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A URA: A language with authorization and audit Steve Zdancewic University of Pennsylvania HCSS 2008.

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Presentation on theme: "A URA: A language with authorization and audit Steve Zdancewic University of Pennsylvania HCSS 2008."— Presentation transcript:

1 A URA: A language with authorization and audit Steve Zdancewic University of Pennsylvania HCSS 2008

2 2 Security-oriented Languages Manifest Security Project (NSF ) –Penn: Benjamin Pierce, Stephanie Weirich –CMU: Karl Crary, Bob Harper, Frank Pfenning CAREER: Language-based Distributed System Security (NSF ) Limin Jia, Karl Mazurak, Jeff Vaughan, Jianzhou Zhao Joey Schorr and Luke Zarko

3 3 host applications data Networked Information System Security Networked hosts Many applications running Data resides at the hosts but can be shared over the network

4 4 host applications data Information-flow Constraints Some data is confidential Heterogeneous trust: –Not all hosts are trusted to the same degree –Different principals might have different opinions about trust

5 5 Challenges Policies are complex to specify and difficult to enforce –Many entities: hosts, programs, users, etc. –Software is large and complex –Heterogeneous trust implies decentralization of policies Existing mechanisms are necessary… –Cryptography –Network protocols –OS / Firewalls, etc. level isolation …but not sufficient –Must decrypt data to process it –Hard to regulate information flows through software –OS / Firewall access control and auditing is at the wrong level of abstraction

6 6 Security-oriented Languages Use static analysis (e.g. type systems) and dynamic checks to enforce security properties at the language level. My own research [Zdancewic et al.] –Jif, secure-program partitioning, robust declassification, … Authorization Logics & Proof Carrying Authorization: –ABLP 1993 [Abadi, Burrows, Lampson, Plotkin] –DCC [Abadi], linearity & time [Garg & Pfenning] –Trust Management [Blaze et al.] Information flow: –Jif [Myers, et al.], FlowCaml [Simonet, et al.], … Much work in the last decade: ESC/Java, Spec# [Leino, et al.] Type Qualifiers [Foster, et al.] PoET/PSLang [Erlingson & Schneider] TAL, Cyclone [Morrisett, et al.] PCC, Ccured[Necula, et al.] xg++, metal [Engler, et al.], Fable [Hicks…]

7 7 Goal of the A URA project: Develop a security-oriented programming language that supports: –Proof-carrying Authorization [Appel & Felton] [Bauer et al.] –Strong information-flow properties (as in Jif [Myers et al.], FlowCaml [Pottier & Simonet] ) Why? –Declarative policies (for access control & information flow) –Auditing & logging: proofs of authorization are informative –Good theoretical foundations In this talk: A high-level tour of A URA 's design –Focus on the authorization and audit components

8 8 Outline A URA 's programming model Authorization logic –Examples Programming in A URA –Dependent types Status, future directions, conclusions

9 9 A URA : Programming Model A URA is a type-safe functional programming language As in Java, C#, etc. A URA provides an interface to the OS resources –disk, network, memory, … A URA is intended to be used for writing security-critical components system interface application A URA runtime system code I/O

10 10 A URA : Authorization Policies A URA security policies are expressed in an authorization logic Applications can define their own policies Language provides features for creating/manipulating proofs system interface application A URA runtime system code policy proof I/O

11 11 A URA : Authorization Policies Proofs are first class and they can depend on data Proof objects are capabilities needed to access resources protected by the runtime: A URA 's type system ensures compliance The runtime logs the proofs for later audit system interface application A URA runtime system code policy proof data I/O log

12 12 A URA : Principals and Keys For distributed systems, A URA also manages private keys Keys can create policy assertions sharable over the network Connected to the policy by A URA 's notion of principal system interface application A URA runtime system log code policy proof data I/O A B AB

13 13 Evidence-based Audit Connecting the contents of log entries to policy helps determine what to log. log policy code

14 14 Evidence-based Audit Connecting the contents of log entries to policy helps determine what to log. Proofs contain structure that can help administrators find flaws or misconfigurations in the policy. log policy code

15 15 Evidence-based Audit Connecting the contents of log entries to policy helps determine what to log. Proofs contain structure that can help administrators find flaws or misconfigurations in the policy. Reduced TCB: Typed interface forces code to provide auditable evidence. log policy code

16 16 Outline A URA 's programming model Authorization logic –Examples Programming in A URA –Dependent types Status, future directions, conclusions

17 17 A URA 's Authorization Logic Policy propositions  ::=true c A says            .  Principals A,B,C … P,Q,R etc. Constructive logic: –proofs are programs –easy integration with software Access control in a Core Calculus of Dependency [Abadi: ICFP 2006]

18 18 Example: File system authorization P1: FS says (Owns A f1) P2: FS says (Owns B f2) … OwnerControlsRead: FS says  o,r,f.(Owns o f)  (o says (MayRead r f))  (MayRead r f) Might need to prove: FS says (MayRead A f1) What are "Owns" and "f1"?

19 19 Decentralized Authorization Authorization policies require application-specific constants: –e.g. "MayRead B f" or "Owns A f" –There is no "proof evidence" associated with these constants –Otherwise, it would be easy to forge authorization proofs But, principal A should be able to create a proof of A says (MayRead B f) –No justification required -- this is a matter of policy, not fact! Decentralized implementation: –One proof that "A says T" is A's digital signature on a string "T" –written sign(A, "T")

20 20 Example Proof (1) P1: FS says (Owns A f1) OwnerControlsRead: FS says  o,r,f.(Owns o f)  (o says (MayRead r f))  (MayRead r f) Direct authorization via FS's signature: sign(FS, "MayRead A f1") : FS says (MayRead A f1)

21 21 Example Proof (2) P1: FS says (Owns A f1) OwnerControlsRead: FS says  o,r,f.(Owns o f)  (o says (MayRead r f))  (MayRead r f) Complex proof constructed using "bind" and "return" bind p = OwnerControlsRead in bind q = P1 in return FS (p A A f1 q sign(A,"MayRead A f1"))) : FS says (MayRead A f1)

22 22 Authority in A URA How to create the value sign(A, "  ") ? Components of the software have authority –Authority modeled as possession of a private key –With A's authority : say("  ") evaluates to sign(A, "  ") What  's should a program be able to say? –From a statically predetermined set (static auditing) –From a set determined at load time In any case: log which assertions are made

23 23 Example Theorems T  P says T "Principals assert all true statements" (P says T)  (P says (T  U))  (P says U) "Principals' assertions are closed under deduction" Define "P speaks-for Q" = . (P says  )  (Q says  ) (Q says (P speaks-for Q))  (P speaks-for Q) "Q can delegate its authority to P" (The "hand off" axiom)

24 24 Example Non-theorems It is not possible to prove false: False  .  "The logic is consistent" Without sign, it's not possible to prove: P says False "Principals are consistent" It is not possible to prove: .(A says  )   "Just because A says it doesn't mean it's true" If  (Q = P) then there is no T such that: (Q says T)  P says False "Nothing Q can say can cause P to be inconsistent"

25 25 Outline A URA 's programming model Authorization logic –Examples Programming in A URA –Dependent types Status, future directions, conclusions

26 26 Propositions: specify policy  A says  (    ) .T (Owns A fh1) Evidence: proofs/credentials sign(A, "  ") bind  P A URA Programming Language Types: describe programs int FileHandle stringPrin int -> int Programs: computations, I/O 3fh1 "hello"A say(  ) ProgramsPolicies Static Dynamic

27 27 Dependent Types Policy propositions can mention program data –E.g. "f1" is a file handle that can appear in a policy –A URA restricts dependency to first order data types –Disallows computation at the type level Programming with dependent types: {x:T; U(x)} dependent pair (x:T)  U(x) dependent functions Invariant: sign only types –Computation can't depend on signatures –But, can use predicates: {x:int; A says Good(x)}

28 28 Auditing Interfaces Type of the "native" read operation: raw_read : FileHandle  String A URA 's runtime exposes it this way: read : (f:FileHandle)  RT says (OkToRead self f)  {ans:String; RT says (DidRead f ans)} RT is a principal that represents the A URA runtime OKtoRead and DidRead are "generic" policies –The application implements its own policies about when it is OKtoRead

29 29 Example File Server Program (* assertions to do with FS access-control policy *) assert Owns : Prin -> FileHandle -> Prop; assert MayRead : Prin -> FileHandle -> Prop; (* RT's delegation to FS *) let del = say((f:FileHandle) -> (p:Prin) -> FS says (MayRead p f) -> OkToRead FS f) (* FS code to handle a request *) let handle (r:Request) = match r with { | readRequest q o f (x:o says MayRead q f) -> match getOwner f with { | Just {o':Owner; ownFS:FS says Own o' f} -> if o = o' then let FSproof = bind a = OwnerControlsRead in bind b = ownFS in return FS (a o q f b x))) in let cap : OkToRead FS f = del f q FSproof Just (read f cap) else … | Nothing -> … | … Create application specific propositions Interface with A URA 's generic policy Dynamically testing values refines proof types. Construct a proof object Call the A URA runtime.

30 30 Outline A URA 's programming model Authorization logic –Examples Programming in A URA –Dependent types Status, future directions, conclusions

31 31 A URA 's Status A URA 's core calculus: –Rich type system that supports dependent authorization policies, recursive types, etc., suitable for compiler intermediate language –Type system is specified using the Coq proof assistant –Correctness properties proved in Coq: Type soundness proof is (nearly) complete (~7000 loc) Have implemented an interpreter in F# –Many small examples programs –Working on larger examples –Goal: experience with proof sizes, logging infrastructure Planning to compile A URA to Microsoft.NET platform –Proof representation / compatibility with C# and other.NET languages

32 32 Open Questions This story seems just fine for integrity, but what about confidentiality? –We have many ideas about connecting to information-flow analysis –Is there an "encryption" analog to "signatures" interpretation? Other future directions: –Revocation/expiration of signed objects? –(Dependent) Type inference? Proof inference? –Connection to program verification? –Correlate distributed logs?

33 33 Security-oriented Languages A URA A language with support for authorization and audit Authorization logic Dependent types Language features that support secure systems

34 34 Thanks!

35 35 Auditing programs What does the program do with the proofs? More Logging! –They record justifications of why certain operations were permitted. When do you do the logging? –Answer: As close to the use of the privileges as possible. –Easy for built-in security-relevant operations like file I/O. –Also provide a "log" operation for programmers to use explicitly. Question: what theorem do you prove? –Correspondence between security-relevant operations and log entries. –Log entries should explain the observed behavior of the program. Speculation: A theory of auditing?

36 36 Background: Authorization Enforcing authorization policies in distributed systems is difficult –Policies can become complex –Software that enforces the policies can be complex Authorization Logics: –Abadi, Burrows, Lampson, Plotkin "ABLP" [TOPLAS 1993] somewhat ad hoc w.r.t. delegation and negation –Garg & Pfenning [CSFW 2006, ESORICS 2006] a constructive modal logic that's very close to monomorphic DCC –Becker,Gordon, Fournet [CSFW 2007] Trust Management / KeyNote –Blaze et al. [Oakland 1996…]

37 37 Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) A Core Calculus of Dependency [Abadi, Banerjee, Heintz, Riecke: POPL 1999] –Type system with lattice of "labels" T L –Key property: noninterference –Showed how to encode many dependency analyses: information flow, binding time analysis, slicing, etc. Access control in a Core Calculus of Dependency [Abadi: ICFP 2006] –Essentially the same type system is an authorization logic –Instead of T L read the type as "L says T" –Curry-Howard isomorphism "programs are proofs"

38 38 Example A URA Program assert Owns : Prin -> FileHandle -> Prop data OwnerInfo : FileHandle -> Type { | oinfo :(f:FileHandle) -> (p:prin) -> (pf (FS says (Owns p f))) -> OwnerInfo f } getOwner : (f:FileHandle) -> Maybe (OwnerInfo f)

39 39 More examples assert OkToRead : FileHandle -> Prop assert HasContents: FileHandle -> String -> Prop data FileData : FileHandle -> Type { | fd : (f:FileData) -> (d:String) -> (pf (FS says (HasContents f d))) -> FileData } read : (f:FileHandle) -> (pf (FS says (OkToRead f)) -> (FileData f)

40 40 Existing mechanisms are necessary Cryptographic protocols provide authentication Encryption protects data on the network OS / Firewalls provide coarse-grained isolation and protection

41 41 …but not sufficient Data must be decrypted during computation Encryption must be used consistently with the policy Regulating information-flow through software is hard Auditing is at the wrong level of abstraction (Firewall, OS) Policy is usually expressed at the application level


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