Presentation on theme: "Armour in Peace Support Operations"— Presentation transcript:
1 Armour in Peace Support Operations Apology for Ben – Presenting on his behalfBen du Toit, Defence Analyst,Defence Decision Support Institute
2 Scope of presentation 1. Changing threats in a VUCA environment. 2. Blurring of boundaries: “armoured” and Armour.3. Enter Capability Based Planning.4. POSTEDFIT analysis of Armour capabilities in PSOs.5. Interoperability and clusters.6. Future prognosis: more than the platform.VUCA – Volatile, uncertain, complex, agile/asymmetric2 – concept of protected forces vs organic Armour elementThe views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Defence Decision Support Institute, the Department of Defence of South Africa, the South African National Defence Force or any of their Services or Divisions
3 Introduction The dominant thinking prior to the 1990s was that there was “war” andthere was “peace.” There was“war-fighting” and there was“peacekeeping.”In the old paradigm, diplomacy fails, war is fought, diplomats talk, peace is achieved, and peacekeepers arrive to monitor it.During the experiences of theearly 1990s, the paradigm changedto: “country collapses into factionalfighting, the peacekeepers arrive anddeliver aid in the middle of thefighting, and everybody turns on thepeacekeepers.”Photo credit: Karel Prinsloo - APSource: Maloney
4 Introduction continued Traditional peacekeeping operations required large numbers of light infantry augmented by thin-skinned vehicles for added mobility. “A blue beret, a rifle and a white jeep”. Token presence.Contemporary PSOs extremely volatile and prone to alarming escalations. No longer as benign as in the past.Conflict may exist at different levels of violence and is more lethal due to legacy equipment of previous conflicts.
5 1. Changing Threats in a VUCA Environment Observation: The changing threat profiles in Peace SupportOperations have a direct influence on the armour capability requiredof intervening forces.The new threat environment for “peacekeepers” is a VUCAenvironment.VOLATILE, UNCERTAIN, COMPLEX AND ASYMMETRICApplicability of:Gen Charles Krulak’s three block war.Gen Rupert Smith’s “War Amongst the People.”Note Armour capability & not just level of protection of vehicles
7 14.Formidable threatsTypical threats to UAV’s & lightly armoured vehicles, not so much to ArmourIn Southern Sudan, govt banned private ownership of Toyota land cruisers in conflict areas – rebel “technicals”Photo credits: Bellum.nu,And
8 No safe rear areaThere is no clear- cut frontline, non-contiguous, non-linear operations.New kid on the block - Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) expertise migrating from Iraq and Afghanistan to Horn of Africa and Algeria.Ever-present RPGs and anti-vehicle mines.Problematic IFF.Safeguarding of stockpiles – protection of logistics.Lines of Communication (LOC) convoys vulnerable underbelly of any expeditionary operation in future.
9 Future threat profile in Sudan, Algeria and Somalia? Effect of IED
10 Harsh environmentFrom tropics, hot and wet to desert, hot and dry, with poorinfrastructure.Challenge to operate & maintain equipment not designed for conditions on the ground – weight restrictions of poor infrastructure (heavy Armour)
11 2. Blurring of Boundaries Tank“Armour proper”as concept/capabilityArmoured CarWar-fightingIFVICVHeavyMediumLightLAV“armoured vehicle”APCModularArmoured VehicleMRAP“New” threat profilesMRAP – Mine Resistant Armour Protected (Mastiff & Bulldog)“Hardened”In reaction to asymmetryand IEDsLightCommercial 4X4Protection of LOCLogistics
12 3. Enter Capability Based Planning What Armour capabilities must we have for PSOs in Africa?Trend is towards Capability Based Planning, rather than Threat Based Planning – Asking questions: “ What do we need to do” rather than “what equipment are we replacing .”Not only platform - centric as in industry marketing brochures in Jane’s Defence periodicals. Realisation of “Equip the Man” not “Man the Equipment”.High-level capability objectives derived from government intent and overarching operational concepts. “What do we want to achieve?”This planning must be mapped to the official mandata & Rules of Engagement for the specific operation
13 Capability Based Planning continued Cascaded down to high level operational scenarios - “what if’s” and mission analysis of PSOs.How can we deliver “effects” in variety of eventualities with effects-based aims. (e.g. as applied by SANDF, Joint Operations Division, Directorate Capability Management).Lens of Firepower, Protection, Mobility, Sustainment, C2.PSOs are human-centric. Human presence on the ground.Armour platforms are multi-role in nature and thus contributes to several capability partitions on the ground.EMPHASISE LAST POINT – static road block, patrol, reaction force, fire support, engineering (demolish) & morale (show of force)
15 Systems Hierarchy P O S T E D F I T 8 Capability Management 7 JOINT HIGHER ORDER MILITARY SYSTEM(Defense Capabilities)JAD8JMDJLDVIRTUAL SYSTEMSCombat/Combat Support/Support Services CapabilitiesOPERATIONAL SYSTEM(Operational Capability)7OPERATIONAL CAPABILITYARMOUR CAPABILITYINFANTRY CAPABILITYAIR CAPABILITYMATÉRIEL SERVICES CAPABILITYCapability ManagementSystems HierarchyPOSTEDFITCORE SYSTEM(Core Capability)Combat Readiness6ARMOUR CORE SYSTEMArmour Products SystemPMELog ProductsCommsAmmoTechnical DataSupply SupportS&TEPHS&TREAL SYSTEMSMatériel Readiness5Products System ManagementPRODUCTS SYSTEMMatériel4PRODUCTS3PRODUCT SUB-ASSEMBLY2COMPONENT1RAW MATERIAL
16 4. POSTEDFIT analysis of required Armour capabilities in PSOs PersonnelHighly trained and knowledgeable in Armour application.Sufficient numbers for rotation and feedback training.Leadership qualities and “fingerspitzengefuhl” for complex emergencies.Ability to interact with belligerents and local population.Able to handle CNN factor and joint, integrated and multi-national challenges.Cultural intelligence.Creative problem solving and agile in decision-making processes.Major implication for training cf. primary function of SANDF
17 Analysis continued Organisation Support Systems Operating in smaller independent units. (2 platforms smallest).Generally multinational coalition and task force.Jointness.Support SystemsImmense challenge in remote and austere conditions.Logistic challengesMaintenance critical, future tend toward built-in test equipment, concomitant with performance audits and forward operational and systems analysis (FOAT teams)Debate whether outsourcing of maintenance of sophisticated vetronics is viable…or only non-critical parts – contractors in theatre.Heavy premium on training of crew and repair personnel , in-theatre repairs.Jointness = operating in JIM environmentLogistic footprint of ArmourFOAT – Forward Operational Analysis Teams – contribute to operational analysis, lessons learned, etc.
18 Analysis continued Support (continued) Complex emergencies – expeditionary nature – long distances, e.g Darfur – drive chain wear and shorter maintenance cycles.Ideal would be modularity of Troop Contributing Countries – common platform interoperability.No clear cut panacea for minimising logistics footprint – one attempt is to synchronise via commonality with commercial vehicles.Feasibility of a “cluster” effect. Could be key-enabler of interoperable logistics in a coalition (SADC/AU/ASF)Variants approach is a viable option with greater commonality of parts.Currently each TCC provides own brand of Armour with own reach-back for maintenance and support.An African Forward Basing concept viable?Cluster concept = e.g. supply entire force with Ratels?TCC =- Troop Contributing CountryForward Basing – where? Viable? Who? Etc.
19 Analysis continued Training As indicated under support and maintenance.Realistic pre-deployment training, refining doctrine and TTPs.Know abilities and restrictions of systems.Urban operations and crowd control.Cultural intelligence – area studies, host nation customs, etcHow to operate in a Joint, Integrated, Inter-departmental and Multinational environment.ROE application rehearsals and “what-if” dry runs.Simulation saves costs and time.Joint Regional Training Facilities.TTP = Tactics, Techniques & ProceduresStress – different to training for primary role
20 Analysis continued Equipment Deploy most reliable equipment in inventory, sustainable in theatre.Preferably own industrial research background and support.Fundamental issue – reliability over sophistication. Cf. good track record of ex-Eastern block equipment in Africa.Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) rely on sound industrial R&D reach-back. Here lead nation(s) can play role.Example TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) for M1 Abrams and Leopard.TUSK – dozer blade, slatted RPG armour, long-lead telephone lines (comms from outside tank), searchlights, special ammo (non-lethal & <lethal), close range surveillance of blind spots around vehicle, etc.
21 Analysis continued Doctrine Urban ops. Inf and Armour co-operation around platform.Agile adaptation.Sharing with coalition partners.Dilhi, East TimorOperation Boleas, LesothoSharing of lessons learned,(e.g. LIALLS in SA Army).“A lesson not implemented is alesson not learned”LIALLS = Lessons Identified And Lessons Learned System
22 Analysis continued Facilities Information Training facilities. Log facilitiesRealistic firing and mobility ranges.InformationMaximum situational awareness.“Left side of the Boom” intelligence regarding IED and other threats.Guaranteed information flow and in case of joint and coalition operations interoperability.OODA requirements of commander – Armour’s BMS and situational awareness embedded in platform navigational and commander’s and gunners viewers – thus shooter can also act as sensor.OODA = Observe, Orientate, Decide & Act (quick decision cycle developed by Col Boyd – fighter pilot in USAF)BMS = Battlefield Management System – multi-spectral/
23 Analysis continued Technology Basic ongoing R&D. Counter IED technologies and initiatives.Add-on and appliqué armour.Reactive and passive armour.Active protection systems viability.Remote firing stations.Modularity and mission specificpackages.Vehicle survivability/protection.Ceramics and new compositematerials.Striker Vehicle
24 Fitting remote firing stations for crew protection Canadian Mambas
25 Analysis continued Technology The scramble for V-shaped vehicle hulls… (PS . He must have had in mind the pioneering work being done by SouthAfrican Scientists in developing the V-shaped anti-landmine vehicle designsin later years!!!)
26 5. Interoperability and clusters Blocks – Grizzlies (MOWAG-based)SADCBRIG – Ratels?Training in operation of Grizzlys donated to AMIS (UNAMID) by CanadaCase study of a platform centric approach.
28 Typical Armour benefits in PSOs Rapid insertion in expeditionary interventions in a case of escalation of events – provided air-transportable or pre-stocked.Ideal inter-positioning platform to show clout and credible deterrence.Able to face all eventualities – greater flexibility to JTF commander.Demonstrate serious commitment: “not fly by night”.High mobility ideal for convoy protection.Enhanced patrolling coverage – fast reconnaissance of large areas – e.g. Sudan where belligerents have high mobility “technicals”.Better protection against RPG, mines and IED than soft skinned vehicles.
29 6. ConclusionsInternational scramble evident for mission tailored armour enhancements – emphasis towards delivering capability commensurate with mission requirements – mixed force packages, of which “Armour proper” is crucial .Armour capability is more than mere technological innovations, requires a total capability management approach, where doctrinal agility must be applied hand-in-hand with training and all the other POSTEDFIT elements.Desired effects-based outcomes of complex emergencies require renewed evaluation of “ends ways, means”.Smaller logistics footprint inherent aim for all expeditionary type of operations. Forward Logistics Base – “African Brindisi”?Ideal would be clustering of platforms and capabilities in regional (SADC and AU) context. Commonality and interoperability with ease of maintenance and sustainment burden.ABCA example. (MOWAG Piranha based LAV, ASLAV, Grizzly and Stryker).BRINDISI – log base in southern Italy for rapid deployment of UN forces (central)ABCA = Australia, Britain, Canada & America – interoperability group looking at standardisation
30 Sources Jane’s Defence periodicals 2002 – 2010 Alghali, Z A and Mbaye, M – Fact File: The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades, Accessible at url:Buchs, Maj Todd – Peacekeeping Operations: Is there a need for mechanized Forces as part of the peacekeeping team, Monograph, academic year 95-96, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.Denning, Mike – A Prayer for Marie: creating an Effective African Standby Force, in Parameters, WinterKriek, Col (retd) H – The Role of Light Armoured Vehicles in Contemporary Warfare, in SA Army Journal, Issue 1, 2007.Maloney, Sean M.- From Myth to Reality Check: From Peacekeeping to Stabilization, in Canadian Policy Options, September 2005.Putter, Lt Col Kris – Armour in Peace Support Operations: The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, in SA Army Journal, Issue 1, 2007.Veldman, Lt Col J – Armour in Operations Other Than War, in Corbadus, Issue XXIV, Vol 2.