Presentation on theme: "WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATION"— Presentation transcript:
1 WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATION Dr. Marwa DaoudyIUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)
2 « Water is not necessary for life, it is life » Antoine de St-Exupéry, Terre des Hommes, 1939
3 WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE PARTIAL PERSPECTIVE:« Crisis » or « war» because of freshwater scarcity – « geopolitics of water »INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:Sanitary, environmental, political, institutional and financial issues
4 MAPWater, an International IssueThe Debate: Water and IRBenefit-Sharing
5 ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS INDICATORS: Global data Resource use per person per yearRate of utilizationDependency rate on external sources
7 WATER-RELATED DATA263 internationally shared basins (A. Wolf, Oregon State, Water Database)70 in Africa, 55 in Europe, 40 in Asia, 33 in South America, 6 in the Middle East1400 million cubic kilometers (millions of billions of m3), 70% of the earth, only 2.5% of freshwaterRenewable resources: km3/year, i.e. 0,007% of the total water volumeNot an issue of global availability but geographic distribution: 9 countries – 60% of world water resources.
8 CRISIS - INDICATORS (I) Availability per person per year:> 1700 m3/h/an: relative water sufficiencyBetween 1700 and 1000 m3/p/year: water stressBetween 1000 and 500 m3/p/y: scarcity line< 500 m3/p/y: absolute scarcity
9 CRISIS - INDICATORS (II) Rate of dependence on external sources:Upstream/downstream (main areas of tension)E.g: Turkmenistan (98%), Egypt (97%), Syria (80%)
10 INDICATORS (III) Water utilizations: 70% to agriculture (ME: 80-90%) Global food: need to find a balance between agriculture/industry/domestic use
11 ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I) Health-related dilemmas:Water quality (80% of diseases are water-borne in poor countries - WHO)Pollution (pesticides and salinity of water and soils)
12 ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II) Demographic growth:World population: x 3 in 100 yearsPressures on water: x 6 in 100 yearsMainly in developing countriesIncreased urbanization: + pressure on water (90% of demographic growth is absorbed by cities)Green Revolution: food security, intensive irrigation practices (vs. Blue Revolution )Urbanization: – activités industrielles + habitat.Green Revolution: – fertilisation régions désertiques (Asie Centrale, Irak)augmentation surfaces irriguées (irrigation intensive)
13 ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES Increased water demand (demographic growth)Decreased water supply and water qualityMain areas of conflict
14 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE Decision-making process?Execution of mandates?Accountability, responsibility?
15 THE DEBATEInstitutional, economic, ethical, strategic and political issues at stakeNo common vision or unified strategy
16 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT Efficiency of international agreementsLegitimacy of proceduresEquitable share of responsibilities
17 International Water Governance Environmental, economic and social issuesSustainable development:Promoting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)Global good vs. Economic goodWater ethics: International Water Law
18 MULTILATERALISM Promoting International Water Governance: Stockholm, Rio, Johannesburg1972, 1992, 2002
19 INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT (IWRM) * Sustainable water management and sustainable development* Integrating sometimes opposed interests (ecosystems/human needs, surface water/underground resources, upstream/downstream interests, different uses…).* Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 (Rio): water is an economic good
20 WATER AND ECONOMICSSymbolic dimension: water = gift from God= public goodWater costs?
21 WATER ECONOMICS: THE DEBATE Regional scarcity: need to calculate total distribution costsGlobal economic costs: distribution + opportunity + externalConclusion: need to enhance economic efficiency and environmental, ecological sustainability. Avoid « tragedy of common goods ».
22 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS Private investments in water sectorInvestments to increase water supplies (supply management): desalination« Virtual water »: food imports = water imports (1500 m3/ton of cereals)Water marketsExporting water (Turkey).
23 ISSUES AT STAKE Privatization of water sector: risks Water access as human rightWater as global public goodThird way: between total privatization and total State control
24 WATER ETHICS Need to enhance cooperation among States International legal standardsSlow but steady construction of IL on utilization of international watercourses for non-navigational purposes (United Nations Convention, 1997).
25 CONCLUSIONS Multidimensional issue Water: human survival, economic growth and political stability« Hydro-politics »: link between hydraulic issues strategic, economic and political levels (cooperation, conflict, security).
27 The Theoretical Debate I. Water Conflict & Cooperation: some IR theoriesII. Debating water issues in the 1990s: environmental security vs. virtual waterIII. Debating water issues today: benefit sharing vs. water rights.
28 Water Specificity – Some Theoretical implications Global Common Good = need for collective actionAvoid « tragedy of the commons » (Hardin, 1968) or unilateral abuse by developing common and organized management of resources.Common and organized management of resources: (Ostrom, 1991).Recent studies suggest that average cost of desalinated water is 65 c/m3.Water property rights: Moore, 1992 & 1994; Luterbacher, Schellnhuber & Wiegandt, 2000.Political economy: Harvard Water Project, Fisher & al.
30 Conflict over Water Classification criteria (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006): Development disputesControl of water resourcesWater as political toolWater as military targetWater as military toolInter-StateIntra-State
31 Water Conflict and Cooperation Regime Theory: regional institutions to manage cooperative regimes for natural resources.International Governance: agent-based resolution of collective problems at local, national and international level.Regime theory: (Young, 1989; Haas, Keohane & Levy, 1993; Kibaroglu, 1998)Hegemonic stability theory: (Lowi, 1994)No conflict over water in ME: Waterbury, 1994).International governance: (Medzini & Wolf, 2001).
32 Water Conflict & Cooperation Power Matrix: additional factors (other than asymmetry) to explain link between water and conflict (interests, riparian position, projected power).Inherent asymmetry as specific nature of conflicts over water (Haftendorn, 2000).Conflict resolution should address asymmetric structure of conflictPower matrix: (Naff & Frey, 1985Inherent asymmetry: (Haftendorn, 2000).Debate in 90s: (Th. Homer-Dixon, 1994):Virtual water: (Allan, 2000).
33 Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation Environmental security vs. virtual water (Pessimists vs. Optimists)Debate in 1990s: very high risks of violent conflict because of increasing water scarcity (e.g., Middle East)Vs. no conflict despite water scarcity and tensions: additional supply through water embedded in food imports
34 GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES Conventional Geopolitics: Natural resource endowments and geography are defining features of a State’s statusGeographical and environmental determinism
35 WATER - GEOPOLITICS Neo-Malthusianism: « WATER WARS» Demographic growth, resource scarcity and violent conflictCornucopian perspectives: cooperation vs. conflictAvailable but mismanaged resourcesNeed to evaluate resources economically (price)(Homer-Dixon)
37 The DebateThe inevitability of water conflicts is supported by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The link between water and violent conflict is thus confirmed.As a strategic security concern, water can become a source of conflict but interdependent riparian states are more likely to cooperate over water.
38 Water & SecurityA new debate on national security: critical security studies (CSS)Enlargement of threats: from traditional (military, economic) to non-traditional (environment, resources, health)Link between environmental problems and emergence of conflicts« Environmental security »Critical security studies: (Krause & Williams, 1997).Securitization: (Buzan,Waever & de Wilde, 1998)
39 Research QuestionsWhat linkages are established between the environment and security? How can they explain the successful securitization of the environment as a referent object since the 1990s.Some would argue that resource scarcities have been over-securitized in the last decades. How? Why? What about current trends towards the securitization of the environment in relation to development?
41 Environmental Security (2) Toronto School (Homer-Dixon, 1993, 1994)Oslo School (Gledditsch, 1998, 2000)Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (ECSP), Washington.
42 THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Link between environmental problems (water) and national security issuesThreat perceptionSecuritization of environmental problems: maintain local biosphere as an essential support on which will depend all other human activities (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 74)
46 ACTORSDefining the Hegemon: State that temporarily gains a preponderance of power in the international and/or regional systemIt can unilaterally dominate the rulesand procedures that guide political and economic relations – and water dynamics
47 STRUCTUREAsymmetry of power (upstream/downstream, military, economic resources)History of relations (politics, culture, etc..)Structural power (1st dimension of power)
49 Bargaining Power (« 2nd face of power ») STRATEGIESBargaining Power (« 2nd face of power »)TimeCosts of no agreement
50 Bilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstable AGREEMENTSBilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstableStructure of agreements =power structure (Schelling, 1960)BATNA: Best Alternative to No Agreement
51 How to reach agreements in situations of Hydro-Hegemony? Security dilemmaUnilateral upstream development = dependence and insecurity for downstream riparians Bargaining power: reverse of asymmetrical dynamics
52 Some Counter-Hegemony Strategies Issue-Linkage: linkage, securitization processChange the other riparian’s utilities & alternativesImpact on strategic, economic, security interestsImmediate interests: food and water securityGeneral interests: regional, border securityInternational Law: source of bargaining and structural power for dependent and/or downstream riparians
53 Power Asymmetry: The Debate Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water conflict. The will of the stronger states prevails and determines the course of action.Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water cooperation A difference in power symmetries presents an opportunity for weaker riparians to find solutions and strategies to impact the process and final outcome, thus enhancing the “power of the weak”.
54 Water Conflict Resolution Asymmetry of power: specific to water conflicts vs. political or some other environmental conflictsResolve the conflict by addressing the structure of conflict, not causes“Desecuritization” process: focus on interests, power and rights
55 POWER ASYMMETRY AND HYDRO-HEGEMONY Research findings: more efficient outcomes if asymmetry of power (power strategies)– limits to Hydro-HegemonyOnly bilateral agreements – limits to issue linkage and downstream power
57 «Cornucopian » perspectives Political EconomyCooperative solutions through water markets and pricing of water:Virtual waterDemand managementBenefit-sharing
58 The DebateCooperation through joint water management, information-sharing, monitoring, etc. can provide the incentive for broader cooperation between co-riparians that is needed for effective de-securitization, thus allowing for conflict prevention/transformation, mutual benefit-sharing and development of all the concerned riparian states.
59 Policy & Research Findings “Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing”, Expert Group on Development Issues of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign AffairsCo-authored with Phillips, Mc Caffrey, Öjendal, & Turton, 2006.
60 The framework for the approach Specific research and policy-oriented questions:What role does the sharing of benefits play in the conflict/cooperation debate?Can cooperation on the sharing of international watercourses be utilized as a broader conflict prevention tool?What are the key areas for development partners in integrating trans-boundary water management more closely into their overall development agendas?
61 From ‘Water Wars’ to the Sharing of Benefits Options for cooperation and the amicable sharing of benefits resulting from professionally managed watersheds.The ‘desecuritization of water resource management’
62 Benefit-Sharing Sadoff and Grey (2002) Simplest and most useful general framework to dateBenefits from cooperation over a shared river basin may be divided into four different categories: ‘environmental’, ‘economic’, ‘political’, and ‘catalytic’.
63 The Inter-SEDE ModelPhillips et al., 2006: assumption that a well-managed watershed will provide enhanced benefits in terms of Security, Economic Development, and the EnvironmentComparative analysis for the Jordan, the Kagera and the Mekong basinsEstablishment of relevant categories of indicators for 21 riparians of the three basins
64 Categories of Benefits Security: promotion of peaceful relations, reduction of military expenditure, prevention of human and societal insecurity.Economic development: enhancement of trade, food production, local household consumption, livelihoods.Both of the above elements are nested in the environment: contribution to biodiversity, promotion of sustainable management of trans-boundary resources, access to sufficient w. resources.
65 Identify Key Drivers Use indicators to identify key drivers All riparians have been ranked for all the indicators and resulting ranks placed in five bands: 1-5Conclusions: relative importance of different categories of drivers
66 CONCLUSIONSClear need for further development of the concept as a whole: “one size does not fit all”Over-riding importance of security-related dynamics: securitization/de-securitization dynamicsAny successful benefit-sharing scheme will require the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of possible benefits to act as an inducement to each co-riparian to be involved.Benefit-sharing will need to be established based on concrete inducements which can be quantifiedEquitable allocation vs. benefits: two sides of same coin
67 From Theory to Reality?Testing the frameworks in the Jordan and Mekong Basins.