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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

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Presentation on theme: "A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies."— Presentation transcript:

1 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies for Pandemic Influenza: Animal/Public Health Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVM Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVM Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

2 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective

3 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Animal and Public Health? 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people) The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesThe food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countries The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplyThe typical city has less than 3 days’ food supply In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMsIn US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs  Of which 80%+ are companion animal oriented 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people) The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesThe food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countries The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplyThe typical city has less than 3 days’ food supply In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMsIn US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs  Of which 80%+ are companion animal oriented

4 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Animal and Public Health? 13. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers 14. Viral Encephalitis Diseases 15. Brucellosis 16. Food/H2O Safety Threats 17. Retroviruses Likely Zoonotics 1. Ebola/Marburg Human Health Impact in Question 1. Swine Vesicular Disease Definite Zoonotics 1. SARS 2. BSE (Mad Cow) 3. Psittacosis 4. Rift Valley Fever 5. Hi-Path Avian Influenza 6. Monkeypox 7. Hanta virus 8. West Nile virus 9. Q Fever 10. Anthrax 11. Plague 12. Tularemia Definite Zoonotics 1. SARS 2. BSE (Mad Cow) 3. Psittacosis 4. Rift Valley Fever 5. Hi-Path Avian Influenza 6. Monkeypox 7. Hanta virus 8. West Nile virus 9. Q Fever 10. Anthrax 11. Plague 12. Tularemia

5 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Value of Poultry to North Carolina

6 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective

7 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner [Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy[Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy  Doesn’t guide us, or help us  Argument from ignorance; poor policy basis [Both] Linear extrapolation of yr ago is dubious[Both] Linear extrapolation of yr ago is dubious  Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?  Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, health care, medical tools and practices are false [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication[Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication  Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance to the ‘next’ pandemic? [Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy[Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy  Doesn’t guide us, or help us  Argument from ignorance; poor policy basis [Both] Linear extrapolation of yr ago is dubious[Both] Linear extrapolation of yr ago is dubious  Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?  Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, health care, medical tools and practices are false [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication[Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication  Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance to the ‘next’ pandemic?

8 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner [Kelley] Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of pandemic[Kelley] Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of pandemic  Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti- virals and vaccinology [Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changes[Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changes  How quick, how bad, how severe?  We don’t understand all that we know, and we don’t know all we need to understand [Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effort[Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effort  2 nd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massive  Not socially neutral [Kelley] Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of pandemic[Kelley] Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of pandemic  Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti- virals and vaccinology [Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changes[Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changes  How quick, how bad, how severe?  We don’t understand all that we know, and we don’t know all we need to understand [Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effort[Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effort  2 nd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massive  Not socially neutral

9 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective Introductory commentsIntroductory comments Summary of Kelley/Weiner presentationsSummary of Kelley/Weiner presentations Additional comments from a veterinarian’s perspectiveAdditional comments from a veterinarian’s perspective

10 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Additional comments Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreaksRefreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreaks  DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of us all I agree with some things you’ve heardI agree with some things you’ve heard I am not as sanguine about some commentsI am not as sanguine about some comments Most, however, I just do not know aboutMost, however, I just do not know about Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreaksRefreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreaks  DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of us all I agree with some things you’ve heardI agree with some things you’ve heard I am not as sanguine about some commentsI am not as sanguine about some comments Most, however, I just do not know aboutMost, however, I just do not know about

11 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Hi Path AI – Clinical Disease High morbidity, high mortality (Most get ill, most die) High morbidity, high mortality (Most get ill, most die) six days after onset of signs hours into disease hours into disease...

12 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Feed Producer Feed Milling and Distribution Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) Feed Brokers Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Chicken Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows

13 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E ‘Grandparent’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Feed Producer Feed Milling and Distribution Cull Hen Market (culls; incl chicks) Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) Out-of-State Growing Feed Brokers Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Broiler Breeders (2 o Breeder, Prod’n hens) Hatchery Unit (Commercial Chicks) Grower Unit (Commercial Chicks) Exports ‘Spike Male’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Chicken Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows

14 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E ‘Grandparent’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Feed Producer Exports Imports Feed Milling and Distribution Packer & Processor (includes value-added processing) Cull Hen Market (culls; incl chicks) Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) High processed meats/protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods) Out-of-State Growing Feed Brokers Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Broiler Breeders (2 o Breeder, Prod’n hens) Hatchery Unit (Commercial Chicks) Grower Unit (Commercial Chicks) Exports ‘Spike Male’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Chicken Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows Distributor

15 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E ‘Grandparent’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Retailer, Restaurant, Institutional Feed Producer Distributor Exports Imports Consumer Feed Milling and Distribution Packer & Processor (includes value-added processing) Cull Hen Market (culls; incl chicks) Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) High processed meats/protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods) Out-of-State Growing Feed Brokers Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Broiler Breeders (2 o Breeder, Prod’n hens) Hatchery Unit (Commercial Chicks) Grower Unit (Commercial Chicks) Exports ‘Spike Male’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Genetics) Chicken Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows

16 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Katrina and Agriculture 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New Orleans60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New Orleans  Harvests started mid-Sept Port regained partial function by end of SeptemberPort regained partial function by end of September  Port personnel are an issue Limited river barge travel started back by mid OctoberLimited river barge travel started back by mid October  Unknown how river has changed  Barge costs much higher via competition with clean-up needs 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New Orleans60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New Orleans  Harvests started mid-Sept Port regained partial function by end of SeptemberPort regained partial function by end of September  Port personnel are an issue Limited river barge travel started back by mid OctoberLimited river barge travel started back by mid October  Unknown how river has changed  Barge costs much higher via competition with clean-up needs CHANGE IN CORN PRICE SINCE END OF AUGUST STRONGER <2% UNCHANGED WEAKER >19%

17 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Avian Influenza H5N1 (now) Avian Influenza (H5N1)Avian Influenza (H5N1)  1 st seen 1997 Hong Kong  Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)  Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa  Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultry But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet... Avian Influenza (H5N1)Avian Influenza (H5N1)  1 st seen 1997 Hong Kong  Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)  Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa  Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultry But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet...

18 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Poultry is THE major high quality protein source for the world Demand over 40 years for all animal proteins has grownDemand over 40 years for all animal proteins has grown  Ruminant meat by %  Pig meat by %  Milk by %  Poultry meat by almost 800% Is a major source of economic wealth as wellIs a major source of economic wealth as well Demand over 40 years for all animal proteins has grownDemand over 40 years for all animal proteins has grown  Ruminant meat by %  Pig meat by %  Milk by %  Poultry meat by almost 800% Is a major source of economic wealth as wellIs a major source of economic wealth as well From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06 Beef Sheep/Goat Pig Poultry Cow Milk Buff Milk Sheep Milk Goat Milk Livestock Demand – Global - % Change % 200% 400% 600% 800%

19 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Poultry as Economic Underpinning: Prior to 2004 From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06

20 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E HPAI H5N1 World Consumption & Export Changes Movement of H5N1 to Europe in fall 2005 triggered a major disruption in world poultry marketsMovement of H5N1 to Europe in fall 2005 triggered a major disruption in world poultry markets  Local variations occur, but the trend is bad Movement of H5N1 to Europe in fall 2005 triggered a major disruption in world poultry marketsMovement of H5N1 to Europe in fall 2005 triggered a major disruption in world poultry markets  Local variations occur, but the trend is bad Source: FAO, February 2006

21 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E US Trade Exposure: <15% of US Production BSE in USA Hurricanes hit Gulf Poultry H5N1 in Russia H5N1 in Croatia, Romania, Turkey H5N1 in Ukraine H5N1 in 18 more Euro Area Countries LoPath? AI in Texas

22 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Ultimate HPAI Costs to Industry - Best Guesstimate Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting  Waiting for others to make production adjustment  Time period before adjustment depends on how deep the pockets of companies and governments Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: Loss Lowered leg qtr prices$142 M / mo Lowered breast prices$104 M / moUnusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: Loss Lowered leg qtr prices$142 M / mo Lowered breast prices$104 M / mo Total$246 M / mo Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices. Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting  Waiting for others to make production adjustment  Time period before adjustment depends on how deep the pockets of companies and governments Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: Loss Lowered leg qtr prices$142 M / mo Lowered breast prices$104 M / moUnusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: Loss Lowered leg qtr prices$142 M / mo Lowered breast prices$104 M / mo Total$246 M / mo Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices. Estimates from : Bill Roenigk Nat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic) Estimates from : Bill Roenigk Nat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)

23 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Response to Theoretical H5N1 in US Poultry (Among those who eat poultry, 96%) Harvard School of Public Health Project on the Public and Biological Security, January 17-25, Note: “Don’t know” responses not shown.

24 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Lessons Learned : Avian Influenza maybe. Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread means animal health & public health are the sameAvian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread means animal health & public health are the same But public health will always be the priorityBut public health will always be the priority  Public health response can be deleterious to animal agriculture  Prevention & response is best responsibility of industry Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread means animal health & public health are the sameAvian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread means animal health & public health are the same But public health will always be the priorityBut public health will always be the priority  Public health response can be deleterious to animal agriculture  Prevention & response is best responsibility of industry

25 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Threats in Spread of H5N1: Confusing, to say the least Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...” www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...” Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...” www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...”

26 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E “Planned Mismanagement”? Making enough vaccine Vaccinating people against H5N1 before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make human vaccine. It concluded that the manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some plants. Making enough vaccine Vaccinating people against H5N1 before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make human vaccine. It concluded that the manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some plants.

27 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Take Homes on Policy... Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousFocusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrous  Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the public  Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrow Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleRisk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensible  Not, in reality, what we are doing now. All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.  H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...  Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill... Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousFocusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrous  Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the public  Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrow Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleRisk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensible  Not, in reality, what we are doing now. All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.  H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...  Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...

28 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E UK Farmer who committed suicide when his animals were buried too close to water table, and his household water turned red. UK April 2001 C. Brown, U GA CVM

29 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies for Pandemic Influenza: Animal/Public Health Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVM Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVM Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

30 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

31 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Understanding Pandemic Influenza Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that is:Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that is: 1. readily transmitted between individuals 2. genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity) 3. increased virulence Facilitated by modern population densities and movement of people, animals, and productsFacilitated by modern population densities and movement of people, animals, and products  In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that is:Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that is: 1. readily transmitted between individuals 2. genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity) 3. increased virulence Facilitated by modern population densities and movement of people, animals, and productsFacilitated by modern population densities and movement of people, animals, and products  In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China DAYS TO CIRCUMNAVIGATE THE WORLD GLOBAL POP’N

32 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Turkey Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows ‘ Grandparent' Lines (1 o Breeder, Female) Retailer, Restaurant, Institutional Feed Producer Distributor Exports Imports Consumer Feed Milling and Distribution Packer & Processor (includes value-added processing) Cull Hen Market (culls; incl poults) Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) High processed meats/protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods) Out-of-State Growing Feed Brokers Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Production Breeders (2 o Breeder, Prod’n hens) Exports ‘Grandparent’ Lines (1 o Breeder, Male) Darkout Site (2 o Breeder, Hens) Hatchery Unit (Commercial Poults) Grower Unit (Commercial Poults) Agriculture Disaster Research Institute

33 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Egg Food-Chain Major Flows Major Flows Minor Flows Minor Flows Green lines/font = feed segment Red lines/font = live animal segment Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment ‘Grandparent’ Lines (Genetics, male/female) Retailer, Restaurant, Institutional Feed Producer Distributor Exports Imports Consumer Feed Milling and Distribution Cull Hen Market (culls; incl chicks) Industrial use (rendering, oils, fertilizer) Feed Brokers Non-food, non-feed Products & uses Multiplier Lines (Comm’l Layer Hens) Layer Unit (Commercial eggs) Egg Handlers and Brokers Processed Eggs (Bakery, commercial) High processed meats/protein (See Poultry Meat Chain) Layer Growout Site (Comm’l Layer Hens) Out-of-State Egg Handlers/Brooders In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale) Off-Line Egg Production (Middlemen ) Agriculture Disaster Research Institute

34 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

35 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006

36 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

37 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

38 A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E


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