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Characterization of Silent Stores Gordon B.Bell Kevin M. Lepak Mikko H. Lipasti University of Wisconsin—Madison

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Presentation on theme: "Characterization of Silent Stores Gordon B.Bell Kevin M. Lepak Mikko H. Lipasti University of Wisconsin—Madison"— Presentation transcript:

1 Characterization of Silent Stores Gordon B.Bell Kevin M. Lepak Mikko H. Lipasti University of Wisconsin—Madison http://www.ece.wisc.edu/~pharm

2 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Background Lepak, Lipasti: On the Value Locality of Store Instructions: ISCA 2000 Introduced Silent Stores A memory write that does not change the system state Silent stores are real and non-trivial 20%-60% of all dynamic stores are silent in SPECINT-95 and MP benchmarks (32% average)

3 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Why Do We Care? Reducing cache writebacks Reducing writeback buffering Reducing true and false sharing Write operations are generally more expensive than reads

4 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Code Size / Efficiency R(I1,I2,I3) = V(I1,I2,I3) - A(0)*(U(I1,I2,I3)) - A(1)*(U(I1-1,I2,I3) + U(I1+1,I2,I3) + U(I1,I2-1,I3) + U(I1,I2+1,I3) + U(I1,I2,I3-1) + U(I1,I2,I3+1)) - A(2)*(U(I1-1,I2- 1,I3) + U(I1+1,I2-1,I3) + U(I1-1,I2+1,I3) + U(I1+1,I2+1,I3) + U(I1,I2-1,I3-1) + U(I1,I2+1,I3-1) + U(I1,I2-1,I3+1) + U(I1,I2+1,I3+1) + U(I1- 1,I2,I3-1) + U(I1-1,I2,I3+1) + U(I1+1,I2,I3-1) + U(I1+1,I2,I3+1)) - A(3)*(U(I1-1,I2-1,I3-1) + U(I1+1,I2-1,I3-1) + U(I1-1,I2+1,I3-1) + U(I1+1,I2+1,I3-1) + U(I1-1,I2-1,I3+1) + U(I1+1,I2-1,I3+1) + U(I1- 1,I2+1,I3+1) + U(I1+1,I2+1,I3+1)) Example from mgrid (SPECFP-95) Eliminating this expression (when silent) removes over 100 static instructions (2.4% of the total dynamic instructions)

5 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti This Talk Characterize silent stores Why do they occur? Source code case studies Silent store statistics Critical silent stores Goal: provide insight into silent stores that can lead to novel innovations in detecting and exploiting them

6 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Terminology Silent Store: A memory write that does not change the system state Store Verify: A load, compare, and conditional store (if non-silent) operation Store Squashing: Removal of a silent store from program execution

7 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti An Example for (i = 0; i < 32; i++){ time_left[i] -= MIN(time_left[i],time_to_kill); } Example from m88ksim This store is silent in over 95% of the dynamic executions of this loop Difficult for compiler to eliminate because how often the store is silent may depend on program inputs

8 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Value Distribution Both values and addresses are likely to be silent

9 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Frequency of Execution Few static instructions contribute to most silent stores

10 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Stack / Heap Uniform stack silent stores (25%-50%) Variable heap silent stores

11 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Stores Likely to be Silent 4 categories based on previous execution of that particular static store Same Location, Same Value A silent store stores the same value to the same location as the last time it was executed Common in loops

12 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Same Location, Same Value for (anum = 1; anum <= maxarg; anum++) { argflags = arg[anum].arg_flags; Example from perl argflags is a stack-allocated temporary variable (same location) arg_flags is often zero (same value) Silent 71% of the time

13 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Stores Likely to be Silent Different Location, Same Value A silent store stores the same value to a different location as the last time it was executed Common in instructions that store to an array indexed by a loop induction variable

14 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Different Location, Same Value for(x = xmin; x <= xmax; ++x) for(y = ymin; y <= ymax; ++y){ s = y*boardsize+x;... ltrscr -= ltr2[s]; ltr2[s] = 0; ltr1[s] = 0; ltrgd[s] = FALSE; } Example from go Clears game board array Board is likely to be mostly zero in subsequent clearings Silent 86%, 43%, 77% of the time, respectively

15 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Stores Likely to be Silent Same Location, Different Value A silent store stores a different value to the same location as the last time it was executed Rare, but can be caused by: Intervening static stores to the same address Stack frame manipulations

16 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Same Location, Different Value for(x = xmin; x <= xmax; ++x) for(y = ymin; y <= ymax; ++y){ s = y*boardsize+x;... ltrscr -= ltr2[s]; ltr2[s] = 0; ltr1[s] = 0; ltrgd[s] = FALSE; } Example from go ltrscr is a global variable (same location) ltr2 is indexed by loop induction variable (different value) Silent 86%, but of that 98% is Same Location, Same Value

17 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers call foo() call bar() … call foo() *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... $17 is callee-saved

18 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... call foo() call bar() … call foo()

19 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 2 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

20 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 2 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

21 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 2 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

22 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 62 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

23 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 62 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

24 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 62 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

25 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Callee-Saved Registers *** void foo() *** sw $17,28($fp)... *** void bar() *** sw $17,28($fp)... 62 = Same location, different value, silent 6 call foo() call bar() … call foo()

26 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Stores Likely to be Silent Different Location, Different Value A static silent store stores a different value to a different location as the last time it was executed Example: nested loops

27 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Different Location, Different Value NODE ***xlsave(NODE **nptr,...){... for (; nptr != (NODE **) NULL; nptr = va_arg(pvar, NODE **)){... *--xlstack = nptr;... } Example from li xlstack is continually decremented (different location) nptr is set to next function argument (different value) Silent if subsequent calls to xlsave store the same set of nodes to the same starting stack address

28 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Likelihood of Being Silent Silence can be accurately predicted based on category

29 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Silent Store Breakdown Stores that can be predicted silent (Same Value) are a large portion of all silent stores

30 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Critical Silent Stores Critical Silent Store: A specific dynamic silent store that, if not squashed, will cause a cacheline to be marked as dirty and hence require a writeback

31 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Critical Silent Stores Dirty bit Cache blocks ABCDEF

32 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Critical Silent Stores sw 0, C sw 2, E x 02 Both silent stores are critical because the dirty bit would not have been set if silent stores are squashed = = ABCDEF

33 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Non-Critical Silent Stores sw 0, C sw 2, E x 02 No silent stores are critical because the dirty bit is set by a non-silent store (regardless of squashing) 0 sw 4, D = =  ABCDEF 4

34 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Critical Silent Stores Who Cares? It is sufficient to squash only critical silent stores to obtain maximal writeback reduction Squashing non-critical silent stores: Incurs store verify overhead with no reduction in writebacks Can cause additional address bus transactions in multiprocessors

35 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Critical Silent Stores: Example do{ *(htab_p-16) = -1; *(htab_p-15) = -1; *(htab_p-14) = -1; *(htab_p-13) = -1;... *(htab_p-2) = -1; *(htab_p-1) = -1; } while ((i -= 16) >= 0); Example from compress These 16 stores fill entire cache lines If all stores to a line are silent, then they are all critical as well 19% of all writebacks can be eliminated

36 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Writeback Reduction Squashing only a subset of silent stores results in significant writeback reduction

37 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Conclusion Silent Stores occur for a variety of values and execution frequencies Silent Store causes: Algorithmic (bad programming?) Architecture / compiler conventions Squashing only critical silent stores is sufficient for removing all writebacks

38 PACT 2000G. Bell, K. Lepak and M. Lipasti Future Work Silence prediction Store verify only if have reason to believe that store is: Silent Critical Multiprocessor Silent Stores Extend notion of criticality to include silent stores that cause sharing misses as well as writebacks

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