Presentation on theme: "Coping with Terrorism through Good Governance: the Pakistan Case Dr. Rifaat Hussain Professor and Chair, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam."— Presentation transcript:
Coping with Terrorism through Good Governance: the Pakistan Case Dr. Rifaat Hussain Professor and Chair, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
The causal connection between Governance and Terrorism Good governance mitigates both greed (interest based) and grievances (fact based) as drivers of violent conflict. With its emphasis on inclusion, participation and empowerment, good governance overcomes citizen’s sense of political alienation with the existing political order and reduces incentives for violent behaviour
The Greed Factor According to Paul Collier, economic motivations and opportunities (“ loot- seeking ”) are more highly correlated with the onset of conflict than ethnic, socio- economic, or political grievances (“justice- seeking”). This leada to the hypothesis that resource wealth makes rebellion feasible by providing the opportunity and even the motivation for rebellion.
The causal connection between Governance and Terrorism Good governance denies political and moral space to terrorist groups to pursue their agendas with impunity. Poverty, unemployment, economic deprivation and despair create enabling environment for terrorists to thrive.
Rising graph of terrorist violence YearNumber of attacksFatalities 20078891338 200818382293 20091168 (January to December 8, 2009) 1802 Comment: Unabating wave of suicide attacks unleashed since October 2009 (October –December) 24 attacks out of which 20 were suicide attacks 546 fatalities
Why Focus on Armed Groups? Pose most direct challenge to the authority of the state. Enhanced capability to do widespread violence Rising importance in the post-Cold War period (9/11 only underscored the global reach and lethality of the activity of some of these groups). Insights into changing forms of violent behavior
Categorizing Armed Groups Trans-national Agenda. Local grievances Secessionist and national liberation movements Mercenary militias Anti-state agendas Criminal syndicates
Key elements of strategic logic of violence There are five principal strategic logics at work in terrorist campaigns: (1) Attrition – ability to impose costs unless target’s behavior is changed (2) Intimidation – convince populations that terrorists are strong (3) Provocation- inducing adversary to engage in indiscriminate violence (4) Spoiling- convincing the adversary that moderates on terrorists side are weak (5) Outbidding – convincing public that terrorists have greater resolve to fight than other groups and thereby worthy of its support
Key goals of extremist/terrorist groups Five goals are of enduring importance: 1.Regime change, 2. Territorial change 3. Policy change, 4. Social control 5. Status quo maintenance.
Militant Organizations in Pakistan NameFounder/Current HeadsOutlook Harkatul Mujahideen (HM)Maulana Fazlurrehman Khalil; Farooq Kashmiri Deobandi Sunni School of thought; Harkatul Ansar in 1980s to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; strongly supported Sipahe Sahaba move against Shiite community; has operated in Kashmir Jaish-e-MohammadMaulana Masood AzharDeobandi-Sunni; a break-away from HM; launched in 2000 with the goal of liberating Kashmir Tehreekul IrfanMaulana Abdullah Shah MazharSuccessor to Jaish; launched after ban on militant organizations in January 2002 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); renamed Jamatud Dawa (JuD) after ban in January 2002; disowns any links with LeT Hafiz Mohammed Saeed (ex- head and founder) Salafi Sunni school of thought; draws inspiration from Saudi Arabia and was the armed wing of Pakistan-based religious organization Markaz-al-Daawatul Ershad; Ideologically closer to Al-Qaeda; created in 1980 and is reputed to be the best trained militant groups fighting in Kashmir
Militant Organizations in Pakistan NameFounder/Current HeadsOutlook Siphahe Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (founder); Maulana Tariq Azam (successor) Rabidly anti-Shia outfit; founded in 1984 Lashkar-e-JhangviRiaz Basra, killed in police encounter 2002 Rabidly anti-Shia outfit, founded in late 1980s by Riaz Basra, who was also formerly associated with HM and SSP; he believed in using force to further Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi’s mission
Key FATA Militant Outfits NameFounder/Current HeadsOutlook TTP South WaziristanBaitullah Mehsud (Founder); Hakeemullah Mehsud (successor) Trans-agency outfit; wedded to anti- Americanism and determined to enforce Sharia; committed to driving foreigners out of Afghanistan TTP Bajaur agencyMaulvi Faqir MuhammadEnforcement of Sharia; TTP Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram Agencies Hakeemullah Mehsud, responsible for three agencies bordering Peshawar Enforcement of Sharia; TTP SwatMaulvi FazlullahEnforcement of Sharia
Key FATA Militant Outfits NameFounders/Current Heads Outlook Tehreek-e-Taliban Mohmand (TTM) Omar KhalidWanted Mullah Omar-style of sharia system TTP (South Waziristan)Mullah NazirFormed tribal Lashkar and mounted armed campaign against foreign militants around Wana Tehreek-e-Nifaze Shariate Mohammdi (TNSM) Sufi MohammadDeobandi Sunni school of thought; Enforcement of Islamic Sharia; Opposed to foreign troops in Afghanistan. Brokered Swat peace deal Lashkar-e-IslamMufti Munir Shakir (Founder); Mangal Bagh Afridi (current head) Deobandi Sunni school of thought; follows Egyptian Ikhawanul Muslimoon and Jamaate Islami Ansar IslamPir Saifurrehman (Founder) Mehbubul Haq (successor) Deobandi School of Thought Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi Analmunkir Haji Naamdar (founder) Maulvi Gul Niaz Deoband School of Thought; advocates Mullah Omar style Sharia and its enforcement in Pakistan
Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Compared Factors Pakistani TalibanAfghan Taliban OriginsReligious SchoolsKandhar and local grievances Key Goals Implement Sharia Seek political power End “foreign occupation”; regain lost power; Popular support Very low and confined to parts of NWFP and Punjab Strong in Pushtun dominated areas of Afghanistan; Funding Internal and externalInternal and External Strategy Armed violence, terrorist attacks including suicide bombing Armed insurgency; terrorism; suicide attacks Weakness Lack of popular support; pitted against a superior force; confined to a geographical areas – FATA and Malakand regions Not perceived as a unifying force; Have failed their country before. Determined international opposition; Dwindling external support Strengths Resolve; organization and stable supply of suicide bombers. Support from banned religious and sectarian outfits Battle hardened; pitted against a strategically ambivalent opponent. Sophisticated media campaign and strategic communication.
17 Selected Human Deprivation Indicators for Pakistan 35% 10% 38% 45% 38% 51% 80% Without access to essential drugs Without Improved Drinking water Without Adequate Sanitation Without Access to Health Services In One Room Households Underweight Children (under 5 years) Children not fully immunized Births not attended by skilled health personal
18 Physical Facilities Available at Educational Institutions in Pakistan,2001-01 14.7% 8.3% 71.3%39.6%57.0%51.7%12.0% Without Building Kacha Building Without Electricity Without Drinking water No LatrineWithout Boundry Wall Access to Primary School, (Over 2 KM)
Expansion of Madaris between 1947 and 2000 by Region Province/Area19471960198019882000 Punjab1211951,0121,3203,153 NWFP59874266781,281 Sindh2187380291 905 Baluchistan2870135347 692 AJK482976 151 Islamabad---12747 94 Northern Areas121647102 185 FATA--- 300 Total24546420562861 6,741
Expansion of Madaris (1988-2002) DeobandiBaraleviAhle- Hadith ShiaJamat-i- Islami Total 1988-2002 1779- 7000717-1585161-37647-41997-5002801-9880
The Key Question When, why, and how do people become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against fellow humans and what can be done about it? Effective counterstrategies cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives extremist/ terrorist violence.
What are we trying to counter: An ideology or religion? A tactic or a mindset? Symptoms or root-causes? A malleable state of mind or a permanent condition? A search for remedial response or a social engineering project? Or a combination of all these. How valid and sharp are our diagnostic tools?
The key is process…. “It is very rare for someone to wake up and randomly decide to commit a violent act; there is almost always a process of radicalization and a network of like-minded people who become enablers.”
At the Policy Level Develop a comprehensive counter strategy based on an understanding of: Beliefs Mentality Background History Ideology and Motives and Organizational structure of of Extremists and Radicals.
At the Policy Level Doing so would require a very detailed mapping of the modus operandi of the extremist forces and the mindsets underpinning their violent behaviour. Connecting the dots would be as important as identifying the right dots. Issue of context would be critical in developing an effective policy response
A Firm and consistent policy Setting and sticking to a firm policy that would deal decisively with infringements of the rule of law. Threats of punitive action must be backed by adequate coercive power to enforce the rule of law. The military and law enforcement apparatus must work in unison to produce the desired results
At the Policy Level Have an outreach to the moderates – influential locals, community leaders, teachers will be the key. Engagement without empowerment Seek to isolate the extremists from the larger society. Guard and offer protection to those who are willing to speak against the extremists. State must become visible in defense of moderates.
At the policy level… Engage in the struggle of ideas – Amar Bil Maroof, Nahi Anali Munkir. Invest in Education and Development. Defuse sources of hatred and violence Improve intelligence and law enforcement entities. Combat sources of Jihadist funding and recruitment. Rekindle hopes of a non-Jihadi future for youth
Reassure people of the following: Terrorism does not pay and it does no work Terrorism is not a winning coercive strategy Shift the focus from cause and form to consequences of extremism and violence for the society at large. Terrorism is strategically irrational behaviour. Terrorist success to be judged along a spectrum ranging from zero success, to partial, to limited to near-success.
At the society level Balancing positive externalities with negative externalities. “Providing support for human rights and/or women’s organisations may or may not help prevent terrorism, but it strains the imagination to envisage it causing any major damage. Fighting poverty, providing education and health services or promoting (by peaceful means) democracy and human rights may not have much effect on terrorism, but even so, such initiatives will help many people in other ways.
Where do we go from here? Treat armed insurgency as a complex problem in which multiple factors are at play. Address Pakistan-Afghanistan challenges by focusing on the needs of disenfranchised Pashtun communities on both sides of the border. Identify the legitimate grievances of different armed groups; Identify those groups with legitimate grievances and those that are fighting for economic reasons; Separate these groups from the Jihadist elements of the insurgency; Target these groups as partners for peace in a peace process.
Options for Pakistan Evolve a comprehensive counterinsurgency security strategy to deal with the rising menace of terrorism; Turn inward and focus on the rising threat of armed militancy within the country. Reverse country’s drift into extremism by strengthening liberal and progressive forces Be ready to pay the necessary price for establishing the writ of the Pakistani state. Resolve the crisis of governance afflicting the country. Terrorists are like fish that survives and swims in a pool of water. This water must be dried up by winning the hearts and minds battle.