Presentation on theme: "Study on the Sharing of Information and Reporting of Suspicious Sports Betting Activity in the EU 28 A study for the DIRECTORATE-GENERAL EDUCATION AND."— Presentation transcript:
Study on the Sharing of Information and Reporting of Suspicious Sports Betting Activity in the EU 28 A study for the DIRECTORATE-GENERAL EDUCATION AND CULTURE, Directorate Youth and Sport, Unit Sport By Oxford Research, Denmark
Objective of the study Overall objective: “to provide the European Commission with an overview of the existing frameworks applicable in the 28 EU Member States and the rules/practices of stakeholders regarding the sharing of information and reporting of suspicious sports betting activity” Specific objectives: Describe the role and tasks of key actors in detecting match fixing Map regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks in EU 28 countries Identify barriers for sharing of information at national and international level Recommend necessary and appropriate EU action
Methodology Tools for collecting information: Desk research Questionnaires – to betting regulators and betting operators Interviews – betting regulators, law enforcement, betting operators, sport governing bodies (national and international) Background information Specific objectives - 15 questions Study objectives 8 case countries 20 overview countries 28 country studies Desk research Questionnaires Interviews Diverse set of methodologies Cross country analysis Final study report Study output
Today’s agenda 1.How is suspicious betting patterns detected by betting operators? 2.What is the role of betting operators, sport and public authorities in detecting suspicious betting patterns? 3.What does the law say about the possibilities for sharing of information? 4.National frameworks for collecting information and reporting suspicious betting patterns? 5.Barriers for sharing of information? 6.Possible role for the EU going forward?
How is the existence of suspicious sports betting activity determined by betting operators?
How is the existence of suspicious sports betting activity determined by betting operators (regulators if proactive) Important distinction: Unusual versus suspicious betting activity No common definition of what constitutes “suspicious betting activity” Betting operators monitor customers closely – “know your customer” Detection approaches – market level: Sudden unexpected activity on a particular market Bet sizes or volumes not typical for the type of market Price changes do not effect demand as expected Market trading volume deviates from than would be expected Activity polarise around a single specific outcome The market price becomes significantly out of line with traders’ assessment of where it should be Large price movement Price movements that do not reflect the action on the pitch in an in-play market Unusual performance based on the historic records of the teams or participants in the match
How is the existence of suspicious sports betting activity determined Detection approaches – account level: An account, or a group of linked accounts, risked or won far more than is the normal behaviour for the account(s) Customer staking markedly more than normal An account has been specifically opened to bet on a suspicious market One account, or a group of accounts, won a large percentage of all winnings in the market An account that has a bias towards betting for/against one of the teams suddenly switching Match fixing can also be detected by sport itself or public authorities
Role and tasks of national authorities, sports betting operators and betting operators
Betting Operators: Access to customers and accounts – betting patterns, individual bets, total volume, history, etc. Can suspend betting on matches and void bets Often best placed to detect suspicious betting patterns No sanctions Sport Governing Bodies: Direct access to athletes, matches, tournaments, etc. Can sanction athletes, officials and clubs – also where public authorities don’t Can introduce requirements in players contracts and for clubs to take part in tournaments etc. Public Authorities: Grant licenses to betting operators Regulate betting operators Can have direct access to customers and bets Law enforcement and investigation Sanctions – larger cases Commercial betting monitoring companies Compare across operators, including Asia Compare actual odds to statistical odds Monitor matches, leagues, players, referees, clubs to detect suspicious persons or organisations Actors have complimentary roles – detection is most effective if key actors work together
Important distinction: Non-personal information versus personal information Who is the information shared with? Law enforcement or private organisation? What information can be shared? In general it is not problematic to share aggregated market level data – like odds movements, market volume, etc. Sharing of personal information is tightly regulated The European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of 1995 sets the conditions for sharing of personal information allow the free sharing of personal information within the EU protect the fundamental rights to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data How to evaluate if personal information can be share? Has the subject given his/her consent? Legal obligation? Justified? Proportional? The only option? Shared with organisation able to handle information?
Frameworks for collection of information and reporting of suspicious sports betting activity
Most countries who have revised their betting/gambling regulation recently have some sort of obligation to collect and/or share information Important distinctions to understand different approaches: Collection of information versus reporting of suspicious betting activity Direct versus indirect approach Proactive versus reactive approach by regulator Collection of information on suspicious betting patterns Reporting of the information
Frameworks for collection of information and reporting of suspicious sports betting activity Categorisation of frameworks to collect and share information: Neither the betting regulator nor the betting operator has an obligation to collect or share information – typically countries that have not revised their gaming act recently The betting regulator is obliged to collect information on suspicious betting patterns (proactive) The betting operators are obliged to collect information on suspicious betting patterns (reactive) It might/might not be specified how this obligation should be fulfilled Not all betting operators who are obliged to collect information are also obliged to share the information. The betting operators are obliged to share information on suspicious betting patterns with authorities (reactive): It might/might not be specified how markets should be monitored to enable the betting operators to detect suspicious patterns and share information – often it is not It might/might not be specified what constitutes suspicious betting patterns and when betting operators should be informed – often it is not
Frameworks for collection of information and reporting of suspicious sports betting activity The proactive approach: France – Arjel has access in real time to to all transactional data generated Italy – ADM has access in real time to to all transactional data generated The reactive approach The UK – betting operators are obliged to report suspicious betting activity to the Gambling Commission (direct obligation) Spain – betting operators must be able to answer information requirements of the Spanish gambling regulator => must collect information (indirect obligation) The Netherlands – Upcoming law requires betting operators to have betting fraud detection system capable of identifying irregularities Schleswig Holstein, Germany – operators shall work with two independent monitoring systems
Frameworks for collection of information and reporting of suspicious sports betting activity Even in the absence of regulation all – at least medium or large - betting operators will collect information on betting activity Voluntary Frameworks: Both national lotteries (ELMS) and some of the large private betting operators share information internally (ESSA) MoUs - If betting operators share information with sport governing bodies they do it through Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) Commercial betting monitoring companies also collect information on suspicious betting activity – like SportRadar Little variance in what is shared and when from sport to sport
As explained the Data Protection Directive sets certain boundaries for sharing of information - the right to privacy – but certain issues complicate it further: Most cases are unique - Judged on a case by case basis Little precedent from previous cases to provide guidance Directive is implemented differently in different countries insecurity -> causes actors to be cautious Police/prosecutors are reluctant to inform private organisations – betting operators and sport governing bodies It differs within the EU if betting operators can share personal information with sport governing bodies – due to differences in implementation and interpretation of law Permission to share information found in most betting operators Terms and Conditions have never been tested
Sharing of information - barriers Practical barriers to sharing of information: A cross border phenomenon - which sport governing bodies and public authorities to contact in other countries? Difficult to have MoUs with all sports governing bodies in all countries Potential receiver of information might not have appropriate information handling procedures Unit in possession of information might not want to share information A pan European law for data protection is currently being drafted – expected to be important step in the direction of harmonisation between countries
Encourage MS to ratify and implement the Council of Europe Convention on Match Fixing Support MS’ implementation of the convention on match fixing – i.e. national platforms Evaluate need for coordination platform to improve coordination of efforts, cooperation between national platforms and information sharing at EU level Facilitate sharing of non-personal information Address uncertainty and stimulate exchange of personal information within the limits of the data protection directive Bring more clarity to what personal information can be shared and under what circumstances? Secure that new pan European law for data protection allow for an appropriate degree of sharing of personal information in cases of match fixing
Thank you – questions? Morten Larsen – email@example.com