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DroidScope: Seamlessly Reconstructing the OS and Dalvik Semantic Views for Dynamic Android Malware Analysis Lok Kwong Yan, and Heng Yin Syracuse University.

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Presentation on theme: "DroidScope: Seamlessly Reconstructing the OS and Dalvik Semantic Views for Dynamic Android Malware Analysis Lok Kwong Yan, and Heng Yin Syracuse University."— Presentation transcript:

1 DroidScope: Seamlessly Reconstructing the OS and Dalvik Semantic Views for Dynamic Android Malware Analysis Lok Kwong Yan, and Heng Yin Syracuse University Air Force Research Laboratory USENIX 2012 1 Presentation: 2012-09-11 曾毓傑

2 Outline Introduction Background Architecture Interface & Plugins Evaluation Discussion & Conclusion 2


4 Introduction Malicious applications exist in official and unofficial marketplace with a rate of 0.02% and 0.2% respectively Virtualization-based analysis approach Analysis runs underneath the entire virtual machine Difficult for an attack within VM to disrupt the analysis Loss the semantic contextual information when the analysis component is moved out of the box We need to intercept certain kernel events and parse kernel data structure to reconstruct the semantic knowledge 4

5 DroidScope Reconstruct two levels of semantic knowledge OS-level: to understand the activities of the malware process and its native components Java-level: comprehend the behaviors in the Java components Built on top of QEMU emulator Build tools for analysis Native instruction tracer Dalvik instruction tracer API tracer Taint tracker 5


7 Android System Overview 7 Android System Parent process for all Android processes provide Java-level abstraction Kernel data structure

8 DroidScope Overview 8


10 Architecture Integrating the changes into the QEMU emulator Came from Android SDK Leave Android system unchanged For different virtual devices can be loaded Reconstruct OS-level and Java-level views Monitors how malware’s Java components communicate with Android Java Framework Monitors how malware’s native components interact with the Linux Kernel Monitors how malware’s Java components and native components communicate through the JNI interface 10

11 Reconstructing OS-level View Basic Instrumentation Insert extra instructions during the code translation phase for system status 11 Target Instructions Tiny Code Generator(TCG) Native Instructions Add additional code for detection

12 Reconstructing OS-level View (Cont.) For example, context switch in ARM architecture would change the c2_base0 and c2_base1 registers, which stores the page table address Extract semantic knowledge System calls Running processes, threads Memory maps 12

13 Reconstructing OS-level View (Cont.) System calls ARM architecture use service zero instruction svc #0 as making system calls, and system call number is in register R7 Processes and Threads Read task_struct structure for process information pid, tgid, pgd, uid, gid, euid, egid, comm, cmdline, thread_info sys_fork, sys_execve, sys_clone, and sys_prctl system calls trigger the information update Memory maps mm_struct sys_mmap2 triggers the information update 13

14 Reconstructing Java-level View Dalvik Instructions Knowing which instruction is executing right now Register R15 points to the currently executing Dalvik instruction 14

15 Reconstructing Java-level View (Cont.) Just-In-Time Compiler Some hot, heavily used instructions are compiled into native machine code Those code execution would skip the mterp component 15 Call dvmGetCodeAddr() for address of compiled code Flush JIT cache, return NULL and reset counter to disable JIT function

16 Reconstructing Java-level View (Cont.) Dalvik Virtual Machine States Record Register R4 to R8 for storing DVM states 16 R4 : Program Counter R5 : Stack Frame Pointer R6 : InterpState Structure R7 : Instruction Counter R8 : mterp Base Address

17 Reconstructing Java-level View (Cont.) Java Objects Obtaining data inside Java objects such as string data 17

18 Symbol Information Native library symbols Use objdump to retrieve symbol information Some malwares often stripped of all symbol information Dalvik or Java symbols Use dexdump to retrieve symbol information Data structures of DVM also contains some symbol information InterpState Structure (Register R6 ) has a method field points to the Method structure for the currently executing method Method structure has a name field points to method name 18


20 Interface & Plugins APIs for analysis customization The instrumentation logic in DroidScope is complex and dynamic An event based interface to facilitate custom analysis tool developement 20

21 Sample Plugin Setup which program to be analyzed and print all Dalvik opcode information 21

22 API Implementation API tracer Instrument the invoke* and execute* Dalvik bytecodes to identify and log method invocations Native instruction tracer Gather each instruction including the raw instruction, its operands, and their values Dalvik instruction tracer Decode instructions into dexdump format, including values and all available symbol information Taint Tracker Monitor sensitive information and keep track data propagation 22


24 Evaluation Benchmark checking efficiency and capability 7 benchmark apps AnTuTu Benchmark AnTuTu CaffeineMark CaffeineMark CF-Bench Mobile Processor Benchmark Benchmark by Softweg Linpack 24

25 Evaluation Performance Capability Analysis of DroidKongFu Analysis of DroidDream 25


27 Discussion Limited Code Coverage One drawback of dynamic analysis By manipulating the return value of function call, we may increase the code coverage Other Dalvik Analysis Tools Dalvik/Java Static Analysis: Woodpecker, DroidMoss Native Static Analysis: IDA, binutils, BAP Android Dynamic Analysis: TaintDroid, DroidRanger Linux Kernel Dynamic Analysis: logcat, adb 27

28 Conclusion We presented DroidScope, a fine grained dynamic binary instrumentation tool for Android that rebuilds two levels of semantic information 28

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