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Agreement: Byzantine Generals UNIVERSITY of WISCONSIN-MADISON Computer Sciences Department CS 739 Distributed Systems Andrea C. Arpaci-Dusseau Paper: “The.

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Presentation on theme: "Agreement: Byzantine Generals UNIVERSITY of WISCONSIN-MADISON Computer Sciences Department CS 739 Distributed Systems Andrea C. Arpaci-Dusseau Paper: “The."— Presentation transcript:

1 Agreement: Byzantine Generals UNIVERSITY of WISCONSIN-MADISON Computer Sciences Department CS 739 Distributed Systems Andrea C. Arpaci-Dusseau Paper: “The Byzantine Generals Problem”, by Lamport, Shostak, Pease, In ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, July 1982 why we need agreement assumptions algorithm steps through examples Bigger Picture: How to handle malicious components Play variant of Mafia/Werewolf

2 Motivation Build reliable systems in presence of faulty components Common approach: Send request (or input) to some “f-tolerant” server Have multiple (potentially faulty) components compute same function Perform majority vote on outputs to get “right” result C1 C2 C3 majority(v1,v2,v3) f faulty, f+1 good components ==> 2f+1 total

3 What is a Byzantine Failure? Three primary differences from Fail-Stop Failure 1) Component can produce arbitrary output Fail-stop: produces correct output or none 2) Cannot always detect output is faulty Fail-stop: can always detect that component has stopped 3) Components may work together maliciously With fail-stop failures: How many components are needed to be f-tolerant??

4 Assumption for F-tolerant Servers Good (non-faulty) components must use same input Otherwise, can’t trust their output result either For majority voting to work: 1) All non-faulty processors must use same input 2) If input is non-faulty, then all non-faulty processes use the value it provides Must agree on value of input C1 C2 C3 A B

5 Byzantine Generals Algorithm to achieve agreement among “loyal generals” (i.e., working components) given m “traitors” (i.e., faulty components) Agreement such that: A) All loyal generals decide on same plan (important even when input is faulty! Why?) B) Small number of traitors cannot cause loyal generals to adopt “bad plan” Terminology Let v(i) be information communicated (I.e., input observed) by ith general Each general combines values v(1)...v(n) to form plan

6 Agreement Conditions Rephrase agreement conditions: A) Loyal generals decide on same plan if All loyal generals use same method for combining information (and see same inputs) B) Small number of traitors can’t hurt loyal generals if Use robust function for decision, such as majority function of values v(1)...v(n)

7 Key Step: Agree on inputs Generals communicate v(i) values to one another: 1) Every loyal general must obtain same v(1)..v(n) 1’) Any two loyal generals use same value of v(i) –Traitor i will try to trick loyal generals into using different v(i)’s 2) If ith general is loyal, then the value he sends must be used by every other general as v(i) How can each general send his value to n-1 others? A commanding general must send an order (order: Use v(i) as my value) to his n-1 lieutenants such that: IC1) All loyal lieutenants obey same order IC2) If commanding general is loyal, every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends Interactive Consistency conditions

8 Impossibility Result With only 3 generals, no solution can work with even 1 traitor (given oral messages) commander attack retreat L1L2 What should L1 do? Is commander or L2 the traitor???

9 Option 1: Loyal Commander commander attack retreat L1L2 attack What must L1 do? By IC2: L1 must obey commander and attack

10 Option 2: Loyal L2 commander attack retreat L1L2 retreat What must L1 do? By IC1: L1 and L2 must obey same order --> L1 must retreat Problem: L1 can’t distinguish between 2 scenarios

11 General Impossibility Result No solution with fewer than 3m+1 generals can cope with m traitors

12 Oral Messages Assumptions A1) Every message sent is delivered correctly –What if it is not? A2) Receiver knows who sent message –What scenarios is this true for? A3) Absence of message can be detected –How can this be done?

13 Oral Message Algorithm OM(m), m>0 Commander sends his value to every lieutenant For each i, let vi be value Lieutenant i receives from commander; act as commander for OM(m-1) and send vi to n-2 other lieutenants For each i and each j not i, let vj be value Lieut i received from Lieut j. Lieut i computes majority(v1,...,vn-1) OM(0) Commander sends his value to every lieutenant

14 Example: Bad Lieutenant Scenario: m=1, n=4, traitor = L3 C L1 L3L2 A A A OM(1): OM(0):??? C L1 L3L2 A A R R Decision??L1 = m (A, A, R); L2 = m (A, A, R); Both attack!

15 Example: Bad Commander Scenario: m=1, n=4, traitor = C C L1 L3L2 A R A OM(1): OM(0):??? L1 L3L2 A R A A Decision?? L1=m(A, R, A); L2=m(A, R, A); L3=m(A,R,A); Attack! R A

16 Bigger Example: Bad Lieutenants Scenario: m=2, n=3m+1=7, traitors=L5, L6 C A A A L2 L6L3 L5L4L1 A A A L2 L6L3 L5L4L1 AAAARR Decision??? Messages? m(A,A,A,A,R,R) ==> All loyal lieutenants attack!

17 Bigger Example: Bad Commander+ Scenario: m=2, n=7, traitors=C, L6 C L2 L6L3 L5L4L1 R A R A A x A,R,A,R,A ARR A A Decision??? L2 L6L3 L5L4L1 Messages?

18 Decision with Bad Commander+ L1: m(A,R,A,R,A,A) ==> Attack L2: m(A,R,A,R,A,R) ==> Retreat L3: m(A,R,A,R,A,A) ==> Attack L4: m(A,R,A,R,A,R) ==> Retreat L5: m(A,R,A,R,A,A) ==> Attack Problem: All loyal lieutenants do NOT choose same action

19 Next Step of Algorithm Verify that lieutenants tell each other the same thing Requires rounds = m+1 OM(0): Msg from Lieut i of form: “L0 said v0, L1 said v1, etc...” What messages does L1 receive in this example? OM(2): A OM(1): 2R, 3A, 4R, 5A, 6A (doesn’t know 6 is traitor) OM(0): 2{ 3A, 4R, 5A, 6R} 3{2R, 4R, 5A, 6A} 4{2R, 3A, 5A, 6R} 5{2R, 3A, 4R, 6A} 6{ total confusion } All see same messages in OM(0) from L1,2,3,4, and 5 m(A,R,A,R,A,-) ==> All attack

20 Signed Messages Problem: Traitors can lie about what others said; how can we remove that ability? New assumption: Signed messages (Cryptography) A4) a. Loyal general’s signature cannot be forged and contents cannot be altered b. Anyone can verify authenticity of signature Simplifies problem: When lieutenant i passes on signed message from j, receiver knows that i did not lie about what j said Lieutenants cannot do any harm alone (cannot forge loyal general’s orders) Only have to check for traitor commander With cryptographic primitives, can implement Byzantine Agreement with m+2 nodes, using SM(m)

21 Signed Messages Algorithm: SM(m) 1. Commander signs v and sends to all as (v:0) 2. Each lieut i: A) If receive (v:0) and no other order 1) Vi = v 2) send (V:0:i) to all B) If receive (v:0:j:...:k) and v not in Vi 1) Add v to Vi 2) if (k { "@context": "http://schema.org", "@type": "ImageObject", "contentUrl": "http://images.slideplayer.com/3324979/11/slides/slide_20.jpg", "name": "Signed Messages Algorithm: SM(m) 1.Commander signs v and sends to all as (v:0) 2.", "description": "Each lieut i: A) If receive (v:0) and no other order 1) Vi = v 2) send (V:0:i) to all B) If receive (v:0:j:...:k) and v not in Vi 1) Add v to Vi 2) if (k

22 SM(1) Example: Bad Commander Scenario: m=1, n=m+2=3, bad commander C L1 L2 A:0R:0 What next? L1 L2 A:0:L1 R:0:L2 V1={A,R} V2={R,A} Both L1 and L2 can trust orders are from C Both apply same decision to {A,R}

23 SM(2): Bad Commander+ Scenario: m=2, n=m+2=4, bad commander and L3 C L1 L3L2 A:0 x Goal? L1 and L2 must make same decision L1 L3L2 A:0:L1 A:0:L2 A:0:L3 R:0:L3 L1 L2 R:0:L3:L1 V1 = V2 = {A,R} ==> Same decision

24 Other Variations How to handle missing communication paths

25 Assumptions A1) Every message sent by nonfaulty processor is delivered correctly Network failure ==> processor failure Handle as less connectivity in graph A2) Processor can determine sender of message Communication is over fixed, dedicated lines Switched network??? A3) Absence of message can be detected Fixed max time to send message + synchronized clocks ==> If msg not received in fixed time, use default A4) Processors sign msgs such that nonfaulty signatures cannot be forged Use randomizing function or cryptography to make liklihood of forgery very small

26 Importance of Assumptions “Separating Agreement from Execution for Byzantine Fault Tolerant Services” - SOSP’03 Goal: Reduce replication costs 3f+1 agreement replicas 2g+1 execution replicas –Costly part to replicate –Often uses different software versions –Potentially long running time To provide A2, protocol assumes cryptographic primitives, such that one can be sure “i said v” in switched environment What is the problem??

27 Conclusions Problem: To implement a fault-tolerant service with coordinated replicas, must agree on inputs Byzantine failures make agreement challenging Produce arbitrary output, can’t detect, collude User different agreement protocol depending on assumptions Oral messages: Need 3f+1 nodes to tolerate f failures –Difficult because traitors can lie about what others said Signed messages: Need f+2 nodes –Easier because traitors can only lie about other traitors

28 Byzantine Werewolves Werewolf/Mafia: Psychological party game Two groups: Werewolves and villagers Multiple rounds of night and day –Night: Werewolves kill a villager –Day: All vote on who to kill…hopefully a werewolf Werewolves trick villages into bad decisions (killing one of their own) Werewolves lie, act in collision Werewolves have more information than villagers (I.e., who is a werewolf) Traditional: Only 1 village “seer” has any info My variant: Every villager can ask one question per round Traditional: More psychological…

29 Byzantine-Werewolf Game Rules Everyone secretly assigned as werewolf or villager 3 werewolves, rest are “seeing” villagers I am moderator Night round: “Close your eyes”; make noises to hide activity “Werewolves, open your eyes”: 3 can see who is who –“Werewolves, pick someone to kill” (Not first round) –Silently agree on villager to kill by pointing –“Werewolves, close your eyes” For all: “NAME, open your eyes” “Pick someone to ask about” –Useless for Werewolves, but hides their identity… –Point to another player –Moderator signs thumbs up for werewolf, down for villager –“NAME, close your eyes”

30 Rules: Day Time Day Time: “Everyone open your eyes; its daytime” “NAME, you have been killed by the werewolves!” –They are now out of the game Agreement time: Everyone talks and votes on who should be “decommissioned” –Villagers try to decommission werewolf –Werewolves try to trick villagers with bad info –Pairwise communication Variant: Signed messages; leave a note with everyone telling them what you know; can show this note to others –When you’ve made up your mind, tell moderator –Moderator: Uses majority voting to determine who is decommissioned “Okay, NAME is dead” –Person is out of game (can’t talk anymore) and shows card Repeat cycle until All werewolves dead OR werewolves >= villagers


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