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Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass Creating a Toolkit for Live Incident Response Data Acquisition and Tips for Better Timeline Analysis Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass.

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Presentation on theme: "Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass Creating a Toolkit for Live Incident Response Data Acquisition and Tips for Better Timeline Analysis Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass."— Presentation transcript:

1 Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass
Creating a Toolkit for Live Incident Response Data Acquisition and Tips for Better Timeline Analysis Jonathan Glass

2 Bio Originally from Roanoke, VA. Awesome Wife and Two Kids
Hopeless tinkerer, maker, and security professional. MCSA,MCSE,S+,CEH,CNDA,CISSP,GCIH,GAWN

3 Disclaimer The Live Response Script presented here was prepared for this presentation to frame the discussion. Feel free to use it. While it is functional on this demo vm, I make no guarantees that it will work every time in every environment. Use at your own risk.

4 Disclaimer I do not claim to be an expert. This presentation is meant to be a discussion of possible techniques. If you know a better way to do something, shout it out. I would love to hear it.

5 Objectives Motivation How Live Response Data Collection Works
Drop script and tools on target Run tools in correct order to collect artifacts Securely send back to analysts. General Guidelines for Live Response An Overview of Artifacts to Collect What to Grab How to Grab It What to Do with It Forensic Timelines How to create Tips on Faster/Better Analysis and Summarization

6 Motivation Building your own script is a great way to understand forensic artifacts/tools. Adds context and verification of COTS tools Gives analyst the ability to compare memory artifacts vs. live output vs. artifacts from the physical drive Malware/rootkits may attempt to mask processes and falsify output of commands. Hard to falsify numerous sources of redunant info Everything means something

7 Live Response vs. Memory Analysis
Memory Analysis is ideal for understanding the current state of the machine but… Full Memory Dumps are Huge Not uncommon to see 8GB or 16GB of RAM in a workstation. Takes time to dump, compress, and encrypt memory dumps to be sent over a network. Solid State Drives are becoming the standard, even though they have far less capacity than HDDs. There might not be enough free space on the workstation to dump memory.

8 General Guidance for Live Response Scripts
Communication should be encrypted to and from target machine. Tread Lightly – The smaller footprint you create on a remote machine, the less likely you are going to cause a business interruption. Keep LR Packages small with only the tools you need. Be concise. Do not generate any more files than what is absolutely necessary. Get In, Grab Stuff, and Get Out – Avoid processing artifacts on the target machine. Don’t connect to a Target machine directly from your workstation.

9 General Guidance for Live Response Scripts
 Protect Privileged Domain Accounts during Live Response Don’t use any kind of “Interactive Logon” Interactive Logons store password hashes as cached credentials and in memory while you are logged on. This includes “Run As” from the command line. Use Temporary Admin Credentials Reset account passwords after acquisition or everyday. Limit the exposure of a compromised LR Account.

10 General Guidance for Live Response Scripts
Batch Programming, Visual Basic Scripting, and PowerShell are great native options to create Live Response Scripts Stick to native solutions unless you are going to compile your Python, Ruby, Perl or whatever into a executable…every time you make a change. Windows has a ton of built-in utilities for pulling a lot of forensically relevant information. Leverage those.

11 Live Response Data Collection
Analyst Target & tells “Target” to Pull LR package 2. Creates Secure Channel 5. Runs Script 3. Pulls latest LR package 1. Investigate “Target” 4. Sends latest LR package 7. Analyst reviews info on Server 6. Target pushes LR Data back to Server Forensic Server

12 PsExec v2.1 PsExec is a light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software.  New with Ver 2.1 – March 7, 2014 enables you to execute programs on remote systems without preinstalling an agent encrypts *all* communication between local and remote systems. including the transmission of command information such as the user name and password under which the remote program executes.

13 7zip 7-Zip is a open source file archiver with a high compression ratio. GUI and command line options. GNU LGPL license. 7za.exe is the command line version Can use AES256 GPG Encryption High Compression is great for memory dumps and other large files.

14 PsExec v2.1 + 7zip = Encrypted Communication
Great way to transfer a collection package to a machine, run apps with as System, and collect data back to the analyst through a “secure” channel.

15 How this Example Script Works
LiveResponse.bat CollectionScript.bat 7za.exe TargetMachine.zip TargetMachine Processes Collected Data

16 An Overview of Artifacts to Collect
What/Why To Collect How To Collect It What To Do With It

17 Artifacts to Collect Artifact to Grab Significance Location on Target
Tools to Grab and/or Parse Batch File Example

18 Protected or Locked Files
Significance The majority of the files needed for analysis are locked, open, or protected. Location Everywhere Method To Grab /Parse VSS Shadowcopy *HoboCopy Low Level Disk Reading *RawCopy https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/ NTFSCopy https://www.tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=9 FGET – HBGARY(old)

19 RawCopy Compiled AutoIt Script
Console application that copy files off NTFS volumes by using low level disk reading method. Will let you copy files that usually are not accessible because the system has locked them. For instance the registry hives like SYSTEM and SAM. Or files inside the "SYSTEM VOLUME INFORMATION". Or any file on the volume. Works best with the MFT record number.

20 Protected or Locked Files
Example: FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b /a C:\Users\') DO ( IF EXIST "C:\Users\%%G\NTUSER.DAT" ( MD C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\%%G\ C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe "C:\Users\%%G\NTUSER.DAT" "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\%%G\“))

21 Physical Memory Significance Location on Target
Running processes and services, open network connections, ARP cache, web history, running malware/Trojans, unpacked/decrypted versions of protected programs, system information (e.g. time lapsed since last reboot) ,information about logged in users, decryption keys for encrypted volumes mounted at the time of the capture, and much more. Location on Target \\.\PhysicalMemory Method to Grab and Parse Grab WinDD Dumpit *DD for Windows Memoryze https://www.mandiant.com/resources/download/memoryze Parse *Volatility - https://code.google.com/p/volatility/ Redline - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/download/redline

22 Physical Memory REM **************BEGIN MEMORY DUMP************* echo Checking if there is enough free disk space to dump Memory FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('cscript /nologo C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\MemCheck.vbs') DO ( SET MEMGO=%%G IF %MEMGO:~0,4% == GOOD ( echo Dumping Memory start /wait cmd /c "C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\LRTools\MemoryDD.bat -output=C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\CollectedData") ELSE (echo "NOT ENOUGH FREESPACE FOR MEMORY Dump")) REM Wait 30 seconds to give time for the memory dump to complete PING -n >nul REM **************END MEMORY DUMP*************

23 Running Processes Significance Locations on Target
Critical to almost all investigations Trivial to determine while online Very hard to piece together offline Locations on Target Memory, Physical Disk, Removable Media Method to Grab and/or Parse List WMIC.exe Process List Full *Volatility - pslist,pstree,psscan,dlllist,handles Grab ProcDump *Volatility – procexedump ProcDump is a command-line utility whose primary purpose is monitoring an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps during a spike that an administrator or developer can use to determine the cause of the spike.

24 Running Processes wmic process list full > C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\ProcessList.txt C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\pslist.exe -t > C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\ProcessTree.txt C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\handle.exe -asu > C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\Handles.txt ProcDump is a command-line utility whose primary purpose is monitoring an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps during a spike that an administrator or developer can use to determine the cause of the spike.

25 $MFT Master File Table Significance Location on Target
The single most important file in a NTFS file system. Contains record of the logical/physical size/location for all files on a NTFS volume. Contains metadata including: Created Date, Entry Modified Date, Accessed Date and Last Written Date. Contains security permissions for each file. Location on Target Logical: ROOT:\$MFT Physical: Location found the MBR(first 512 bytes of on Volume) Method to Grab and Parse Need to be running with system level privs to gain direct access to $MFT Use *RunAsSystem https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/or PsExec Grab: *RawCopy https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/ *MFTDumper.py - https://github.com/Kvetch/Kludge-Collector/blob/master/collector/mftfinder.py Parse: *AnalyzeMFT https://github.com/dkovar/analyzeMFT *ntfswalk https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/

26 $MFT Master File Table REM **************BEGIN MFT DUMP************* echo Running fls-live.exe to grab MFT data from all NTFS drives connected to the system. FOR /F "tokens=*" %%A IN ('cscript /nologo C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ListOfLocalDrives.vbs') DO ( SET "BAM=%%A" start /wait cmd /c "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\fls-live.exe %%A\ >> C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\TimelineFiles\fls-bodyfile.txt" mkdir C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\%BAM:~0,1%\ start /wait cmd /c "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe %BAM:~0,1%:0 C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\%BAM:~0,1%\ ) REM **************END MFT DUMP*************

27 Registry Significance: Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Hierarchical “database” that contains system configuration information, and tracks a great deal of system and user activity. Much of that activity has some form of time stamp associated with it. Location on Target System C:\Windows\system32\config C:\Windows\system32\config\RegBack User C:\Users\user\NTUSER.DAT C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\USRCLASS.DAT Method to Grab and Parse Grab locked file utilities Parse RegRipper Volatility hivescan,hivelist,printkey,hivedump,hashdump,lsadump,userassist Python https://github.com/williballenthin/python-registry

28 Registry Significance: Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Hierarchical “database” that contains system configuration information, and tracks a great deal of system and user activity. Much of that activity has some form of time stamp associated with it. Location on Target System C:\Windows\system32\config C:\Windows\system32\config\RegBack User C:\Users\user\NTUSER.DAT C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\USRCLASS.DAT Method to Grab and Parse Grab Locked file utilities Export using Reg Parse RegRipper Volatility hivescan,hivelist,printkey,hivedump,hashdump,lsadump,userassist Python https://github.com/williballenthin/python-registry

29 Registry FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b /a C:\Users\') DO (
IF EXIST "C:\Users\%%G\NTUSER.DAT" ( MD C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\%%G\ C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe "C:\Users\%%G\NTUSER.DAT" "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\%%G\")) for %%i in (SAM SECURITY SOFTWARE SYSTEM DEFAULT COMPONENTS BCD-TEMPLATE) do (C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\%%i C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\) c:\windows\system32\reg.exe export HKLM C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hklm.reg c:\windows\system32\reg.exe export HKCU C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcu.reg c:\windows\system32\reg.exe export HKCR C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcr.reg c:\windows\system32\reg.exe export HKU C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hku.reg c:\windows\system32\reg.exe export HKCC C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcc.reg

30 Index.dat Significance Location on Target
The cache INDEX.DAT file is a database of cache entries.  It holds information relating to individual cached items so that the browser can check whether the resource needs to be updated (eTag) and information relating to the location of the cached item. Location on Target C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\index.dat C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\Low\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\Low\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat\MSHistXXXXXXXXXXX\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\Low\index.dat\MSHistXXXXXXXXXXX\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\index.dat C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Low\Content.IE5index.dat C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UserData\index.dat C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UserData\Low\index.dat

31 Index.dat Grab Parse Assume they are locked.
Perl - id - https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=6

32 Index.dat and other web history files
echo Grabbing Browser History Files Set FilesToGrab=index.dat,*.dat,urlclassifier3.sqlite,index.sqlite,addons.sqlite,chromeappsstore.sqlite,content-prefs.sqlite,cookies.sqlite, downloads.sqlite,extensions.sqlite,permissions.sqlite,places.sqlite,search.sqlite,signons.sqlite,webappsstore.sqlite for %%X in ("%FilesToGrab:,=" "%") do ( for /f "tokens=*" %%a in ('dir /s /a /b c:\%%X') do ( for /f "tokens=*" %%b in ('cscript /nologo C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\recursionPath.vbs "%%a"') do ( mkdir "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\WebHistory%%b" C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe "%%a" "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\WebHistory%%b" )

33 Journal Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
The change journal is a component of NTFS that will, when enabled, record changes made to files and folders. The change journal records time of the change, affected file/directory, change type (eg. delete, rename, size extend, etc) Location on Target [root]\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J $J is an alternate data stream Method to Grab and Parse Grab Locked File Parse Windows Journal Parser https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser

34 Journal FOR /F "tokens=*" %%A IN ('cscript /nologo C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ListOfLocalDrives.vbs') DO ( FOR /F "tokens=*" %%B IN ('C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ifind.exe -n /$Extend/$UsnJrnl:$J \\.\%%A:') DO ( C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy%ARC%.exe %%A:%%B C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\ ) )

35 Event Logs Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Application, System, and Security Location on Target C:\Windows\system32\config Method to Grab and Parse Grab Locked File Parse GrokEVT is a set of forensics scripts designed to make sense of EVT logs for investigations. Along with RegLookup, it is able to combine registry information and event log templates to place EVT data in context. python-etvx LogParser Windows Event Log Parser (evtwalk) https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=25

36 Network Info Significance Location on Target
Current TCP and UDP connections are extremely important to document while the machine is running. Very hard to piece together after the fact without external logs. Location on Target Memory

37 Network Info Method to Grab and Parse Grab
“netstat -anto & wmic process get ProcessID,Name,CommandLine >netcon.txt” a  Displays all connections and listening ports. n  Displays addresses and port numbers in numerical form. t   Displays the current connection offload state. o  Displays the owning process ID associated with each connection. Volatility connections, connscan, sockets, netscan

38 Prefetch Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Designed to boost the startup process of frequently launched applications Name of the executable, Unicode itemizations of the DLLs that the executable requires to function, Timestamp of when the application was last launched, a count of the times that the executable has ran. Location on Target %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\*.pf Method to Grab and Parse Grab Just copy them. Parse Windows Prefetch Parser (pf)- https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=1

39 LNK Files Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Created Date, Last Written Date, Last Accessed Date, Full Path, Command Line, occasionally the MAC address Location on Target %APPDATA%\ Microsoft\ Windows\ Recent\ %APPDATA%\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\ Desktop, etc... Method to Grab and Parse Windows LNK Parsing Utility (lp) -https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=11 “dir /s /b C:\users\*.lnk | LP -pipe -csv >> results.csv” LNK Parser - https://code.google.com/p/lnk-parser/

40 USB Activity Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Entry vector for bad stuff Exfil vector Location on Target HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2 Method to Grab and Parse Grab C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log and Registry Files

41 Recycle Bin Significance Location on Target Method to Grab and Parse
Many cases routinely require examination of Recycle Bin Malware often operate from the Recycle Bin People delete stuff. $I files Bytes 0-7: $I File header " ". Bytes 8-15: Original file size – stored in hex, in little-endian. Bytes 16-23: Deleted date/time stamp – represented in number of seconds since Midnight, January 1, 1601. Bytes : Original file path/name. Location on Target c:\$Recycle.Bin\%SID% %SID% is the SID of the user who deleted the file Method to Grab and Parse recbin.pl - Harlan Carvey https://winforensicaanalysis.googlecode.com/files/wfa3e.zip

42 Anti-Virus Logs/Quarantined Files
Significance Logs give timestamps of last virus subscription update, last scan, virus/quarantine activity Quarantined files are potentially malicious samples that have been rendered inert. Location on Target Application Logs Vendor Specific Method to Grab and Parse

43 Add anything that you might find useful.
Not an Exhaustive List Add anything that you might find useful.

44 Now We Put It All Together
DEMO!

45 “Super” Timeline Creation

46 Super Timeline? Grab any relevant log that has a timestamp
Make sure they all are on the same time zone (local vs. UTC) and format (YYYY/MM/DD hh:mm:ss) Put them all in the one big file Sort

47 Setting up Your Machine for Command Line Timeline Analysis

48 Useful Tools For Command Line Timeline Analysis
Linux or OSX command line If you absolutely must use Windows for timeline analysis… GnuWin GnuWin provides ports of tools with a GNU or similar open source license, to modern MS-Windows (Microsoft Windows 2000 / XP / 2003 / Vista / 2008 / 7)

49 Useful GnuWin Packages
Grep - searches one or more input files for lines containing a match to a specified pattern. CoreUtils - collection of basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities Includes a ton of really useful timeline analysis commands like cat,cut,fold,head,join,nl,sort,tac,uniq,wc and a few others. Many of these tools are also included in the Kludge source files

50 Make a Tools Folder and Update Path
The %PATH% variable should be updated on regular and elevated accounts if you are going to use either for timeline analysis. Always append your Tools folder to the END of your PATH. Do not prepend to the beginning.

51 Command Line Timeline Analysis Examples

52 Command Line Timeline Analysis
Determine the processes that were launched during a specific hour that do not have “Windows” in the file path: c:\Incidents\DEMO\TLN>grep " \ 20" timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4688" |cut -d, -f1,10 |sort| uniq |grep -vi Windows :05:01,C:\Tools\grep.exe :05:13,C:\Tools\grep.exe :06:36,C:\Tools\grep.exe :31:39,C:\Tools\grep.exe :39:02,C:\Tools\grep.exe

53 Command Line Timeline Analysis
Use simple regular expressions to help maximize your searches: This example shows the event codes for the when the Event Logging Service Starts (6005) and Stops (6006): c:\DEMO\TLN>grep -iE "EventLog/600[5,6]" timeline.csv :48:11,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4; :46:03,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4; :40:10,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4; :38:01,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4; :33:18,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4; :10:44,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4; :49:40,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4; :26:30,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4; :24:32,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;

54 Command Line Timeline Analysis
c:\DEMO\TLN>grep -E “,URL,|Content.IE5” timeline.csv | cut -d: -f1,2 | sort| uniq|cut -d" " -f1 |sort |uniq -c This will give you a count of the unique minutes that web history or temporary internet files were created and a rough estimate of how long a user was actively browsing. Great for when proxy logs are not available.

55 Command Line Timeline Analysis
Determine the logon times and user names for anyone that interactively logged on to the system: C:\DEMO>grep timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4624"| cut -d, -f1,10,13 | grep -E ",2$|,11$" |sort | uniq :10:09,DAVESTRUM,11 :50:46,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :59:56,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :20:45,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :21:24,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :16:01,DAVESTRUM,11 :39:38,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :42:22,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 :47:07,DAVESTRUM,2 :47:08,DAVESTRUM,2 BUT THIS STILL DOESN’T READ ALL THAT WELL

56 Command Line Timeline Analysis
LABEL, SEPARATE, and COMBINE YOUR FINDINGS C:\DEMO>grep timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4624"| cut -d, -f1,10,13 | grep -E ",2$|,11$" |sort | uniq > logontimes.txt & FOR /F "delims=" %i IN ('type logontimes.txt') %i LOGON >> FINDINGS.TXT C:\DEMO>grep timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4647"| cut -d, -f1,6 | sort | uniq > logofftimes.txt & FOR /F "delims=" %i IN ('type logofftimes.txt') %i LOGOFF >> FINDINGS.TXT C:\DEMO> type FINDINGS.TXT | sort :10:09,DAVESTRUM,11 LOGON :50:46,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON :59:56,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON :20:45,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON :21:24,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON :06:43,DAVESTRUM LOGOFF

57 References https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/orion-incident-response-live-cd-33368 https://blogs.sans.org/computer-forensics/files/2012/06/SANS-Digital-Forensics-and-Incident-Response-Poster-2012.pdf https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/downloads/list https://tzworks.net/download_links.php https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandReference

58 References

59 Will post the script and Tools shortly….

60 Questions?


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