Presentation on theme: "Answers to your questions ● An issue was that of the conventionality of language.We can quote Wittgenstein: ● 3.342 An unseren Notationen ist zwar etwas."— Presentation transcript:
Answers to your questions ● An issue was that of the conventionality of language.We can quote Wittgenstein: ● 3.342 An unseren Notationen ist zwar etwas willkürlich,aber das ist nichtwillkürlich:Das, wenn wir etwas willkürlich bestimmt haben, dann etwas anderes der Fall sein muss (Dies hangt von dem Wesen der Notation ab.) TRAD.In our notation is somewhat arbitrary, but it is notarbitrary: That when we have something arbitrarily determined, then something else must be the case (this depends on the nature of the notation.) ● ust as p o q supposed p ⊃ q, or as 2, 3 to assume + - = so.table supposed wood, iron, leg, tray, color and many other names but not supposed to as "astute." In bringing these names are isomorphic to the objects they represent. Or rather the relationships between objects are isomorphic with the reports of the names. If there is a relationship between the object table and the table leg and the wood of the table is the same relation in the proposition. "The table legs are made of wood." That's why they are no longer arbitrary. Name and designated are ultimately one.
● A civilization of the image ● If then the word "table" is an image of reality as well as the proposition "The table legs are made of wood" and if it is the image of the table is one with the object or with the reality of the table legs, we can safely use images instead of objects. We can use words instead of things ● And in fact we do not use things in the language but the words. Even we could also use things like words. For example if I place an overturned chair on the table could say that arriving late or any other cosa.We can also use images as if they were words. The comics have the same sequence (for the West from left to right) which is in this sequence of squiggles that we call writing.Also why the West (not East) has been defined as a civilization of the image even because the word is image. ● 4.01 Der Satz is ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.The sentence is a picture of reality
Idealism ● Ιδέα is to see. Idealism is that important philosophical movement which says that without the images (including speech) could not understand anything. As if things could talk. Baron Munchausen as if he could sit up by himself, through the tail. Names: Kant, Fichte, Shelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer is the author of the metaphor of the Baron. I
Idealism ● The idealism is still there, even in contemporary science. Quantum mechanics says that if a particle does not observe it, wave or particle can be together, like Schrödinger's cat if you do not observe it can be alive and dead together. ● Instead, we think to be realistic for the simple reason that if there were an object that duplicates the word or vice versa, we could not explain the multiplicity of languages with which we describe reality, or the multiplicity of relationships that these objects have 4.0412.
Wittgenstein ● Yet the logic is a language for Wittgenstein, and represents fully the reality. Then we can really do without? No.Wittgenstein arrives with a proposition almost incomprehensible in German and in English. What should we formalize. So we would understand as well as switching from one language to a logical language.
Logic ● Wittgenstein says the issues are resolved without looking at the logic in the world (5551). If we look at the world track on a fundamentally flawed. We just need that something is there. Not like it is. This tells us how the logic. ● But this claim is based? It is by logic. ● 5.5521 Und wenn dies nicht so wäre, wie konnten wir die Logic anwenden? Man könnte sagen: Wenn es eine Logik gäbe, auch wenn es keine Welt gäbe, wie könnte es dann eine Logik geben, da es eine Welt gibt? ● And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? You could say: If there was a logic, even if there were no world, how could there be a logic, since there is a world?
Calculus ● If there was a logic, = p even if there were no world = ~ q ● how could there be a logic = ~p since there is a world? = q ● The two propositions are equivalent and thus if we admit the existence of the logic we must also admit the existence of the world.