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Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 1.

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Presentation on theme: "Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 1."— Presentation transcript:

1 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 1

2 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 2 OBJECTIVE Provide an overview of intelligence concepts and their application to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operationsProvide an overview of intelligence concepts and their application to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations

3 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 3 OUTLINE UN PerspectiveUN Perspective Info Requirements and SourcesInfo Requirements and Sources DoctrineDoctrine Intel ContributionsIntel Contributions Intel ChallengesIntel Challenges Info ArchitectureInfo Architecture Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

4 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 4 INTELLIGENCE - UN Perspective “Massive flows of refugees and displaced persons have become the central feature of most humanitarian emergencies.” -- Mr Eliasson, former UN Sec-Gen for Humanitarian Affairs “We don’t call it intelligence, but it’s the same thing. We both have a need for accurate and timely information.” -- Ms Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees “Information is not the problem; the problem is analysis.” -- Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer, UNHCR

5 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 5 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Typical Information Requirements: Political, economic, and social dataPolitical, economic, and social data Details about refugees/displaced personsDetails about refugees/displaced persons –specific needs (food, water, shelter, medicine) –cultural and demographic considerations –future intentions Maps and physical characteristics of the crisis areaMaps and physical characteristics of the crisis area Infrastructure and resources in the host countryInfrastructure and resources in the host country Major relief organizations in the crisis areaMajor relief organizations in the crisis area Threats to relief personnel (crime, civic violence, health)Threats to relief personnel (crime, civic violence, health)

6 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 6 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Principal sources of information:Principal sources of information: –Refugees/displaced persons –IO and NGOs in the crisis area –Host Nation governments –Regional and international organizations –Other UN organizations with field presence –Coalition partners –Local media Clandestine intelligence may not be usefulClandestine intelligence may not be useful –Could undermine humanitarian nature of operation –Insufficient time to make HUMINT operational –Foreign disclosure challenges

7 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 7 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR The primary intel effort must focus on answering the commander’s priority intelligence requirements assisting in the accomplishment of the mission - Involves assessing the potential threats to the HA/DR mission (from forces external and/or internal to the affected population) - The unique aspects of HA/DR ops may result in significant or even primary emphasis being placed upon logistic [to include transportation and infrastructure], medical, or political intelligence and/or intel support to CA and PSYOP -- Joint Pub

8 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Collection should not be equated with hostile penetration of a country’s internal affairs; - In fact, open sources may be an excellent source to determine agendas and patterns of operation and to identify factional territory - In some cases, provisions have to be made for working with governments for which no previously established intelligence agreements exist… - … and for exchanging security-related information with NGOs, and IOs. -- Joint Pub

9 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 9 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Because of NGO and IO sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military (and intelligence) organizations, use of the term “information” vice “intelligence” may be less inflammatory.- Joint Pub Because of NGO and IO sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military (and intelligence) organizations, use of the term “information” vice “intelligence” may be less inflammatory.- Joint Pub But be up front and honest about who you are (integrity and transparency)But be up front and honest about who you are (integrity and transparency) A working relationship can develop with IO and NGOs if you can explain your purpose, intentions, boundaries, and what you can offer to them.A working relationship can develop with IO and NGOs if you can explain your purpose, intentions, boundaries, and what you can offer to them. Information exchange: must be two-wayInformation exchange: must be two-way –so IO and NGOs don’t see you as a ‘leech’ –personnel protection is valuable data to IO and NGOs

10 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Expertise in information collection, analysis and disseminationExpertise in information collection, analysis and dissemination –Indications and Warning –Predictive analysis –Situational awareness –Force protection assessments –USG info and intel dissemination –Imagery –Information flow architecture An entity other than operators and field reps digesting and assessing massive amounts of dataAn entity other than operators and field reps digesting and assessing massive amounts of data What can military intelligence contribute to HA/DR operations?

11 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Challenges to military intelligence in HA/DR operations A natural inclination for military personnel to focus on enemy “threats”A natural inclination for military personnel to focus on enemy “threats” –INTSUMs dominated by force protection, rather than balanced with situational awareness Requires a deliberate shift from conventional military intel analysis to HA/DR analysisRequires a deliberate shift from conventional military intel analysis to HA/DR analysis –I.e. key terrain changes from hilltops to hospitals –The enemy becomes disease, crime, civil unrest, damage

12 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Challenges to military intelligence in HA/DR operations Image perceptionImage perception –“Cloak and dagger spies” and “torturers” Recent arrivals to the crisis typically lack deep knowledge and in-country experienceRecent arrivals to the crisis typically lack deep knowledge and in-country experience InteroperabilityInteroperability –Equipment/Doctrine/Experience

13 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 INTEL SUPPORT TO HA/DR Challenges to military intelligence in HA/DR operations Language / cultural differencesLanguage / cultural differences Disclosure of classified informationDisclosure of classified information Intelligence vs. InformationIntelligence vs. Information –Interaction with IO, NGOs, etc.

14 INTELLIGENCE (INFORMATION) CYCLE Dissemination & Integration Collection Analysis & Production Processing & Exploitation Planning & Direction Mission

15 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 15 PLANNING AND DIRECTION Conducted continuouslyConducted continuously IncludesIncludes –Task-organizing intelligence assets – Developing a collection plan – Requests for collection and production – Monitoring availability and quality of collected information

16 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 16 COLLECTION Collection OperationsCollection Operations –Acquire information to answer requirements –Assess bias of information source Collection ManagersCollection Managers –Convert information requirements into collection requirements –Task collection assets –Monitor results

17 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 17 PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION Collected data is correlated and converted into forms suitable for analysis and productionCollected data is correlated and converted into forms suitable for analysis and production

18 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 18 ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION Changes information collected from single or multiple sources into finished intelligenceChanges information collected from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence

19 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 19 DISSEMINATION AND INTEGRATION Determine list of distributionDetermine list of distribution –JTF, CTF, UN, Host Nation, NGOs Provides finished analysisProvides finished analysis Dissemination methodsDissemination methods –Electronic (“soft copy”) –Paper (“hard copy”) –Briefings –Photos / graphics Ability to go ‘low tech’ as required

20 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 20 EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK Consumers at all levels evaluate the intelligence (information) process and provide feedback to improve intelligence (information) supportConsumers at all levels evaluate the intelligence (information) process and provide feedback to improve intelligence (information) support

21 COMBINED INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE COLL MAN C2X C2 NAT’L SPT ELM OPS ANALYSIS C/JTF CIVIL- MILITARY OPS CENTER (CMOC) COALITION GOV’TS HOST NATION NGO’sUN REFUGEES & DPs Combined Military Information Center - CMIC

22 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS HA/DR OPS Best sources of information on emerging HA/DR crisis could be in-country NGOs and Host Nation Best sources of information on emerging HA/DR crisis could be in-country NGOs and Host Nation Honest and open communications is key Honest and open communications is key CMIC liaison in CMOC CMIC liaison in CMOC Info is abundant; analysis is the problem Info is abundant; analysis is the problem Don’t focus on force protection to the detriment of ability to monitor other aspects of the situation Don’t focus on force protection to the detriment of ability to monitor other aspects of the situation Clandestine HUMINT may not be useful Clandestine HUMINT may not be useful Unclassified intelligence products are imperative in relationships with coalitions, IO and NGOs Unclassified intelligence products are imperative in relationships with coalitions, IO and NGOs Sensitive info should be handled with discretion, not classification Sensitive info should be handled with discretion, not classification Understand ethnic and organizational cultures, objectives, bias Understand ethnic and organizational cultures, objectives, bias Have the ability to operate “low tech” Have the ability to operate “low tech”

23 Lt Col Paulson, USCINCPAC/J2 FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 23


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