Presentation on theme: "Atlantic Council of Canada Roundtable 13 September 2012 902-494-6444 The Future of the Navy-Coast Guard Relationship in Canada Halifax."— Presentation transcript:
Atlantic Council of Canada Roundtable 13 September 2012 firstname.lastname@example.org 902-494-6444 The Future of the Navy-Coast Guard Relationship in Canada Halifax MARINE RESEARCH Institute
Aim To conduct a ‘blue sky’ vision session To discuss five questions in open forum
Published: 22 June 2010 Conducted: 27-29 October 2011 CFPS Research Project CFPS Research Workshop “Western Hemisphere Perspectives and Approaches to Future Maritime Security Challenges”
Five Questions 1.How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard Relationship compare internationally? 2.Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed? 3.What should the role of the Canadian Coast Guard be in time of conflict or war? 4.Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or less in support of Canadian law enforcement? 5.How will the relationship between the RCN and CCG evolve in arctic patrolling operations?
Outline The geographic context The CCG-Navy by the Numbers (Q1) A Typology Analysis of Ships (Q2) The Relationship in Conflict and War (Q3) The Roles of the Sea Services (Q4) Navy-Coast Guard in the Arctic (Q5)
Present Size of Canada’s Offshore RankCountrySize of EEZ 1USA11,351,000 km² 7Indonesia6,100,000 km² 8Canada5,599,077 km² 9Japan4,500,000 km²
Future Size of Canada’s Offshore RankCountrySize of EEZ 1USA11,351,000 km² 4Russia7,500,000 km² 5Canada7,499,151 km² 6U.K.6,800,000 km² +33.9%
150 states have coastlines – 72 have coast guards CFPS Research Project
Navy Only 28 Coast Guard Only 9 Coast Guard & Navy 63 Military Coast Guard & Navy 9 Para Military Coast Guard & Navy 53 Civil Coast Guard 2 Navy 2 ? RCMP RCN USN USCG CCG
Canada United States Strategy Begins with Awareness – Similarities & Differences Monarchy Currency History Policies Management Driven Language Free Societies Allied Economies Democracies Borders Arts Sports Families Republic Currency History Policies Strategy Driven 9/11 Context, Context, Context is Key CFPS Research Workshop Coastline = 1: 10.29 Landmass = 1: 1.01 Pop., Economy, Capacity = 10: 1 Source: Hansen – Rutgers University, “Institutional Misalignment,” 8 November 2011
‘Average’ Coast Guard(s) by Pop. Avg. civilian model is 27.2% of the manpower strength of the regular force naval strength = 2,998 people; Average paramilitary model is 20.9% of naval strength = 2,304 people; or Average military model runs is 12.2% of naval strength = 1,345 people. In Canada, the CCG is 84.2% of naval strength = 9,350 people. Source: J Matthew Gillis, The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship, CFPS, 2010
Question #1 How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard Relationship compare internationally?
Typology of Vessels Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000 Civil Military
Combatants Naval, Coastguard and Government-owned vessels/craft which possess some sort of inherent armed or combat capability primarily intended for offensive use. The general rationale behind the groupings for combatant vessels is as follows: SS - Submarines DD - Principle Surface Combatants PB - [Coastal] Patrol Vessels PC - River/Roadstead Patrol Vessels MM - Mine Warfare Vessels LL - Amphibious Warfare Vessels WW - Coastguard: All vessels or craft owned or operated by a Coastguard service Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000 V – Police vessel or craft Z – Government vessel or craft
Non-Combatants Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence purposes. The general groupings follow: AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General) YY - Service Craft VJ – Police Hovercraft ZS – Government Submersibles TM – Merchant (General) TU – Fishing (General) YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht) Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Typology of Vessels (I) Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000 Civil Military CombatantsNon-Combatants 7 types 5 types SSDDPBPCMMLLWDDAAYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC Armed - Defensive Armed - Offensive Navy Coast Guard Naval Coast Guard ? ? ?
Non-Combatants Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence purposes. The general groupings follow: AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General) Service and Support YY - Service Craft Government Owned VJ – Police Hovercraft ZS – Government Submersibles Merchant TM – Merchant (General) TU – Fishing (General) Recreational YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht) Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Typology of Vessels (II) Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000 Civil Military CombatantsNon-Combatants 7 types 5 types SSDDPBPCMMLLWDD AAYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC Civil ServiceSupportAuxiliary Government-owned Armed - Defensive Armed - Offensive Unarmed Navy Coast Guard
Cross-Border Crime Two-way problem Criminal organizations seek vulnerabilities in geography and enforcement Organized crime is the most prevalent threat encountered Over 100 crime groups and 90 criminal entrepreneurs involved in cross-border crime Link: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/reports- rapports/2010-threat-menace-eng.htm Source: CSupt. Joe Oliver, RCMP, Maritime Security Workshop, 29 October 2011 “Crime moves swiftly to exploit ‘gap’ areas”
ConflictCoexistCoordinateCooperate CollaborateConglomerate Degree of Alignment Tactical Institutional National Level of Directing Authority Gov’t Dept Cmtte Panel Manager Culture ? ? ? A National Alignment Plan? Source: Hansen – CJSOE Security Conf., “Institutional Change,” 4 June 2012
Question #2 Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed?
National Shipbuilding Strategy 28 Large Vessels Combat Ships: –Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ships (6+2) –Canadian Surface Combatants (15) Non-Combat Ships: –CCG Science Vessels (4) –DND Joint Support Ships (2+1) –CCG Polar Icebreaker (1) Source: NSPS Media Tech Briefing, 18 Oct 2011
The Peace-Conflict Continuum Source: WT. Johnsen, Redefining Land Power for the 21 st Century, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998
Coast Guard in Conflict or War? Far from emphasizing the extreme case of amphibious assault against defended beachheads, traditional naval support roles in expeditionary warfare most commonly involve cover, administrative support, and supply operations. These are not departures from history. Rather, they are the usual, but nonetheless essential, roles of naval forces in expeditionary warfare. Source: Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 269.
Questions #3 What should the role of the Canadian Coast Guard be in time of conflict or war?
Military Role Constabulary Role Diplomatic Role Use of the Sea Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16. Adapted from: Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontier, 2005, 18. The Three Functional Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
A “Tri-Modal” Force Structure Military Role (How will Canada fight?) - High-end combat capabilities - Sustainment of Operations Constabulary Role (When to use naval force?) - Low-end combat capabilities - Support to OGDs Diplomatic Role (What do Canadians expect?) - Support to Humanitarian Support & Disaster Relief - Supply to Capacity Building and Assistance Efforts Adapted from: Hughes, “A Bi-Modal Force Structure for National Maritime Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, 29-47.
Military Role Constabulary Role Diplomatic Role Use of the Sea Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16. The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’ In the presence of a recognized military threat. Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Image:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/images/future_surface_combatant3.jpg Where is the Navy Going? Future Surface Combatants?
Military Role Diplomatic Role Use of the Sea Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16. The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’ When criminal activity impedes or restricts legitimate activity. Constabulary Role Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Source: http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat-smamat/documents/Big%20AOPS%20pics/AOaftstbd2.jpg Where is the navy going? Naval Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship?
Source: http://www.casr.ca/doc-news-mid-shore-patrol-vessel-2009.htmhttp://www.casr.ca/doc-news-mid-shore-patrol-vessel-2009.htm Image: http://www.damen.nl/PRODUCTS/Damen_Stan_Patrol_4207.aspx?mId=8643&rId=150&Big=1 Where is the coast guard going? Mid-shore Patrol Cutters? Specifications for the new Mid-Shore Patrol Vessel / Damen Stan Patrol 4207: Length overall: 42.80 m Speed range: 23.0 - 30.0 knots (42.6 - 55.5 km/h) Ship's Boat: RHIB (rigid hull inflatable boat)
Military Role Constabulary Role Diplomatic Role Use of the Sea Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16. The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’ When foreign policy goals/national interest are at stake. Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Images: German and French navies. Left - Berlin-class (Germany) Right - Mistral-class amphibious assault, command and force projection ship (France) Where is the navy going? JSS or Oiler-Replenisher?
Military Role Constabulary Role Diplomatic Role Ken Booth’s Triangle – Adapted for the ‘New Security Environment’. The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’ Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8. Order Peace Good Governance Compassion Respect Reputation Response
Questions #4 Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or less in support of Canadian law enforcement?
CCGS Louis St. Laurent ‘Heavy’ [Arctic] Icebreaker Image: shipspotting.net
CCGS Amundsen T1200-class ‘Medium’ [Gulf] Icebreaker Image: Marc Tawil Arctic Net
CCGS Sir William Alexander T1100-class ‘Light’ [River] Icebreaker Image: shipspotter.com
AOPS Deficiencies? “Endurance: 6,800 nm at 14 knots transit speed – 6,800 nm ‘not enough’ according to CCG; – Should be able to increase range with speed of 10 knots (+/-10,000 nm).” AOPS is “slow and dumb” according to Senator Colin Kenny; it is a “slushbreaker.” Source: AOPS Briefing, Project Manager, Dalhousie University, 5 Oct 2011.
Where Does AOPS ‘fit’ as an Icebreaker? ClassSt. LaurentT1200T1100AOPS Displace’t11,345 t.6,0973,8095,730 Length119.6 m.98.283.097.5 Beam24.4 m.19.816.219.0 Draught9.9 m.220.127.116.11 Engines29,400 kw17,7008,84713,200 Motors20,142 kw12,1745,2509,000 Speed20 kts16.5 17 Range23,000 nm15,0006,5006,800 Endurance205 days192120 Bunkers3,500 m³2,200785690
CCG Class Comparisons (I) Range Displacement.5 5 15 1.5 10 1.0 20 2.0 25 2.53.03.5 KNM Kt St Laurent T1200 T1100 ? River Gulf/ Arctic ? Arctic
CCG Class Comparisons (II) Bunkers Power.5 5 15 1.5 10 1.0 20 2.0 25 2.53.03.5 Km³ KW St Laurent T1200 T1100 River Arctic/ Gulf ?
AOPS Class Analysis Range Displacement.5 5 15 1.5 10 1.0 20 2.0 25 2.53.03.5 KNM Kt St Laurent T1200 T1100 Power KW Bunkers Km³ T1100 T1200 St Laurent AOPS River ? Gulf/ Arctic ?
AOPS V1 versus V2 ClassT1200AOPS V1AOPS V2Change Displace’t6,097 t6,9405,730-17.4% Length98.2 m109.697.5-11.0% Beam19.8 m18.219.0+4.4% Draught7.4 m7.05.7-18.6% Engines17,700 kw18,00013,200-27% Motors12,174 kw15,0009,000-40% Speed16.5 kts2017-15% Range15,000 nm8000 e6,800-17.4 e Endurance192 days120 NC Bunkers2,200 m³810 e690-17.4 e Note: e = estimated using change in displacement.
AOPS Class Analysis (II) Range Displacement.5 5 15 1.5 10 1.0 20 2.0 25 2.53.03.5 KNM Kt St Laurent T1200 T1100 Power KW Bunkers Km³ T1100 T1200 St Laurent AOPS2 River ? Gulf ? AOPS1
Naval Bias Against Fuel Capacity ClassSt. LaurentT1200T1100AOPS V2 Displacem’t11,345 t6,0973,8095,730 Bunkers*3500 m³2,200785690 Ratio (D).31 m³/t.36.21V2 =.120 V1 =.117 Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded. Halifax-class frigates: ratio =.10 per tonne of displacement
CCG Fuel Consumption ClassSt. LaurentT1200T1100 Endurance205 days192120 Bunkers3500 m³2,200785 ‘Min.’ Rate*15.4 m³/day10.35.9 ‘Normal’ Rate30 m³/day e20.010 e ‘High’ Rate75 m³/day e [+/-1000 m³/day] 50.025 e Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded. Source: Mr. N. Hawksworth – C. Eng. CCG, Atlantic Region
RCN Sustainment of CCG Operations ClassT1200GainT1100Gain Bunkers2,200 m³9.1%78525.5 Min. Rate10.3 m³/day19.4 days5.933.9 ‘Normal’ Rate20.0 m³/day10 days11.8 e16.9 ‘High’ Rate50.0 m³/day4 days29.5 e6.8 Assumes approximately 200 cubic metres of fuel (one-third of AOPS’s useable fuel capacity of 620 cubic metres) is available for transfer to CCG ship. Estimated gain for St. Laurent is 5.7% of total bunker capacity, and 13 days (min., 15.4 cum/day), 6.5 days (normal, 30.8 cum/day) or 2.6 days (high, 77 cum/day) of operation (using same equating rate from T1200 class). Note: e = estimated equating rate increase from T1200 class.
A RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (I) Assuming 10-knot transit speed and 6 hours for reloading, 1XAOPS could deliver 200 tonnes of fuel at a distance of: - 3,800 nm to a T1100 CCG icebreaker operating a ‘low’ rate; - 1,170 nm to a T1200 CCG icebreaker operating at a ‘normal’ rate; or - 280 nm to CCG Louis St. Laurent operating at a ‘high’ rate of fuel consumption. Adding a second AOPS doubles the rate of delivery or the range at which they can sustain a CCG ship.
RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (II) A ‘cold weather capable’ RCN sustainment ship (AOR), could deliver approximately 7,000 m³ of fuel to the ice-edge or a suitable anchorage near the ice-edge. The AOR could: - act as a ‘station tanker’; - replenish shore or barge tanks; or - employ AOPSs (or CCG ships) as ‘shuttles’. Comment from CCG Chief Engineer, CCGS Louis St. Laurent: “This could change everything.” Image: BMT Aegir 18R-class commercial AOR
Question #5 How will the relationship between the RCN and the CCG evolve in arctic patrolling operations?
Read More Here Canadian Naval Review at: http://www.navalreview.ca/ The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship: A Mandate-Based Typology, J. Matthew Gillis, CFPS 2010 at: http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/Gillis- OutputsAndProducts.pdf “Broadsides,” the on-line discussion forum of Canadian Naval Review, at: http://www.navalreview.ca/broadsides-discussion- forum/
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