Presentation on theme: "Inequality, Grievances and Civil War"— Presentation transcript:
1Inequality, Grievances and Civil War Lars-Erik Cederman,ETH ZürichKristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of Essex & PRIO Halvard Buhaug,PRIO & NTNUCambridge University Press, 2013
2Main argument Grievance skepticism in civil-war literature Yet, we argue that grievances matterApproach:Intermediate disaggregationMotivational mechanisms, not just cognitionEthno-Nationalism, not just ethnicityRelevant data, rather than standard toolbox
3From inequalities to civil war HorizontalInequalitiesCivil WarEmpirical linkGroup identificationIntergroup comparisonEvaluation of injusticeFraming and blamingClaims & RepressionMobilizationGrievances
4Group level dyads State Polity Government Legend: Included group Excluded groupGroup 4Group 6Political relationshipGroup 5
5Using Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) Data to Study the Effect of Exclusion and Downgrading
6Polygon overlay (Yugoslavia) Given examples of typical research:Our modeling efforts have so far focused on statistical and computational methods.Group-level inequalities ==> civil-war violenceHowever, notoriously difficult to find data on wealth of ethnic groupsWe use spatial GDP data from Nordhaus G-Econ covering the whole globe and then use the geocoded settlement contours as cookie cutters. This allows us to estimate inequality between ethnic groups worldwide and to link inequality to conflict.This curve shows that both richer and poorer groups tend to experience violence.
7Effect for poor groups low_ratio = G/g if g<G, 1 otherwise where G = GDP pc of country g = GDP pc of group
8Beyond dyadic group model Transnational ethnic-kinGrievances and conflict durationScaling to country levelConstructing better indicators with group-level informationImproving conventional risk forecastsTwo main variables: relative group size and relative TEK size in first and second dyadsPrimary dyad:H1. Monotonic effect. Main idea: more resources conflict; but also motivation: larger groups feel entitled to more, especially in cases of minority ruleSecondary dyads:Two hypotheses should be falseH2. Mere existence of ethnic kin across the border regardless of size should not matte (essentialism)H3. A straight monotonic effect fails to solve the problem and should not be trueH4. Our curvilinear hypothesis, which is different from the domestic relationship according to H1!Mechanism 1: Rather than just looking at increased potential support for group from large TEK groups, we also consider the deterrent effect making the incumbent cautious in case of increasing relative TEK size.Mechanism 2: Uncertainty, which is much more acutely felt in transborder relations, should make power parity more conflict prone, as has been found in the IR literature!H5. In analogy with the reasoning under H4, we also believe that TEK groups that are represented in the government (EGIPs) should be more cautious than those that are excluded and have little to lose (like the Kurds). This sense of caution should be especially powerful where the incumbent TEK group could destabilize its own state by triggering secessions involving other minorities.
9Conclusions for theory Core themesGrievances matter!Economic and political HIs increase risk of civil warTheory-measure correspondenceDisaggregation in study of conflictScaling information at different levels of analysisTheory development in new research areas
10Conclusions for policy Address grievances rather than merely strengthening stateFocus on demos/inclusion/inequality, not just democracy as electionsRelevance to Iraq and SyriaExclusion and discrimination declining globally, but still significant conflict risks
12Current research: Gleditsch Spatial evolution of conflictSpread vs. containmentImplications for peacekeepingConflict and tacticsNon-violent direct action, terrorism and indirect targeting; non-violent direct actionGroup perspective on strategy choice
13Current research: Buhaug Security implications of climate changeFood insecurity and urban protestAgricultural loss and rural unrestAn urbanization bomb?All global population growth until 2050 will be absorbed by cities in developing countriesIncreasing poverty, inequalities, unemployment to be expected without successful adaptation
14Current research: Cederman Endogeneity of exclusionMeasuring economic horizontal inequalityPower sharingTrends in inequality and civil warEthnic Power Relations data: next release in October, see
15Instrumenting for Exclusion ColonialStrategyInitialExclusionConflict* In another collaborative project that includes Julian Wucherpfennig, Philipp Hunziker, and myself,we attempt to find a measure of exclusion that is independent of conflict.* Focusing on post-colonial states, we exploit differences in the colonial empires’ approach to the ethnicity of colonized populations within each colony. As opposed to the French ethnically neutral approach that tended to include those groups that were close to the coast, the British application of “selective indirect rule” made peripheral groups more, rather than less, influential. Thanks to this variation in terms of colonial strategies and group locations, we come up with a clean estimate of initial exclusion in post-colonial states, and use this variable as an explanation of internal conflict.* Based on this research strategy, we arrive at very clear results that confirm our previous studies that explain ethno-nationalist conflict in terms of limited power access. If anything, this work has tended to underestimate the actual conflict-inducing impact of political exclusion.* limitations: Not time variant (impossible to evaluate inclusion decisions along the way)Only postcolonial cases. Yet at least it tells us that the exclusion result holdsReference to Fearon & co’s attack on our exclusion resultExclusion where possible (excluding where it is safe means bringing in the problem cases) states calibrate as much as they can get away with!Exclusion where necessary (excluding trouble makers)Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, Cederman “Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Post-Colonial Conflict.” Working paper, UCL and ETH Zürich.
16Using satellite and survey data to improve measures of econ. HI G-Econ EstimateNightlights EstimateMyanmarCederman, Weidmann and Bormann Triangulating Horizontal Inequality: Toward Improved Conflict Analysis. APSA, Washington DC.
17Ethnic inclusion & power sharing Prewar conflict risk Postwar conflict riskSNF Project Cederman & HugUsing EPR dataFocus on ethnic inclusion through territorial and governmental power sharing, i.e. autonomy and inclusion* autonomy and inclusion useful* baseline (esp. before and after conflict)* disaggregated (see asymmetric federalism)Postwar autonomy may be too little too late, but* preventive prewar effect* does not make things worse* postwar inclusion does workNew evidence showing that autonomy with inclusion is quite effectiveCederman, Hug, Schädel & Wucherpfennig “Territorial autonomy in the shadow of future conflict: Too little too late?” APSA, Chicago.
18Exclusion and the decline of violence Cederman, Gleditsch & Wucherpfennig Explaining the Decline of Ethnic Conflict: Was Gurr Right and For the Right Reasons? APSA, Washington DC.