Presentation on theme: "SARAH FULLER HELEN LADD DUKE UNIVERSITY SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY School Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades."— Presentation transcript:
SARAH FULLER HELEN LADD DUKE UNIVERSITY SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY School Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary Schools
Purpose To determine how high quality teachers are distributed between upper and lower elementary school To determine the role of accountability in the distribution of high quality teachers
Motivations Concern that children in early elementary are receiving low quality teachers Reduced effectiveness of investments in early childhood programs Accountability systems that test only upper grades incentivize principals to strategically place best teachers in the upper grades
Previous Literature Role of Teacher Preferences Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2008 Bigger Role of Strategic Behavior by Principals Cohen-Vogel, 2011 Chingos and West, 2011
Data North Carolina administrative data for the school years 1995-2009 Accountability Programs 1995-1996: No Accountability 1997-2002: North Carolina ABCs 2003-2009: No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
Measures of Teacher Quality Teacher Licensure Test Scores Standardized by test type and year taken Averaged across all tests taken by teacher Value-Added Index Value-added calculated for upper grades (3-5) Value-added regressed on qualifications including: Less than 3 years experience Licensure test score College selectivity Master’s degree Lateral entry Value-added index predicted for all teachers
N Licensure Test Score Value-Added Index PANEL A. 2009 Lower13,827-0.0080.012 Upper12,3500.0900.103 Within School Difference 1,285-0.100-0.087 PANEL B. 1995 Lower9,507-0.079-0.125 Upper8,590-0.016-0.111 Within School Difference 1,016 -0.059-0.018 Descriptive Results
School Level Regressions Outcomes Lower Grade Shortfall: Difference between lower grade average and upper grade average Independent Variables Accountability Regimes School Level Free/Reduced Price Lunch Quintiles
Shortfall by Free/Reduced Price Lunch Quintile Note: Empty bars are not statistically different from zero.
Shortfall by Accountability Regimes Note: Empty bars are not statistically significant.
Teacher Test Scores by Free/Reduced Lunch Quintile and Accountability Regime
Value-Added Index by Free/Reduced Lunch Quintile and Accountability Regime
Teacher Movement Moving teachers between grades is a potential mechanism for sorting by teacher quality Moving Up Expect teachers with higher qualifications to be more likely to move up to the upper grades Moving Down Expect teachers with higher qualifications to be less likely to move down to the lower grades
Movement of Teachers by Test Scores Moving Down Moving Up Teacher Test Score -0.003**0.000 0.008***0.000 (0.001)(0.004) (0.001)(0.003) ABCs -0.003 0.015*** (0.004) (0.003) NCLB -0.002 0.007* (0.003) ABCs*Teacher Test Score -0.006 0.005 (0.004) NCLB*Teacher Test Score -0.001 0.011** (0.004) Observations 99,957 122,654 Note: Coefficients expressed as marginal effects calculated at the mean of the independent variables.
Movement of Teachers by Value-added Moving Down Reading Value-added -0.015***-0.012*** (0.001)(0.003) Math Value-added -0.018***-0.012*** (0.001)(0.003) ABCs -0.009** (0.003) NCLB -0.006* (0.003) ABCs*Value-added -0.003-0.004 (0.003) NCLB*Value-added -0.003-0.006* (0.003) Observations 97,618 97,647 Note: Coefficients expressed as marginal effects calculated at the mean of the independent variables.
Summary Consistent shortfall in teacher quality in the lower grades compared to the upper grades The introduction of NCLB increases shortfall in teacher quality in the lower grades The increase is larger in the most disadvantaged schools