Presentation on theme: "The Political Economy of Hatred Edward Glaeser The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2005 Traviss Cassidy and Salama Freed June 14, 2011."— Presentation transcript:
The Political Economy of Hatred Edward Glaeser The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2005 Traviss Cassidy and Salama Freed June 14, 2011
Outline of Discussion Introduction Basic Tenets of Hatred The Hatred Model: Basic Sequence The Hatred Model: Expected Benefits The Hatred Model: Stage 2 The Hatred Model: Stages 1 and 3 Examples: – Racism in the American South United States – Anti-Semitism in 19 th Century Europe – Islamic Hatred of Americans
Basic Tenets of Hatred “People say they hate because the object of their hatred is evil.”(Glaeser, 2005) Hatred “stems from seeing oneself under attack” (Baumeister, 1995) Hatred is often a characteristic of an entire group, not just those who are actually guilty of the crimes from which the hatred stems. Glaeser argues in this paper that the spread of hatred is successful when voters have little incentive to investigate and dispute a false signal.
The Hatred Model The Basic Sequence Politicians spread hatred when their policies will harm a particular group in an effort to create desire to exclude or deprive the particular group. There are four periods of the model: – Politician decide to spread hate filled message about particular group (“out-group”) to those not a member of that group (“in-group”). – In-group members receive signal, decide on a series of two actions Whether the allegation deserves investigation, and If credible, whether to protect themselves against out-group. – Members of both groups vote, and the winning politician gets their way – Out-group members may harm in-group members as a result of policies implemented
The Hatred Model Expected Benefits Three main constituents seek to maximize what is important to them: – Politicians maximize expected support minus the total cost of their campaign. – The in-group maximizes expected utility through all actions in the game where Utility= Net Income +Expected harm from out-group – investigation costs – self-protection costs – The out-group maximizes their net income. Note they are passive in the basic model (in that they are not receiving additional benefits) but are given an opportunity to become active in the future.
The Hatred Model The Basic Sequence Stage 2 Politician sends false signal to in-group of harmful nature of out-group Out-group is harmful with probability one or θ /(θ +φ(1-θ)) based on distribution Out-group is harmless In-group receives signal of out-group danger In-group chooses to protect themselves Do nothingInvestigate Don’t Investigate Out-group is harmful
The Hatred Model Stage 2: The Response to Potential Harm After receiving a signal, the in-group: – Decides whether to spend S to investigate the signal, then – Chooses whether to spend R to protect themselves from potential harm or reduce damages from said harm (by a factor of δ<1) Note the benefit they will receive from protecting themselves outweighs the amount spent for in-group to protect themselves, so self-protection is optimal Prop 1: Investigating and learning the truth of a story is only optimal iff the cost of the search is less than the gains from the investigation. – The cost of investigating the signal varies among the in-group, based on prior knowledge, frequent contact, or education, as well as other factors. Less educated people will tend to dismiss false stories (and will likely have means to search for truth) People who have frequent contact with the out-group will dismiss false stories as well.
The Hatred Model Stage 2: The Response to Potential Harm