3-- Gen George S. Patton, Jr. United States Army Inspector General“A typical IG is a man past middle age, spare, wrinkled, cold, passive, non-committal, with eyes of a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unresponsive, calm, and damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster of paris cast, a human petrification with a heart of feldspar and without charm or friendly germ, minus bowels, passion, or a sense of humor. Happily, they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell.”-- Gen George S. Patton, Jr. United States Army
4Key 3 How to approach and conduct I/O Who to contact if you have questionsThe implications of not having good I/O can be huge (Bradley aka Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden?
5WHY WE EXIST? IO MISSION ABUSES - 60s/70s ABUSES - 80/90’S VIETNAM ERA ABUSESINFILTRATION OF COLLEGECAMPUSESINVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTICPOLITICAL ISSUESSURVEILLANCE OF ANTI-WARPROTESTORSABUSES - 80/90’SCOMPARTMENTED PROGRAMABUSESEl Salvador “Hit Squads”Waco, TX Fort Bragg, NCIRAN-CONTRA; GUATEMALAIO MISSION1975 – Church Committee1981 – E.O1982 – DODR RSECNAVINST ESECNAVINST EMCO B
6Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work DeputySecretary of Defense Robert O. WorkATSD(Civil Support)InspectorGeneral(IntelligenceOversight)CounselASD(LegislativeAffairs)(Public Affairs)DirectorAdministrationand ManagementUSD(Policy)(Comptroller)(Personnel &Readiness)DNIOperational Test& Evaluation(AcquisitionTechnologyand Logistics)ATSD I/OUSDIntelligenceATSDIO Michael Goodroe- Acting- DNI Clapper - DODIG Mr. Jon RymerRESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OFALL INTELLIGENCE / COUNTER INTEL ACTIVITIESIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
7IGMC Organization Inspector General of the Marine Corps Administrative Support DivisionInspections DivisionAssistance& InvestigationHotline ManagerSenior OfficialInvestigationsReadiness DivisionIntelligenceOversight(GS-15)DeputySergeant MajorCounsel to theNo brief is complete without an organizational chart.The IG has 5 major divisions and a Counsel who works for SecNav but is assigned to the IGMC.Depending on the case/circumstances, IGMC reports directly to SecNav or CMC.Our overall staff is 27 people; Both the Admin Division and IGMC Counsel are worth their weight in gold. The first keeps everything coordinated, inbound correspondence (FOIA) related, assists, security management, personnel support, everything behind the scenes… they do). By virtue of what they do on the investigation side of the house, having an in-house counsel pays dividends for not only the CG but our investigators early in the investigation process. Helps shape allegations and whether we like it or not, special interest, SOI, whistleblower cases cannot be forwarded from our office without a formal thumbs up from Counsel on legal.GS-15GS-15
8Oversight DivisionResponsible for the Oversight of intelligence and non-intelligence “Sensitive Activities”Includes: Intelligence, counterintelligence, covered/clandestine actions, special access programs, support to law enforcement agencies, special operations, other special activitiesInsider Threat Program - Force ProtectionInformation Operations – CyberAs you can see, Intel Oversight is very broad. Along with ensuring the rights of US Persons, it also includes non-intelligence activities such as RUT’s ( Realistic Urban Training), TRUE’s ( Training in Urban Environment Exercises), etc
9Sensitive ActivitiesSensitive Activities are activities, by their very nature, that require special oversight to reduce the potential for:Physical risk to DON personnel or propertyIssues of unlawful/improper conductPublic embarrassmentMay require special protection from disclosureSensitive Activities:If not properly executed or administered, could raise issues of:Unlawful conduct;Government ethics;Unusual danger;May require special protection from disclosure
10INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT Getting Started with Your Units Do your homework and read the regulations.Identify subordinate Intel units and/or activities.Get your Staff Judge Advocate involved.Inspect as part of the CGIP:Training program in placeUnderstanding of appropriate activitiesKnowledge of reporting requirements
11GOOD IO PROGRAM COMPONENTS INSIGHT- Knowledge of programs and potential pitfallsOVERSIGHT – Review of programs for compliance with current laws and directivesFORESIGHT – Determine way ahead to mitigate future problems and set path for future lawful conduct
12GOOD INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM INDICATORS COMMAND AND LEADER EMPHASISCODIFY RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTSFORMALLY APPOINT IO OFFICIAL (Whom Everyone Knows)TRAINING – EARLY AND OFTEN – WITH CREATIVE REINFORCEMENT
13GOOD INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM INDICATORS MUST BE AN ACTIVE PART OF ALL OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTIONACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY SJAQUESTIONABLE ACTIVITY REPORTINGTimelinessPrompt and Appropriate Corrective ActionACCURATE / CURRENT RECORDS & FILES
14DoD 5240.1-R Procedures General Provisions Collection of Info on U.S. PersonsRetention of InformationDissemination of InformationElectronic SurveillanceConcealed MonitoringPhysical SearchesSearches of MailPhysical SurveillanceUndisclosed Participation in OrganizationsContracting for Goods and ServicesAssistance to Law EnforcementExperimentation on HumansEmployee ConductQuestionable Activities
15Procedure 15 Under Procedure 15, IGs must . . . Identify, investigate, and report questionable activities. Marines should report through their Commander or IG. IGs must then report all questionable activities within five working days from discovery to IGMC-IGODetermine whether any organization, staffs, or office not specifically identified as an intelligence component are being used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.You can reach IGMC-IGO at DSN or (703)
16Questionable Activity Commonly Reported Examples Gathering information on U.S. domestic groups not connected with a foreign power or international terrorism.Producing and disseminating intelligence threat assessments containing U.S. person information without a clear explanation of the intelligence purpose for which the information was collected.Storing operations and command traffic about U.S. persons in intelligence files merely because the information was transmitted on a classified system.Collecting U.S. person information from open sources without a mission or authorization to do so.Disseminating command force protection information on U.S. person domestic activity as an intelligence product.Becoming directly involved in criminal investigative activities without proper authorization.
17Significant or Highly Sensitive (S/HS) Matter Impugn the reputation or integrity of the DoD intelligence community and/orChallenge the propriety of an intel activityPrompted by Congressional inquiryMay result in adverse media coverageMay impact foreign relationsSignificant unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive materialReport serious questionable intelligence activities and all significant or highly sensitive matters immediately.
18WHY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT? Relevance in the Current EnvironmentGWOT ANDTRANSFORMATIONFORCE PROTECTIONEVOLVINGCAPABILITIESPRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING&COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIESINFORMATION SHARING&INTELLIGENCE FUSIONOPENSOURCECOLLECTIONIO Training is normally conducted as part of pre-deployment training for Intel personnel. However, with the current OPTEMPO, I am finding this not to be the case. Fortunately, it has not been too detrimental to this date, but if it continues, it may be a problem. With regard to Force Protection, we are finding we have the “slippery slope” or mission creep in the fusion of Law Enforcement information mixed with DoD intelligence. The issue is the method of collection and by whom.
19Reporting FormatDTMAssessment of effect on national security, international relations, civil liberties, and privacy rightsRemedial action taken or plannedActions taken if incident involves improper handling or compromise of classified informationSigned on letterhead (not an or phone call)Recommend discussion between COCOM and Service IG’s on jurisdiction
20Intelligence Oversight Inspection Methodology Identify your command’s intelligence componentsInvolve your local Staff Judge AdvocateRequest a briefing from these intelligence components on their program to comply with MCO BDoes the unit or activity have a copy of MCO B and appropriate SOPs on hand?Examine training records to determine if personnel are receiving training in accordance with MCO BQuiz unit or activity members
21Intelligence Oversight Inspection Methodology (continued) Review unit procedures for handling all intelligence information.Physically check the intelligence files for U.S. person information.Check the unit or activity's annual review of intelligence files.Pay particular attention to files pertaining to support given to law-enforcement activities.Determine if the unit or activity knows about Procedure 15 and how to report a questionable activity.
22Command IG Responsibilities for Intelligence Oversight Inspect intelligence components and activities as part of the Commanding Generals Inspection Program (CGIP) to ensure compliance MCO B.Report any questionable activities within five working days to IGMC-IGO in accordance with Procedure 15.Ensure that inspected personnel are familiar with the provisions of DoD R (Procedures 1 through 4 and 14) and know how to report questionable activities in accordance with Procedure 15.
23Intelligence Oversight Triangle Commanders Remain Responsible forEverything the Unit Does or Fails to DoIntelligence ProfessionalInspector Generalof the Marine CorpsA system of checks and balances to mitigate risk
24What We Are Seeing in DoD TrendsWhat We Are Seeing in DoDInspectionsExecution of Intelligence Activities is Generally GoodTroops Get Trained—Leaders and Contractors Don’tUnimaginative Training Leads to Poor RetentionLack of Non-Intel Leader Awareness and Emphasis on IOLoss of High Demand Low Density Personnel to the Private SectorReports of Questionable Intelligence Activity (Procedure 15)Conduct of Intelligence Activities without Appropriate AuthorityPersonnel Misconduct in the Course of Intelligence OperationsFailure to Report Questionable ActivitiesForce Protection Dets are sometimes outside their authority in Collectionvs AnalysisSome of the trends we are seeing across the board in DoD
25DoD IO Case Files Source Operations The Rogue Analyst The Rogue G2 The Rogue G3 who thinks they are James BondCERP Funds for SourcesExtorting money from drug cartel (Yes this was attempted)Unauthorized Collection Activities“Health and Welfare” (Wink, Wink) Subterfuge SearchesHacking into Accounts of US PersonsPhysical Surveillance and InvestigationsOther Employee Conduct Violations“The Instructor ‘Looked’ Like a Terrorist”
26Requirements & Resolution IO ReportingRequirements & ResolutionReporting is Non-NegotiableReport All Questionable ActivityConfirmed and Possible ViolationsReport To Intel Oversight Within 5 Working Days of DiscoveryMARFOR, IGMC, SJA, Command Channels or VFR Direct
28INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IS A GOOD THING - ENSURES PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS- PROTECTS USMC’S GOOD NAME- DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MARINE CORPS IS POLICINGIT’S OWN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES- PROCEDURE 15 - ALTERNATE REPORTING CHANNELNOT A DISCIPLINARY REPORTBOTTOM LINE:ATTEND TO IO RESPONSIBILITES UP FRONT OR….GET HELP ATTENDING TO DAMAGE CONTROL LATER
29One Last Point On Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities “In the information age, the bad news is going to get out…the only question is who will tell it first and will they tell it accurately.”- Torie ClarkFormer Asst. SECDEF for Public Affairs
31Key 3 How to approach and conduct I/O Who to contact if you have questionsThe implications of not having good I/O can be huge
32Summary/Conclusion“A free people have long had to decide where to plant the flag on that inevitable spectrum between security and liberty. We have always planted it close to liberty.”LtGen Hayden, Former Director, NSA
33Assistant Inspector General Intelligence Oversight Mr. Edwin T. VogtAssistant Inspector GeneralIntelligence Oversight(703)DSN
35GOOD IO PROGRAM COMPONENTS INSIGHTOVERSIGHTFORESIGHT
36ISSUES ASSIGNED TO IGMC-IO CLASSIFIEDACTIVITIESIn the current environment with GWOT, violations of Intel Oversight has come to light on a few occasions. One of the biggest issues has been with the use of Interpreters who are indigenous personnel. Some have been hired by US Corporations which by the rules, puts them in the category of US Persons. We have had issues where some of these interpreters were working both sides. As you can imagine, many of these issues never make it to the open source information network.INTELLIGENCEACTIVITIES
37Questionable Activity Can the S-2 keep files on Marines in the battalion who are members of a suspicious group?Can the CI/HUMINT Company conduct surveillance of the local chapter of Hell’s Angels because we think that they may be a risk to our families and Soldiers?Can the S-1 collect and retain information on the spouses and children of Marines in the battalion?Can we use Low-Level Voice Intercepts (LLVI) to help local law-enforcement agencies?Can Military-Intelligence components collect information on the Ku Klux Klan?No.NCIS or the Provost Marshal has regulatory authority but not the intelligence organizations.Yes (social roster, NEO information, etc.)Maybe. Check Procedure 12 and consult your Operational Law Attorney.No -- as long as they are not agents of a foreign power. As a force-protection issue, the Provost Marshal or NCIS is better suited to collect this information.
38Intelligence Oversight Presidential Charter INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARDSECDEFQUARTERLYREPORTDepartment of DefenseGeneral CounselTo ensure that these orders are complied with, a structure of oversight and reporting was set up. The President’s Intelligence Oversight Board was created. Quarterly, every Service must report in the affirmative of:Our compliance regarding the requirements of the various orders and regulationsAny questionable activitiesAny issues relating to Intelligence OversightSo if you ever wondered where your Quarterly Intelligence Oversight report went, or if any one actually read it, now you know.ATSD(IO)POLICY ANDGUIDANCECOMPLIANCEINSPECTIONS