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User-Driven Access Control Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern OSes Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno University of Washington Alexander Moshchuk,

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Presentation on theme: "User-Driven Access Control Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern OSes Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno University of Washington Alexander Moshchuk,"— Presentation transcript:

1 User-Driven Access Control Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern OSes Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno University of Washington Alexander Moshchuk, Bryan Parno, Helen J. Wang Microsoft Research Crispin Cowan Microsoft

2 Modern Client Platforms 2 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner iOS, Android, WP, Win8, browsers – Applications isolated from one another. – Limited global sharing. – Cannot access user-owned resources by default: Cross-application data Devices (camera, GPS, …) Resources (clipboard, autocomplete data) Problem: How should platforms grant applications access to user-owned resources? Challenge: Users are in the loop to grant permissions.

3 State of the Art 3 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Manifests (Android, Windows Phone) Prompts (iOS, browsers) Out of context: Checked at time of install, not time of use. Disruptive: In practice, only prompted at first use to avoid prompt-fatigue. Both are not least-privilege: Once granted permissions, apps can use them, even if not necessary for application functionality.

4 Permission Granting Goals 4 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner In context – Unlike manifests Non-disruptive – Unlike prompts Least privilege – Unlike manifests and prompts Let this application access my location now.

5 Outline Motivation and Setup User-Driven Access Control – via Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) Capturing Authentic User Intent Implementation Evaluation 5 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

6 User-Driven Access Control Observation: A user’s natural UI actions in the context of an application carry permission-granting semantics. See also EWS [SVNC ‘04], NitPicker [FH ‘05], CapDesk [M ‘06], Qubes, Polaris [SKYCM ’06], UIBAC [SE ‘08], BLADE [LYPL ‘10]. Challenge: How can the system understand generalized in-app permission-granting behaviors? 6 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

7 Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) 7 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Approach: Let the system control these UI elements (ACGs) to capture a user’s permission granting intent. Challenges: – How can system capture authentic user intent? – How to prevent disruption of application context? – Can this model support necessary app functionality? – …?

8 8 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Photo Editor App Camera ACG User’s ViewSystem’s View Kernel Camera Resource Monitor Policy: Which app can access camera in what fashion ACG Photo Editor App 1) User clicks on camera ACG 2) Take picture 3) Receive picture Isolation container

9 Design Challenges What are appropriate access semantics? How to accurately capture user intent? How can we support: – customized access control gadgets? – ACGs composing multiple resources? – shortcuts and gestures instead of visual gadgets? How can we generalize to application- controlled resource monitors? – e.g., Facebook contacts, Flickr photos 9 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

10 Access Semantics 10 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner One time: Session: Scheduled: Permanent: UI-coupled UI- decoupled Least privilege Permanent Access Few applications (5% of top 100 Android apps) legitimately require permanent access.

11 Outline Motivation and Setup User-Driven Access Control – via Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) Capturing Authentic User Intent Implementation Evaluation 11 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

12 Threats by Malicious Applications Manipulate access control gadget display – Directly or by strategic obstruction Clickjacking (trick users into clicking on ACG) – Visual or timing-based Programmatically click on ACG 12 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Requirements: 1. ACG  User: Authentic display of ACG to user. 2. User  ACG: Authentic user actions to ACG.

13 ACG  User: Display Integrity (1) Display isolation: Apps can’t set ACG’s pixels. (2) Complete visibility: ACGs are active only when completely visible. (3) Sufficient display duration: ACGs activate only after a reaction delay. (4) Limited customization by applications. 13 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner 73% of top Android apps need only limited customization.

14 User  ACG: Authentic Input (1) Input event isolation: – Input events dispatched only from user input devices to ACGs. (2) The kernel controls the cursor over ACGs. (3) Handling nested applications – e.g., iGoogle embeds ad which embeds camera ACG – Must grant permissions to correct application. 14 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

15 Outline Motivation and Setup User-Driven Access Control – via Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) Capturing Authentic User Intent Implementation Evaluation 15 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

16 Implementation Implemented as part of the ServiceOS system with 2500 lines of C# code. System support for: – Access control gadgets Resources: camera, GPS, clipboard, autocomplete Access semantics: one-time, session – ACG composition: camera+GPS – Input sequences: copy-and-paste, drag-and-drop – Nested applications – Content picking and application-specific ACGs ACGs in applications: browser and MS Word 16 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Our experience shows that the implementation effort is modest for both system developers and application developers.

17 Outline Motivation and Setup User-Driven Access Control – via Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) Capturing Authentic User Intent Implementation Evaluation 17 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner

18 18 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner X X Location access granted Social engineering risk: moderate (high effort/risk for attacker) Usability: high Least-privilege guarantees: high Discussion: Security Analysis Our User  ACG and ACG  User properties do not prevent applications from gaining unauthorized access by social engineering attacks.

19 19 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner Evaluation Highlights Vulnerability Study – User-driven access control addresses most published vulnerabilities related to resource access: 36 of 44 in Chrome (82%), and 25 of 26 in Firefox (96%). User Expectations – Based on survey showing Android screenshots, most users already believe (52% of 186) – and/or desire (68%) – that resource access follows the user-driven access control model.

20 Summary User-driven access control captures a user’s permission-granting intent from natural interactions with the system and applications. Access control gadgets enable user-driven permission granting. – In-context, non-disruptive, and least-privilege. ACGs match user expectations. 20 May 21, 2012 Franziska Roesner


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