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Foreign Policy in the 1920s.

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1 Foreign Policy in the 1920s

2 Key Concept In the years following World War I, the United States pursued a unilateral foreign policy that used international investment, peace treaties, and select military intervention to promote a vision of international order, even while maintaining U.S. isolationism, which continued to the late 1930s. -Washington Naval Conference, Stimson Doctrine, Neutrality Acts

3 After WWI America returned to its isolationist tendencies
“Irreconcilables” in Congress continued to oppose the League of Nations -U.S. sent “unofficial observers” to attend

4 America Seeks Benefits Without Burdens
Making peace with fallen foe: U.S.A., having rejected Treaty of Versailles, technically at war with Germany, Austria, and Hungary: In 1921 Congress passed simple joint resolution that declared war over

5 “I Sympathize Deeply with You, Madam, but I Cannot
Associate with You,” 1923 P resident Harding’s secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, broke the news to a desperate, war-tattered Europe that America was going, and staying, home. p723

6 Middle East Nations recognized the strategic importance of oil
Under Harding, Secretary Hughes secured for U.S. oil companies right to share in Middle East oil exploitations

7 Washington Naval Conference
Disarmament an issue for Harding: Businessmen did not want to finance naval building program started during war Washington “Disarmament Conference” : Invitations sent to all but Bolshevik Russia (U.S. refused to recognize the new government) Agenda included naval disarmament and situation in Far East Hughes declared 10-year “holiday” on construction of battleships Proposed scaled-down navies of America and Britain with parity Five-Power Treaty (1922)- Agreed to reduce capital ships (ie., battleships and aircraft carriers) 5:5:3 ratio for U.S., Britain, and Japan

8 Figure 31.1 Limits Imposed by
Washington Conference, 1921–1922 The pledge of the British and Americans to refrain from fortifying their Far Eastern possessions, while Japan was allowed to fortify its possessions, was the key to the naval-limitation treaty. The United States and Great Britain thus won a temporary victory but later paid a horrendous price when they had to dislodge the wellentrenched Japanese from the Pacific in World War II. © 2016 Cengage Learning Figure 31-1 p723

9 Conference important, but:
Four-Power Treaty (1922) Britain, Japan, France, and United States to preserve status quo in Pacific; agreed to consultation in the event of a crisis In a concession to the Japanese, the U.S. and Britain agreed not to fortify possessions in the Pacific Nine-Power Treaty (1922) signatories agreed to keep open the Open Door in China- “Sick Man of the Far East” Recognized Japanese dominance in Manchuria Conference important, but: No restrictions on construction of smaller warship Congress made no commitment to use of armed force U.S. did not want to spend money on building up its navy, while other nations put money into their non-capital ships

10 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)
“Outlawed” war Calvin Coolidge’s Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, won Nobel Peace Prize for his role 15 nations signed treaty Eventually ratified by 62 nations

11 New parchment peace delusory:
Defensive wars still permitted Pact virtually useless Reflected American mind (1920s): Willing to be lulled into false sense of security Same attitude showed up in neutralism of 1930s

12 Foreign Policy Under Calvin
Isolation continued to reign in Coolidge era: Senate did not allow America to adhere to World Court (of the League of Nations) Coolidge halfheartedly and unsuccessfully pursued further naval disarmament Intervention in Caribbean and Central America: Troops withdrawn (after eight-year stay) from Dominican Republic in 1924 Remained in Haiti ( ) America in Nicaragua intermittently since 1909; Coolidge briefly removed troops in 1925, but in 1926 he sent them back in order to protect American lives and interests; they remained until 1933 Oil companies clamored for military expedition to Mexico in 1926, but Coolidge resisted; U.S.-Mexican tensions increased

13 Map 29.1 The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1941 This map explains why
many Latin Americans accused the United States of turning the Caribbean Sea into a “Yankee lake.” It also suggests that Uncle Sam was much less “isolationist” in his own backyard than he was in faraway Europe or Asia. © 2016 Cengage Learning Map 29-1 p667

14 International Debt overshadowed all foreign-policy problems in 1920s:
Complicated tangle of private loans, Allied war debts, and German reparations payments (see Figure 31.2) 1914: U.S.A. a debtor nation to sum of $4 billion 1922: U.S.A. a creditor nation to sum of $16 billion

15 Figure 31.2 Aspects of the Financial
Merry-go-round, 1921–1933 Great Britain, with a debt of over $4 billion owed to the U.S. Treasury, had a huge stake in proposals for inter-Allied debt cancellation, but France’s stake was even larger. Less prosperous than Britain in the 1920s and more battered by the war, which had been fought on its soil, France owed nearly $3.5 billion to the United States and additional billions to Britain. © 2016 Cengage Learning Figure 31-2 p729

16 U.S. Treasury had loaned to $10 billion to the Allies during war
Allies protested U.S. demand for repayment as unfair French and British stressed they had suffered tremendous losses against common foe America, they argued, should write off loans as war costs Borrowed dollars fueled wartime boom in U.S. economy, where nearly all Allied purchases had been made Final straw, protested Europeans, was America's postwar tariffs made it almost impossible for Europeans to sell goods to earn dollars to pay debts

17 Allied debts affected policy on reparations:
French and British demanded $32 billion in reparations payments from Germany (Germany’s debt was only paid off in 2010) Allies hoped to use money to settle war debts since U.S.A. demanded repayment As Germany suffered tremendous inflation, some Europeans proposed debts and reparations be scaled down or even canceled Coolidge rejected any idea of debt cancellation

18 A German Woman Burns Near-Worthless Paper
Currency for Cooking Fuel, 1923 The memory of the hyperinflation of the 1920s haunted Germans well into the twenty-first century. p730

19 Dawes Plan (1924) Negotiated by Charles Dawes, about to be Coolidge's running mate Rescheduled German reparations payments Opened way for more private American loans to Germany Whole financial cycle became more complicated: U.S. bankers loaned money to Germany, Germany paid reparations to France and Britain, Former Allies paid war debts to United States

20 After crash of 1929, U.S. loans dried up
President Herbert Hoover declared one-year moratorium in 1931, but most debtors soon defaulted Except “honest little Finland,” which struggled along making payments until last of debt discharged in 1976 United States never did get its money, but its policies generated ill will

21 Japanese Militarists Attack China
Depression increased international difficulties Militaristic Japan stole Far Eastern spotlight: September, 1931: Japanese imperialists lunged into Manchuria America had strong sentimental stake in China, but few significant economic interests Americans stunned by act of naked aggression Flagrant violation of League of Nations covenant and other international agreements solemnly signed by Tokyo Not to mention American sense of fair play

22 Japanese Aggression in Manchuria This American cartoon lambastes Japan for
disregarding international treaty agreements when it seized Manchuria in The next year the Japanese would set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. p740

23 Japanese Militarists Attack China (cont.)
Yet Washington rebuffed League attempts to secure U.S. cooperation in economic pressure on Japan Washington and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson decided to fire only paper bullets So-called Stimson doctrine (1932): Declared United States would not recognize any territorial acquisitions achieved by force Righteous indignation—or preach-and-run policy—would substitute for solid initiatives Verbal slap not deter Japan's militarists Bombed Shanghai (1932) killing many civilians

24 Japanese Militarists Attach China (cont.)
No real sentiment for armed intervention among depression-ridden Americans, who remained strongly isolationist during the 1930s Collective security died and World War II born in 1931 in Manchuria

25 Hoover’s Good Neighbor Policy
Hoover wanted to improve relations with Latin America 1928- As president-elect, he undertook a seven week tour of the region After stock market crash of 1929, desire to pursue economic imperialism declined

26 Hoover advocated international goodwill
Strove to abandon interventionist twist given Monroe Doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt Negotiated with Haiti for withdrawal of U.S. troops by 1934 In 1933, last U.S. marines left Nicaragua after almost continuous stay of some twenty years Hoover engineered foundation of Good Neighbor policy Policy advanced by Franklin Roosevelt


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