1. Intelligence Oversight
United States Marine Corps
Inspector General
Intelligence Oversight
MR EDWIN T. VOGT
Assistant Inspector General
Intelligence Oversight Division

2. Changing Times

3. -- Gen George S. Patton, Jr. United States Army
Inspector General
“A typical IG is a man past middle age, spare, wrinkled, cold, passive, non-committal, with eyes of a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unresponsive, calm, and damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster of paris cast, a human petrification with a heart of feldspar and without charm or friendly germ, minus bowels, passion, or a sense of humor. Happily, they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell.”
-- Gen George S. Patton, Jr. United States Army

4. Key 3 How to approach and conduct I/O
Who to contact if you have questions
The implications of not having good I/O can be huge (Bradley aka Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden?

5. WHY WE EXIST? IO MISSION ABUSES - 60s/70s ABUSES - 80/90’S
VIETNAM ERA ABUSES
INFILTRATION OF COLLEGE
CAMPUSES
INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC
POLITICAL ISSUES
SURVEILLANCE OF ANTI-WAR
PROTESTORS
ABUSES - 80/90’S
COMPARTMENTED PROGRAM
ABUSES
El Salvador “Hit Squads”
Waco, TX Fort Bragg, NC
IRAN-CONTRA; GUATEMALA
IO MISSION
1975 – Church Committee
1981 – E.O
1982 – DODR R
SECNAVINST E
SECNAVINST E
MCO B

6. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work
Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work
ATSD
(Civil Support)
Inspector
General
(Intelligence
Oversight)
Counsel
ASD
(Legislative
Affairs)
(Public Affairs)
Director
Administration
and Management
USD
(Policy)
(Comptroller)
(Personnel &
Readiness)
DNI
Operational Test
& Evaluation
(Acquisition
Technology
and Logistics)
ATSD I/O
USD
Intelligence
ATSDIO Michael Goodroe- Acting- DNI Clapper - DODIG Mr. Jon Rymer
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF
ALL INTELLIGENCE / COUNTER INTEL ACTIVITIES
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

7. IGMC Organization Inspector General of the Marine Corps Administrative
Support Division
Inspections Division
Assistance
& Investigation
Hotline Manager
Senior Official
Investigations
Readiness Division
Intelligence
Oversight
(GS-15)
Deputy
Sergeant Major
Counsel to the
No brief is complete without an organizational chart.
The IG has 5 major divisions and a Counsel who works for SecNav but is assigned to the IGMC.
Depending on the case/circumstances, IGMC reports directly to SecNav or CMC.
Our overall staff is 27 people; Both the Admin Division and IGMC Counsel are worth their weight in gold. The first keeps everything coordinated, inbound correspondence (FOIA) related, assists, security management, personnel support, everything behind the scenes… they do). By virtue of what they do on the investigation side of the house, having an in-house counsel pays dividends for not only the CG but our investigators early in the investigation process. Helps shape allegations and whether we like it or not, special interest, SOI, whistleblower cases cannot be forwarded from our office without a formal thumbs up from Counsel on legal.
GS-15
GS-15

8. Oversight Division
Responsible for the Oversight of intelligence and non-intelligence “Sensitive Activities”
Includes: Intelligence, counterintelligence, covered/clandestine actions, special access programs, support to law enforcement agencies, special operations, other special activities
Insider Threat Program - Force Protection
Information Operations – Cyber
As you can see, Intel Oversight is very broad. Along with ensuring the rights of US Persons, it also includes non-intelligence activities such as RUT’s ( Realistic Urban Training), TRUE’s ( Training in Urban Environment Exercises), etc

9. Sensitive Activities
Sensitive Activities are activities, by their very nature, that require special oversight to reduce the potential for:
Physical risk to DON personnel or property
Issues of unlawful/improper conduct
Public embarrassment
May require special protection from disclosure
Sensitive Activities:
If not properly executed or administered, could raise issues of:
Unlawful conduct;
Government ethics;
Unusual danger;
May require special protection from disclosure

10. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT Getting Started with Your Units
Do your homework and read the regulations.
Identify subordinate Intel units and/or activities.
Get your Staff Judge Advocate involved.
Inspect as part of the CGIP:
Training program in place
Understanding of appropriate activities
Knowledge of reporting requirements

11. GOOD IO PROGRAM COMPONENTS
INSIGHT- Knowledge of programs and potential pitfalls
OVERSIGHT – Review of programs for compliance with current laws and directives
FORESIGHT – Determine way ahead to mitigate future problems and set path for future lawful conduct

12. GOOD INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM INDICATORS
COMMAND AND LEADER EMPHASIS
CODIFY RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
FORMALLY APPOINT IO OFFICIAL (Whom Everyone Knows)
TRAINING – EARLY AND OFTEN – WITH CREATIVE REINFORCEMENT

13. GOOD INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM INDICATORS
MUST BE AN ACTIVE PART OF ALL OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION
ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY SJA
QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITY REPORTING
Timeliness
Prompt and Appropriate Corrective Action
ACCURATE / CURRENT RECORDS & FILES

14. DoD 5240.1-R Procedures General Provisions
Collection of Info on U.S. Persons
Retention of Information
Dissemination of Information
Electronic Surveillance
Concealed Monitoring
Physical Searches
Searches of Mail
Physical Surveillance
Undisclosed Participation in Organizations
Contracting for Goods and Services
Assistance to Law Enforcement
Experimentation on Humans
Employee Conduct
Questionable Activities

15. Procedure 15 Under Procedure 15, IGs must . . .
Identify, investigate, and report questionable activities. Marines should report through their Commander or IG. IGs must then report all questionable activities within five working days from discovery to IGMC-IGO
Determine whether any organization, staffs, or office not specifically identified as an intelligence component are being used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.
You can reach IGMC-IGO at DSN or (703)

16. Questionable Activity Commonly Reported Examples
Gathering information on U.S. domestic groups not connected with a foreign power or international terrorism.
Producing and disseminating intelligence threat assessments containing U.S. person information without a clear explanation of the intelligence purpose for which the information was collected.
Storing operations and command traffic about U.S. persons in intelligence files merely because the information was transmitted on a classified system.
Collecting U.S. person information from open sources without a mission or authorization to do so.
Disseminating command force protection information on U.S. person domestic activity as an intelligence product.
Becoming directly involved in criminal investigative activities without proper authorization.

17. Significant or Highly Sensitive (S/HS) Matter
Impugn the reputation or integrity of the DoD intelligence community and/or
Challenge the propriety of an intel activity
Prompted by Congressional inquiry
May result in adverse media coverage
May impact foreign relations
Significant unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive material
Report serious questionable intelligence activities and all significant or highly sensitive matters immediately.

18. WHY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT?
Relevance in the Current Environment
GWOT AND
TRANSFORMATION
FORCE PROTECTION
EVOLVING
CAPABILITIES
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
&
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
INFORMATION SHARING
&
INTELLIGENCE FUSION
OPEN
SOURCE
COLLECTION
IO Training is normally conducted as part of pre-deployment training for Intel personnel. However, with the current OPTEMPO, I am finding this not to be the case. Fortunately, it has not been too detrimental to this date, but if it continues, it may be a problem. With regard to Force Protection, we are finding we have the “slippery slope” or mission creep in the fusion of Law Enforcement information mixed with DoD intelligence. The issue is the method of collection and by whom.

19. Reporting Format
DTM
Assessment of effect on national security, international relations, civil liberties, and privacy rights
Remedial action taken or planned
Actions taken if incident involves improper handling or compromise of classified information
Signed on letterhead (not an or phone call)
Recommend discussion between COCOM and Service IG’s on jurisdiction

20. Intelligence Oversight Inspection Methodology
Identify your command’s intelligence components
Involve your local Staff Judge Advocate
Request a briefing from these intelligence components on their program to comply with MCO B
Does the unit or activity have a copy of MCO B and appropriate SOPs on hand?
Examine training records to determine if personnel are receiving training in accordance with MCO B
Quiz unit or activity members

21. Intelligence Oversight Inspection Methodology (continued)
Review unit procedures for handling all intelligence information.
Physically check the intelligence files for U.S. person information.
Check the unit or activity's annual review of intelligence files.
Pay particular attention to files pertaining to support given to law-enforcement activities.
Determine if the unit or activity knows about Procedure 15 and how to report a questionable activity.

22. Command IG Responsibilities for Intelligence Oversight
Inspect intelligence components and activities as part of the Commanding Generals Inspection Program (CGIP) to ensure compliance MCO B.
Report any questionable activities within five working days to IGMC-IGO in accordance with Procedure 15.
Ensure that inspected personnel are familiar with the provisions of DoD R (Procedures 1 through 4 and 14) and know how to report questionable activities in accordance with Procedure 15.

23. Intelligence Oversight Triangle
Commanders Remain Responsible for
Everything the Unit Does or Fails to Do
Intelligence Professional
Inspector General
of the Marine Corps
A system of checks and balances to mitigate risk

24. What We Are Seeing in DoD
Trends
What We Are Seeing in DoD
Inspections
Execution of Intelligence Activities is Generally Good
Troops Get Trained—Leaders and Contractors Don’t
Unimaginative Training Leads to Poor Retention
Lack of Non-Intel Leader Awareness and Emphasis on IO
Loss of High Demand Low Density Personnel to the Private Sector
Reports of Questionable Intelligence Activity (Procedure 15)
Conduct of Intelligence Activities without Appropriate Authority
Personnel Misconduct in the Course of Intelligence Operations
Failure to Report Questionable Activities
Force Protection Dets are sometimes outside their authority in Collection
vs Analysis
Some of the trends we are seeing across the board in DoD

25. DoD IO Case Files Source Operations The Rogue Analyst The Rogue G2
The Rogue G3 who thinks they are James Bond
CERP Funds for Sources
Extorting money from drug cartel (Yes this was attempted)
Unauthorized Collection Activities
“Health and Welfare” (Wink, Wink) Subterfuge Searches
Hacking into Accounts of US Persons
Physical Surveillance and Investigations
Other Employee Conduct Violations
“The Instructor ‘Looked’ Like a Terrorist”

26. Requirements & Resolution
IO Reporting
Requirements & Resolution
Reporting is Non-Negotiable
Report All Questionable Activity
Confirmed and Possible Violations
Report To Intel Oversight Within 5 Working Days of Discovery
MARFOR, IGMC, SJA, Command Channels or VFR Direct

28. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IS A GOOD THING
- ENSURES PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
- PROTECTS USMC’S GOOD NAME
- DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS POLICING
IT’S OWN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
- PROCEDURE 15 - ALTERNATE REPORTING CHANNEL
NOT A DISCIPLINARY REPORT
BOTTOM LINE:
ATTEND TO IO RESPONSIBILITES UP FRONT OR….
GET HELP ATTENDING TO DAMAGE CONTROL LATER

29. One Last Point On Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities
“In the information age, the bad news is going to get out…the only question is who will tell it first and will they tell it accurately.”
- Torie Clark
Former Asst. SECDEF for Public Affairs

30. Questions ?

31. Key 3 How to approach and conduct I/O
Who to contact if you have questions
The implications of not having good I/O can be huge

32. Summary/Conclusion
“A free people have long had to decide where to plant the flag on that inevitable spectrum between security and liberty. We have always planted it close to liberty.”
LtGen Hayden, Former Director, NSA

33. Assistant Inspector General Intelligence Oversight
Mr. Edwin T. Vogt
Assistant Inspector General
Intelligence Oversight
(703)
DSN

34. Back-up slides

35. GOOD IO PROGRAM COMPONENTS
INSIGHT
OVERSIGHT
FORESIGHT

36. ISSUES ASSIGNED TO IGMC-IO
CLASSIFIED
ACTIVITIES
In the current environment with GWOT, violations of Intel Oversight has come to light on a few occasions. One of the biggest issues has been with the use of Interpreters who are indigenous personnel. Some have been hired by US Corporations which by the rules, puts them in the category of US Persons. We have had issues where some of these interpreters were working both sides. As you can imagine, many of these issues never make it to the open source information network.
INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES

37. Questionable Activity
Can the S-2 keep files on Marines in the battalion who are members of a suspicious group?
Can the CI/HUMINT Company conduct surveillance of the local chapter of Hell’s Angels because we think that they may be a risk to our families and Soldiers?
Can the S-1 collect and retain information on the spouses and children of Marines in the battalion?
Can we use Low-Level Voice Intercepts (LLVI) to help local law-enforcement agencies?
Can Military-Intelligence components collect information on the Ku Klux Klan?
No.
NCIS or the Provost Marshal has regulatory authority but not the intelligence organizations.
Yes (social roster, NEO information, etc.)
Maybe. Check Procedure 12 and consult your Operational Law Attorney.
No -- as long as they are not agents of a foreign power. As a force-protection issue, the Provost Marshal or NCIS is better suited to collect this information.

38. Intelligence Oversight Presidential Charter
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
SECDEF
QUARTERLY
REPORT
Department of Defense
General Counsel
To ensure that these orders are complied with, a structure of oversight and reporting was set up. The President’s Intelligence Oversight Board was created. Quarterly, every Service must report in the affirmative of:
Our compliance regarding the requirements of the various orders and regulations
Any questionable activities
Any issues relating to Intelligence Oversight
So if you ever wondered where your Quarterly Intelligence Oversight report went, or if any one actually read it, now you know.
ATSD(IO)
POLICY AND
GUIDANCE
COMPLIANCE
INSPECTIONS