Economic Sanctions: Factors of Success Research Proposal by David Benedetto
What makes some Sanctions Work? Allies? – Measured by trade status Government Responsive to People – Audience Costs Political Instability in Recipient Speed/Strength of Sanction
Guatemala VS. North Korea Allied to sender Political Instability Strong, Fast Sanction Not Allied to sender Political Stability Little Freedom Speed/Strength of Sanction
Recipients – Non-random Selection? States not allied – “Friendlies” = Success “Regime Change” as goal – Instability = Success
WORKS CITED Achin, Kurt. “US Pushes to Enforce N. Korea Sanctions”. 24 Aug. 2009. VOA News. Sept. 28 th 2009. Cortright, David, Julia Wagler, George A. Lopez. “Learning from the Sanctions Decade.” June 2000. The Fourth Freedom Forum. 5 Oct. 2009. Elliott, Kimberly Ann. “Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions.” 23 Oct. 1997. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sept. 28 th 2009. Elliott, Kimberly Ann. “Honduras: Deja Coup and the Forgotten ‘Autogolpe.’” 13 July 2009. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 20 Sept. 2009. Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577-592. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 - North Korea, 16 July 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a64529427.html [accessed 28 September 2009] “Freedom Rankings for LAC Countries by Population Size-Groups”. 1993. Latin American Network Information Center. 28 Sept. 2009. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, & Barbara Oegg (2007). Economic Sanctions RECONSIDERED (3 rd Edition). Korea, North. (2008). The World Factbook [Online]. Retrieved 21 Sept. 2009, from US Central Intelligence Agency: “Sanctions Against North Korea”. The Global Policy Forum. 2009.
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