Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.


Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN ELECTION"— Presentation transcript:


Shri Champak Bhattacharyya, IPS Superintendent of Police Nadia West Bengal

3 “An electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance.”

4 Process Flexibility Standardization Flexibility Standardization
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Process Flexibility Standardization Flexibility Standardization Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 4

5 Phases Prevention Recovery Preparedness Response
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Phases Prevention Recovery Preparedness Response Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 5

6 Prevention Identify potential targets
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Prevention Identify potential targets Evaluate existing security plan’s effectiveness Develop and implement “best practice” security strategies Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 6

7 Prevention (Cont’d.) Adapt security measures Analyze response
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Prevention (Cont’d.) Adapt security measures Analyze response Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 7

8 Preparedness Establish policy Plan and coordinate response
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Preparedness Establish policy Plan and coordinate response Develop communication strategies Select and train personnel Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 8

9 Response Take immediate action to save lives Control damage
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Response Take immediate action to save lives Control damage Manage media communications Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 9

10 Recovery Transfer responsibility Communicate with public and the media
Critical Incident Management (CIM) Office of Antiterrorism Assistance Recovery Transfer responsibility Communicate with public and the media Assess resource inventory Initiate community restoration efforts Coordinate investigative team involvement Module 4: Introduction to the Critical Incident Management Process 10


What is the evidence on the relative level of conflict among different types of elections – local, provincial, or national? What trends can be tracked on a country or regional basis as indicators of the motives, victims, and perpetrators of electoral conflict? How does election sequencing and scheduling impact potential conflict and violence? Do the number and nature of political parties impact the prospects for a peaceful election? What is the evidence on the impact of the system of representation on the potential for conflict? Does the presence of observers prevent violence or simply delay it until the observers depart?

13 Key Elements of Analytical Thinking
Analyze Evaluate Improve Analytical Thinking

14 Steps in the Analytical Thinking Process
1. Define the problem 5. Select and implement a solution 2. Gather and interpret information 4. Test possible solutions 3. Develop possible solutions

15 Professional Electoral Administration Principles Of Electoral Good Practice
a. INTEGRITY, meaning the ability to act in a non-partisan and independent manner by not acting to benefit political interests and/or corruptly, and by ensuring that the electoral law, rules and codes of conduct are followed; b. IMPARTIALITY, meaning the ability to be fair and to afford stakeholders equitable and honest treatment or a level playing field, and the ability to treat all stakeholders in an evenhanded, non-partisan manner; c. INDEPENDENCE, meaning the ability to carry out the work without influence from or being under the control of an external force, such as the government or the ruling party; d. TRANSPARENCY, referring to the ability of the EMB to be open and truthful, and to the availability to stakeholders of timely information and access to EMB records; e. EFFI CIENCY, meaning that optimal use is made of resources of all kinds, that electoral funds are used wisely, and that activities are designed and conducted in a sustainable and cost effective manner f. SERVICE-MINDEDNESS, ensuring that all activity is aimed towards the delivery of high-quality services to all stakeholders, and in particular voters; and g. PROFESSIONALISM, meaning the meticulous and accurate implementation of electoral procedures as a key element for the delivery of credible elections. EMBs need to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained and acquainted with the necessary skills to apply high professional standards in the implementation of their technical work. Professional training prompts public trust that the entire process is ‘in good hands’. 15

Four descriptive categories of conflict and violence from security point of view: Voters in conflict with the State and claiming unfairness in the election process The State in conflict with voters who challenge the election results or the electoral hegemony of the State 3. Political rivals in conflict with each other for political gain or 4. A blending of these three categories 16

The types of security threats likely to arise in a particular election are influenced by both of structural and circumstantial aspects of the election process. The security threat from electoral conflict and violence can occur at five intervals in an election chronology IDENTITY CONFLICT can occur during the registration process when refugees or other conflict-forced migrants cannot establish or re-establish their officially recognized identities. The result is that these populations can remain disenfranchised and outside of the political process and potentially provoke conflict within the process 17

CAMPAIGN CONFLICT can occur as rivals seek to disrupt the opponents’ campaigns, intimidate voters and candidates, and use threats and violence to influence participation in the voting. 18

BALLOTING CONFLICT can occur on Election Day when political rivalries are played out at the polling station. Steps can be taken to provide alternative means of balloting if particular groups or communities are exposed to violence or intimidation. 19

RESULTS CONFLICT can occur in disputes over election results and the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve these disputes in a timely, fair, and transparent manner. The manner in which results are reported can also be a conflict issue. 20

REPRESENTATION CONFLICT can occur when elections are organized as “zero sum” events where “losers” are left out of participation in governance. 21

22 India In Previous Election
With 600 million voters, India divides its election process into five phases so that security forces can move about and focus their assets where required. Much of the violence in Indian elections can be attributed to separatist movements and ethnic conflict wherein groups exploit the visibility of an electoral campaign to mount strikes against the Indian government. For example, land mines that took the lives of 33 police officers in September 1999 elections have been blamed on “left-wing” guerrillas.35 In 1998, a land mine was set off under a bus of Indian troops, allegedly by Maoist guerillas in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Five troopers were killed and 26 injured. 22

23 ELECTION SECURITY Election organizers protect the electoral process from conflict and violence through security planning and implementation using established and ad hoc security instruments. Post-conflict elections attract substantial election security resources. Police security forces, in partnership with local authorities, have been deployed to provide protection to people, facilities, materials, and data. In national elections, the national and local security forces have the responsibility to keep the peace. 23

The methodology commences with a threat analysis to ascertain the scale, locations, and types of threats that may impact the electoral process. Such threats include ethnic retaliation, existence of paramilitary groups, and land mines inhibiting freedom of movement. These threats play out in different ways in the electoral chronology of voter registration, the political campaign, Election Day, and the installation of the newly elected officials. 24

Election security has been most effective when it has been a civil-police-para-military partnership of equals. Obstacles must be overcome for a mutual understanding of respective corporate cultures to be accomplished. Para-military and police planners must remain sufficiently flexible to react to the realities and requirements of post-conflict politics and civilians must understand the structures within which disciplined services’ function. In addition to security, the para- military and police must also be provided with communications, intelligence, logistics, transport, video production, office services, and training in support of electoral processes. 25

Ad hoc security structures can be established in order to develop, resource, and implement an election security plan. Two examples of these ad hoc structures include Joint Election Operations Centers, which are combined para-military-police-civilian communications and coordination centers. In addition, joint political violence committees have been established that share information across agencies and organize combined security actions or responses. 26

27 Security in Different Phase of Election

28 Compliance Techniques
Use of Force Continuum Deadly Force Defensive Techniques Compliance Techniques Contact Controls Verbal Persuasion Physical Presence

29 Special features that may be built into the process that were intended to reduce friction among the political players and to prevent electoral conflict to ensure an incident free election day. 29

30 SPECIAL FEATURE REGISTRATION Individuals who are displaced by the conflict should be permitted to register to vote so that their political exclusion did not become a point for future conflict. Voter registration lists should be open to confirmation and challenge. However, the public copies of these list should show limited personal data and could not be copied in order to reduce the opportunities for retaliation against individuals or communities who chose to participate. 30

31 Candidates and Campaigns
SPECIAL FEATURE.. Contd. Candidates and Campaigns In order to reduce the opportunities for intimidation by established political interests, numerous official options for participation should be open to public including political parties, non-partisan citizens alliances, and independent candidacies. Further, an Election Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission may be established with penalizing authority so that election disputes could be resolved in a timely, fair, and transparent manner. Two or more political parties would not attempt to hold events at the same times and locations, a advance notification may be given to the Police for every public campaign rally. 31

32 SPECIAL FEATURE.. Contd. Voting Individuals who will be displaced by the conflict should be permitted to vote so that their political exclusion does not become a point for future conflict. 32

33 Administrative Authority should closely monitor all vote reporting
SPECIAL FEATURE.. Contd. Vote Reporting Media should be responsible enough to ensure impartial reporting To avoid provoking words and stories To be cautious enough not to add fuel to the excited crowd Administrative Authority should closely monitor all vote reporting 33

34 Enhancing Communication Network
SPECIAL FEATURE.. Contd. Enhancing Communication Network In Election, ensuring appropriate communication between election and security officials which significantly enhances responsiveness, efficiency as well as avoiding misunderstanding 34

35 Special features must be coupled with security supervision provided by State Police Force, the Central Police Force and other security providing agencies 35

36 Information Collection
Human Resource Integration – Vertical and Horizontal EOC (Emergency Operations Center) Organization Incident Commander (IC) Resource Dispatching and Tracking Information Collection Coordination Communication

37 Major Management Areas:
Command Finance / Administration Planning Logistics Operations

38 Relationship between Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Joint Operations Center (JOC)
Single incident or single jurisdiction Multiple incidents and/or multiple jurisdictions EOC EOC JOC EOC EOC EOC

39 JOC Organizational Structure

40 Tactical Operations Staff
JOC Leader Tactical Operations Leader Defensive Marksmen Assault Force

41 Tactical Operations Tasks
Breaching Negotiation Support Assault Tactical Operations Tasks Perimeter Control Intelligence Gathering Containment Evacuations

42 Training and Development for Police Personnel
One of the pillars of professionalism in electoral administration is the proper training and development of core permanent election staff (if any), temporary management staff appointed for specific electoral events, and the large numbers of field staff that may be temporarily engaged for large-scale events such as elections, referendums or census-style voter registration. The principles of good electoral practice, such as impartiality, transparency, voting secrecy, equality of access, accountability and efficiency, form the basis of all election staff training. Staff training and development is a continuing activity. Changes in electoral procedures and technology, and the time that elapses between elections, mean that even the most experienced staff cannot rely entirely on experience to ‘know’ their current tasks. 42

43 Some Important Steps towards Developing Electoral Administration as a Profession
a. the introduction of formal training and qualifications; b. the establishment of a professional and sustainable electoral management body to safeguard and promote the professional interests of electoral administrators and regulate their ethical conduct; c. the creation of a pool of resources and a network of expertise which electoral practitioners can refer to and consult in performing their professional work; d. the development of a career path and opportunities for electoral administrators. 43

44 OPERATIONAL TRAINING Intensive training of temporary staff before every electoral event is a critical element of electoral service delivery and staff performance. The provision of a high-quality service, based on the principles of integrity and good electoral practice, is the underlying message of all training for temporary staff. 44

Cascade training entails the training of a core group of trainers in both electoral technical matters and training techniques – the ‘training of trainers’ who in turn train others ‘face to face’ at a lower level. The second level trains the third level and so on, until all targeted staff are trained. Cascade training’s relative cost-effectiveness and ability to train large numbers of people in a short period of time. Training by Mobile Teams: One alternative to cascade training is training by a small number of mobile teams of trainers, which conduct training for all election staff at all levels. This method has the advantage that the information is imparted accurately by competent teams of trainers. However, it requires more time, since a small number of teams are responsible for the training of all electoral staff across the country. Simultaneous Training: Another alternative to cascade training is simultaneous training, whereby all police personnel are trained on a single day or series of days. 45



Similar presentations

Ads by Google