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1 PROBLEM SHIFTS IN THE STUDY OF THE WELFARE STATE / INEQUALITY LINK Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Presentation at the meeting of ISA-RC28.

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Presentation on theme: "1 PROBLEM SHIFTS IN THE STUDY OF THE WELFARE STATE / INEQUALITY LINK Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Presentation at the meeting of ISA-RC28."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 PROBLEM SHIFTS IN THE STUDY OF THE WELFARE STATE / INEQUALITY LINK Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Presentation at the meeting of ISA-RC28 in Oslo, Norway, May 5-8, 2005

2 2 THREE POSSIBLE TYPES OF OVERVIEWS: AN INVENTORY OF FINDINGS, A LIST OF ACCEPTED HYPOTHESES (BUT WHY DON’T OLD SOLDIERS FADE AWAY?), A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WITH PROGRESSIVE RATHER THAN RETROGRESSIVE PROBLEM SHIFTS. THIS REVIEW IS OF THE LAST TYPE.

3 3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A STATE HAVING A WELFARE REGIME AND LIMITED INEQUALITY AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF THAT STATE, IS ALMOST TAUTOLOGICAL. IF NOT, IT IS A QUALIFIED ONE.

4 4 MERTON 1959 : QUESTIONS WORTHY OF ATTENTION INVOLVE SOME CONTRADICTION. LENSKI 1966 : BREAK QUESTIONS DOWN INTO CONSTITUENTS. DUNCAN 1967 : SOME QUESTIONS POSE THE ISSUE POORLY. ULTEE 2001: A METHODOLOGY OF QUESTIONS.

5 5 WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION? A STATE IS A CORPORATE ACTOR, AND LIKE ANY ACTOR IT USES ITS RESOURCES IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT REACHES ITS GOALS OPTIMALLY.

6 6 WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION? ALTHOUGH A STATE BY WEBERS 1921 DEFINITION HAS THE MONOPOLY ON THE MEANS OF VIOLENCE, A STATE NEVER IS ALL-POWERFUL: ONE CAN DO ANYTHING WITH WEAPONS, EXCEPT SIT ON THEM.

7 7 WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION? ACCORDING TO ELIAS` 1939 AMENDS, A STATE HAS THE MONOPOLY OF TAXATION, GIVING A STATE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. A PERSON`S INCOME IS TAXED. A NAPOLEONTIC STATE LEVIES FEES FOR EXTRACTING MINERALS FROM THE SOIL.

8 8 WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION? EQUALITY IS AN INDETERMINATE GOAL: THE RICH CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF THE POOR, AND THE POOR CAN BE LIFTED UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE RICH.

9 9 SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES DID NOT AIM FOR A STATE WITH FULLY EQUAL OUTCOMES, BUT SOUGHT TO BUILD SAFETY NETS AND RAISE A SOCIETY`S LOWER STRATA.

10 10 COALITIONS OF A SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC PARTY WITH OTHER PARTIES, CAN`T ONLY WATER DOWN THE IDEA OF A WELFARE STATE, COALITIONS CAN GIVE IT ALSO MORE IMPETUS.

11 11 INEQUALITY AS A COMPOUND QUESTION: TO AVOID CONFUSION, SPECIFY BETWEEN WHO AND WHO OCCURS IN WHICH RESPECT SOME INEQUALITY? MORE RESOURCES MAKE FOR BETTER LIFE CHANCES.

12 12 LENSKI 1966 POWER AND PRIVILEGE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE WOULD MAKE FOR ACCUMULATION OF RESOURCES, BUT INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES SHOW LESS INCOME INEQUALITY THAN AGRARIAN SOCIETIES.

13 13 LATER LENSKI RESOURCES AND LIFE CHANCES THE CONTRADICTION FOR THE TECHNOLOGY THESIS OVERCOME BY THE IDEOLOGY THESIS: ACTIVIST IDEOLOGIES PROVIDE FREE SCHOOLING AND OTHER CITIZEN RIGHTS, AND THESE RESOURCES MAKE FOR SMALLER INEQUALITIES IN LIFE CHANCES.

14 14 HEWITT 1977: WHY DO INCOME DISPARITIES DIFFER BETWEEN EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL STATES? IS THE SHARE OF THE RICHEST 5%, 10%, 20% LOWER AFTER PROLONGED SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT? A MORE ATTUNED MEASUREMENT WOULD BE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION.

15 15 FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: IS THE SHARE OF THE POOREST 10%, 20% HIGHER AFTER PROLONGED SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT? THE SHARE OF THE POOREST 10%, 20% HARDLY DEPENDS UPON GOVERNMENT! FINDING ASCRIBED TO ERRORS IN MEASUREMENTS. IT RESULTS FROM COALITION BUILDING.

16 16 HEWITT’S MOST PERTINENT INEQUALITY QUESTION: DOES PROLONGED SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC RULE MAKE FOR HIGHER SOCIAL EXPENDITURES? KORPI 1989: DID SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS INTRODUCE AND RAISE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, DISABILITY BENEFITS AND OLD-AGE BENEFITS?

17 17 KORPI & PALME 2003: HAVE SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980 LOWERED VARIOUS BENEFITS LESS THAN OTHER GOVERNMENTS? THIS IS A DEFENSIVE QUESTION: WHY LOWER BENEFITS UNDER SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TOO?

18 18 KORPI & PALME’S 2003 OFFENSIVE QUESTION: DOES SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE HAVE SMALLER EFFECTS IN MORE OPEN ECONOMIES? APPARENT ASSUMPTION ABOUT STATE RESOURCES: IN A MORE OPEN ECONOMY, STATE INCOME THROUGH TAXATION IS LOWER AND MORE VOLATILE.

19 19 ALTERNATIVE QUESTION: HOW ABOUT (POST)INDUSTRIAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES, SUCH AS HYDRO-ELECTRICITY AND OIL? DO NOT FORGET: WE ARE COMPARING (POST)INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES. THEIR PRIME SOURCE OF ENERGY IS FOSSILE OR INANIMATE.

20 20 KORPI & PALME 2003: HAVE SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980 LOWERED VARIOUS BENEFITS LESS THAN OTHER ONES? NEGLECTED FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: DID SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE INCREASE SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS MORE THAN OTHER GOVERNMENTS?

21 21 SOLIDARITY QUESTIONS ARE COMPOUNDS TOO: BENEFITS MAY GO DOWN WHILE CONTRIBUTIONS GO UP: SOLIDARITY OF WHO WITH WHOM? OTHER POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS: DO SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS MAKE FOR FEWER UNEMPLOYED PERSONS, DISABLED PERSONS AND OLD PERSONS?

22 22 HERE IT BECOMES CLEAR WHY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE MIGHT MAKE FOR HIGH CONTRIBUTIONS: IT INTRODUCED COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE, LEADING TO MORE OLD PERSONS.

23 23 A STATE THAT AIMS TO LOWER UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, REDUCE INCOME DISPARITIES AND INCREASE UPWARD MOBILITY, MAY BE CALLED AN INTERVENTION STATE, AND IF SUCCESSFUL A WELFARE STATE.

24 24 DOES A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT ALWAYS MAKE FOR A WELFARE STATE, OR DOES IT SOMETIMES NEED OUTSIDE HELP, HELP WITHIN PARLIAMENT, AND DOES THE OPPOSITION NEVER DO A THING?

25 25 OUTSIDE HELP: CORPORATISM THESIS. INSIDE HELP: BALDWIN THESIS (COMMUNIST, FARMERS PARTY). OTHER PARTIES AND OTHER WELFARE REGIMES: ESPING-ANDERSEN’S THREE WORLD OF WELFARE CAPITALISM.

26 26 TESTING THE BALDWIN THESIS BY RAISING FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS: IF COALITIONS ARE THAT IMPORTANT, MIGHT IT BE THAT REDISTRIBUTIVE MEASURES TAKE FROM THE HIGHEST DECILES WHILE GIVING LESS TO THE LOWEST DECILES? TULLOCK’S THESIS OF THE STRETEGIC MIDDLE.

27 27 THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE ARE MORE WELFARE REGIMES THAN THE SCANDINAVIAN ONE, POSES THE ISSUE POORLY. RESEARCH INDICATES MORE THAN THREE WELFARE REGIMES, STILL SOME COUNTRIES DON’T FIT. EXISTENCE QUESTIONS ARE SUB-STANDARD.

28 28 BUT THE NEW AND DETAILED QUESTION BEHIND THE FALSE AND DISTRACTING QUESTION IS: DOES A STATE PROVIDE BENEFITS TO A PERSON IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSONS PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSON’S CHILDREN OR PARENTS, AND IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSON’S SPOUSE OR PARTNER?

29 29 DETAILED FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS: DOES SOCIALIST RULE PROVIDE UNCONDITIONAL WELFARE? DOES CHRISTIAN RULE PROVIDE CHILD BENEFITS? DOES LIBERAL RULE PROVIDE WELFARE AFTER TAKING PAST AND SPOUSE INTO ACCOUNT?

30 30 THE DUTCH FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: WHY DID THE TAKE-OFF OF THE WELFARE STATE TAKE SO LONG IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THEN SHOW EXPLOSIVE GROWTH? SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND CATHOLICS LOG-ROLLED: OLD- AGE PENSION WAS TRADED AGAINST CHILD BENEFITS. DE SWAAN 1988 MISSED THIS ANSWER.

31 31 FROM DISPARITIES QUESTIONS TO MOBILITIES QUESTIONS: SINCE LIPSET & BENDIX 1959: ARE ABSOLUTE MOBILITY RATES FOR ALL (POST)INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES SIMILAR? SINCE FEATHERMAN, HAUSER & JONES 1978: ARE RELATIVE MOBILITY RATES SIMILAR?

32 32 FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: BUT WHY WOULD PROLONGED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE MAKE FOR MORE RELATIVE MOBILITY? IT INTERVENES BY WAY OF STIPENDS TO INCREASE UPWARD MOBILITY, BUT IS ITS GOAL TO INCREASE DOWNWARD MOBILITY?

33 33 NEXT TO QUESTIONS ABOUT INTRAGENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILITY AND INTERNEGERATIONAL CLASS MOBILITY, STAND MORE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY.

34 34 IF STIPENDS ARE AWARDED IRRESPECTIVE OF PARENTAL INCOME, STIPENDS MAKE FOR LESS DOWNWARD EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY, NOT ONLY FOR MEDIOCRE SONS BUT ALSO FOR CLEVER FEMALES.

35 35 BOURDIEU 1972 ON COMPENSATORY STRATEGIES AND HOUT & RAFTERY 1981 ON MAXIMALLY MAINTAINED INEQUALITY: SOLIDARITY OF RICH PARENTS WITH THEIR CHILDREN, SEEKS TO CANCEL EFFECTS OF MORE UPWARD EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY.

36 36 WHETHER RULED BY SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OR NOT, EUROPE`S CORE COUNTRIES HAVE MORE THAN 10% UNEMPLOYMENT AND IN THAT SENSE ARE NOT WELFARE STATES (ANYMORE). NEXT TO QUESTIONS ON INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY, STAND QUESTIONS ON INTRAGENERATIONAL (UN)EMPLOYMENT MOBILITY.

37 37 THE GALLIE & PAUGAM 2000 QUESTION: ARE THE UNEMPLOYED TRAPPED IN A GENEROUS STATE SAFETY NET, OR DO LOWER AND SHORTER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS MAKE FOR MORE MOBILITY FROM UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WHAT DO ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES DO?

38 38 THE MAYER-MÜLLER QUESTION: DOES VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN TIMES OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT GIVE SCHOOL LEAVERS BETTER CHANCES OF FINDING A JOB?

39 39 LINKING THE (UN)EMPLOYMENT INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY QUESTION TO THE INTERGENERATIONAL CLASS MOBILITY QUESTION: DOES UNEMPLOYMENT AS A YOUTH AND DOES A HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WHEN COMPULSORY SCHOOLING ENDS MAKE FOR A WORSE JOB IN LATER LIFE?

40 40 This presentation may be viewed in full on my website under the heading foreign presentations. Or just type in google: wout ultee It is the first hit.


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