Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

1 4/04 The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War February 2005.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "1 4/04 The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War February 2005."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 4/04 The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War February 2005

2 2 4/04 Understanding Emerging Threats: The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War This study has several objectives: –Develop a typology of tendencies in Muslim world –Identify key cleavages and fault lines –Identify the factors that produce extremism and violence –Analyze the effects of 9/11, the GWOT and Iraq –Develop recommendations for a U.S. strategy The goals of the strategy are: –Help our friends and potential allies –Neutralize our adversaries –Influence those in the middle

3 3 4/04 Muslim Tendencies & Marker Issues Seven Tendencies Seven marker issues Radical FundamentalistsIdeology Scriptural FundamentalistsPolitical/legal views TraditionalistsViews of government Modernists (liberal)Human rights Modernists (Islamist)Social agenda Liberal SecularistsPropensity for violence Authoritarian SecularistsLinks to terrorism

4 4 4/04 Typology of Muslim Tendencies HighLow Situation- continent HighPropensity for Violence Terrorism an instrument of state policy Usually none Generally indirect DirectLinks to Terrorism InconsistentProgressive in education and women’s rights Generally progressive Conservative but many value non- religious subjects in education ReactionaryGenerally reactionary Social Agenda Primacy of party and state and collective interests Primacy of individual political and human rights Islam contains the basic concepts of human rights and individual freedoms Islam guarantees human rights and liberties SameReject Western concept of human rights and individual liberties Human Rights Political legitimacy derives from state ideology Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections. Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people Political legitimacy derives from God Government Rely on authoritarian structures Support secular law and institutions Politically moderate Politically conservative Revolutionary and anti-status quo Political-Legal Leader cult and socialist and/or pan-Arab ideologies Liberal democratic or social democratic values Islam viewed as consistent with modern world Fuse Islamic beliefs with local traditions Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures Emphasis on obligation of jihad Ideology Authoritarian Secularists Liberal Secularists ModernistsTraditionalistsScriptural Fundamentalists Radical or neo- Fundamentalists

5 5 4/04 Muslim Tendencies: Radical Fundamentalists Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan) Islamic Movement of Nigeria 1 1 Al-Qaida (international) Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan) Asnar al-Islam (Iraq) PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas (Palestinian territories) Saudi Salafist Groups IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional) Hizbollah (Turkey) Democracy +- Violence - + Hib ut-Tahrir (international) MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia

6 6 4/04 Add Scriptural Fundamentalists 1 Darul Arqam (SEA regional) Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international) Muslim Brotherhood (regional) SCIRI (Iraq) Al-Dawa (Iraq) 1 Hib ut-Tahrir (international) MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan) Islamic Movement of Nigeria Ennada (Tunisia) 1 1 Al-Qaida (international) Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan) Asnar al-Islam (Iraq) PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas (Palestinian territories) Saudi Salafist Groups IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional) Hizbollah (Turkey) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) Hezbollah (Lebanon)1 1 1 Democracy +- Violence - +

7 7 4/04 Add Traditionalists and Modernists 1 Darul Arqam (SEA regional) Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international) Party of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) AKP - Justice and Development Party (Turkey) Izala (Nigeria) Al-Wasat (Egypt) Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) 1 PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia) 1 Hib ut-Tahrir (international) MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan) Islamic Movement of Nigeria Ennada (Tunisia) Muslim Brotherhood (regional) SCIRI (Iraq) Al-Dawa (Iraq) 1 1 Al-Qaida (international) Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan) Asnar al-Islam (Iraq) PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas (Palestinian territories) Saudi Salafist Groups IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional) Hizbollah (Turkey) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) Hezbollah (Lebanon)1 1 1 Democracy +- Violence - +

8 8 4/04 Add Secularists 1 Darul Arqam (SEA regional) Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international) Party of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) AKP (Turkey) Izala (Nigeria) Al-Wasat (Egypt) Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) PDI-P (Indonesia) Kuwait Nat. Democratic Movement Democratic Left Party (Turkey) 1 Muslim Brotherhood (regional) SCIRI (Iraq) Al-Dawa (Iraq) Neo-Destour Party (Tunisia) Central Asian ruling parties PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia) 1 Hib ut-Tahrir (international) MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan) Islamic Movement of Nigeria Ennada (Tunisia) Al-Fatah (Palestinian territories) 1 1 Al-Qaida (international) Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan) Asnar al-Islam (Iraq) PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas (Palestinian territories) Saudi Salafist Groups IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional) Hizbollah (Turkey) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) Baath Party of Iraq and Syria Hezbollah (Lebanon)1 1 1 Democracy +- Violence - +

9 9 4/04 The Muslim World Is Far From Homogenous B e r b e r – A f r i c a n A r a b T u r k i c P e r s i an S o u t h A s i a n M a l a y

10 10 4/04 Briefing Outline –The Islamic Landscape –Fault lines in the Muslim World –Sources of Islamic Radicalism –Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq Trends –Conclusions

11 11 4/04 Sources of Islamic Radicalism Processe s Catalytic Events Conditions

12 12 4/04 Sources of Islamic Radicalism Conditions  Failed political and economic models  Structural anti-Westernism  Unresolved issues of state and religious authority Processes  The Islamic resurgence  Riyaldiplomatik: external funding of religious fundamentalism and extremism  Convergence of Islamism and tribalism  Growth of radical Islamic networks  Emergence of the mass media  The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts Catalytic Events  The Six-Day War (in Arab world)  The Iranian Revolution  The Afghan War  The (First) Gulf War  September 11 and the Global War on Terrorism  The Iraq War and its aftermath

13 13 4/04 Briefing Outline –The Islamic Landscape –Fault lines in the Muslim World –Sources of Islamic Radicalism –Post-9/11 and post-Iraq Trends –Conclusions

14 14 4/04 The War in Iraq a “Catalytic Event” in the Middle East On the order of the 1967 Six-Day War or higher Western-led coalition assumed responsibility for restructuring political system of Muslim country Effects of the war can be analyzed at three levels: –Effects on Iraq –Effects on Middle East –Effects on broader Muslim World

15 15 4/04 A Strategy for the Muslim World Needs to Include: A geopolitical vision of the Muslim world: What kind of a Muslim world do we want to see emerge from the current turmoil? And what are the engagement, military posture, and access implications of this vision? Practical steps to: (1) support friends and potential allies (2) neutralize enemies (3) appeal to mainstream Muslims: “The War of Ideas”

16 16 4/04 The Centerpiece of the Practical Side of the Strategy is to Empower Moderates Two components of this approach: –Help to create moderate Muslim networks –Support “Civil Islam”organizations Currently radicals have the advantage –They are a minority, but have developed extensive international networks –Liberal and moderate Muslims have no similar networks Creation of an international moderate Muslim network would provide a platform to amplify their message and protection However, the initial impulse may require an external catalyst

17 17 4/04 And Disrupt Radicals The U.S. and its allies also need to disrupt radical networks and deny resources to extremists The key analytical/intelligence problem is: how can hostile networks be identified? Within Western countries, policymakers need to be attentive to radical infiltration of prisons and the military Resource denial involves difficult practical problems, but could be partially addressed through network disruption

18 18 4/04 Influence the Muslim Mainstream Obvious attempts by non-Muslims to influence Muslims would likely backfire. U.S. needs to rely on Muslim scholars to delegitimize radical ideology Over the long term, important to promote madrassa and mosque reform What the U.S. and its allies can do: –Assist moderate madrassas to provide broad modern education & marketable skills –Assist governments in developing/strengthening capabilities to monitor mosques and madrassas

19 19 4/04 Seek to Engage Islamists in “Normal Politics” Goal is to influence radicals into moderation Always a danger that an Islamist party, once in power, may move against democratic freedoms However, inclusion of such groups within democratic institutions may over time lessen threat An unequivocal commitment to non-violence and democratic processes should be prerequisite –Turkey’s AKP an ambiguous model

20 20 4/04 Engage Muslim Diasporas Engagement of Muslim diasporas could help U.S. advance its interests in Muslim world One possibility is working with Muslim NGOs in responding to humanitarian crises However, efforts to engage diasporas need to be undertaken cautiously Need to be able to distinguish between “benign” and “malign” diasporan manifestations

21 21 4/04 Expand Economic Opportunities Will not by itself prevent extremists from striking at perceived enemies of Islam However, might help to indirectly undercut the appeal of radicals Priority on improving the economic/job prospects of the young How international assistance is channeled is critical Funding should not be politically neutral –Should emphasize programs run by secular or moderate Muslim organizations

22 22 4/04 Build Appropriate Military Capabilities and Posture Comprehensive review of U.S. military capabilities and posture in Muslim world needed New challenges require the U.S. to develop different kinds of military capabilities –counter-insurgency & stabilization capabilities –cultural intelligence In Iraq, the U.S. faces a dilemma: –cannot leave without defeating insurgency or leaving power vacuum behind –but need to reduce visibility as “occupying power”

23 23 4/04 Geopolitical Implications of Pro- Democracy Strategy A pro-democracy strategy implies: 1.Re-examination of the current U.S. military relationship with authoritarian but “friendly” Muslim states 2.Hard-headed look at benefits/costs of such relationships What are the alternatives to authoritarian regimes? What is the risk/benefit balance? 3.Distancing from authoritarian but friendly regimes could have access implications as well 4.Compensate through closer engagement with countries undergoing democratic change

24 24 4/04 Engagement and Access Implications In Arab world, shift focus of U.S. security relationships from authoritarian states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) to democratizing states (Bahrain, Qatar) Main operating bases in Iraq not desirable at this time, but should not foreclose option Throughout the Muslim world: –seek to reduce “ungoverned areas” that can become havens for terrorists Shift from bilateral to regional approaches to what are essentially transnational problems

25 25 4/04 Bottom Line Islamic radicalism is driven by complex and interactive factors Some are common to Muslim world; others vary widely from region to region; regionally-based analysis is critical Key challenge for the U.S. is to identify and find common ground with liberal Muslims and find ways to help them counter the extremists Islamic networks play key role in spread of extremism; there is critical need to build moderate Muslim networks Education a key battlefield: problem is how to move reform of both secular and Islamic schools A democratization strategy will require comprehensive re- examination of U.S. defense relationships in Muslim world and will have engagement and access implications


Download ppt "1 4/04 The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War February 2005."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google