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© 2007 Thomson South-Western
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A difference in access to relevant knowledge is called information asymmetry.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Moral Hazard Moral hazard refers to the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. Employers can respond to the moral-hazard problem in various ways: Better monitoring. High wages. Delayed payment.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Moral Hazard An agent is a person who is performing an act for another person, called the principal. The principal is a person for whom another person, called the agent, is performing some act.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Hidden Characteristics: Adverse Selection and the Lemons Problem Adverse Selection Adverse selection refers to the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an uniformed party.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Hidden Characteristics: Adverse Selection and the Lemons Problem Example of Adverse Selection: Many time potential buyers may not even consider used cars because they surmise that the sellers know something bad about the cars. This is also known as the lemons problem. Insurance—People with hidden health problems are more likely to want to buy health insurance than those with good health In certain labor markets, if a firm reduces the wage it pays, high productivity workers tend to quit.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Signaling to Convey Private Information How do Markets respond to Asymmetric Information? Signaling Signaling refers to an action taken by an informed party to reveal private information to an uninformed party. Screening Screening occurs when an action taken by an uniformed party induces an informed party to reveal information.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Asymmetric Information and Public Policy The study of asymmetric information gives us new reason to be wary of markets. When some people know more than others do, the market may fail to put the resources to their best uses.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Asymmetric Information and Public Policy Although asymmetric information may call for government action, three facts complicate the issue: Private markets can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on their own The government rarely has more information than the private parties. The government itself is an imperfect institution
© 2007 Thomson South-Western POLITICAL ECONOMY Political economy (public choice) is the application of economic methods to the study of how government works.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western POLITICAL ECONOMY Problems Associated with How Government Determines Public Policy –The Condorcet Voting Paradox –Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem –The Median-Voter Theorem –Self-interested Politicians
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Table 1 The Condorcet Paradox
© 2007 Thomson South-Western The Condorcet Voting Paradox The Condorcet paradox occurs when the majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for society. Transitive preferences imply that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a mathematical result which shows that, under certain conditions, there is no scheme for aggregating individual preferences into a valid set of social preferences.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem No voting system can satisfy all of the following Unanimity Transitivity Independence of irrelevant alternatives No dictators
© 2007 Thomson South-Western The Median Voter Is King The median voter theorem is a mathematical result that shows that if voters are choosing a point along a line and each voter wants the point closest to his most preferred point, then majority rule will pick the most preferred point of the median voter.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Figure 1 The Median Voter Theorem
© 2007 Thomson South-Western Politicians Are People Too Some politicians are motivated by self-interest. Some politicians sacrifice the national interest to solidify their base of voters.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS Recently, a field called behavioral economics has emerged in which economists make use of basic psychological insights to examine economic problems.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS People aren’t always rational: –People are overconfident. –People give too much weight to a small number of vivid observations. –People are reluctant to change their minds. People care about fairness as demonstrated by the ultimatum game. People are inconsistent over time.
Summary © 2007 Thomson South-Western In many economic transactions, information is asymmetric. When there are hidden actions, principals may be concerned that agents suffer from the problem of moral hazard.
Summary © 2007 Thomson South-Western When there are hidden characteristics, buyers may be concerned about the problems of adverse selection among sellers. Private markets sometimes deal with asymmetric information with signaling and screening.
Summary © 2007 Thomson South-Western Although government policy can sometimes improve market outcomes, governments are themselves imperfect institutions. –The Condorcet paradox shows that majority rule may fail to produce transitive preferences for society. –Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that no voting scheme will be perfect. –In many situations, democratic institutions will produce the outcome desired by the median voter, regardless of the preferences of the rest of the electorate.
Summary © 2007 Thomson South-Western Individuals who set government policy may be motivated by self-interest rather than the national interest. The study of psychology and economics reveals that human decisionmaking is more complex than is assumed in conventional economic theory.
Summary © 2007 Thomson South-Western People are not always rational, they care about the fairness of economic outcomes, and they can be inconsistent over time.
Copyright © 2004 South-Western 22 Frontiers of Microeconomics.
Chapter Frontiers of Microeconomics 22. Asymmetric Information Information asymmetry – “I know something you don’t know” – A difference in access to relevant.
Harcourt, Inc. items and derived items copyright © 2001 by Harcourt, Inc. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 1. Definition of asymmetric information 2. Sources of.
Frontiers of Microeconomics Premium PowerPoint Slides by Ron Cronovich © 2012 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated,
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0 CHAPTER 22 FRONTIERS OF MICROECONOMICS In this chapter, look for the answers to these questions: How does asymmetric information affect market outcomes?
Voting Theory. Overview Voting Paradoxes Condorcet Criterion Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.
Asymmetric Information Topic 6. Outline for this Topic Asymmetric Information Adverse Selection Definition Signaling in the market for goods: The Case.
Chapter 21 Asymmetric Information Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written.
Chapter 11 Game Theory and Asymmetric Information.
18 Private Information Information One common assumption in economic analysis: perfect information … … buyer and seller have the same information.
Economics of Information Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Chapter 17.
CHAPTER 17 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Microeconomics 9e by Case, Fair.
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1 Transaction Costs, Imperfect Information, and Market Behavior Chapter 14 © 2006 Thomson/South-Western.
Chapter 14 Markets with Asymmetric Information. Chapter 17Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons Market Signaling.
Overview Aggregating preferences The Social Welfare function The Pareto Criterion The Compensation Principle.
Chapter 17 Markets with Asymmetric Information. Chapter 17Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons Market Signaling.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Plan Majority voting Condorcet theorem Cycles Borda rule Condorcet critique (dependence on irrelevant alternatives) Arrow’s.
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Ch. 2: Trade, Tradeoffs, and Economic Systems Del Mar College John Daly ©2003 South-Western Publishing, A Division of Thomson Learning.
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Chapter ElevenCopyright 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. 1 Chapter 11 Game Theory and Asymmetric Information.
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CHAPTER 12 Risk and information ©McGraw-Hill Education, 2014.
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