Presentation on theme: "JMC Ammo Assessment Outbrief November 2007"— Presentation transcript:
1JMC Ammo Assessment Outbrief November 2007 US Army Joint Munitions CommandAmmunition Assessment TeamMr. Doug MaddoxMr. James GrayMr. James YoungMr. Mike Griffith
2Bottom Line Up Front ATHP Doctrine Working Well Highly Motivated Soldiers but Additional Ammo Training NeededBetter Guidance Needed to Manage Suspended AmmunitionRIP/TOA Process Needs ImprovementDerivative UICs Usage Hampers Asset VisibilityEOD Units Doing Great JobSuccessfully Gathered Ammo and Packaging DataOutstanding Support to Ammo Assessment TeamFirst Bullet -- Ammunition Transfer and Handling Point doctrine established a holding point forward of the Ammunition Supply Points. This holding area (looks and acts like a mini ASP) is operated by the Brigade Support Battalion, usually with an Ammunition Warrant OIC and a staff of MOS 89B NCO’s and soldiers to perform the receipt, storage, inventory, issue and shipping functions. Use of the ATHP resulted in two big benefits (JMC perspective) -- reduced the amount of ammunition issued to using units to be controlled by personnel untrained in ammunition operations and secondly, provides a controlled area for the storage of unit held stocks not immediately needed to support operations in 20’ ISO containers within the ATHP, greatly enhancing explosives safety.Second Bullet – Nearly all soldiers encountered were enthusiastic and motivated to do a good job. In majority of units assessed, NCO’s and soldiers assigned duties as the “unit ammo NCO” have limited if any training in the storage, handling, accounting and issuing of ammunition at the time of assuming the responsibility for the unit’s ammunition. The Assessment Team provided guidance and assistance where possible including providing Yellow Books, unit ammunition guides, condition code cards, and examples of explosives safety documentation. Additionally, we provided theater points of contact and website information for HQ, JMC, the Defense Ammunition Center and other ammunition related sites.Third Bullet – The Assessment Team recorded the ammunition lot number for all noted lots during the assessment. A comparison of the noted ammunition lots to the Joint Munitions Command suspension/restriction data base was performed. In total, approximately suspended/restricted ammunition lots are being held in the hands of units. Each unit/brigade was notified of the on-hand suspended/restricted lots to ensure appropriate actions are taken to remove the lots from unit possession. The JMC SCR is addressing ways to better identify suspended/restricted lots in the hands of units during the RIP/TOA process.Fourth Bullet – Related to the previous bullet. Improved processes to physically examine ammunition during the RIP/TOA process are being examined. Additionally, it was reported by multiple units that only limited time was available during the RIP/TOA for the conduct of ammunition inventories. Therefore, incoming units often do not have an accurate listing of on-hand assets at the time they begin their tour.Fifth Bullet – Derivative UIC’s are assigned to units by HQDA, G-3 for the TAMIS training system tracking. Units are taking this generated UIC to draw Unit Basic Load in the place of their home station identification number. Starting 1 Dec 07, HQDA, G-3 will start linking the derivative UIC to the home station identification number in the hope of being able to track units while deployed from home station. By doctrine, SAAS-Mod documentation indicates the DODAAC of the receiving unit, thereby providing visibility of the location of assets. However, when derivative UIC’s are used it is not possible to track ammunition issues to the actual unit having possession of the ammunition. The audit trail stops at the unit with the assigned DODAAC level.Sixth Bullet – The Assessment Team encountered very limited quantities of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable (CC-H) ammunition at the ATHP’s or in the hands of using units. The team was told repeatedly that EOD units were providing regularly disposing of CC-H stocks in a timely manner.Seventh Bullet – Assessment Team visited 140+ units, assessing on-hand stocks at each unit.Eighth Bullet – Assessment Team received outstanding support from all assessed units, ATHP personnel and AMC organizations.
3JMC Ammo Assessment The Mission Assist Commanders in their ammo operationsDetermine ammo packaging requirementsIdentify serviceable vs unserviceable ammoEnsure safe ammo storage at FOBsAssist Commanders in their ammo operations --- The assessment team routinely provided ammunition storage, handling, accountability, identification, serviceability, packaging and explosives safety guidance to unit ammunition personnel. The team removed all noted unsafe/unserviceable ammunition from unit use; ensuring that these munitions were segregated in storage to prevent future use. The team provided multiple technical reference materials to unit personnel to include Yellow Books, unit ammunition guides, condition code cards, and examples of explosives safety documentation. Additionally, we provided theater points of contact and website information for HQ, JMC, the Defense Ammunition Center and other ammunition related sites. Training in the use of the Munitions History Program (MHP) was provided to several organizations.Determine packaging requirements – The assessment team assessed ammunition in the hands of over 120 battalion sized units. We assessed ammunition in the hands of units through examination of stocks retained at the unit level – in most cases this was accomplished by visual examination of the stocks stored in unit level ISO containers. In select cases, the team also examined ammunition stored on uploaded vehicles, combat outposts and unit arms rooms. Additionally, the team discussed ammunition performance with combat users to include tank crews, gun crews, combat escort personnel, aviators, combat engineers, EOD personnel and combat infantrymen.Identify serviceable versus unserviceable - As the team visually examined stocks, attention was always focused on noting any visually unserviceable stocks. Additionally, all noted ammunition lot numbers were recorded to allow a suspension/restriction check to be completed. Analysis was performed on all noted lots. Results of suspension/restriction check, along with a listing of all noted ammunition lots, were provided to each unit.Ensure safe storage at FOBs – The team discussed storage licenses and explosives safety limits at each visited location. Explosives safety guidance was provided to unit personnel that addressed such basic tenets as separating blasting caps from other items, Net Explosives Weight limits, safe storage practices, segregation of unserviceable and foreign ammunition to prevent unintended use, basic principals of the hazard class/division concepts and compatibility requirements.
4JMC Ammo Assessment What Was Accomplished Observed general ammunition storage conditions.Reviewed unit ammunition listing for on-hand DODIC's and quantitiesAssessed ammunition statusDetermined approximate on-hand quantitiesDetermined general/overall condition by DODICDetermined packing/packaging/palletization statusReviewed explosives storage license/storage authorization documentationDetermined compliance with storage license/storage authorization documentationProvided technical ammunition storage/handling guidanceChecked ammunition suspension/restriction statusRecordedISO container serial numbersS/N of Cat 1 missiles and rockets – no undue handling or movementObserved general ammunition storage conditions --- Team observed storage conditions that varied from very good (ISO containers neatly organized, DODIC’s separated in storage, ammunition lots separated (or identified in containers with multiple lots), unserviceable stocks segregated from serviceable stocks) to very bad (containers not neatly organized, containers with mixed storage of other classes of supply in addition to ammunition, little or no DODIC separation, ammo container markings not visible, lot numbers not marked on substitute ammo cans (M2A1 containers)). Use of HESCO barriers is very widespread – in general, physical condition of newly constructed/renovated ATHP’s exceeded expectations. The HESCO barricades are being used correctly, providing cells for the storage of 8,800 lbs NEW of 1.1 munitions per cell.Reviewed unit ammunition listing for on-hand DODIC's and quantities --- Team reviewed unit provided ammunition lot/quantity listings (if available) and unit LOGSTAR reports. The assessment team worked with unit personnel to resolve gross inaccuracies noted during the visit – majority of errors were the result of transcription errors.Assessed ammunition statusDetermined approximate on-hand quantitiesDetermined general/overall condition by DODICDetermined packing/packaging/palletization statusNo significant speaker notes to add – the sub bullets speak for themselves.Reviewed explosives storage license/storage authorization documentationDetermined compliance with storage license/storage authorizationdocumentationProvided technical ammunition storage/handling guidanceThe team discussed storage licenses and explosives safety limits at each visited location. Explosives safety guidance was provided to unit personnel that addressed such basic tenets as separating blasting caps from other items, Net Explosives Weight limits, safe storage practices, segregation of unserviceable and foreign ammunition to prevent unintended use, basic principals of the hazard class/division concepts and compatibility requirements. Explosives safety storage license requirements were discussed with units that did not have a valid license for their storage locations. Tactics, practices and procedures for the safe storage of ammunition were stressed.Checked ammunition suspension/restriction statusAdditionally, all noted ammunition lot numbers were recorded to allow a suspension/restriction check to be completed. Analysis was performed on all noted lots. Results of suspension/restriction check, along with a listing of all noted ammunition lots, were provided to each unit.Recorded ISO container serial numbersAt the request of HQ, JMC Transportation Division, the team recorded S/N of over xxxxxx ISO containers. S/N’s were provided to HQ, JMC Transportation Division staff for analysis, as required, in coordination with SDDC and USTRANSCOM.Recorded S/N of Cat 1 missiles and rockets – no undue handling or movementAt the request of HQDA, G4, Munitions Division; the team recorded viewable S/N’s for all observed Category 1 missiles. In total the team recorded S/N’s for approximately 3600 missiles/rockets (mainly AT4’s) – missile S/N’s were recorded either from the outer pack, inner pack or item based on the assessed unit’s storage configuration. The team did not open outer packs for the sole purpose of noting a S/N on an individual item. Listing of noted S/N’s was provided to each assessed unit, ARCENT G4-Ammo, 1st Theater Sustainment Command and made the data available to HQDA, G4, Ammunition Division through the assessment server.
5JMC Ammo Assessment Pre-Assessment Assumptions ~ 60,000 tons in theaterEstimated 20, ,000 tons forward of ASPs/ATHPsQuantity, packaging, and condition of ammo unknownLarge quantities require packagingPackaging material largely unavailableLarge volume of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition (CC-H)The ~60K short tons figure was obtained by starting with the on-hand quantities of ammunition on hand on 9/11APS-5 stocks on hand on 9/11 (Qatar)PlusAmmunition stocks in Kuwait on 9/11Ammunition downloaded from the MV Carter (APS-3) in 2003 and 2004JMC directed ammunition shipments to theaterAmmunition brought to theater by the 4IDLessReported expenditures (combat and retrograde) (Early MUREP expenditure reporting was poor, at best)Ammunition retrograded to date (CONUS and other locations)equals20,000 to 25,000 ton estimate of ammunition in front of the ASPs/ATHPs was based on our understanding of existing accountability systems. Lack of reporting of on-hand assets at the ATHP’s to WARS led to JMC only having visibility of assets in the TSA and the ASP’s. Until relatively recently ( ) ammunition forward of the ASP’s was not maintained on Standard Army Ammunition System – Modernized (SAAS-Mod). Command emphasis by the 1st Theater Sustainment Command has resulted in nearly all ATHP’s now reporting via SAAS-Mod to WARS.A mature expenditure reporting process did not exist in theater until mid There is very little accurate expenditure data for the early days of OIF1. Proper expenditure reporting drives future budget requirements for acquisition.
6JMC Ammo Assessment What We Found ~ 65K tons of USA ammunition in theater31.0K tons in Theater Storage Area (Kuwait)18.5K tons in MNC-I ASP’s (Five locations in Iraq)8.6K tons in MNC-I ATHP’s (14 locations in Iraq)6.5K to 7.5K tons forward of ASPs/ATHPs (UBL + excess)Quantity and condition of ammo~ 5000 tons require packagingIncludes US Army and USMC ammunitionConsiderable quantities of small itemsSmall Arms Ammunition40MM ammunitionFlaresGrenades~12,000 ammunition lot segmentsLimited packaging material available in IraqVirtually no packaging material retained for uploaded ammoMinimal CC-H (unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition )65K tons of USA ammunition in theater31.0K tons in Theater Storage Area (Kuwait)18.5K tons in MNC-I ASP’s (Five locations in Iraq)8.6K tons in MNC-I ATHP’s (14 locations in Iraq)6.5K to 7.5K tons forward of ASPs/ATHPsNote: 6.5 to 7.5 ton forward of ASP’s/ATHP’s includes all ammunition assessed during the visit plus an estimated quantity of ammunition in the hands of units not assessed. The analysis included a review of MNC-I Op Ord 07-01, Annex A; an in-depth analysis of the number and type of units assessed and the number and type of units not assessed. The analysis considered weapon densities, type of unit, size of unit, unit ammunition basic load and mission unique factors. The assessed quantities were then extrapolated to estimate the total quantities of ammunition in theater requiring retrograde/reset.Anecdotal reports received prior to the assessment team visited, as well as past history during Desert Storm and OIF1/OIF2, indicated large quantities of unserviceable ammunition was in the ASP’s. Additionally, other reports indicated that EOD personnel were over burdened with Counter IED missions and were not able to fully support ammunition demil operations. The assess visit disproves this assumption – the team encountered minimal quantities of unserviceable ammunition and was repeated told that EOD units are providing excellent support in disposing of unserviceable stocks. In some cases, EOD personnel are calling on ATHP staff personnel on a regular basis to determine if there is an available stocks that require demilitarization.
10JMC Ammunition Assessment Additional Units Assessed MND-B1BCT, 1CD2BCT, 1CD2BCT, 1ID2BCT, 2ID2BCT, 82 AD2 SCR4 BCT, 1ID1 CD CAB35 EN BDE112121222822411351749153613732141AAAA227130254213251812RSSRSSRSSRSS1182UUUUU227203821641504126281283UUUUU227MMMMM522STBSTBSTB21221623252124AAAA22718215BSBBSBBSB232269231922615ASBASBASBASBASB19((--))STBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTBSTB2172BTBBTBSTB4STBSTBSTB1152BSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSBBSB299FSBFSBFSBFSBSTBSTBSTB407BSBBSB610BSBBSBBSB2BSBBSBBSBNOT ASSESSEDAdditional Units AssessedCOMPLETED1/37 FA1/7 FABRTE 1-5 CAVTARGET UNITSNUMBER COMPLETEDPERCENT COMPLETED5042841/23 INF29 INF HHC504 MI769 EN92 MP210 BSB
11JMC Ammunition Assessment ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED MND-C2BCT, 3ID2BCT, 10 MTN3BCT, 3ID4BCT, 25ID3RD CAB23210334253301214151AAAA150113401431UUUU313509231-9B189UMUMUU11023774323STB1523STBAAAAA425STB317STB2BSBASBASB26BSTBBSB203725BSB603ASBASBASBBSB210COMPLETEDADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED10026PERCENT COMPLETEDNUMBER COMPLETEDTARGETUNITS164 ENG2-4 FA
12JMC Ammunition Assessment ADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED MND-N3BCT, 82AD3BCT, 1CD4BCT, 2ID1BCT, 10MTN4BCT, 1CD1 CAB111 EN BDEXXXXXXX382o3142110411111oAH4911150557318719162o12746250592221913321217158231124STBSTB13192ooo2336421GSBSB138282ooo202BSB1STB27163STB3STB10BSBASB60182BSB215BSBNOT ASSESSEDADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSEDCOMPLETED143 CSSB23 ROC17 CSSB18 EOD873338PERCENT COMPLETEDNUMBER COMPLETEDTARGETUNITS116 ENG552 MP12 CAB
13JMC Ammunition Assessment MNF-W2 REGT, 2 MarD1BCT, 3 ID6 REGT, 2 MarDIIIXIII21362II3IB1II2DSI159II1II1771II13IB1II26IIIIIB2I369BSTBIII17R11IIIIBSB3IIA219II14IIII75141II27TACONNOT ASSESSEDTACONCOMPLETEDADDITIONAL UNITS ASSESSED7879PERCENT COMPLETEDNUMBER COMPLETEDTARGETUNITSOPCON To 1 BCT 3IDII(-)372/504 PIR787 CSSBUSMC ASP AL ASADII18264 CSSB478 EN BNB CO, 1/52 AVN
14JMC Ammo Assessment Observations ATHP doctrine working very well within theaterLess ammo stored in unit areasLess ammo issued to unit – being retained at ATHPtons of ammunition forward of ASPs/ATHPs -- primarily small ammunition items (small arms ammo, 40mm ammunition, flares and grenades)~ 35% of ammunition still packaged~ 65% requires packagingAssessed ammunition encompasses 12,000+ ammo lot segments that require significant sorting and repackingVast majority of stock visually in serviceable conditionMinimal unserviceable ammunition on handEOD handling demilitarization workloadUnits not unnecessarily unpacking ammunitionATHPs very well constructed using HESCO BarriersSpeaker NotesFirst Bullet -- ATHP doctrine is working very well within the theater -- Theater Sustainment Command has overall responsibility to ensure stocks of positioned to support the warfighter. This mission is executed through the TSA, CSA, ASP’s and ATHP’s. Ammunition Transfer and Handling Point doctrine established a holding point forward of the Ammunition Supply Points. This holding area (looks and acts like a mini ASP) is operated by the Brigade Support Battalion, usually with an Ammunition Warrant OIC and a staff of MOS 89B NCO’s and soldiers to perform the receipt, storage, inventory, issue and shipping functions. Use of the ATHP resulted in two big benefits (Assessment Team perspective) -- reduced the amount of ammunition issued to using units to be controlled by personnel untrained in ammunition operations and secondly, provides a controlled area for the storage of unit held stocks not immediately needed to support operations in 20’ ISO containers within the ATHP, greatly enhancing explosives safety.Second Bullet – As noted above, the quantity of ammunition forward of the ATHPs is less than expected. However, the ammunition types of ammunition involved (primarily small arms ammunition, grenades, flares and 40mm ammunition) require extensive packaging. Based on assessment team observations, an estimated 35% of noted ammunition is properly packaged and 65% requires repackaging.Third Bullet – Following up on the previous thought, the assessed ammunition encompassed nearly 400 ammunition DODICs and in excess of 12,000 ammunition lots segments. This means there is significant sorting and packaging to do at the time of unit turn-in.Fourth Bullet – The good news --- vast majority of assessed ammunition was in visually good condition. The ammunition is certainly showing the effects of being unpacked and in the hands of units for long periods of time but in general, the ammunition is still visually serviceable and will be able to be reset to meet future requirements.Fifth Bullet -- The Assessment Team encountered very limited quantities of unserviceable, uneconomically repairable (CC-H) ammunition at the ATHP’s or in the hands of using units. The team was told repeatedly that EOD units were providing regularly disposing of CC-H stocks in a timely manner.Sixth Bullet – The physical condition of the ATHPs is much better than anticipated by the Assessment Team. Several locations have been reconstructed in the past year and the use of HESCO barricades is common throughout Iraq. The design has been standardized and HESCO barricades are being properly employed to construct individual storage cells with room for six each 20’ ISO containers and with an explosives limit of 8,800 lbs. of Hazard Class/Division 1.1 munitions per cell. A big success story.
15JMC Ammo Assessment Recommendations No central theater level packaging managementInventory of ammunition packaging items not maintained on SAAS – Mod accountable recordsRecommendation: Units comply with regulations to maintain SAAS - Mod accountable records of on-hand packaging materialsAt the unit level, packaging material not retained after ammunition openedRecommendation: Implement automatic returns policyRecommendation: Command wide policy directing units to return designated packaging to ATHPTheater ammunition packaging material stockpile is not well establishedRecommendation: Use Ammunition Assessment findings as basis for packaging requirementsRecommendation: Position required ammunition packaging materials at CSA and ASP’s in Iraq for call forward by ATHP’s on an “as required” basis to support turn-in operations.Approximately 115 suspended/restricted ammunition lots noted consisting of 46 DODIC’s and 230 lot segmentsThe RIP/TOA process has contributed to loss of visibility of large majority of suspended/restricted ammunition lotsRecommendation: Incorporate new procedures into RIP/TOA process to ensure identification and removal of suspended munitions from the hands of userNo system to easily track ammunition lot numbers at unit level. Very few units properly record ammunition lot numbersRecommendation: CASCOM develop system for unit level useSAAS Mod communication from ATHP/ASP’s to the TSC often interruptedRecommendation: Ensure the SAAS VSAT (hardware) is employed as intendedSpeaker NotesFirst Bullet -- Recommendations are self explanatory.Second Bullet -- Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process has resulted in many ammunition lots remaining in the hands of units for four plus years in harsh, combat conditions. Many ammunition lots have been passed from unit without regard to maintaining records that contain lot identity or integrity.RIP/TOA process allows units to “fall in” on ammunition that is not part of the incoming unit’s Basic Load. Even though there is no authorization for the ammunition, the excess ammunition is retained “just in case” it may be needed at some future date. In some cases it was observed that units had munitions on hand and were not authorized the weapon that it was used with (such as 25MM ammunition) but no Bradley Fighting Vehicle.Adequate time is often not allowed to conduct a thorough inventory during the RIP/TOA process. Leading to inaccurate records. This may be a mission stopper for another unit that may be in short supply of a critical item.Serviceability inspections are not a routine part of the RIP/TOA process. Unserviceable ammunition is being transferred from unit to unit. This could be prevented by the unit requesting a courtesy inspection well in advance of the RIP/TOA through the Brigade Ammunition Officer (BAO). The BAO in turn would contact an Ammunition Logistics Assistance Representative (LAR)/QASAS (Quality Assurance Specialist Ammunition Surveillance).QASAS could target suspected types of ammunition during a RIP/TOA (example: 40MM) for unit swap out at the ASPs/ATHPs. Provide additional QASAS support during the RIP/TOA process to target lots from the Assessment Team report and inspect for serviceability during exchange processAssess units two (2) months before RIP/TOAEnsure target types of munitions are positioned at the ASP/ATHP before the RIP/TOA.Third Bullet – Multiple instances were noted about problems with ATHP communication of SAAS-Mod data to the Theater Sustainment Command. At the time of the Assessment Team visit to the ASP at FOB Adder, the ASP had not had connectivity with the TSC for over two weeks – the problems included a physical problem with a severed cable that linked the ASP to other communications systems on Tallil AB. In the absence of land line communication as noted above, the ASP staff should have been able to communicate with the TSC through the use of the SAAS Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite ground station. However, the VSAT satellite ground station was not available for use at the ASP.Equipment intended for use at the ASPs/ATHPs needs to be available for use.
16JMC Ammo Assessment Recommendations Limited ammunition training at unit level316th ESC is developing unit level training programRecommendation: Export 316th ESC program theater widePersonnel very motivated to do a good job- HOOAH!Warrant Officers/NCOs expressed concerns with lack of adequate SAAS Mod training forAmmunition MOS 89B personnelRecommendation: Develop mobile training team to travel to each ATHP requesting training, or develop resident course at a location in IraqValid Storage Licenses do not exist for all locationsRecommendation: Commanders work with unit safety personnel to ensure completionEncroachment at many ammunition storage areasATHP’s with inadequate safety distances without approved waivers/exemptionsUnit level storage in billeting areas/motor poolsRecommendation: Commanders ensure risk management methodologies are employed to properly address associated risks; include preparation of required waivers/exemptions documenting deviations from established DOD and DA explosives safety standardsAmmunition lot segregation in unit storage is not well maintainedRecommendation: Unit ammunition warrant officers develop ammunition storage guidance addressing proper storage practicesVaried methods being utilized to provide protection from indirect fireRecommendation: Establish command policy directing use of overhead protection method that does not render the ISO containers unusableSpeaker NotesFirst Bullet – The Assessment Team discussed this issue with staff members from ARCENT G4-Ammo and 316th ESC. Ammo warrants at each organization agree with the team observations. 316th ESC is currently developing a training program for unit level ammunition personnel.Second Bullet – NCOs and Ammunition Warrant Officers stated concerns about the level of SAAS-Mod skills possessed by assigned ammo personnel. The need for a training program to improve the skills of assigned personnel was discussed with ARCENT G4-Ammo and 316th ESC staffs. NOTE: It is the feeling of some Assessment Team members that the reasons for lack of SAAS-Mod skills are twofold. First, implementation of the ATHP doctrine has resulted in the assignment of many WO1 ammunition warrant officers to brigade level ATHP billets; in many cases the young ammo warrant does not have an extensive SAAS-Mod experience base on which to draw. Secondly, in CONUS ATHP ammo personnel rarely, if ever, get to “work ammo”; therefore, personnel arrive in theater with only those skills retained from schoolhouse training and no real world experience on which to draw.Third Bullet – Multiple storage locations were not in possession of a valid storage license. The storage license states the quantity of new explosives weight for each hazard class and division that can be stored in each potential explosive site (PES) in compliance with Department of the Army (DA) explosives safety standards. Absence of a license can easily result in storage of ammunition in quantities that are not in compliance with DA requirements. Commanders need to work with safety personnel to ensure proper licenses are in place and complied with to ensure safe storage. Assignment of two explosives safety experts from the US Army Defense Ammunition Center to the MNC-I staff early next year will provided much needed in theater technical expertise to enhance the explosives safety licensing process.Fourth Bullet – See above comments. Commanders need to ensure that risk management methodologies are employed to properly address associated risks; include preparation of required waivers/exemptions documenting deviations from established DOD and DA explosives safety standards.Fifth Bullet – Ammunition lot segregation/separation in storage is an integral part of effective ammunition management at the unit level. In many cases, the assessment team encountered unit level personnel with little or no knowledge of ammunition lot numbers and/or ammunition storage techniques. Increased emphasis on educating using unit personnel who are storing ammunition in unit level ISO containers inside ATHP’s will improve unit storage practices.Sixth Bullet – Multiple methods of providing top cover for ISO containers to protect ammunition stocks from indirect fire were observed. Some methods worked well while other methods rendered ISO containers unusable for the movement of ammunition through the transportation system. Photos are available.
17Support To Ammo Retrograde/Reset What the Theater Can DoEstablish theater wide ammunition packaging management programImprove SAAS MOD communication between ASPs/ATHPs and Theater Sustainment CommandPosition ammunition packaging material forward of the Theater Storage Area (TSA)Continue providing same level of outstanding EOD ammunition demilitarization supportSpeaker NotesFirst Bullet – Ammunition packaging availability is critical to successful ammunition retrograde/reset operations. The principal goal of retrograde/reset is to ensure that the reset ammunition is in a “ready to issue” condition following the reset process. Later slides will detail ongoing actions to address this issue. If ATHP management continues the practice of not unpacking the ammunition until used, it will greatly enhance and reduce the level of effort required to retrograde/reset in theater ammunition stocks.Second Bullet – It’s all about communication. Ammunition management decisions are made based on available information.Third Bullet – Unit turn-in operations will be enhanced if the proper ammunition packaging materials (within reason) can be positioned forward of the Theater Storage Area in Kuwait to support unit turn-ins at ATHPs/ASPs in Iraq. For example, recently turned in 120mm tank main gun ammunition was received at Camp Liberty ASP in an unserviceable condition -- approximately 180 unserviceable, uneconomically repairable rounds were included in the turn-in of approximately 500 rounds. Damage to many of the unserviceable rounds was the result of improper packaging methods employed for movement of the rounds to Camp Liberty – having the proper packaging (PA116 metal square rimmed container with internal support sleeve) at the initial turn-in location would have prevented the damage.HQ, Joint Munitions Command, in cooperation with the 316th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), has placed an ammunition manager at the 316th to work this issue. Mr. Bob Wild will assist in the requirements determination process and will facilitate improved communication between the theater and HQ, JMC.Fourth Bullet – Continued EOD demilitarization support will greatly assist in reducing time and energy spent processing unserviceable, uneconomically repairable ammunition.Given the assessed tonnage of unpackaged ammunition a theater wide ammunition packaging management program will contribute to a successful ammunition retrograde/reset program.
18ATHP Doctrine Working Well Highly Motivated Soldiers SummaryATHP Doctrine Working WellHighly Motivated SoldiersGreat Support Provided to Ammunition Assessment TeamSuccessfully Gathered Ammunition and Packaging DataSpeaker NotesFirst Bullet – As discussed earlier. Less ammo in the hands of units while still supporting mission requirements is a good thing.Second Bullet – Great soldiers trying to do the right thing.Third Bullet – Great support at all levels.Fourth Bullet – The team accomplished all that it set out to do. The great support made the job easier and we accomplished the mission in less time than planned.HOOAH!!!!! HOOAH!!!!! HOOAH!!!!!
19Ammunition Assessment Team Back Row: Jim Gahagan, Mike Griffith, Bob Wild, Ed Averill, John Barton, Bill Sykes, Jim GrayFront Row: Doug Maddox (kneeling), Dave Tipp (kneeling), Jim Young (standing)
20US Army Joint Munitions Command Points of Contact Assessment Project ManagerMs. Lisa SwansonDirector, Munitions Readiness DirectorateUS Army Joint Munitions CommandATTN: AMSJM-RD1 Rock Island ArsenalRock Island, ILDSN (312)NIPR:SIPR:Assessment Team ChiefMr. Doug MaddoxChief, Ammunition Surveillance DivisionUS Army Joint Munitions CommandATTN: AMSJM-QAS1 Rock Island ArsenalRock Island, ILDSN (312)NIPR:SIPR:JMC In-Theater Senior Command RepresentativeMr. Tom Evans402nd AFSBAPO AE 09391DSN (312) , Opt #1, Ext 6528VOIPNIPR:SIPR:Assessment Team LeaderMr. James Gray, JMC Senior CommandRepresentative to HQ, USCENTCOMHQ, US Central CommandATTN: CCJ4-O7715 South Boundary BlvdTampa, FL 33621DSN (312)NIPR:SIPR:Joint Munitions Command Operations Center Ammo Desk -- Available 24/7DSN: (312) ; NIPR: SIPR:
21EXAMPLE Packaging Requirements for Cartridge, 5.56mm (1305-A059) Packed 10rds/clip, 3 clips per cardboard box, 7 cardboard boxes per bandoleer,4 bandoleers per M2A1 can, 2 M2A1 cans per wirebound boxDODICDODAAC/UICITEMQTY REQUIRING PACKAGINGCOMPONENT QTY REQUIREDA059WAQPY1Bandoleer35,000168Carton1,166Clip3,500M2A1 Ammo Box42Magazine FillerPallets, Wood 40"x48"1Seals21Wirebound BoxEXAMPLEData detailprovided atthe UIC levelPackaging componentslisted individuallyCalculatedComponentRequirement
33Lack of Lot Segregation Box markings–36 ea Signal, Illumination,Green Star (L305)Signal,Illum,Green Star,Parachute(L305)Signal,Illum,Red Star,Cluster(L306)Four distinct groupsof signals inside boxSignal, Illum, Green Star, Cluster (L314)Signal, Illum, White Star, Parachute (L312)
35Lack of Lot Segregation Box markings–36 ea Signal, Illumination,Green Star (L305)Signal,Illum,Green Star,Parachute(L305)Signal,Illum,Red Star,Cluster(L306)Four distinct groupsof signals inside boxSignal, Illum, Green Star, Cluster (L314)Signal, Illum, White Star, Parachute (L312)