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THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE 12 DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE THREE INDO-CHINA WARS.

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Presentation on theme: "THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE 12 DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE THREE INDO-CHINA WARS."— Presentation transcript:

1 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE 12 DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE THREE INDO-CHINA WARS presented by DAVE SABBEN MG 08 – A Shau - Hamburger Hill May 1969

2 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT BACKGROUND Ever since the Second Indo-China War started in 1959, the North had been infiltrating men and supplies down a series of tracks through Laos and entering the South through a series of river valleys near the Laos border. The main route lay through the border town of Lao Bao, thence up the Da Krong River valley, over the ridge and down the A Shau River valley. Not only was this a route – it became a major base area and warehouse / supply depot. 2

3 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles LOCATE THE AREA What is now designated the “Ho Chi Minh Road” was then a series of tracks, river crossings and camps and developed by the Americans into Route 548 (now Route 14). Here’s the valley… Note the arrow indicating North … because we’re going to skew the map… Note the new North. And let’s take some time to describe the new map-diagram… Note Route 922 from Laos to Route 14. 3

4 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE A SHAU VALLEY The A Shau River valley is a 28-mile-long “gash” in the mountainous spine of Viet Nam inland from Hue and lying parallel to the Laos border. It is up to 2 miles wide and, except where cultivated, is covered in dense, 3-canopy jungle, tangled vines, thick bamboo and elephant grass tall enough to hide an APC. Each year, the NVA had launched a Spring Offensive from the valley. However, after the Hue debacle of Tet 1968, Special Forces recce patrols noted plenty of traffic coming into the area but little going out. The NVA were obviously stockpiling. It was a remote area and no Allies had operated there since the French, in the 40s and 50s. The NVA had had more than ten years to build their infrastructure. 4 10 Km 6.2 Miles

5 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 4 The two river valleys – key links in the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And a huge area in which to hide camps and caches… A SHAU looking NORTH A SHAU looking SOUTH DA KRONG looking NORTH DA KRONG looking SOUTH 5

6 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles HISTORY OF THE AREA In 1963, the U.S. Army Special Forces established a camp near A Shau village. On 9 March 1966, the NVA 95th Regiment launched a major attack on the camp, and the next day, after hard fighting, it fell to the enemy. Within days, two more Special Forces camps nearby were abandoned. The whole valley became the NVA’s exclusive domain. The NVA operated out of the two valleys through 1966 and 1967 and it was from these valleys that the 1968 Tet Offensive and the capture of Hue was planned and equipped. A Project Delta Recce Team prepares to leave on a covert surveillance mission to Route 922 It was suspected that an extension to Route 922 in Laos was being made to link into the A Shau. Secret recce patrols were put in to verify this. 48 Project Delta Operation, PIROUS 5-67 patrols went in – and proved that the NVA were using the valley as a major infiltration corridor, using vehicular convoys at night. 6

7 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles * Apr-May 1968 - Operation Delaware. It endured stiff resistance and meagre results. * Mar 1969 – Operation Massachusetts Striker. Another success, despite heavy casualties. We shall look at each of these briefly….. * Jan-Feb 1969 – Operation Dewey Canyon. One of the most successful operations of the War. * Aug 1968 - Operation Somerset. It had no better luck than Operation Delaware. 7 With the Project Delta recce reports, it was decided to put the two valleys and the Route 922 area (the part within South Viet Nam) on the B-52 “Arclight” bombing program. As well, after Hue was retaken in 1968, US and ARVN forces undertook a series of operations into the area: DELAWARE SOMERSET DEWEY CANYON MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER

8 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION DELAWARE 14 APRIL – 14 MAY 1968 Following an intense air bombardment and the setting up of several FSBs on nearby heights, the 1 st Cavalry Div (Airmobile), the ARVN 1 st Div and an ARVN airborne task force did an air assault into A Luoi. Despite intense AA fire, they secured the airstrip, which was then repaired by US Engineers. Appalling weather conditions forced closure of the Op on 14 May 68. The NVA suffered 739 KIA and lost tons of supplies. US losses were 86 KIA, 47 MIA, 530 WIA. Two jets and a C-130 cargo plane were shot down, as were 20+ choppers. The force encountered stiff opposition but discovered several huge caches of supplies. A large NVA defended position was attacked and taken - capturing 315 Soviet K-44 rifles, a 60 mm mortar tube, 36 Soviet mine detectors, 60 flame- throwers, 200+ chicom protective masks, 225 pounds of medical supplies, 600 122 mm rockets, 100 pounds of dynamite, 6 tons of rice, 60 cases of canned meat, 70 37 mm antiaircraft rounds and 3 B-40 rockets. Also 5 Russian trucks and 2 tanks. 8 DELAWARE

9 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles FSB FURY FIRE SUPPORT BASES (FSBs) For each Op, a number of mutually-supporting FSBs were set up. These were always on peaks or ridgelines. We’ll show some of these FSBs as we go because they show what the country and the conditions were like… FSB EAGLES NEST 9 DELAWARE

10 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION SOMERSET PLAN 4 – 19 AUGUST 1968 Two battalions of the 101st Airborne Division, with two ARVN battalions, launched an airmobile operation into the valley just to the South of A Luoi. The Op had no better luck than Operation Delaware, and much the same weather, and withdrew on August 19. However, it had secured a route into the valley from the East. Airmobile insertion into A Shau Operations into the valley were difficult to install and resupply by air, so it was decided to build a road from Hue to A Luoi. This was started by US Engineers in August 1968 and was secured by a series of FSBs and clearance operations along the route. This road was not opened until 10 June 1969 – and will be referred to in a later slide.. The same road is still in use – it is Route 49.. 10 SOMERSET

11 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT Evacuating an FSB after use 11

12 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION DEWEY CANYON 20 Jan – 13 Mar 1969 In January, 1969, after the road into the A Shau was constructed, Operation Dewey Canyon was launched up the Da Krong and into the top end of the A Shau. Led by 1, 2 & 3 battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment, the Marines not only advanced to the Laotian border but also launched a battalion-sized raid into Laos itself (Base Area 611). 1/9 2/9 3/9 They discovered that the NVA, protected by their 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments, had built major roads in the area, and as many as 1,000 trucks were moving East and South from there daily. After capturing enormous enemy arms caches, including 73 AAA guns, 16 122mm artillery guns, nearly 1,000 AK-47 rifles and more than a million rounds of small-arms and machine-gun ammo, the Marines withdrew on 13 March, 1969. The NVA had lost 1,617 KIA while Marines lost 130 KIA and 920 WIA. 12 DEWEY CANYON

13 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION DEWEY CANYON 20 Jan – 13 Mar 1969 Operation Dewey Canyon was considered one of the best regimental manoeuvres of the Vietnam War. The statistics: The Marines had disrupted a major NVA logistics centre. As a result, the NVA were unable to launch any offensive into I Corps that YEAR (1969). DA KRONG RIVER VALLEY 1/9 2/9 3/9 BASE AREA 611 BASE AREA 611 Unfortunately, at the end of the operation, the NY Times reported the incursion into neutral Laos. Anti-war groups were up in arms. The Secretary of Defense didn't confirm or deny the incursion. However, the US ambassador to Laos apologized for the incident. After the shocks of Tet, Hue, My Lai, Johnson’s decision against re-election, the ongoing Peace Talks frustrations, etc, the US public were more and more inclined to heed the Anti-War groups. More so when some Viet Vets themselves started to protest the war. 13

14 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles 14 FSB Airborne

15 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER 1 Mar – 8 May 1969 2 Bde of 101 st Airborne entered the A Shau in bad weather but soon struck opposition. A 33-day pursuit of supply depot defenders pushed them across the valley and into temporary positions on the Laos side – ironically, right where the next Operation (Apache Snow) was planned to start on 10 May (see later slides). Massive NVA store caches were captured – including several trucks and bulldozers and a heavy duty road that NVA engineers had been constructing. A force occupied a position to set up a new FSB (Lash) and found it was sitting on yet another NVA cache – 100 tons of brand-new SKS rifles, ChiCom radios & field telephones, large stocks of medicines and even fourteen trucks. The Op ended on 8 May having accounted for 170 NVA KIA and capturing more than 150 tons of supplies including about 900 weapons. 15 MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER

16 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles FSB Lash 16

17 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 Km 6.2 Miles OPERATION APACHE SNOW 10 – 20 May 1969 Possibly the largest single airmobile assault of the Vietnam War. It involved ten battalions of the 101st Airborne, the 1st ARVN Division and the 9th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division. Two battalions were simultaneously inserted into LZs near the Laos border in less than 45 minutes. Surprise was complete - no helicopters were lost. 17 Recce patrols and Ops soon established that the NVA were concentrating on the hillmass called Dong Ap Bia (Trig Point 937), held by the major portion of the NVA’s 29 th Regt. These two battalions were to block enemy escape routes into Laos along Highway 922 and to interdict the highly used enemy Route 548 (Route 14) on the valley floor. The battalions were also to exploit a large cache area pin-pointed near Fire Base Airborne (used for Dewey Canyon). APACHE SNOW

18 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 23 10 Km 6.2 Miles FSB CURRAHEE May - June 1969 Because of the large numbers of troops and the consequent resupply issue, the US and ARVN forces needed a large base in the valley (as distinct from on a ridge or peak). FSB Currahee was established near the road and river systems met, South of A Luoi. The FSB was large enough to include an LZ and resupply depot. 18 Once established, it remained in place beyond the end of the current Operation. FSB Currahee 18

19 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT Hamburger Hill seen from A Luoi Hill 937 was part of Ap Bia Mountain – a four-peak, looming, solitary massif, unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding Annamite range. It dominates the valley, towering some 937 meters above sea level. The entire mountain is a rugged, uninviting wilderness blanketed in double- and triple- canopy jungle, dense thickets of bamboo and waist-high elephant grass. Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers, one of the largest extending southwards to a height of 900 meters, another reaching south west to a 916-meter peak. Hamburger Hill seen from A Luoi 19 On a bright sunny day – as in the photo above – it is hard to take in the size of the mountain. But put on your sunglasses…

20 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE BATTLE FOR THE HILL Early patrols climbed the ridges and found NVA on the main peak. They were well dug in and prepared to stay and fight. For three days the US forces probed and looked for weaknesses. At the same time, the hill was bombarded continually with artillery, aerial rocket artillery and airstrikes. During this time, the US forces occupied the other peaks – the 916 and 900 features as well as the one to the North West. 10 May – discovery and probes. 11 - 13 May – artillery, airstrike – take the other peaks.. 20

21 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE BATTLE FOR THE HILL Determined assaults 14-16 May produced more casualties than results. The battle was attracting attention. On May 16, Associated Press warco Jay Sharbutt learned of the ongoing battle on Hill 937 and travelled to the area. He asked why infantry rather than firepower was used as the primary offensive tool on Hill 937. More reporters followed to cover the battle, and the term "Hamburger Hill" became widely used. 10 May – discovery and probes. 11 - 13 May – artillery, airstrike – take the other peaks.. 14 - 16 May – early fighting for the peaks. 18 May – second attempt on 937 – fails. On May 18, two battalions assaulted the enemy stronghold for the second time. One unit, Delta Coy, reported being within 25 meters of the top when a torrential rainstorm struck and forced the paratroopers to move off the hill which rain had turned into a mudslide. Two more battalions were moved up the hill to join the original two for a final assault. The operation was supported by some 217 airstrikes as well as fire from four 105mm artillery batteries, two 155mm batteries, one 175mm battery and one 8-inch battery. 21

22 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT 10 May – discovery and probes. 11 - 13 May – artillery, airstrike – take the other peaks.. 14 - 16 May – early fighting for the peaks. 18 May – second attempt on 937 – fails. THE BATTLE FOR THE HILL On the 19 th, Sharbutt’s report on the battle was published in the USA. Using considerable journalistic licence, he described it as a “meat-grinder”. 20 May – 4-pronged attack – succeeds. Sharbutt’s dispatches on 19 th and 20 th were not innocuous descriptions of the fight as in other reports. He used emotive words which struck a nerve: “The paratroopers came down the mountain, their green shirts darkened with sweat, their weapons gone, their bandages stained brown and red–with mud and blood.” They set off a firestorm of protest back home. On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Sen. Edward Kennedy called the attack on Dong Ap Bia "senseless, and irresponsible…madness“ and “nothing but cruelty and savagery". And Senator George McGovern denouncced “the senseless slaughter”. From 20 May – Opposition to the War grows… At 10 in the morning of May 20 the four- pronged assault began. By early afternoon the Allies had taken the 937 peak. Most of the enemy had fled, but more than 600 NVA had been killed. 22

23 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT These photos are of Dak To, but show similar scenes to Hamburger Hill 23

24 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT From 20 May… A body count confirmed that 633 NVA soldiers had died in the battle, but there is no telling how many other NVA soldiers were killed and wounded and carried into Laos, or buried alive in bunkers and tunnels, or ended up in forgotten graves in Laos. Final U.S. casualties were 46 dead and 400 wounded. While these losses were high, Hamburger Hill was not the bloodiest fight of the war. During the Tet Offensive week of February 10-17, 1968, 543 Americans were killed in action and 2,547 wounded without causing any outcry from the American public. On 19 June… …President Nixon orders General Creighton Abrams to "conduct war with a minimum of American casualties” – no more attacks. What then…? On 5 June… …the US quietly abandoned the hill… …resulting in the firestorm in the Senate… On 17 June… …US Intelligence admitted that some 1,000 NVA had reoccupied the hill. In response… On 8 June… President Nixon conferred with SVN President Thieu and announced plans to "Vietnamize" the war and to start troop withdrawals of 25,000 by 8 July & 35,000 more by December. On 21 August… …the Nixon administration actions its “Vietnamization” program – now only “assisting SVN armed forces to take over an increasing share of combat operations.” On 27 June… Life magazine ran photos of 241 Americans killed in Vietnam in one week. Only five of these were casualties on Hamburger Hill. The feature was titled, The Faces of the Dead in Vietnam: One Week’s Toll, and it was prefaced by a quote from a letter written by one of those five soldiers during a break in the fighting: You may not be able to read this. I am writing in a hurry. I see death coming up the hill. The erroneous impression was thus created that all 241 pictured had been killed during the Hamburger Hill assault, increasing public disgust over what appeared to be a senseless loss of life. This article is considered to be a turning point in the war. IT WASN’T THE CASUALTIES… …IT WAS THE WASTE GO ON THE DEFENSIVE PERMIT THE MEDIA TO BE UNACCOUNTABLE EXECUTE THE ESCAPE PLAN… PLAN THE ESCAPE… 24

25 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT At Home Contrary to widespread belief, Vietnam is not the most unpopular war in American history. The Mexican War in 1848 was far more unpopular, as was the 1950-53 war in Korea. The majority of Americans supported the war in Vietnam from the landing of the Marines in Da Nang in March 1965 (64 percent supporting, 21 percent opposed after the first U.S. combat engagements) until October 1967, when for the first time a plurality (46 percent opposed, 44 percent supporting) turned against the war. Those 30 months equalled the period of time the American people supported the ground war in Europe in World War II, from the landing of U.S. forces in North Africa in November 1942 until the end of the war in May 1945. Public opinion had turned – not on ideological grounds, as the anti-war movement would claim, but for pragmatic reasons: Either win the damn thing or get the hell out! was the prevalent sentiment. When the Johnson administration seemed unable to do either, the American people’s patience ran out. A February 1969 poll revealed that only 39 percent still supported the war, while 52 percent believed sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been a mistake. 25

26 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT Why decisive? The battle became a turning point in the war because: The pointlessness of the war became apparent to all; Strategy changed from “maximum pressure on the NVA” to “protective reaction”; It spelled the end of major American ground combat operations in Vietnam; From here, they moved into defence, and defence can’t win a war;. It brought in the first withdrawals of troops; The costs of effort exceeded the American people’s value attached to the war: It introduced the decline of morale in the whole armed forces (the start of large-scale indiscipline, fraggings, drugs, desertions…) For the individual soldier, the goal of the war became survival. Anything that got in the way of that became expendable; They must have purpose to their mission and their sacrifices. When it gets to the point where the soldiers doubt the mission and think of their own survival, victory becomes impossible. 26

27 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT OPERATION MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS 8 JUNE – 14 AUGUST 1969 On June 8, an operation started against NVA in the high ground to the east of the A Shau. (Remember – this had already been planned while Washington was revising its thinking.) US Engineers constructed a new airstrip on the valley floor near Ta Bat, and the final part of the new road from Hue (Route 547 [14]) was opened. On June 10, a column of 80 tracked vehicles - drove into the valley – on the new road….. 10 Km 6.2 Miles Operation Montgomery Rendezvous was 27

28 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT So – just to add a word about the war… The US presence included construction… While the Operations were in full swing, the Engineers were also building the road. At all times they needed FSBs and protection forces. The scale of the road-building operation was huge – survey, levelling, bridging… And it was built to stay – still being in use today. The Road… 28

29 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT The late General Abrams, the MACV commander at the time, should have the last word on the battle for Hamburger Hill. His biographer, Lewis Sorley, related: Shortly after the battle and its immediate aftermath, Abrams had several people over for a game of poker. They had dinner beforehand, and Abrams told his guests: ‘ Today we had a congressional delegation in, including Teddy Kennedy. They were complaining about the loss of life at Hamburger Hill. I told them the last time the 29th NVA Regiment came out of North Vietnam it destroyed Hue, and I heard from every antiquarian in the world. This time, when they came out again, I issued orders that they were to be intercepted and defeated before they could get to Hue. We drove them back into North Vietnam, but I was criticized for the casualties that entailed. If they would let me know where they would like me to fight the next battle, I would be glad to do it there.’ Then they dealt the cards. 29

30 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE 12 DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE THREE INDO-CHINA WARS presented by DAVE SABBEN MG 08 – A Shau - Hamburger Hill Questions?

31 THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION WAS PREPARED BY DAVE SABBEN WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT © ON CREATIVE CONTENT THE FINE PRINT This Powerpoint show is copyright to Dave Sabben but is freely available for any non-profit use. It may be downloaded free from Dave’s website: www.sabben.comwww.sabben.com It was prepared for presentation to those who join his Decisive Battlefields and Long Tan Trek Tours of Viet Nam (see other panel for the “commercial”) as introductions for the various battles. Because the shows are live presentations, much more is in the narrative than is included in the text on the slides. The shows are intended to be introductions and overviews – not detailed expositions or analyses. Views and conclusions are the author’s and are not offered as the only possible or even as fully comprehensive views. Where possible, permissions have been obtained to use maps or photos but some have been used without specific permission. Copyright holders who want their material either not used or credited, please contact Dave Sabben at http://www.sabben.com/contact%20us.html Anyone wishing to make an anonymous donation towards the cost and time of putting this show together is invited to make a donation of any amount to (Australian) Westpac bank account BSB# 733 000, Account# 853 546 (branch = 360 Collins St, Melbourne), or (Australian) CBA bank account BSB# 063 550, Account# 1024 7640 (branch = Hampton, Victoria), either account in the name of David Sabben. If passing this slide show to others, please don’t remove this slide. THE “COMMERCIAL” As at 2011, Dave Sabben leads one tour per year (second half of October) to visit some of the areas of Australian/ANZAC operations of 1966-1971. The highlight of these tours is to walk the Long Tan battlefield with Dave (a platoon Commander in that battle). The walk takes about 4 hours – about the time of the battle – so the group goes to all the key locations of the battle and hears about what happened pretty much in “real time”. For further enquiry into these tours, please visit: http://www.sabben.com/longtantrek/ and select VN%20Long%20Tan%20Trek%20Tours.html orVN%20Long%20Tan%20Trek%20Tours.html VN%20Decisive%20Battlefields%20Tours.html An optional extension to the Long Tan Trek Tour takes in the main US battles of northern South Viet Nam including Da Nang, Hue, the DMZ (including Khe Sanh) and the A Shau Valley (Hamburger Hill), then visits both Hanoi (‘Hanoi Hilton’, War Museum) and the Dien Bien Phu valley (both Viet Minh and French positions). As well as the once –a-year-in-October tours, Dave can arrange a similar tour at any time of year for a group of 20 or more. Dates, durations, standards of accommodation, inclusions etc will be all your call. Please contact Dave (with numbers and preferences) at http://www.sabben.com/contact%20us.html Note that these are “battlefield-oriented” tours – they do NOT go to the popular tourist sites. “Tourist” tours can be added before or after. If passing this slide show to others, please don’t remove this slide. PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS SLIDE


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