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Published byMarlee Gallegos
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What does an SBC do? 1
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 2 Carrier SBC’s Carrier SBC IP PBX Intranet FW Carrier SBC Historically designed to sit at the SP’s edge to protect the carrier. Complex to use command-line devices Provides a distinct separation between networks while providing a means of transporting signaling and media Perform topology hiding for the SP Tracking calls (CDR) for billing Act as a Network Address Translator (NAT) for the SP Provides admission control to limit calls from customer (and insure SLA) Protocol Internetworking for H.323 and SIP Enterprise Network 11/26/20122 SP Network
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 3 Enterprise SBC Internet IP PBX Intranet DMZ Avaya SBCE Internal FW External FW/NAT Mobile Users, Telecommuters SRTP/ RTP Remote Worker Avaya SBCE Encryption TLS proxy SRTP proxy Enablement FW / NAT traversal Call admission control Signaling and media firewall Enterprise Network Security Floods and fuzzing prevention Spoofing prevention (fingerprint verification) Media anomaly prevention Stealth attack prevention Tollfraud Prevention Anti-spam Whitelist/Blacklist Behavior learning 06/01/2012© 2012 Avaya, Inc. All Rights Reserved.3 SIP Trunking
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 44 Avaya SBCE: SIP Trunking Architecture Use Case: SIP Trunking to Carrier Carrier offering SIP trunks as lower-cost alternative to TDM Heavy driver for Enterprise adoption of SBC Support Aura, IPO and CS1K From a SECURITY Stand Point, it is recommended the SBCE be in the DMZ Carrier SIP trunks to the Avaya Session Border Controller for Enterprise Avaya SBCE is located in a DMZ behind the Enterprise firewall Services: security and demarcation device between the IP-PBX and the Carrier −NAT traversal, −Securely anchors signaling and media, and can −Normalize SIP protocol InternetEnterprise Avaya SBCE DMZ SIP Trunks Carrier CS1000
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 55 NAT Traversal Enterprise IP PBX Internet or Provider Network FW IP Address SBC External IP Address At a basic level think of it this way: If the SBC sends an INVITE message to the carrier, can the carrier reply and reach IP address ? No. The SBC facilitates NAT Traversal by making sure all signaling messages have a REACHABLE return address. In this example, the INVITE would have a source address of When a reply is sent it reaches the firewall which forwards to external IP Address.
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 66 Understanding Toll Fraud Toll fraud can only be prevented by a holistic approach involving best practice configuration of many elements in a UC environment. Examples include: –Customized tuning of SBC to set intelligent call thresholds for outbound and inbound traffic (based on time of day for optimal fine-tuning) –Enable short-call toll fraud duration –Limit international calls to only valid destinations for needed countries
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 77 DoS and Toll Fraud Protection Single Source DoS Any type of DoS attack that is directed against one or more enterprise endpoints that originate from a single source (normally spoofed). Stealth DoS/DDoS A type of low ‐ volume DoS attack that is directed against an endpoint where the source of the call is constantly changed. Call Walking A type of DoS attack whereby serial calls originating from a single source (normally spoofed) are directed against a sequential group of end ‐ points. Toll Fraud Refers to internal or external users using the corporate phone system to place unauthorized toll calls. Phone DoS/DDoS A type of DoS attack that is directed against a single enterprise end ‐ point.
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 88 DoS and Toll Fraud Protection DoS settings can be customized Time-of-Day can be used to refine DoS settings Specific protection exist for ‘Short Duration Toll Fraud’ as well: –Short call duration toll fraud is where a large number of short calls (less than 1-2 seconds) are made to make money on the ‘connect’ fees.
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 9
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 11 Avaya SBCE: Remote Worker Architecture Use Case: Remote Worker Extend UC to SIP users remote to the Enterprise Solution not requiring VPN for UC/CC SIP endpoints From a SECURITY Stand Point, it is recommended the SBCE be in the DMZ Remote Worker are external to the Enterprise firewall Avaya Session Border Controller for Enterprise −Authenticate SIP-based users/clients to the enterprise −Securely proxy registrations and client device provisioning −Securely manage communications without requiring a VPN InternetEnterprise Avaya SBCE DMZ Remote Workers
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 12 Remote Worker: VPN vs VPNless Endpoints VPN Endpoint VPN Headers add additional size to traffic. In aggregate reduces bandwidth. Encrypts traffic, yet does not validate it. (Encrypting and distributing a virus isn’t helpful) No ability at VPN head-end to distinguish between voice and data traffic. Ultimately voice quality suffers. Cumbersome user experience for real-time communication application VPNless Endpoint TLS/SRTP encrypts the traffic with a smaller bandwidth footprint than VPN Signaling and media are unencrypted at the SBC and inspected at Layer 7 to validate the traffic before it is allowed through Numerous policies allow Enterprise control of endpoints. Consistent user experience for applications
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 13 Call Servers For SIP Trunking, an accepted architecture is: –Call Server + SBC –Call Server + SM + SBC A valid call server is –CS1k 7.5 –CM –IPO 8.x SM must be 6.x For SIP Trunking if these basic requirements are not met there is no opportunity with this customer UNTIL these elements are there. Session Manager is NOT required for SIP Trunking
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 14 Avaya SBCE and 6.2 Interoperability Matrix All Tests performed in the SIL Labs PlatformNo SMSM 6.1SM 6.2 CS1K R7.5R4.0.5/R6.2 IPO R8.0R4.0.5/R6.2NA CM R5.2.1R4.0.5/R6.2 CM 6.0.1R4.0.5/R6.2 NA CM R6.2R4.0.5/R6.2 Supported - Tested NANot Supproted or Tested.
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 15 IPO 8.x ONLY supports SIP Trunking ONLY certified with AT&T at the moment A generic app note is in the works to accommodate additional carriers
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 16 Carriers Tested as of November 10 th, Alestra AT&T AT&T Puerto Rico Belgacom Bell Canada Broad-Connect Broadview BT Global Services BT HIPCOM BT Italia BT Wholesale Cable & Wireless CenturyLink Teliasonera TELUS T-Mobile NL UPC Vamoin1/KPN Verizon Business Virgin Media Vodafone DE Vodafone NL VoicePulse Windstream Worldnet P. Rico XO Colt Etisalat Fastweb SPA Frontier Gamma IntelePeer KPN Level 3 MTSAllStream PAETEC Phonect QSC Sprint Swisscom Tele2 Telefonica del Peru Telenor Find App Notes Here: https://devconnect.avaya.com/public/dyn/d_dyn.jsp?fn=103
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 17 SIP Trunking Qualification Must include supported call servers (CS1, CM, SM, IPO) Must be explicitly tested with that given configuration with the carrier. –Example: If CM SBC->Service Provider ‘A’ is tested, that does NOT mean CM SM->Service Provider “A’ is tested. Make sure the specific configuration is documented with an App Note. –If the architecture is valid, but it is not tested, then escalate through Jack Rynes
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 18 SIP Trunking with AACC AACC – If this is a basic SIP Trunking deployment involving: Service Provider - SBC SM CM There may be a valid solution for the SBC but all call flows should be vetted with the CSE’s.
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 19 SIP Trunking with Call Center Elite CC Elite – If this is a basic SIP Trunking deployment involving: Service Provider - SBC SM CM -and- Avaya Experience Portal is NOT part of the call flow There may be a valid solution for the SBC but all call flows should be vetted with the CSE’s.
Avaya SBCE Key Features 20
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 21 Avaya SBCAE Remote Enterprise Intranet The Unique Avaya Solution for UC Application Security Internet Avaya Session Manager (SIP) Internal Phone (RTP) Remote Phone Configuration (HTTPS) Certificate Authority (SCEP) Personal Profile Manager (SOAP) Directory Server (LDAP) Web Server (HTTP) Presence and IM (XMPP) Enterprise DMZ Firewalls Remote NAT & Firewall Security UC Policy, Access control, & Authentication Privacy (encryption) with TLS, SRTP UC Threat protection Comprehensive Services Directory, Web applications, Login profiles Remote Management Configuration management, Certificate, PKI management Hi Authenticated Endpoints Allow supporting protocols with full NAT Giving you Full Features
© 2012 Avaya Inc. All rights reserved. 22 Session Border Controller capacities are rated in Simultaneous Sessions –A simultaneous session = a communication session between 2 SIP endpoints –Can think of it as analogous to a DSO in the ‘old world’ –Key for engineering is to understand the numbers of sessions required in the solution For Secure SIP trunking, look at the number of TDM DSOs required For Remote Worker, calculate required call volumes ASBCE 6.2 System Capacity 22 Portwell CAD-0208 Max Capacity W/out Encrypt Max Capacity With Encrypt HA SA Capacity in Simultaneous Sessions ‘Rules of Thumb’ SIP trunking usually 5 users per ‘SS’ Must account for higher ratio in small Remote Worker must consider both On-net and off-net requirements Remember, in Dell configs, Encryption Services impact capacity
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