Presentation on theme: "Armour in Peace Support Operations Ben du Toit, Defence Analyst, Defence Decision Support Institute."— Presentation transcript:
Armour in Peace Support Operations Ben du Toit, Defence Analyst, Defence Decision Support Institute
2 1. Changing threats in a VUCA environment. 2. Blurring of boundaries: “armoured” and Armour. 3. Enter Capability Based Planning. 4. POSTEDFIT analysis of Armour capabilities in PSOs. 5. Interoperability and clusters. 6. Future prognosis: more than the platform. Scope of presentation The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Defence Decision Support Institute, the Department of Defence of South Africa, the South African National Defence Force or any of their Services or Divisions
3 The dominant thinking prior to the 1990s was that there was “war” and there was “peace.” There was “war-fighting” and there was “peacekeeping.” In the old paradigm, diplomacy fails, war is fought, diplomats talk, peace is achieved, and peacekeepers arrive to monitor it. During the experiences of the early 1990s, the paradigm changed to: “country collapses into factional fighting, the peacekeepers arrive and deliver aid in the middle of the fighting, and everybody turns on the peacekeepers.” Source: Maloney Photo credit: Karel Prinsloo - AP Introduction
4 Introduction continued Traditional peacekeeping operations required large numbers of light infantry augmented by thin-skinned vehicles for added mobility. “A blue beret, a rifle and a white jeep”. Token presence. Contemporary PSOs extremely volatile and prone to alarming escalations. No longer as benign as in the past. Conflict may exist at different levels of violence and is more lethal due to legacy equipment of previous conflicts.
5 Observation: The changing threat profiles in Peace Support Operations have a direct influence on the armour capability required of intervening forces. The new threat environment for “peacekeepers” is a VUCA environment. VOLATILE, UNCERTAIN, COMPLEX AND ASYMMETRIC Applicability of: Gen Charles Krulak’s three block war. Gen Rupert Smith’s “War Amongst the People.” 1. Changing Threats in a VUCA Environment
6 War amongst the people
7 Photo credits: Bellum.nu, And 14. Formidable threats
8 No safe rear area There is no clear- cut frontline, non-contiguous, non- linear operations. New kid on the block - Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) expertise migrating from Iraq and Afghanistan to Horn of Africa and Algeria. Ever-present RPGs and anti-vehicle mines. Problematic IFF. Safeguarding of stockpiles – protection of logistics. Lines of Communication (LOC) convoys vulnerable underbelly of any expeditionary operation in future.
9 Future threat profile in Sudan, Algeria and Somalia?
10 Harsh environment From tropics, hot and wet to desert, hot and dry, with poor infrastructure.
Protection of LOC Logistics War-fighting Light Commercial 4X4 “Hardened” MRAP APC LAV ICV IFV Armoured Car Tank “armoured vehicle” “Armour proper” as concept/ capability In reaction to asymmetry and IEDs “New” threat profiles Modular Armoured Vehicle 2. Blurring of Boundaries Heavy Medium Light
12 3. Enter Capability Based Planning What Armour capabilities must we have for PSOs in Africa? Trend is towards Capability Based Planning, rather than Threat Based Planning – Asking questions: “ What do we need to do” rather than “what equipment are we replacing.” Not only platform - centric as in industry marketing brochures in Jane’s Defence periodicals. Realisation of “Equip the Man” not “Man the Equipment”. High-level capability objectives derived from government intent and overarching operational concepts. “What do we want to achieve?”
13 Capability Based Planning continued Cascaded down to high level operational scenarios - “what if’s” and mission analysis of PSOs. How can we deliver “effects” in variety of eventualities with effects-based aims. (e.g. as applied by SANDF, Joint Operations Division, Directorate Capability Management). Lens of Firepower, Protection, Mobility, Sustainment, C 2. PSOs are human-centric. Human presence on the ground. Armour platforms are multi-role in nature and thus contributes to several capability partitions on the ground.
14 Personnel Organization Support Systems Training Equipment Doctrine Facilities Information Technology PO S TED F I T Firepower Mobility Protection Sustainment Command and control OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ARMOUR CAPABILITY INFANTRY CAPABILITY AIR CAPABILITY MATÉRIEL SERVICES CAPABILITY POSTEDFIT Capability Elements
15 Systems Hierarchy JOINT HIGHER ORDER MILITARY SYSTEM (Defense Capabilities) RAW MATERIAL PRODUCT SUB- ASSEMBLY PRODUCTS CORE SYSTEM (Core Capability) OPERATIONAL SYSTEM (Operational Capability) PRODUCTS SYSTEM JAD JLD JMD ARMOUR CORE SYSTEM TF I DESTOP Armour Products System Capability Management Products System Management PME Log Products Comms Ammo Technical Data Supply Support S&TE PHS&T OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ARMOUR CAPABILITY INFANTRY CAPABILITY AIR CAPABILITY MATÉRIEL SERVICES CAPABILITY 8 REAL SYSTEMS VIRTUAL SYSTEMS Matériel Combat/Combat Support/Support Services Capabilities Matériel Readiness Combat Readiness COMPONENT 2
16 4. POSTEDFIT analysis of required Armour capabilities in PSOs Personnel –Highly trained and knowledgeable in Armour application. –Sufficient numbers for rotation and feedback training. –Leadership qualities and “fingerspitzengefuhl” for complex emergencies. –Ability to interact with belligerents and local population. –Able to handle CNN factor and joint, integrated and multi- national challenges. –Cultural intelligence. –Creative problem solving and agile in decision-making processes.
17 Organisation –Operating in smaller independent units. (2 platforms smallest). –Generally multinational coalition and task force. –Jointness. Support Systems –Immense challenge in remote and austere conditions. –Logistic challenges –Maintenance critical, future tend toward built-in test equipment, concomitant with performance audits and forward operational and systems analysis (FOAT teams) –Debate whether outsourcing of maintenance of sophisticated vetronics is viable…or only non-critical parts – contractors in theatre. –Heavy premium on training of crew and repair personnel, in-theatre repairs. Analysis continued
18 Analysis continued Support (continued) –Complex emergencies – expeditionary nature – long distances, e.g Darfur – drive chain wear and shorter maintenance cycles. –Ideal would be modularity of Troop Contributing Countries – common platform interoperability. –No clear cut panacea for minimising logistics footprint – one attempt is to synchronise via commonality with commercial vehicles. –Feasibility of a “cluster” effect. Could be key-enabler of interoperable logistics in a coalition (SADC/AU/ASF) –Variants approach is a viable option with greater commonality of parts. –Currently each TCC provides own brand of Armour with own reach- back for maintenance and support. –An African Forward Basing concept viable?
19 Training –As indicated under support and maintenance. –Realistic pre-deployment training, refining doctrine and TTPs. –Know abilities and restrictions of systems. –Urban operations and crowd control. –Cultural intelligence – area studies, host nation customs, etc –How to operate in a Joint, Integrated, Inter-departmental and Multinational environment. –ROE application rehearsals and “what-if” dry runs. –Simulation saves costs and time. –Joint Regional Training Facilities. Analysis continued
20 Equipment –Deploy most reliable equipment in inventory, sustainable in theatre. –Preferably own industrial research background and support. –Fundamental issue – reliability over sophistication. Cf. good track record of ex-Eastern block equipment in Africa. –Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) rely on sound industrial R&D reach-back. Here lead nation(s) can play role. –Example TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) for M1 Abrams and Leopard. Analysis continued
21 Doctrine –Urban ops. –Inf and Armour co-operation around platform. –Agile adaptation. –Sharing with coalition partners. Analysis continued Sharing of lessons learned, (e.g. LIALLS in SA Army). “A lesson not implemented is a lesson not learned” Operation Boleas, Lesotho Dilhi, East Timor
22 Facilities –Training facilities. –Log facilities –Realistic firing and mobility ranges. Information –Maximum situational awareness. –“Left side of the Boom” intelligence regarding IED and other threats. –Guaranteed information flow and in case of joint and coalition operations interoperability. –OODA requirements of commander – Armour’s BMS and situational awareness embedded in platform navigational and commander’s and gunners viewers – thus shooter can also act as sensor. Analysis continued
23 Technology –Basic ongoing R&D. –Counter IED technologies and initiatives. –Add-on and appliqué armour. –Reactive and passive armour. –Active protection systems viability. –Remote firing stations. –Modularity and mission specific packages. –Vehicle survivability/protection. –Ceramics and new composite materials. Analysis continued
Fitting remote firing stations for crew protection
(PS. He must have had in mind the pioneering work being done by South African Scientists in developing the V-shaped anti-landmine vehicle designs in later years!!!) The scramble for V-shaped vehicle hulls… Analysis continued Technology
5. Interoperability and clusters Training in operation of Grizzlys donated to AMIS (UNAMID) by Canada Case study of a platform centric approach.
28 Typical Armour benefits in PSOs Rapid insertion in expeditionary interventions in a case of escalation of events – provided air-transportable or pre-stocked. Ideal inter-positioning platform to show clout and credible deterrence. Able to face all eventualities – greater flexibility to JTF commander. Demonstrate serious commitment: “not fly by night”. High mobility ideal for convoy protection. Enhanced patrolling coverage – fast reconnaissance of large areas – e.g. Sudan where belligerents have high mobility “technicals”. Better protection against RPG, mines and IED than soft skinned vehicles.
29 6. Conclusions International scramble evident for mission tailored armour enhancements – emphasis towards delivering capability commensurate with mission requirements – mixed force packages, of which “Armour proper” is crucial. Armour capability is more than mere technological innovations, requires a total capability management approach, where doctrinal agility must be applied hand-in-hand with training and all the other POSTEDFIT elements. Desired effects-based outcomes of complex emergencies require renewed evaluation of “ends ways, means”. Smaller logistics footprint inherent aim for all expeditionary type of operations. Forward Logistics Base – “African Brindisi”? Ideal would be clustering of platforms and capabilities in regional (SADC and AU) context. Commonality and interoperability with ease of maintenance and sustainment burden. ABCA example. (MOWAG Piranha based LAV, ASLAV, Grizzly and Stryker).
30 Sources Jane’s Defence periodicals 2002 – 2010 Alghali, Z A and Mbaye, M – Fact File: The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades, Accessible at url: Buchs, Maj Todd – Peacekeeping Operations: Is there a need for mechanized Forces as part of the peacekeeping team, Monograph, academic year 95-96, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Denning, Mike – A Prayer for Marie: creating an Effective African Standby Force, in Parameters, Winter Kriek, Col (retd) H – The Role of Light Armoured Vehicles in Contemporary Warfare, in SA Army Journal, Issue 1, Maloney, Sean M.- From Myth to Reality Check: From Peacekeeping to Stabilization, in Canadian Policy Options, September Putter, Lt Col Kris – Armour in Peace Support Operations: The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, in SA Army Journal, Issue 1, Veldman, Lt Col J – Armour in Operations Other Than War, in Corbadus, Issue XXIV, Vol 2.