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© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Agenda Part 1 of 3  A holistic view What  We say we know  We know what to write Why How.

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Presentation on theme: "© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Agenda Part 1 of 3  A holistic view What  We say we know  We know what to write Why How."— Presentation transcript:

1 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Agenda Part 1 of 3  A holistic view What  We say we know  We know what to write Why How

2 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 2 What? Guidance begins at the Executive level Our military culture must reward new thinking, innovation, and experimentation. President George W. Bush, Citadel Speech, 23 SEPT 1999

3 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 3 What? Guidance from the top of the Army To win this war and to be prepared for any other task our Nation may assign us; we must have a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. A fundamental underpinning of this mindset is a culture of innovation. "Adapt or Die" contains important ideas that clearly describe some significant challenges to innovation in our institutional culture, as well as the behaviors we seek to overcome them. Equally important, the authors question the status quo. We must be prepared to question everything. As this article states, "Development of a culture of innovation will not be advanced by panels, studies, or this paper. Cultural change begins with behavior and the leaders who shape it." We have the talent to establish the mindset and culture that will sustain the Army as ready and relevant, now and into the future. GENERAL Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

4 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 4 What? Everywhere you look-cries for change “ Cognitive Reform Is Hard A process of cognitive and cultural transformation cannot be accomplished in uncoordinated bits and pieces as it is today. If done right, it might well demand change as sweeping and revolutionary as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The end state of this effort should be nothing less than a revolution in learning throughout the Department of Defense. This much is clear from past efforts, however: reform of this magnitude is essential, long overdue, and undoable without the commitment of the entire military intellectual community.” “Culture-Centric Warfare” Major General Robert Scales, Jr. U.S. Army (Retired) Proceedings, September 2004

5 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 5 What? Do we really know?  We know what we think we want  We write and brief great sounding buzz words  We put it out there almost as it should happen without having to change anything else  Seems we hope it changes, but we can also keep the “good ole days”  COHORT in the 1980s of major change but isolated from other institutions  Is this occurring now?

6 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 6 What? “Do we really know?”  How many times have you seen or heard these words or statements? The Army must, “Change the culture” “Create adaptive leaders” “Adjust how we train leaders” “Create an environment that promotes innovation” “Change the personnel system” “Have the best leader development system in the world” “Have a world class leadership program” But, after coming back to reality you think “Do these people really know what it means to implement these ideas?” “It’s all talk and I have seen this before; only the names have changed …”

7 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 7 What? The Army has defined the Culture  First the National Command authority, Joint Staff and the Army =Strategy defines end state = Expeditionary Army influenced by society & resources  We start with the strategic problem = the culture  We know what we want, or do we think we know? Cold War Army Culture Leadership I define as the one most impacted by culture Expeditionary Army What type of Culture is needed too? What type of Leader is needed? Generations Of War One of many institutions that must evolve

8 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 8 What? Expeditionary Army = new culture Cold War Army Individual replacements Doctrine of attrition-massive firepower Top-down hierarchy & information- centralization Analytical planning defines result Heavy and complex tail Complex, short-shelf life equipment High training-tempo to offset high personnel-tempo Joint is “special duty” Expeditionary Army Stabilization—unit manning Maneuver Warfare doctrine “Trust-tactics” Networking-decentralization Results driven Innovation enables constant modification to doctrine, tactics and force designs Task organizes lower level Training & education determined by cyclic unit management Joint is accepted as norm

9 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 9 What? Cultures are different?- “Adapt or Die” Today’s Culture Stress “process” Forecasting Risk aversion Bureaucratic Top-down Rank equals success Change is criticism =>adherence to process ensures success Future Army Culture Stress “innovation” Experimentation Prudent risk-taking Agility Feedback loops Contribution valued Change is evolutionary =>as long as objectives are achieved

10 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 10 What? Army defines what? Future leaders will have a higher level of doctrine-based skills, knowledge, attitudes, and experience …In fact, the complex nature of future operations may require leaders of greater experience and rank commanding at lower levels than ever before. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: Force XXI Operations (October 2001) The extraordinarily high quality of the Army’s human dimension …must rise to an even higher level in the increasingly complex operating environment of the 21 st century…particularly…at the level of the combat battalion. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-19 Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept (October 2003)

11 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 11 Why BOLC* Provide officers with a rigorous framework for leadership Produce adaptable leaders who embody the Warrior Ethos Establish a common standard and shared experience built on overcoming adversity and developing respect / confidence with their combined arms peers to produce: competent warrior leaders grounded in combat Soldier tasks capable of leading Soldiers in today’s COE *TRADOC’s basic officer leaders course What? TRADOC defines what?

12 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 12 Capable of fast-paced action Responsive to changes measured in seconds Extremely flexible Mentally agile Capable of independent operations Technologically proficient Warrior Ethos Lieutenants of the Future Force will have to enter the Army already equipped with a sufficiently wide and deep base of knowledge, intellectual skills, and mental capabilities. What? Cadet Command defines what?

13 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 13 Attributes:  Mental Agility  Flexibility  Adaptability  Physical hardiness  Emotional hardiness  Followership  Dominance Skills:  Decision Making  Interpersonal  Analytical  Synthetic  Computer  Oral and Written Communication  Information Filtering  Research  The bureaucratic understanding of leadership, a checklist: Actions:  Team Building  Decision Making  Values:  Selfless Service  Respect “… processes and structures that lend required order and routine to our lives can also hinder innovation. Examples include human resource policies that manage people as inputs rather than outputs, labyrinthine organizational structures that frustrate interdisciplinary networking, and reporting procedures that focus more on things then on ideas.” BG David A. Fastabend and Mr. Robert H. Simpson “Adapt or Die” The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army What? Cadet Command check-list response

14 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 14 What? Break the down the goal further  Leadership is one part, but the most important part  But this is what this entire study is about, how to create new leaders Cold War Army Culture Leadership Expeditionary Army What type of Culture? What type of Leader?

15 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 15 What? Second but important part-New Leaders  The most important aspect is how we lead (command) the Expeditionary Army=“adaptive leaders What does the lieutenant of the Expeditionary Army look like? How do we recruit them? How do we challenge them? How do we create them? How do we educate & train them? How do we evaluate them? How do we compensate them? How do we sustain them in the Army? Big question remains? What type of culture must exist to act as a catalyst toward Evolution?

16 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 16 What? What if it is all talk?  What happens when “Why” moves on, but not we don’t? The Culture Present-Strategic Reform Officer Education and Training=New ROTC Goal: Expeditionary Army When these do not occur Simultaneously people in between become frustrated =ATLDP 2001 Limited changes may occur, some improvements, but vision is not achieved Resistance to cultural change is incredible-many are based on out-date-assumptions VISION An Incredible amount of energy is expended in planning and resources to make this happen Senior leaders, professional journals, and “experts”: “Change the culture” Guidance/directives to plan for change Proclamations made, superficial policies made, but beliefs, laws, regulations not changed Something less than planned achieved, if anything Maybe an Army not ready for the next real threat “Why”

17 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 17 What? More details, more questions?  To provide decision makers and their staffs: A thorough analyses A different prospective on leadership and how to create it A tool to quantify and understand overused statements seen on briefs:  “change culture”  “adaptive leaders”  “education, vice training”  In order to: Understand that of all the good things the Army is doing,  Leadership development and creation is the least understood  Leadership development must evolve  Leadership development is being restricted by out of date assumptions Recommend holistic reform of how the Army prepares future officers  Because if we don’t start honestly addressing these issues now, we (the Army and the country) will be in trouble in the future

18 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 18 What? Conclusion should lead to more questions?  Okay, we say what? but leads to other questions: Are willing to reexamine:  The concept of “officer”?  The force structure that demands so many officers?  Laws and policies that support a bloated top-heavy officer corps?  A culture that awards those that intelligently challenge the status quo? Are we willing not to  “make mission” to achieve quality?  Change Neo-Taylorism terms like “production,” “make mission,” and “checklists” in the way we evaluate?  Create the type of accessions system that will cater to, and continually challenge the types of people that fit these terms?

19 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 19 What Conclusion  The Army is good at defining “What”: Admits that our traditional view of war is out of date War and stability operations have merged, creating a need for:  A cadre of officers that must be able to deal with both  Begins the process toward creating the “strategic lieutenant” Revisits how we define (and conflict with) the concept of selfless service for the Army and the nation  We have to overcome myths when revising our education and training for cadets: ROTC (leadership development) cannot remain subordinate to the more traditional and accepted on-campus academic disciplines. Instead, it must: Begin exposing them to complex problem solving, cognitive development earlier Reform every institution that deals with some aspect of creating officers

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