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1 Campus Network Security and Security Repercussions Pete Siemsen National Center for Atmospheric Research July 28 th, 2002.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Campus Network Security and Security Repercussions Pete Siemsen National Center for Atmospheric Research July 28 th, 2002."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Campus Network Security and Security Repercussions Pete Siemsen National Center for Atmospheric Research July 28 th, 2002

2 2 Overview Obstacles to security Overview of threats and solutions Case study: NCAR

3 3 Obstacles to Security Doesn’t mesh well with research Considered low priority (few resources) Not always taken seriously

4 4 Obstacles to Security Security implementers may not be appreciated. Too little security, it’s your fault: “We got hacked, you should’ve done more” Too much security, it’s your fault: “I can’t get my work done, you should do less” When it works, no one notices

5 5 Types of Threats Viruses Packet sniffing Denial of service Scanning for holes Wireless

6 6 Viruses: problems Hard to battle Mail-borne Web-borne Instant Messaging ?

7 7 Viruses: solutions Scan block executable attachments Virus scanning software helps, but new viruses are not immediately detected

8 8 Packet Sniffing: problems Your users may type passwords on foreign networks Switches are better than hubs, but do not protect you from Layer 2 attacks

9 9 Packet sniffing: problems dsniff suite for overloading switches, spoofing ARPs, man-in-middle, etc. ettercap for injecting commands in someone else’s session

10 10 Packet Sniffing: solutions Use switches instead of hubs or repeaters Consider MAC address locking Consider SecureID Ban telnet in favor of ssh Use VPNs for remote access Run ARPwatch

11 11 Denial of Service: problems Distributed DoS can’t be blocked No magic bullet Luckily, attacks are usually short-lived See trinoo and stacheldracht

12 12 Denial of Service: solutions Must back-track to source, installing filters as you go to reduce pain Install patches to keep your systems from becoming part of the problem Scan for client code on your systems Filter ICMP

13 13 Denial of Service: solutions Dave Dietrich's DDOS website: staff.Washington.edu/Dietrich/wise/ddos ICMP traceback proposal: see itrace IP traceback: apers/Sigcomm00.pdf

14 14 Scanning for holes: problems “script kiddies” are unsophisticated hackers who run software “kits” to attack a target. They don’t have to understand networking. Software scans for open ports and known vulnerabilities

15 15 Scanning for holes: solutions Apply vendor patches in a timely manner Filter packets inbound Scan your own systems Use an intrusion detection system See

16 16 Wireless: problems

17 17 Wireless: problems

18 18 Wireless: problems

19 19 Wireless: problems

20 20 Wireless: problems

21 21 Wireless: problems

22 22 Wireless: problems

23 23 Wireless: problems

24 24 Wireless: problems WEP is insecure (see Kismet, Airsnort, WEPcrack) Can’t track down attackers easily Physical security is harder You may not own all the access points!

25 25 Wireless: solutions Tune access point power Don’t count on WEP: use VPNs Requires extra network engineering Wardrive/netstumble with Kismet, Airsnort, WEPcrack IETF is working on better standards

26 26 Wireless: solutions Current issue of SysAdmin David Packham’s URL list: et/prev- mtg/ meeting/0602.meeting/06 02.presentations/dave.packham.url.li st.html

27 27 Case study: NCAR

28 28 NCAR’s Environment Academic research institution But no students! Collaboration with 63 member Universities ~1500 university (external) users Diverse, widespread field projects ~2500 networked nodes internal to NCAR ~1500 internal users

29 29 NCAR’s Motivation to Get Serious About Security We experienced increasing malicious attacks More hackers hacking Availability of script kiddie “kits” · Easy to get · Don’t require network expertise We had some strong advocates

30 30 Getting Started

31 31 NCAR Security Committee We created a committee to develop policy Sysadmins from all NCAR Divisions Formal process delivered institutional buy-in 2-hour meetings once a month Lots of cooperation, little authority With time, authority has grown

32 32 The Security Policy Need a policy that defines vulnerabilities how much security is needed level of inconvenience that is tolerable solutions We recommended a full-time Security Administrator for the institution

33 33 Define Scope of Problem Decide which types of attacks are problems Examples: Hacker spoofing of source IP address Hacker scanning for weaknesses · TCP/UDP ports, INETD services Hackers sniffing passwords Hacker exploitation of buggy operating systems · Inconsistent/tardy OS patching

34 34 Define Scope of Solution What we won’t do Not feasible to secure every computer Over-reliance on timely OS security fixes Can’t prohibit internal “personal” modems Attacks from within aren’t a big problem What we will do Reduce external attacks from the Internet

35 35 Basic Solutions at NCAR One-time passwords (critical devices) Switched LANs Packet filtering on routers Application-proxy gateways Filter attachments Encryption for wireless and remote access (VPNs and ssh)

36 36 One-time Passwords A.K.A. Challenge-Response Requires little calculator things (~$50/per) Prevents password sniffing We use it on critical devices Routers, ATM Switches, Ethernet Switches, Remote Access Servers, Server hosts (root accounts) At the least, do this!

37 37 Switched LANs Reduces packet eavesdropping Get this for “free” with switched network Hackers can still steal ARP entries Hackers can still fill CAM tables

38 38 Packet Filtering

39 39 Router-Based Filters Used to construct router-based firewall around your internal network Main security implementation tool Routers check each inbound packet against filter criteria and accept or reject

40 40

41 41 Packet Filtering At NCAR Routers can filter on IP address source, destination, ranges Interfaces: inbound and/or outbound Protocols, TCP ports, etc. We filter inbound and outbound packets Performance is no longer an issue with modern routers

42 42 Filter Stance: Strong or Weak? Strong Deny everything, except for the good stuff Weak Allow everything, except for the bad stuff NCAR chose a Strong stance

43 43 Example Filter Statistics 41 lines (rules) in NCAR’s old Cisco access-list Hits as of 9/30/98, 28 days after filter was installed: 3 MP Denied because of spoofing 17 MP Denied because of “catchall” 71 MP Permitted to exposed networks 100MP Permitted to exposed hosts

44 44 Exposed Hosts Example: Web servers, data source machines, etc. Must meet stringent security standards to avoid being compromised and used as launch pads for attacking protected hosts OS restricts set of network services allowed Must keep up with OS patches

45 45 Intrusion Detection NCAR uses SNORT and Network Flight Recorder to look for suspect patterns in packets.

46 46 VPNs Virtual Private Network: an encrypted tunnel from one point to another over an untrusted network. NCAR uses VPNs or ssh for all remote connections to NCAR networks. Mostly used by travelers and home users with DSL or cable modems.

47 47 Wireless at NCAR We filter all wireless packets The filters are established and removed as wireless machines connect and disconnect VPN users are passed through

48 48 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host AP DHCP server router client bridge Internet NCAR VPN server

49 49 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host AP DHCP server router client bridge Internet NCAR staff user NCAR VPN server

50 50 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host AP DHCP server router client bridge Internet NCAR Guest user DNS 1

51 51 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host auth AP DHCP server router client web bridge Internet Guest user NCAR DNS 2

52 52 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host AP DHCP server router client web bridge Internet Guest user NCAR DNS 3

53 53 Wireless at NCAR BSD Unix host AP DHCP server router client bridge Internet Guest user NCAR DNS web 4

54 54 Security Administrator Provides focus for security for the entire institution Helps deal with break-ins Central point of contact Tracks CERT advisories for sysadmins Advocates security solutions, like ssh Scans exposed hosts for standards violations Generally helps/educates sysadmins

55 55 Impacts of NCAR’s Security

56 56 Benefits >99% of NCAR hosts are protected Outbound Telnet, HTTP, etc. still work Relatively cheap and easy Dial-in users are “inside”, no changes

57 57 Drawbacks UDP is blocked Some services are no longer available Inbound pings are blocked !!! To use FTP, must use passive mode, or use an exposed host, or proxy through a gateway DNS and can get complicated

58 58 Drawbacks Crunchy outside, chewy inside Modems in offices are a huge hole Users must install VPN or ssh software for remote access

59 59 Wrap-up

60 60 Security is Never “Done” How do you know if you’re being hacked? “Silent” attacks very hard to detect “Noisy” attacks hard to distinguish from other network (or host) problems Network keeps changing Software keeps changing Hackers keep advancing

61 61 Security is Never “Done” Policy and security mechanisms must evolve Security committee continues to meet

62 62 Conclusion NCAR struck a balance between: Convenience and Security Politics and Technology Cost and Quality

63 63 Scary paper How to own the Internet in your spare time, at: sec02/index.html


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