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This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira.

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Presentation on theme: "This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira."— Presentation transcript:

1 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum PREVENTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE MEASURES Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng.

2 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Information requirements  Information expected on : oBasic parameters and standards for design oSafety equipment main characteristics oEfficiency of safety measures oControl and monitor of measures oTraining related to safety measures

3 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Information requirements (cont.)  Information not to be provided when not contributing to report and being available else where, e.g. hydraulic calculations of pressure drop in fire-fight network (available anyway in fire-protection study)  Safety Report should not be a collection of certificates (pressure testing, etc.). Relevant documents should be checked during inspections

4 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety measures  Measures for safety of installation, referred also as : oSafety Barriers oLines of Defence oLayers of Protection  Safety measures : oprevent the expression of an initial event oprevent the escalation of an initial event to top event ocontribute to mitigation of top event

5 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety measures (cont.)  Basic categories (on target basis) : oHardware, related with equipment, examples : valves instruments fireproofing fence oBehavioural, examples : restrictions to personnel for entry in areas regulations on work permit instruction for evacuation

6 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety measures (cont.)  Basic categories (on action type basis) : oPassive : function is permanent (no activation required) the state of process does not matter examples :  safety dikes/bunds  fireproofing of equipment/structures  safety distances between equipment

7 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety measures (cont.)  Basic categories (on action type basis) : (cont.) oActive : function of measure requires activation  by process (pressure forces balance spring to move, in case of Pressure Safety Valves)  by human (hand operated isolation valves) examples :  excess flow valves (high flow forces mechanism to move for operation)  fire-fight hoses (operation by human requires, network must be under pressure)

8 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety measures (cont.)  Basic categories (on action type basis) : (cont.) oActive : (cont.) function not guarantied 100%, as measures can fail, examples :  pressure safety valve does not open, or fails to close  fire-fight pump fail to start, no pressurisation of network  debris in line lead to excess flow valve failure to close (debris stuck on valve seat)  Instrument fails to measure pressure value, due to impulse line clogging

9 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Layers of protection framework  Onion-shape, the failure of each internal layer requires the operation of the next external one

10 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Process design  Basic elements of design, examples : oRaw materials hazardous properties oIntermediates hazardous properties oProcess conditions (pressure, temperature, exotherm) oDesign codes/standards

11 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Basic Process Control System  Monitoring / Automatic Regulation of process conditions (pressure, temperature etc.) within n ormal region LC LT PRV FCV LI FI

12 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Basic Process Control System (cont.)  Important issues : oEstablishment of proper power supply to instruments by secure source (batteries rack), monitoring not lost oFail-safe mode for actuated valves in loss of actuation medium oEasy for pneumatic/hydraulic valves, fail safe action by spring action, in case of loss of pressure of air or hydraulic fluid, by fully closing/opening of valve) oHard for motorised valves, if fail-safe requires move to either full close, or full open position. Typically motorised valves fail as-is

13 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alarms and Human Intervention oAlarms from operating conditions going out of normal range, operator action (closure of FCV by operator in example) required to force operating condition (level in example) back to normal LC LT PRV FCV LI FI LAH LAL

14 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Emergency Shut Down (ESD), Interlocks, Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) oEmergency Shut Down : Procedure for moving the plant in safe condition via shutting down process oAutomatically actuated by interlocks (“protection” system, Safety Instrumented System) oBasic elements of SIS Sensor Logic Solver Final element Sensing of process parameter (transmitter or switch) Final control element (for example actuated valve) Comparison with limit

15 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Emergency Shut Down (ESD), Interlocks, Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) (cont.) LCV LC LT PRV FCV LI FI LAH LAL LSHH ESD valve LAHH I1 SIS limits Sensor Logic solver Final element

16 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety Instrumented Function (SIS) (cont.)  Automation sequence implemented by SIS is called Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)  Demand Mode SIF. In failure of SIF, hazard exists only in failure of Basic Process Control System. oLow probability of requirement to operate oExample, airbar : Operation via measurement of deceleration and activation of pyrotechnic devise inflating bag. Fail of airbag to operate has consequence only of car is out of control and crashes oFailure rate expressed as probability of failure on demand (PFD)

17 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety Instrumented Function (SIS) (cont.)  Continuous Mode SIF. Interfered to some basic control oHigh probability of requirement to operate oExample, car breaks : almost continuous operation oTypical industrial example, burner management system in furnaces oFailure rate expressed as probability of failure per hour (PFH) or failure per year (PFY)

18 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety Integrity Level (SIL) oDistrict Level (1-4) for integrity of SIFs oIn process industries up to SIL3 expected, higher in nuclear, aviation oDemand mode PFDRisk Reduction Factor (RFF) SIL SIL SIL SIL PDF=1/RFF

19 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety Integrity Level (SIL) oContinuous mode PFH SIL SIL SIL SIL

20 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Safety Integrity Level (SIL)  Typical steps for definition of required SIL oCalculation of existing risk (no SIF existing), R init oComparison with risk level required, R req oCalculation of RFF, PFD for necessary SIF oAttribution of required SIL for SIF

21 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium LOPA and SIL  Layer Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) : methodology for evaluation on existing layers of protection and required risk reduction  Limited to single cause-consequence pairs  Similar to HAZOP, supplemented by additional columns for attribution of risk calculations. Necessary estimation of among others : oinitial event probability oprobability of failure of available safeguards, such as: basic process control system, independent alarms (operator intervention in not fast processes) physical protection systems

22 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium LOPA and SIL (cont.)  Necessary data failure rates, based on existing instruments/control valves in establishment  Necessary SIL must be verified by proposed SIF  PFD for SIF takes into account all SIF elements  Generic data on failure rates, for basic control system elements or existing SIF element might overestimate failure rate, especially for rather recent installations  Specialized data required on specific elements

23 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium LOPA and SIL (cont.)  Potentially, requirement for redundant SIF elements : Sensors / Logic solvers /Final elements  Specific redundancies required for SIF elements, for specific SIL levels, taking into account SFF (Safe Failure Fraction : fraction of element failures that are safe -not leading to hazardous situations- or diagnosed/detected)  Proof Test Period oMaximum period for verification of SIF function by testing oAffects detected and undetected dangerous failures of SIF and consequently SIF PFD value and SIL in combination with SIF configuration (XooY, e.g. 2oo3)

24 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Physical protection  Last barrier for avoiding Loss of Containment, relief devices (e.g. Pressure Safety/Relief valves, Rupture Disks) LCV LC LT PRV FCV LI FI LAH LAL LAHH LSHH ESD valve

25 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Post release physical protection  Usually refers to safety dikes/bunds, minimising extent of area for released substance Emergency response  Internal (1 st level)  External (2 nd level)

26 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium COMMENTS OF SPECIFIC SAFETY MEASURES FOLLOW

27 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures  Design basis/standards oList of standards expected to be available in new establishments, as typical part of construction Contracts oPotentially not available in very old small installations

28 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Layout, separation distances between sections, activities, as per standards, legislation : oSegregation of storage and process areas (Domino effects minimisation) oSegregation of incompatible materials (for example, oxidisers with flammables) oBuildings with high occupancy (administration, maintenance) at distance from storage, process (minimisation of effects to personnel) oBuildings in process areas (e.g. control rooms) with special specification (blast proof, high fireproofing, special ventilation)

29 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Layout and traffic control : oRoad network design main roads away from high hazard areas establishment of alternative routes to all areas access to site via alternative gate ways (essential for escape actions) oCollision control measures oPermanent protection sidebars in roads in vicinity to above ground pipelines, tanks

30 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Layout and traffic control (cont.) : oTraffic control Controlled entry to site Road signals Movable bars for entry to safety dikes Vehicle velocity restrictions

31 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Area classification (ATEX Directives) oIn existing establishments, detailed information expected to be available : Maps with ATEX zones, equipment type per ATEX zone (Ex d, Ex ia etc.) Zone 1 LPG Road tanker station LPG cylinder filling station LPG tanks Zone 1

32 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Area classification (ATEX) (cont.) oIn new establishments, during Seveso Report submission stage, no detailed information expected to be available (usually defined during detailed design stage) oNo details required to be provided in Seveso Report. Design basis for area classification and selection of equipment, ignition control to be considered as adequate oExplosion protection document (as per ATEX Directives) to document details on topic, during inspections

33 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Area classification (ATEX) (cont.) oVERY IMPORTANT !!!! ATEX Directives implementation not intended to protect plant against Seveso accidents. ATEX Zones defined usually for limited release flow rates, not for catastrophic failures oNevertheless, ATEX implementation considered as essential on risk control for both : releases at “normal” operation initial stage of accident development

34 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Prevention measures (cont.)  Procedures oEquipment inspection (vessel/tanks, rotating equipment etc.) oMaintenance Work permit regime Predictive/preventive maintenance

35 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations  Automatic systems via field detectors (gas, heat flame) in field  Manual operated systems (alert buttons in field)  Alarms provided locally (visual, optical alarm) and remotely (signal to dedicated panels in control room)  Essential for activating internal emergency plans  Central alarm system/panel for annunciation of emergency situation to all personnel, direct neighbours (siren, one/multiple type sounds)

36 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Essential provisions for alert systems osecured power supply (feed by UPS/generator) to detector/alert system via secured line), so that detectors remain live even in power failure in plant oaddressable detectors, ring type topology (maintenance in section or signal line single failure does not deactivate other detectors)

37 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Detectors types : oHand held : Maintenance works (work permit requirement Occupational health monitoring Emergency response cases oFixed detectors (field devices)  Detection concept categories : oFire/Heat detectors oGas detectors

38 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Fire/heat detectors : oSmoke (photo-electronics, ionisation) detectors (indoors applications) oRate of Rise (ROR) temperature detectors (indoors, suitable for “dirty” air areas, comparison of two thermocouple/thermistors) oTemperature detectors (indoors applications, eutectic alloy principle (in ° C range) oLinear type (metal cord couple or optic fibre, with sensitive to heat polymer), example applications : floating roof rim seal area transformers

39 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Fire/heat detectors : oOptical flame detectors detection in cone shape area UV spectra  best for hydrogen fire, not for smoky fires  susceptible to false alarms from arcs  usually used indoors, IR/multi spectra (best for hydrocarbons fires, even for hydrogen with special filters) oVisual flame imaging (special CCD cameras)

40 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Gas Detectors (point) : oCatalytic sensor (pellistor), half bridge with one element in catalytic material typical for fixed detectors for combustible gas concentration limitation to 10% O 2 concentration and for concentration above UFL) Catalyst poisoning issues

41 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Gas Detectors (point) : oIR absorption sensors oAbsorbance required in IR (not for hydrogen) usually for hydrocarbons oImmune to poisons oFail-safe oThermal conductivity sensor (for specific gases as hydrogen methane, sampling line to detector required as also reference gas) oSemiconductor, MOS (for flammables, based on variation of conductivity on surface absorption of gas)

42 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Gas Detectors (point) : (cont.) oElectrochemical sensors (typical for toxic gases) oFlame ionisation detector (needs hydrogen supply for flame and sampling light to detector), suitable for flammables oPhotoionisation (UV radiation spectrum), for small leak identification via portable instrument oParamagnetic (for Oxygen)

43 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Gas Detectors (path) : oMonitoring specific path between source of radiation source and detector (up to 100 m for hydrocarbons) oTypically IR absorption concept  IR cloud imaging (up to 2 km), requires temperature difference between release and background

44 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Acoustic leak detectors oGas releases create high frequency sound (ultrasound) oPerformance usually set for release 0.1 kg/sec oIdentification in area basis (radius up to 40 m) oSuitable for both flammables, toxic releases, not selective gas application oPotential false signals from not continuous background noise (e.g. opening of steam trap.) oSignal filtering required oIn low pressure releases (<10 bar), detector required to be closer to source

45 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Gas detectors issues oIMPORTANT !!!, interference of other gases with gas detector signal, risk of inaccurate signal In case of different types of flammables (e.g. hydrogen and hydrocarbons) special type of dedicated detectors for each type may be required Poisoning by other gases (e.g. chlorine, sulfur compounds) oTypically, pre-alarms and main alarm provided by detectors (for example at 10% and 25% of LEL for flammables)

46 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Very important features for flame/heat/gas detectors oInstallation requirements At high/low elevation, depending on gas dispersion type (neutral/heavy gas cases) indoors detectors), ventilation type Coverage (hard to define for point detectors, no special information in standards) Proper classification of detectors per ATEX requirements oFail-safe operation not always evident

47 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Alert systems for emergency situations (cont.)  Very important features for flame/heat/gas detectors (cont.) oDiagnostics/self check required, examples : clear path for optical methods functioning detector Functioning electronics oMaintenance/calibration periods

48 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems  Safety report must not include primary calculations for fire-fight systems, such as : owater network hydraulic calculations, ocapacity requirement calculations  The former are expected to be provided in fire protection studies  Safety report must provide data on :  System elements characteristics and performance  Activation method of sections of fire-fight systems (fire fight panels, local buttons etc.)

49 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Water supply source : olocation, ocapacity (volume) oavailability (hours) based on worst case demand from fire protection study orefill rate (if connected with external sources, e.g. tap water network)  Fire Department twins connection points (fire brigade vehicles, third party water tankers) to fire network (location, number and type of connections, network sections served)

50 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water pumps : olocation, number/ type electric (power supply source) /diesel (capacity of available fuel) main /jockey (if applicable) ocapacity of pumps (flow, DH) omode of operation start local-manual (start button in pump house) remote- manual (start button in remote places defined, such as close for fire cabinets) automated (pressure switch in network or other)

51 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network categories oOpen-dry, open piping without water (typical case for LPGs, deluge/open sprinkler systems and aboveground outdoors installations) oWet, piping filled with water (typical case for buildings where closed type sprinklers are used) oSemi-dry systems (piping network filled with initially with air, closed sprinklers types, typically in cooling towers or where freezing conditions are possible

52 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network (cont.) oTypical requirement : oisolation valves for network maintenance o“ring” type network (every point is connected to water source by two different routes), in case of maintenance in section, water supply is not compromised to the rest of network oIdeal situation : network is separated in sections by remote operated valves oImportant issue : if activation in section is required, operation of valve supplying water to section must be from safe location

53 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network (cont.) oBad practice : isolation valves closed during normal conditions. In case of emergency, too close to tanks/potential fire, impossible to operate

54 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network (cont.) oOperability of fire-fight network and its element must always be ensured  Fire-fight network elements : oWater hydrant (pillars) for connection of hoses type/size of connections oWater monitors (canons) capacity coverage activation type (local/remote)

55 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network elements : (cont.) oFire cabinets hose length, size coverage nozzle types (fog/straight) oFoam systems Preparation of foam is by injecting foam concentrate solution along with water by ejector (venturi)

56 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network elements : (cont.) oFoam systems (cont.) foam supplied to :  monitor  tank top (floating roof)  tank internals (fixed roof) flow rate of monitor, coverage type of foam (FP, AFFF, special foams for ethers/alcohols etc.) volume of foam tank (if available locally) and consumption

57 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water network elements : (cont.) oDeluge/open type spray sprinklers (LPG tanks etc.) Supply of water to header activated all sprinklers served by header oClosed type sprinklers (buildings-warehouses) Glass bulb. Heat in air “fuses” glass and water is sprayed One sprinkler activation at a time Important !!! Sufficient coverage between each sprinkler must be ensured

58 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire-fight water curtains  Steam hose systems  Fire extinguishers oNumber/type/size per area/tank oCoverage of areas oTypes : portable, wheeled (high capacity) oMain groups of contents : Foam Chemical (powder) CO 2

59 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Inert gas networks oCO 2, special inert gases oApplications in closes areas: electrical rooms (switchgear rooms) gas turbines enclosures oExtremely important !!! Activation of system must ensure that no person is in room when gas is supplied Typically, verification of incident from panel out of room, optical/audible alarm in room and out of room, along with delay in gas supply

60 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Proper fire-fight networks layout drawings should be considered as indispensible for Safety Report, Emergency Plans

61 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Layout drawing presenting the elements of fire protection equipment (example for MTBE tank) Monitor Foam concentrate tanks Foam solution supply to floating roof Cooling water spraying ring Hydrant Auxiliary Connections For Fire Protection Team Vehicle Monitor Foam solution supply to floating roof Cooling water spraying ring Hydrant Auxiliary Connections For Fire Protection Team Vehicle

62 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fire-fight systems (cont.)  Fire protection team (internal) equipment oFire-fight vehicles fire-fight mediums supported (water, foams, powder) flow rate capacity (volume) of water, fire-fight medium  Mobilisable fire-fight equipment oInventory of foam concentrate containers in warehouse per type

63 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Toxic release mitigation  Number one priority : stop of release  Usually attempt for improving dispersion via water hoses in gas releases  No water jet on liquefied/refrigerated gas  Special water curtain systems for special gases (e.g. HF)

64 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Toxic release mitigation (cont.)  If liquid pools are formed different approaches might be necessary depending of release extent and substance properties : oconfinement of released quantities by sand or other suitable material if release not in diked area ocoverage of pool by inert material (Polyethylene sheets) orecovery of released materials by pump to tank or tanker oneutralization in situ (e.g. use of lime for acids), use of supplementary water spray for fume mitigation

65 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Toxic release mitigation (cont.)  Important issues : oSuitable personnel protective equipment (PPE) especially for field responders, such as : Breathing equipment (such as SCBA) Gas tight (if necessary) and resistant suits Resistant boots oRegular training in PPE oProper mitigation materials (inert material, neutralization means) in adequate inventory with establishment

66 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment  At least two escape ways away of each other of establishment must be foreseen (no personnel trap in establishment)  At least two different access entrance points away of each other must be foreseen for external responder personnel and vehicles)  For personnel escape and entrance points, opening of door/gate must be always possible (from inside for escape ways, ideal from outside for entrance points)  Ideal situation : alternative access routes to road leading of establishment

67 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  Ammonia Plant example (good situation) Main Gate ACCESS ROADS (new and old highway) Auxiliary gates North

68 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  Ammonia Plant example (cont.) o3 different gates for personnel escape o2 different gated for entrance of vehicles (North, West) oNo matter what the wind direction, one gate can be accessed oKeys of gates at dedicated key-house closed to gate, gates can open if required with no special restrictions oAccess to establishment via new and old highway

69 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  LPG example I (good situation) Main gate Auxiliary gate ACCESS ROAD I ACCESS ROAD II ACCESS ROAD III

70 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  LPG example I (cont.) o2 different gates for exit of personnel, entrance of vehicles oAuxiliary gate closed. Keys available to main gate, away from potential accident points oAccess to gates via 3 different routes

71 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  LPG example II (not good situation) Main Gate ONLY ACCESS ROAD (highway) Auxiliary gate for vehicles North East tanks West tanks Sphere Road tanker filling stations

72 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  Example II (cont.) oAuxiliary gate not used, locked Keys as main gate No escape capability via this gate, if not accessible from main gate, (as for accident in west tanks group) No capability for entrance of external emergency responders vehicles to establishment, if main gate is blocked Proposed to install key-house close to auxiliary gate

73 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Escape ways and access to establishment (cont.)  Example II (cont.) oOnly one access road to establishment (highway with significant traffic load) Barrier in middle of highway (only east section lanes can be used) No access to establishment for external emergency responders if high-way is blocked

74 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Facilities for coordination of internal/external emergency response  Emergency response control centre (internal) oLocation in “safe” area ideal : remote building out of affected areas otherwise : blast proof building, if explosions are possible, special ventilation system required in case of potential toxics dispersion oFacilities for communication with internal emergency response teams (radio communication) oFacilities for communication with external responders oEstablishment of proper power supply to centre by secure source : generator, batteries rack

75 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature  Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to Meet the Requirements of Seveso Directive 1996/82/EC as Ammended by Directive 2003/105/EC (Seveso II), Major Hazard Accident Bureau, EU  Checklist System for Safety Reports, Instructions for Preparation and Inspection of a Safety Report (SR) in accordance with UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and the EU Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO II) by a consistent Checklist system, Training Session for the Evaluation of Safety Reports February  Guidelines for Preparation and Inspection of a Safety Report, UNECE convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents & the EU Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO ll) by a consistent Checklist system, 2012

76 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature (cont.)  Sectoral Checklist for Preparation and Inspection of a Safety Report, UNECE convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents & the EU Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO ll) by a consistent Checklist system, 2012  IEC 61508, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, 2010  IEC 61511, Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector, 2003  Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment, CCPS- AIChE, 2001  Marszal E., Scharpf E., Safety Integrity Level Selection, Systematic Methods Including Layer of Protection Analysis, ISA, 2002  Lines of Defence/Layers of Protection Analysis in the COMAH Context, Amey VECTRA Limited for Health and Safety Executive, 2004

77 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature (cont.)  Process SafeBook 1, Functional Safety in the Process Industry, Rockwell Automation, 2013  Manual Safety Integrity Level, Pepperl+Fuchs, 2007  EN 50073, Guide for the selection use & maintenance detectors for combustible gases & oxygen, 1999  The selection and use of flammable gas detectors, Health and Safety Executive, 2004  Det-tronics, A Practical Guide to Gas Detection. Combustible and toxic gas detection principles, , 2007  Edward Naranjo and Gregory A. Neethling, Diversified Technologies for Fixed Gas Detection White paper, General Monitors, 2009  Safety Report Assessment Guides (SRAGs), Health and Safety Executive, UK


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