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JMC Ammo Assessment Outbrief November 2007

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1 JMC Ammo Assessment Outbrief November 2007
US Army Joint Munitions Command Ammunition Assessment Team Mr. Doug Maddox Mr. James Gray Mr. James Young Mr. Mike Griffith

2 Bottom Line Up Front ATHP Doctrine Working Well
Highly Motivated Soldiers but Additional Ammo Training Needed Better Guidance Needed to Manage Suspended Ammunition RIP/TOA Process Needs Improvement Derivative UICs Usage Hampers Asset Visibility EOD Units Doing Great Job Successfully Gathered Ammo and Packaging Data Outstanding Support to Ammo Assessment Team First Bullet -- Ammunition Transfer and Handling Point doctrine established a holding point forward of the Ammunition Supply Points. This holding area (looks and acts like a mini ASP) is operated by the Brigade Support Battalion, usually with an Ammunition Warrant OIC and a staff of MOS 89B NCO’s and soldiers to perform the receipt, storage, inventory, issue and shipping functions. Use of the ATHP resulted in two big benefits (JMC perspective) -- reduced the amount of ammunition issued to using units to be controlled by personnel untrained in ammunition operations and secondly, provides a controlled area for the storage of unit held stocks not immediately needed to support operations in 20’ ISO containers within the ATHP, greatly enhancing explosives safety. Second Bullet – Nearly all soldiers encountered were enthusiastic and motivated to do a good job. In majority of units assessed, NCO’s and soldiers assigned duties as the “unit ammo NCO” have limited if any training in the storage, handling, accounting and issuing of ammunition at the time of assuming the responsibility for the unit’s ammunition. The Assessment Team provided guidance and assistance where possible including providing Yellow Books, unit ammunition guides, condition code cards, and examples of explosives safety documentation. Additionally, we provided theater points of contact and website information for HQ, JMC, the Defense Ammunition Center and other ammunition related sites. Third Bullet – The Assessment Team recorded the ammunition lot number for all noted lots during the assessment. A comparison of the noted ammunition lots to the Joint Munitions Command suspension/restriction data base was performed. In total, approximately suspended/restricted ammunition lots are being held in the hands of units. Each unit/brigade was notified of the on-hand suspended/restricted lots to ensure appropriate actions are taken to remove the lots from unit possession. The JMC SCR is addressing ways to better identify suspended/restricted lots in the hands of units during the RIP/TOA process. Fourth Bullet – Related to the previous bullet. Improved processes to physically examine ammunition during the RIP/TOA process are being examined. Additionally, it was reported by multiple units that only limited time was available during the RIP/TOA for the conduct of ammunition inventories. Therefore, incoming units often do not have an accurate listing of on-hand assets at the time they begin their tour. Fifth Bullet – Derivative UIC’s are assigned to units by HQDA, G-3 for the TAMIS training system tracking. Units are taking this generated UIC to draw Unit Basic Load in the place of their home station identification number. Starting 1 Dec 07, HQDA, G-3 will start linking the derivative UIC to the home station identification number in the hope of being able to track units while deployed from home station. By doctrine, SAAS-Mod documentation indicates the DODAAC of the receiving unit, thereby providing visibility of the location of assets. However, when derivative UIC’s are used it is not possible to track ammunition issues to the actual unit having possession of the ammunition. The audit trail stops at the unit with the assigned DODAAC level. Sixth Bullet – The Assessment Team encountered very limited quantities of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable (CC-H) ammunition at the ATHP’s or in the hands of using units. The team was told repeatedly that EOD units were providing regularly disposing of CC-H stocks in a timely manner. Seventh Bullet – Assessment Team visited 140+ units, assessing on-hand stocks at each unit. Eighth Bullet – Assessment Team received outstanding support from all assessed units, ATHP personnel and AMC organizations.

3 JMC Ammo Assessment The Mission
Assist Commanders in their ammo operations Determine ammo packaging requirements Identify serviceable vs unserviceable ammo Ensure safe ammo storage at FOBs Assist Commanders in their ammo operations --- The assessment team routinely provided ammunition storage, handling, accountability, identification, serviceability, packaging and explosives safety guidance to unit ammunition personnel. The team removed all noted unsafe/unserviceable ammunition from unit use; ensuring that these munitions were segregated in storage to prevent future use. The team provided multiple technical reference materials to unit personnel to include Yellow Books, unit ammunition guides, condition code cards, and examples of explosives safety documentation. Additionally, we provided theater points of contact and website information for HQ, JMC, the Defense Ammunition Center and other ammunition related sites. Training in the use of the Munitions History Program (MHP) was provided to several organizations. Determine packaging requirements – The assessment team assessed ammunition in the hands of over 120 battalion sized units. We assessed ammunition in the hands of units through examination of stocks retained at the unit level – in most cases this was accomplished by visual examination of the stocks stored in unit level ISO containers. In select cases, the team also examined ammunition stored on uploaded vehicles, combat outposts and unit arms rooms. Additionally, the team discussed ammunition performance with combat users to include tank crews, gun crews, combat escort personnel, aviators, combat engineers, EOD personnel and combat infantrymen. Identify serviceable versus unserviceable - As the team visually examined stocks, attention was always focused on noting any visually unserviceable stocks. Additionally, all noted ammunition lot numbers were recorded to allow a suspension/restriction check to be completed. Analysis was performed on all noted lots. Results of suspension/restriction check, along with a listing of all noted ammunition lots, were provided to each unit. Ensure safe storage at FOBs – The team discussed storage licenses and explosives safety limits at each visited location. Explosives safety guidance was provided to unit personnel that addressed such basic tenets as separating blasting caps from other items, Net Explosives Weight limits, safe storage practices, segregation of unserviceable and foreign ammunition to prevent unintended use, basic principals of the hazard class/division concepts and compatibility requirements.

4 JMC Ammo Assessment What Was Accomplished
Observed general ammunition storage conditions. Reviewed unit ammunition listing for on-hand DODIC's and quantities Assessed ammunition status Determined approximate on-hand quantities Determined general/overall condition by DODIC Determined packing/packaging/palletization status Reviewed explosives storage license/storage authorization documentation Determined compliance with storage license/storage authorization documentation Provided technical ammunition storage/handling guidance Checked ammunition suspension/restriction status Recorded ISO container serial numbers S/N of Cat 1 missiles and rockets – no undue handling or movement Observed general ammunition storage conditions --- Team observed storage conditions that varied from very good (ISO containers neatly organized, DODIC’s separated in storage, ammunition lots separated (or identified in containers with multiple lots), unserviceable stocks segregated from serviceable stocks) to very bad (containers not neatly organized, containers with mixed storage of other classes of supply in addition to ammunition, little or no DODIC separation, ammo container markings not visible, lot numbers not marked on substitute ammo cans (M2A1 containers)). Use of HESCO barriers is very widespread – in general, physical condition of newly constructed/renovated ATHP’s exceeded expectations. The HESCO barricades are being used correctly, providing cells for the storage of 8,800 lbs NEW of 1.1 munitions per cell. Reviewed unit ammunition listing for on-hand DODIC's and quantities --- Team reviewed unit provided ammunition lot/quantity listings (if available) and unit LOGSTAR reports. The assessment team worked with unit personnel to resolve gross inaccuracies noted during the visit – majority of errors were the result of transcription errors. Assessed ammunition status Determined approximate on-hand quantities Determined general/overall condition by DODIC Determined packing/packaging/palletization status No significant speaker notes to add – the sub bullets speak for themselves. Reviewed explosives storage license/storage authorization documentation Determined compliance with storage license/storage authorization documentation Provided technical ammunition storage/handling guidance The team discussed storage licenses and explosives safety limits at each visited location. Explosives safety guidance was provided to unit personnel that addressed such basic tenets as separating blasting caps from other items, Net Explosives Weight limits, safe storage practices, segregation of unserviceable and foreign ammunition to prevent unintended use, basic principals of the hazard class/division concepts and compatibility requirements. Explosives safety storage license requirements were discussed with units that did not have a valid license for their storage locations. Tactics, practices and procedures for the safe storage of ammunition were stressed. Checked ammunition suspension/restriction status Additionally, all noted ammunition lot numbers were recorded to allow a suspension/restriction check to be completed. Analysis was performed on all noted lots. Results of suspension/restriction check, along with a listing of all noted ammunition lots, were provided to each unit. Recorded ISO container serial numbers At the request of HQ, JMC Transportation Division, the team recorded S/N of over xxxxxx ISO containers. S/N’s were provided to HQ, JMC Transportation Division staff for analysis, as required, in coordination with SDDC and USTRANSCOM. Recorded S/N of Cat 1 missiles and rockets – no undue handling or movement At the request of HQDA, G4, Munitions Division; the team recorded viewable S/N’s for all observed Category 1 missiles. In total the team recorded S/N’s for approximately 3600 missiles/rockets (mainly AT4’s) – missile S/N’s were recorded either from the outer pack, inner pack or item based on the assessed unit’s storage configuration. The team did not open outer packs for the sole purpose of noting a S/N on an individual item. Listing of noted S/N’s was provided to each assessed unit, ARCENT G4-Ammo, 1st Theater Sustainment Command and made the data available to HQDA, G4, Ammunition Division through the assessment server.

5 JMC Ammo Assessment Pre-Assessment Assumptions
~ 60,000 tons in theater Estimated 20, ,000 tons forward of ASPs/ATHPs Quantity, packaging, and condition of ammo unknown Large quantities require packaging Packaging material largely unavailable Large volume of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition (CC-H) The ~60K short tons figure was obtained by starting with the on-hand quantities of ammunition on hand on 9/11 APS-5 stocks on hand on 9/11 (Qatar) Plus Ammunition stocks in Kuwait on 9/11 Ammunition downloaded from the MV Carter (APS-3) in 2003 and 2004 JMC directed ammunition shipments to theater Ammunition brought to theater by the 4ID Less Reported expenditures (combat and retrograde) (Early MUREP expenditure reporting was poor, at best) Ammunition retrograded to date (CONUS and other locations) equals 20,000 to 25,000 ton estimate of ammunition in front of the ASPs/ATHPs was based on our understanding of existing accountability systems. Lack of reporting of on-hand assets at the ATHP’s to WARS led to JMC only having visibility of assets in the TSA and the ASP’s. Until relatively recently ( ) ammunition forward of the ASP’s was not maintained on Standard Army Ammunition System – Modernized (SAAS-Mod). Command emphasis by the 1st Theater Sustainment Command has resulted in nearly all ATHP’s now reporting via SAAS-Mod to WARS. A mature expenditure reporting process did not exist in theater until mid There is very little accurate expenditure data for the early days of OIF1. Proper expenditure reporting drives future budget requirements for acquisition.

6 JMC Ammo Assessment What We Found
~ 65K tons of USA ammunition in theater 31.0K tons in Theater Storage Area (Kuwait) 18.5K tons in MNC-I ASP’s (Five locations in Iraq) 8.6K tons in MNC-I ATHP’s (14 locations in Iraq) 6.5K to 7.5K tons forward of ASPs/ATHPs (UBL + excess) Quantity and condition of ammo ~ 5000 tons require packaging Includes US Army and USMC ammunition Considerable quantities of small items Small Arms Ammunition 40MM ammunition Flares Grenades ~12,000 ammunition lot segments Limited packaging material available in Iraq Virtually no packaging material retained for uploaded ammo Minimal CC-H (unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition ) 65K tons of USA ammunition in theater 31.0K tons in Theater Storage Area (Kuwait) 18.5K tons in MNC-I ASP’s (Five locations in Iraq) 8.6K tons in MNC-I ATHP’s (14 locations in Iraq) 6.5K to 7.5K tons forward of ASPs/ATHPs Note: 6.5 to 7.5 ton forward of ASP’s/ATHP’s includes all ammunition assessed during the visit plus an estimated quantity of ammunition in the hands of units not assessed. The analysis included a review of MNC-I Op Ord 07-01, Annex A; an in-depth analysis of the number and type of units assessed and the number and type of units not assessed. The analysis considered weapon densities, type of unit, size of unit, unit ammunition basic load and mission unique factors. The assessed quantities were then extrapolated to estimate the total quantities of ammunition in theater requiring retrograde/reset. Anecdotal reports received prior to the assessment team visited, as well as past history during Desert Storm and OIF1/OIF2, indicated large quantities of unserviceable ammunition was in the ASP’s. Additionally, other reports indicated that EOD personnel were over burdened with Counter IED missions and were not able to fully support ammunition demil operations. The assess visit disproves this assumption – the team encountered minimal quantities of unserviceable ammunition and was repeated told that EOD units are providing excellent support in disposing of unserviceable stocks. In some cases, EOD personnel are calling on ATHP staff personnel on a regular basis to determine if there is an available stocks that require demilitarization.

7 Munitions Readiness Report Families
Assessed Tonnage Munitions Readiness Report Families

8 DRAFT Assessed Sites ASSESSED SITES KUWAIT KUWAIT Diamondback
Dahuk Dahuk Habur Gate Habur Gate Diamondback Diamondback 99 Days in Theater 16 Days pre assessment prep 26 sites/120+ Battalions assessed 99 Days in Theater 26 sites/120+ Battalions assessed McHenry McHenry Al Kasik Al Kasik Tigris R. Tigris R. Marez Marez Q West Q West Warrior Warrior Mosul Mosul Tal Afar Tal Afar Q West Q West Bernstein Bernstein Speicher Speicher Kirkuk Kirkuk Anaconda Anaconda Al Asad Al Asad Tikrit Tikrit Taji Taji Warhorse Warhorse Euphrates R. Euphrates R. DRAFT Kirkush Kirkush Blue Diamond Blue Diamond Balad Balad Liberty Liberty Al Asad Al Asad Baqubah Baqubah Prosperity Prosperity Taji Taji Ramadi Ramadi Ramadi Ramadi Falcon Falcon Baghdad Baghdad Fallujah Fallujah Al Taqaddum Al Taqaddum Habbaniyah Habbaniyah Hammer Hammer Ar Rustimayah Ar Rustimayah Karbala Karbala Striker Striker Iskandariyah Iskandariyah Kalsu Kalsu Loyalty Loyalty Slayer Slayer Rustamiyah Rustamiyah Ad Diwaniyah Ad Diwaniyah West BIAP West BIAP Kalsu Kalsu 87 Days In Theater 16 Days pre-assessment preparations 11 Das post-assessment evaluation and out-briefs Tallil Tallil Iskandariyah Iskandariyah Adder Adder Umm Qasr Umm Qasr KUWAIT KUWAIT Arifjan Arifjan

9 Assessed Tonnage By Region

10 JMC Ammunition Assessment Additional Units Assessed
MND-B 1BCT, 1CD 2BCT, 1CD 2BCT, 1ID 2BCT, 2ID 2BCT, 82 AD 2 SCR 4 BCT, 1ID 1 CD CAB 35 EN BDE 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 82 2 4 1 1 35 1 7 4 9 1 5 3 61 3 7 3 2 1 4 1 A A A A 227 130 2 5 4 2 1 325 1 8 1 2 RSS RSS RSS RSS 1 18 2 U U U U U 227 20 3 82 1 64 1 504 1 26 2 8 1 28 3 U U U U U 227 M M M M M 5 2 2 STB STB STB 2 12 2 16 2 325 2 12 4 A A A A 227 1 82 15 BSB BSB BSB 2 32 2 69 2 319 2 2 615 ASB ASB ASB ASB ASB 1 9 ( ( - - ) ) STB STB STB STB STB STB STB STB STB STB STB 2 17 2 BTB BTB STB 4 STB STB STB 115 2 BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB BSB 299 FSB FSB FSB FSB STB STB STB 407 BSB BSB 610 BSB BSB BSB 2 BSB BSB BSB NOT ASSESSED Additional Units Assessed COMPLETED 1/37 FA 1/7 FA BRT E 1-5 CAV TARGET UNITS NUMBER COMPLETED PERCENT COMPLETED 50 42 84 1/23 INF 29 INF HHC 504 MI 769 EN 92 MP 210 BSB

11 JMC Ammunition Assessment ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED
MND-C 2BCT, 3ID 2BCT, 10 MTN 3BCT, 3ID 4BCT, 25ID 3RD CAB 2 3 2 10 3 3 4 25 3 30 1 2 14 15 1 A A A A 1 501 1 3 40 1 4 31 U U U U 3 1 3 509 2 3 1 - 9 B 1 89 U M U M U U 1 10 2 377 4 3 23 STB 15 2 3 STB A A A A A 425 STB 3 17 STB 2 BSB ASB ASB 26 BSTB BSB 203 725 BSB 603 ASB ASB ASB BSB 210 COMPLETED ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED 100 26 PERCENT COMPLETED NUMBER COMPLETED TARGET UNITS 164 ENG 2-4 FA

12 JMC Ammunition Assessment ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED
MND-N 3BCT, 82AD 3BCT, 1CD 4BCT, 2ID 1BCT, 10MTN 4BCT, 1CD 1 CAB 111 EN BDE X X X X X X X 3 82 o 3 1 4 2 1 10 4 1 1 111 o A H 4 9 1 1 1 505 5 73 1 87 1 9 1 6 2 o 1 2 7 4 6 2 505 9 2 22 19 1 3 3 2 12 1 71 5 82 3 1 12 4 STB STB 1 319 2 o o o 23 3 6 4 2 1 GS BSB 1 38 2 82 o o o 202 BSB 1 STB 27 1 6 3 STB 3 STB 10 BSB ASB 601 82 BSB 215 BSB NOT ASSESSED ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED COMPLETED 143 CSSB 23 ROC 17 CSSB 18 EOD 87 33 38 PERCENT COMPLETED NUMBER COMPLETED TARGET UNITS 116 ENG 552 MP 12 CAB

13 JMC Ammunition Assessment
MNF-W 2 REGT, 2 MarD 1BCT, 3 ID 6 REGT, 2 MarD III X III 2 1 3 6 2 II 3 I B 1 II 2 DS I 159 II 1 II 1 77 1 II 1 3 I B 1 II 2 6 I II II B 2 I 3 69 BSTB I II 1 7 R 11 II II BSB 3 II A 2 1 9 II 1 4 II II 7 5 1 41 II 2 7 TACON NOT ASSESSED TACON COMPLETED ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED 78 7 9 PERCENT COMPLETED NUMBER COMPLETED TARGET UNITS OPCON To 1 BCT 3ID II (-) 3 7 2/504 PIR 787 CSSB USMC ASP AL ASAD II 1 8 264 CSSB 478 EN BN B CO, 1/52 AVN

14 JMC Ammo Assessment Observations
ATHP doctrine working very well within theater Less ammo stored in unit areas Less ammo issued to unit – being retained at ATHP tons of ammunition forward of ASPs/ATHPs -- primarily small ammunition items (small arms ammo, 40mm ammunition, flares and grenades) ~ 35% of ammunition still packaged ~ 65% requires packaging Assessed ammunition encompasses 12,000+ ammo lot segments that require significant sorting and repacking Vast majority of stock visually in serviceable condition Minimal unserviceable ammunition on hand EOD handling demilitarization workload Units not unnecessarily unpacking ammunition ATHPs very well constructed using HESCO Barriers Speaker Notes First Bullet -- ATHP doctrine is working very well within the theater -- Theater Sustainment Command has overall responsibility to ensure stocks of positioned to support the warfighter. This mission is executed through the TSA, CSA, ASP’s and ATHP’s. Ammunition Transfer and Handling Point doctrine established a holding point forward of the Ammunition Supply Points. This holding area (looks and acts like a mini ASP) is operated by the Brigade Support Battalion, usually with an Ammunition Warrant OIC and a staff of MOS 89B NCO’s and soldiers to perform the receipt, storage, inventory, issue and shipping functions. Use of the ATHP resulted in two big benefits (Assessment Team perspective) -- reduced the amount of ammunition issued to using units to be controlled by personnel untrained in ammunition operations and secondly, provides a controlled area for the storage of unit held stocks not immediately needed to support operations in 20’ ISO containers within the ATHP, greatly enhancing explosives safety. Second Bullet – As noted above, the quantity of ammunition forward of the ATHPs is less than expected. However, the ammunition types of ammunition involved (primarily small arms ammunition, grenades, flares and 40mm ammunition) require extensive packaging. Based on assessment team observations, an estimated 35% of noted ammunition is properly packaged and 65% requires repackaging. Third Bullet – Following up on the previous thought, the assessed ammunition encompassed nearly 400 ammunition DODICs and in excess of 12,000 ammunition lots segments. This means there is significant sorting and packaging to do at the time of unit turn-in. Fourth Bullet – The good news --- vast majority of assessed ammunition was in visually good condition. The ammunition is certainly showing the effects of being unpacked and in the hands of units for long periods of time but in general, the ammunition is still visually serviceable and will be able to be reset to meet future requirements. Fifth Bullet -- The Assessment Team encountered very limited quantities of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable (CC-H) ammunition at the ATHP’s or in the hands of using units. The team was told repeatedly that EOD units were providing regularly disposing of CC-H stocks in a timely manner. Sixth Bullet – The physical condition of the ATHPs is much better than anticipated by the Assessment Team. Several locations have been reconstructed in the past year and the use of HESCO barricades is common throughout Iraq. The design has been standardized and HESCO barricades are being properly employed to construct individual storage cells with room for six each 20’ ISO containers and with an explosives limit of 8,800 lbs. of Hazard Class/Division 1.1 munitions per cell. A big success story.

15 JMC Ammo Assessment Recommendations
No central theater level packaging management Inventory of ammunition packaging items not maintained on SAAS – Mod accountable records Recommendation: Units comply with regulations to maintain SAAS - Mod accountable records of on-hand packaging materials At the unit level, packaging material not retained after ammunition opened Recommendation: Implement automatic returns policy Recommendation: Command wide policy directing units to return designated packaging to ATHP Theater ammunition packaging material stockpile is not well established Recommendation: Use Ammunition Assessment findings as basis for packaging requirements Recommendation: Position required ammunition packaging materials at CSA and ASP’s in Iraq for call forward by ATHP’s on an “as required” basis to support turn-in operations. Approximately 115 suspended/restricted ammunition lots noted consisting of 46 DODIC’s and 230 lot segments The RIP/TOA process has contributed to loss of visibility of large majority of suspended/restricted ammunition lots Recommendation: Incorporate new procedures into RIP/TOA process to ensure identification and removal of suspended munitions from the hands of user No system to easily track ammunition lot numbers at unit level. Very few units properly record ammunition lot numbers Recommendation: CASCOM develop system for unit level use SAAS Mod communication from ATHP/ASP’s to the TSC often interrupted Recommendation: Ensure the SAAS VSAT (hardware) is employed as intended Speaker Notes First Bullet -- Recommendations are self explanatory. Second Bullet -- Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process has resulted in many ammunition lots remaining in the hands of units for four plus years in harsh, combat conditions. Many ammunition lots have been passed from unit without regard to maintaining records that contain lot identity or integrity. RIP/TOA process allows units to “fall in” on ammunition that is not part of the incoming unit’s Basic Load. Even though there is no authorization for the ammunition, the excess ammunition is retained “just in case” it may be needed at some future date. In some cases it was observed that units had munitions on hand and were not authorized the weapon that it was used with (such as 25MM ammunition) but no Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Adequate time is often not allowed to conduct a thorough inventory during the RIP/TOA process. Leading to inaccurate records. This may be a mission stopper for another unit that may be in short supply of a critical item. Serviceability inspections are not a routine part of the RIP/TOA process. Unserviceable ammunition is being transferred from unit to unit. This could be prevented by the unit requesting a courtesy inspection well in advance of the RIP/TOA through the Brigade Ammunition Officer (BAO). The BAO in turn would contact an Ammunition Logistics Assistance Representative (LAR)/QASAS (Quality Assurance Specialist Ammunition Surveillance). QASAS could target suspected types of ammunition during a RIP/TOA (example: 40MM) for unit swap out at the ASPs/ATHPs. Provide additional QASAS support during the RIP/TOA process to target lots from the Assessment Team report and inspect for serviceability during exchange process Assess units two (2) months before RIP/TOA Ensure target types of munitions are positioned at the ASP/ATHP before the RIP/TOA. Third Bullet – Multiple instances were noted about problems with ATHP communication of SAAS-Mod data to the Theater Sustainment Command. At the time of the Assessment Team visit to the ASP at FOB Adder, the ASP had not had connectivity with the TSC for over two weeks – the problems included a physical problem with a severed cable that linked the ASP to other communications systems on Tallil AB. In the absence of land line communication as noted above, the ASP staff should have been able to communicate with the TSC through the use of the SAAS Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite ground station. However, the VSAT satellite ground station was not available for use at the ASP. Equipment intended for use at the ASPs/ATHPs needs to be available for use.

16 JMC Ammo Assessment Recommendations
Limited ammunition training at unit level 316th ESC is developing unit level training program Recommendation: Export 316th ESC program theater wide Personnel very motivated to do a good job- HOOAH! Warrant Officers/NCOs expressed concerns with lack of adequate SAAS Mod training for Ammunition MOS 89B personnel Recommendation: Develop mobile training team to travel to each ATHP requesting training, or develop resident course at a location in Iraq Valid Storage Licenses do not exist for all locations Recommendation: Commanders work with unit safety personnel to ensure completion Encroachment at many ammunition storage areas ATHP’s with inadequate safety distances without approved waivers/exemptions Unit level storage in billeting areas/motor pools Recommendation: Commanders ensure risk management methodologies are employed to properly address associated risks; include preparation of required waivers/exemptions documenting deviations from established DOD and DA explosives safety standards Ammunition lot segregation in unit storage is not well maintained Recommendation: Unit ammunition warrant officers develop ammunition storage guidance addressing proper storage practices Varied methods being utilized to provide protection from indirect fire Recommendation: Establish command policy directing use of overhead protection method that does not render the ISO containers unusable Speaker Notes First Bullet – The Assessment Team discussed this issue with staff members from ARCENT G4-Ammo and 316th ESC. Ammo warrants at each organization agree with the team observations. 316th ESC is currently developing a training program for unit level ammunition personnel. Second Bullet – NCOs and Ammunition Warrant Officers stated concerns about the level of SAAS-Mod skills possessed by assigned ammo personnel. The need for a training program to improve the skills of assigned personnel was discussed with ARCENT G4-Ammo and 316th ESC staffs. NOTE: It is the feeling of some Assessment Team members that the reasons for lack of SAAS-Mod skills are twofold. First, implementation of the ATHP doctrine has resulted in the assignment of many WO1 ammunition warrant officers to brigade level ATHP billets; in many cases the young ammo warrant does not have an extensive SAAS-Mod experience base on which to draw. Secondly, in CONUS ATHP ammo personnel rarely, if ever, get to “work ammo”; therefore, personnel arrive in theater with only those skills retained from schoolhouse training and no real world experience on which to draw. Third Bullet – Multiple storage locations were not in possession of a valid storage license. The storage license states the quantity of new explosives weight for each hazard class and division that can be stored in each potential explosive site (PES) in compliance with Department of the Army (DA) explosives safety standards. Absence of a license can easily result in storage of ammunition in quantities that are not in compliance with DA requirements. Commanders need to work with safety personnel to ensure proper licenses are in place and complied with to ensure safe storage. Assignment of two explosives safety experts from the US Army Defense Ammunition Center to the MNC-I staff early next year will provided much needed in theater technical expertise to enhance the explosives safety licensing process. Fourth Bullet – See above comments. Commanders need to ensure that risk management methodologies are employed to properly address associated risks; include preparation of required waivers/exemptions documenting deviations from established DOD and DA explosives safety standards. Fifth Bullet – Ammunition lot segregation/separation in storage is an integral part of effective ammunition management at the unit level. In many cases, the assessment team encountered unit level personnel with little or no knowledge of ammunition lot numbers and/or ammunition storage techniques. Increased emphasis on educating using unit personnel who are storing ammunition in unit level ISO containers inside ATHP’s will improve unit storage practices. Sixth Bullet – Multiple methods of providing top cover for ISO containers to protect ammunition stocks from indirect fire were observed. Some methods worked well while other methods rendered ISO containers unusable for the movement of ammunition through the transportation system. Photos are available.

17 Support To Ammo Retrograde/Reset
What the Theater Can Do Establish theater wide ammunition packaging management program Improve SAAS MOD communication between ASPs/ATHPs and Theater Sustainment Command Position ammunition packaging material forward of the Theater Storage Area (TSA) Continue providing same level of outstanding EOD ammunition demilitarization support Speaker Notes First Bullet – Ammunition packaging availability is critical to successful ammunition retrograde/reset operations. The principal goal of retrograde/reset is to ensure that the reset ammunition is in a “ready to issue” condition following the reset process. Later slides will detail ongoing actions to address this issue. If ATHP management continues the practice of not unpacking the ammunition until used, it will greatly enhance and reduce the level of effort required to retrograde/reset in theater ammunition stocks. Second Bullet – It’s all about communication. Ammunition management decisions are made based on available information. Third Bullet – Unit turn-in operations will be enhanced if the proper ammunition packaging materials (within reason) can be positioned forward of the Theater Storage Area in Kuwait to support unit turn-ins at ATHPs/ASPs in Iraq. For example, recently turned in 120mm tank main gun ammunition was received at Camp Liberty ASP in an unserviceable condition -- approximately 180 unserviceable, uneconomically repairable rounds were included in the turn-in of approximately 500 rounds. Damage to many of the unserviceable rounds was the result of improper packaging methods employed for movement of the rounds to Camp Liberty – having the proper packaging (PA116 metal square rimmed container with internal support sleeve) at the initial turn-in location would have prevented the damage. HQ, Joint Munitions Command, in cooperation with the 316th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), has placed an ammunition manager at the 316th to work this issue. Mr. Bob Wild will assist in the requirements determination process and will facilitate improved communication between the theater and HQ, JMC. Fourth Bullet – Continued EOD demilitarization support will greatly assist in reducing time and energy spent processing unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition.Given the assessed tonnage of unpackaged ammunition a theater wide ammunition packaging management program will contribute to a successful ammunition retrograde/reset program.

18 ATHP Doctrine Working Well Highly Motivated Soldiers
Summary ATHP Doctrine Working Well Highly Motivated Soldiers Great Support Provided to Ammunition Assessment Team Successfully Gathered Ammunition and Packaging Data Speaker Notes First Bullet – As discussed earlier. Less ammo in the hands of units while still supporting mission requirements is a good thing. Second Bullet – Great soldiers trying to do the right thing. Third Bullet – Great support at all levels. Fourth Bullet – The team accomplished all that it set out to do. The great support made the job easier and we accomplished the mission in less time than planned. HOOAH!!!!! HOOAH!!!!! HOOAH!!!!!

19 Ammunition Assessment Team
Back Row: Jim Gahagan, Mike Griffith, Bob Wild, Ed Averill, John Barton, Bill Sykes, Jim Gray Front Row: Doug Maddox (kneeling), Dave Tipp (kneeling), Jim Young (standing)

20 US Army Joint Munitions Command Points of Contact
Assessment Project Manager Ms. Lisa Swanson Director, Munitions Readiness Directorate US Army Joint Munitions Command ATTN: AMSJM-RD 1 Rock Island Arsenal Rock Island, IL DSN (312) NIPR: SIPR: Assessment Team Chief Mr. Doug Maddox Chief, Ammunition Surveillance Division US Army Joint Munitions Command ATTN: AMSJM-QAS 1 Rock Island Arsenal Rock Island, IL DSN (312) NIPR: SIPR: JMC In-Theater Senior Command Representative Mr. Tom Evans 402nd AFSB APO AE 09391 DSN (312) , Opt #1, Ext 6528 VOIP NIPR: SIPR: Assessment Team Leader Mr. James Gray, JMC Senior Command Representative to HQ, USCENTCOM HQ, US Central Command ATTN: CCJ4-O 7715 South Boundary Blvd Tampa, FL 33621 DSN (312) NIPR: SIPR: Joint Munitions Command Operations Center Ammo Desk -- Available 24/7 DSN: (312) ; NIPR: SIPR:

21 EXAMPLE Packaging Requirements for Cartridge, 5.56mm (1305-A059)
Packed 10rds/clip, 3 clips per cardboard box, 7 cardboard boxes per bandoleer, 4 bandoleers per M2A1 can, 2 M2A1 cans per wirebound box DODIC DODAAC/UIC ITEM QTY REQUIRING PACKAGING COMPONENT QTY REQUIRED A059 WAQPY1 Bandoleer 35,000 168 Carton 1,166 Clip 3,500 M2A1 Ammo Box 42 Magazine Filler Pallets, Wood 40"x48" 1 Seals 21 Wirebound Box EXAMPLE Data detail provided at the UIC level Packaging components listed individually Calculated Component Requirement

22 Assessed Tonnage --- MND-B

23 Assessed Tonnage --- MND-C

24 Assessed Tonnage --- MND-N

25 Assessed Tonnage --- MNF-W

26 Effective Indirect Fire Protection Methods

27 Indirect Fire Protection That Caused Damage

28 Ammunition Damaged During Transit Due to Improper Packaging
Cartridge Case Separation 120MM Tank Ammunition 120MM Tank Ammunition 120MM Tank Ammunition *Total Loss of $400, in Assets

29 Examples of Bad Storage Practices

30 Examples of Bad Storage Practices

31 Examples of Good Storage Practices

32 Examples of Good Storage Practices

33 Lack of Lot Segregation
Box markings 36 ea Signal, Illumination, Green Star (L305) Signal, Illum, Green Star, Parachute (L305) Signal, Illum, Red Star, Cluster (L306) Four distinct groups of signals inside box Signal, Illum, Green Star, Cluster (L314) Signal, Illum, White Star, Parachute (L312)

34 Lack of Lot Segregation

35 Lack of Lot Segregation
Box markings 36 ea Signal, Illumination, Green Star (L305) Signal, Illum, Green Star, Parachute (L305) Signal, Illum, Red Star, Cluster (L306) Four distinct groups of signals inside box Signal, Illum, Green Star, Cluster (L314) Signal, Illum, White Star, Parachute (L312)

36 ATHP Construction -- HESCO Barriers


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