" Jones, Beverly Robertson, Albert Jenkins, and John D. Imboden.

140 Stuart’s Ride  Jeb Stuart understood his role  According to Lee’s staff and Longstreet  On the night of June 21 st Lee issued verbal orders to Stuart that he was immediately to cross the Potomac, screening the army if the AOP was crossing the river.  Historians argue over 2 written orders from Lee to Stuart

141 Stuart’s Ride  Lee’s principal staff officers  Charles Marshall-Walter Taylor-Charles Venable

142 Lee to Stuart June 22, 1863  I have just received your note of 7:45 from General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell’s army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by the Chambersburg….You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins’ brigade and give him necessary instructions….  Official Records hereinafter listed as OR. OR, I, 27, 3:913.

143 Stuart’s Ride  This written order does not give Stuart wide latitude, nor does it contradict the verbal orders issued on the 21 st.  Stuart chose to take his three best brigades with the best commanders and leave the rear guarded by Beverly Robertson a man Stuart did not trust.

144 Lee’s note Ewell June 22  …I also directed Gen. Stuart should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a portion of his cavalry, to march with three of his brigades across the Potomac and place himself on your right and keeping in communication with you, and keep you advised of the movements of the enemy.…” OR, I, 27, 3:

145 Stuart’s Ride  Longstreet, Stuart’s immediate superior added an addendum on the night of June 22.  Telling Stuart to begin his ride via Hopewell Gap.  Lee not pleased with this issued the following order

146 Lee to Stuart June 23  If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross over the river east of the mountains. In either case, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, etc….Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. (Emphasis added)  OR, I, 27,

147 Stuart’s Ride  A mysterious 3 rd order dated June 23, does not appear in Lee’s dispatches,  The only witness was Stuart aide Henry B. McClellan.  Some historians accept this at face value  According to McClellan it gave Stuart complete freedom of action, with 2 exceptions.  Stuart was to meet up with Ewell at York.  Stuart was not to cross with the rear of the Army at Shepherdstown or Williamsport.

148 Stuart’s Ride  Stuart began his ride on the 25 th and ran into strong Union infantry and cavalry at immediately at Haymarket, VA (Hancock’s II Corps), forcing Stuart to turn south.  According to the orders Stuart should have stopped his ride.  Lee deserves part of the blame for failing to make use of the 4 cav bde’s he had with him.

149

150 Final Notes before the battle  Lee was blind.  Meade takes command.  Meade order to protect Washington, Baltimore an engage Lee on favorable terms  “Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit.....” OR  Meade given broad command  Buford was doing what Jeb Stuart should have been doing.  Reynold’s was feeling the Confederate position.  Pipe’s Creek Circular

151

152 Further thoughts  The AOP point of supply was Westminster  The most direct route to Gettysburg was the Baltimore Pike, one of the few macadamized roads at the time.  Gettysburg is in volume 27-1 or 2 of the OR

153 Commanders

154 I Corps AOP  I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson, and Abner Doubleday.

155 II Corps AOP  II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, with the divisions of and Brig. Gens. John Gibbon, John C Caldwell, Alexander Hays

156 III Corps AOP  III Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys

157 V Corps AOP  V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Sykes, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James Barnes, Romeyn Ayres, and Samuel W, Crawford.

158 VI Corps AOP  VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Horatio G, Wright, Albion P. Howe, and Maj. Gen. John Newton.

159 XI Corps AOP  XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow, and Adolph von Steinwehr, and Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.

160 XII Corps AOP  XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary.

161 Cavalry Corps AOP  Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. John Buford, Judson Kilpatrick and David M. Gregg.

162 First Corps ANV  First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Including the (the divisions of Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood and Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, and Lafayette McLaws.

163 Second Corps ANV  Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen., with the divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, and Edward Johnson.

164 Third Corps ANV  Third Corps Commanded by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill with divisions commanded by Maj. Gens. Richard Anderson, William Dorsey Pender, and Henry Heth.

165 Cavalry Division ANV  Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. With brigades commanded by Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee, WH.F. "Rooney" Lee, Wade Hampton, William "Grumble" Jones, Beverly Robertson, Albert Jenkins, and John D. Imboden.

166 Lee Plans the attack July 2 nd, 1863  Hood and McLaws to attack astride and Perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road  However, Sickles forward movement forced Lee to modify the plan

167

168 Lee’s own words  Longstreet was ordered to attack obliquely… while Ewell was to attack the crest directly… Longstreet would envelop the enemy fully, driving them into Ewell OR 27 2,

169

170 Concentric Plan of Attack Cemetery Hill

171 Little Round Top-Reconsidered  Commanded the Union Position?  Artillery platform?  CSA could threaten the Union supply line?

172 Little Round Top and Civil War History  Little Round Top was never part of the plan, confirmed by Lee, Longstreet, AP Hill, Ambrose Wright  As Hood’s Division engaged in combat with units on their right they moved in that direction.  Friction of war  Offered no or very limited enfilading fire on Cemetery Hill  Could not threaten Union Supply  Union Artillery Reserve on Power’s Hill  It did offer a field of view and a position in which to anchor the Union line.

173 1.5 miles from point to point

174 LRT Continued  CW Artillery is best not used on harsh heights or slopes  Battery D 5 th US Artillery, Charles Hazlett commanding  Warren told Charles Hazlettt, that Little Round Top “was no place for artillery fire – both of us knew that. I told him [Hazlettt] so. ‘Never mind that’ [Hazlettt] says, ‘the sounds of my guns will be encouraging to our troops and disheartening to the others…  Report of Benjamin Rittenhouse (Hazlett’s Deputy)  “ I watched Pickett’s men advance, and opened on them with an oblique fire, and ended with a terrible enfilading fire. Lt. Samuel Peebles pointed the first or right piece and Sergeant Timothy Grady the second – both splendid shots. When the enemy got a little more than half way to our lines, I could use only these two pieces, as the others could not be run out far enough to point them to the right.”

175

176 The Trip  6am  Parking lot 6 next to Wawa  Home  Cell  Wife’s cell


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