Presentation on theme: "J.D.B. V. NORTH CAROLINA THREE YEARS ON: WHERE ARE YOU GOING, WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN? Eddie Ferrer,Tobie Smith,Randee Waldman, DC Lawyers for YouthLegal Aid."— Presentation transcript:
J.D.B. V. NORTH CAROLINA THREE YEARS ON: WHERE ARE YOU GOING, WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN? Eddie Ferrer,Tobie Smith,Randee Waldman, DC Lawyers for YouthLegal Aid Society ofBarton Juvenile Defender BirminghamClinic NJDC Leadership Summit October 24, 2014
Presentation Overview Topics covered in this presentation J.D.B. decision Subsequent custody analyses by lower courts Subsequent applications in other contexts Miranda waiver/invocation of rights Terry stops Voluntariness of consent to search or seizure Mens Rea & Culpability Sentencing & Jurisdiction Procedural Due Process Proposed applications
JDB: FACTS J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct (2011) 13 years old and in 7 th grade Removed from classroom and escorted by SRO to a closed- door conference room Questioned for at least 30 minutes without Miranda warnings and without an opportunity to call his grandmother Not informed that he was free to leave At first denied involvement Officer then told him about the possibility of detention and urged him to tell the truth After confession, officer advised of Miranda rights Charged with breaking and entering and larceny
JDB: HOLDING Custody involves two discrete inquiries: What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? Would a reasonable person felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? Custody analysis does not consider the subjective mental state of the suspect Age is not subjective – it is a fact with common sense implications Child’s age has a bearing on the Miranda analysis if the child’s age was known to the officer, or was objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.
JDB: LANGUAGE OBJECTIVITY OF AGE “[a] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go. We think it clear that courts can account for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis.” (2403) **Internal citations omitted for all quotes**
JDB: LANGUAGE AGE “The law has historically reflected the same assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them. Like this Court’s own generalizations, the legal disqualifications paced on children as a class... exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.” (2203-4)
JDB: LANGUAGE AGE “A child's age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ It is a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.’ Such conclusions apply broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge.” (2403)
JDB: LANGUAGE AGE “Time and again, this Court has drawn these commonsense conclusions for itself. We have observed that children generally are less mature and responsible than adults; that they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them; that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures than adults; and so on.” “Describing no one child in particular, these observations restate what ‘any parent knows’ – indeed, what any person knows – about children generally.” (2403)
JDB: LANGUAGE AGE “[o]fficers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult.” (2407)
JDB: LANGUAGE CUSTODY “By its very nature, custodial police interrogation entails inherently compelling pressures.” (2401) “[T]he pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.” (2401) “That risk is all the more troubling – and recent studies suggest, all the more acute – when the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.” (2401)
JDB: LANGUAGE SCHOOL SETTING “[t]he effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of the person questioned. A student – whose presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action – is in a far different position than, say, a parent volunteer on school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from the community on school grounds to attend a basketball game. Without asking whether the person ‘questioned in school’ is a ‘minor,’ the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting is unknowable.” (2405)
JDB: REMANDED “This is not to say that a child’s age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. It is, however, a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.” (2406) Case remanded to trial court to determine if J.D.B. was in custody, taking into account all relevant circumstances, including age No reported decisions on this outcome
THE BEST post-J.D.B. published “custody” decision N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852 (Ky. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 303 (U.S. 2013). WHY: 17-year-old Not “traditional arrest” circumstances Recognizes acquiescence to authority in school setting: “No reasonable student, even the vast majority of seventeen year olds, would have believed that he was at liberty to remain silent, or to leave....” “In Custody”
Other good post-J.D.B. “custody” decisions: United States v. IMM, 747 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2014). In re Edgar Z., 2014 WL (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2014) (unreported). In re F.F., 2013 WL (Cal. Ct. App. March 28, 2013) (unreported). In re J.S., 2012-Ohio-3534 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012) (unreported). In re T.W., 2012-Ohio-2361 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 2012) (unreported). In re Robert J., 2012 WL (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2012) (unreported). “In Custody” (Cont’d)
THE WORST post-J.D.B. published “custody” decision People v. N.A.S., 2014 WL (Colo. June 30, 2014). WHY: 13-year-old Brought involuntarily to assistant principal’s office Uniformed SRO, principal, assistant principal, and N.A.S.’s dad and uncle were present “In Custody” (Cont’d)
Other published post-J.D.B. decisions finding juveniles not in custody: Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 980 N.E.2d 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). State v. Jones, 55 A.3d 432 (Me. 2012). State v. Yancey, 727 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). C.S. v. Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Ind. 2011). State v. Pearson, 804 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2011). “In Custody” (Cont’d)
Age in Related Contexts Courts have extended J.D.B.’s “reasonable juvenile” standard to analogous issues Validity of waiver or invocation of Miranda rights Investigatory seizures (Terry stops)—would a reasonable juvenile feel free to leave? Voluntariness of consent to search or seizure
Miranda Waiver/Invocation Decision extending J.D.B. to assess validity of Miranda waiver AND finding no valid waiver: Boyd v. State, 726 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Other decisions citing J.D.B. in assessing validity of Miranda waiver or invocation: People v. Nelson, 266 P.3d 1008 (Cal. 2012). People v. N.A.S., 2014 WL (Colo. June 30, 2014).
Terry Stops Most decisions addressing J.D.B. in this context have held that age is a factor: Hunt v. Dept. of Safety and Homeland Sec., 69 A.3d 360 (Del. 2013) (holding that 8-y.o. student was seized). In re J.G., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). In re Michael S., 2012 WL (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2012) (unreported). As has an influential treatise: “Were the Supreme Court to resolve this issue, it is likely... the Court would conclude that this ‘reasonable person’ test requires consideration of... the suspect[’s]... youth” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a) (5th ed. 2014).
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that age should be a factor in assessing voluntariness of consent to a blood draw: “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw. If the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth's age... [is a] relevant... factor that courts should consider in assessing whether consent was voluntary....” State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (Ariz. 2013) (citing J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399, 2406). Voluntary Consent to Search/Seizure
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Notable Decisions 1. Mens Rea & Culpability 2. Sentencing & Jurisdiction 3. Procedural Due Process
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Mens Rea & Culpability Notable Decisions In re D.V., 2645 P.3d 803 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) B.B. v. Commonwealth, 2014 WL (Ky. Ct. App. May 16, 2014) In the Matter of the Welfare of J.E.M.,2012 WL (Minn.) People v. Juarez, 2011 WL (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2011) Sen v. State, 301 P.3d 106 (Wyo. 2013)
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Mens Rea & Culpability Favorable Utah: Juvenile who ran away from child-welfare placement cannot be held in contempt Juvenile did not understand the placement order so did not have the “necessary culpable mental state” to be found in contempt for violating the order Kentucky: Discusses (but does not rule) on the application of juvenile standard to defendant’s state of mind as applied to the legal concept of wantonness
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Mens Rea & Culpability Unfavorable Minnesota: Refuses to apply reasonable juvenile standard to the element of knowledge in a possession of a child pornography case Wyoming: Incapacity to form specific intent based on defendant’s age has no application in a criminal proceeding California: Refuses to apply reasonable juvenile standard, instead applies reasonable person standard to criminal culpability for homicide
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Sentencing & Jurisdiction Notable Decisions State v. Lyle, , 2014 WL (Iowa July 18, 2014) People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014) People v. Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) People v. Willis, 997 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013)
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Sentencing & Jurisdiction Mandatory Minimums Iowa Supreme Court: relies heavily on J.D.B. reasoning to find that ALL mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders violate the state Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Sentencing & Jurisdiction Juvenile Life Without Parole Lower courts producing mostly favorable decisions in juvenile LWOP cases, however courts focus on Miller and the 8th Amendment rather than on J.D.B. EXAMPLE: The California Supreme Court held unconstitutional the presumption in favor of LWOP for two 17-year-olds convicted of felony murder Courts must consider “all relevant evidence bearing on the ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ discussed in Miller and how those attributes ‘diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders” … “Miller require[s] [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Sentencing & Jurisdiction Mandatory Automatic Transfer: Illinois: rejected argument based on JDB, Roper, Graham, and Miller that mandatory adult jurisdiction over offenses by 15, 16, and 17-year olds constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Procedural Due Process Notable Decisions Gingerich v. State, 979 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) In re D.V., 2645 P.3d 803 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) People v. Perez, 12 N.E.3d 416 (N.Y. 2014) In re M.W., 978 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio 2012) State ex rel. A.W., 212 N.J. 114 (New Jersey 2012)
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Procedural Due Process FAVORABLE OUTCOMES 1.Juvenile deprived of due process by court’s denial of motion to continue waiver (transfer) hearing 12-year-old, 5’2”, and 80 lbs Citing to J.D.B. “The differences between juvenile and adult criminal offenders underscore the importance of protecting the due process rights of juveniles at waiver hearing” 2.Reversal of contempt finding against juvenile who ran away from child-welfare placement - no evidence that juvenile actually understood the placement order or the consequences of non-compliance The order “may be sufficient to put an adult on notice of what is expected. But applying such unclear terms to a child is problematic due to the child’s youth” Citing to J.D.B. “Children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them…children “generally are less mature and responsible than adults…they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them[.]”
Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Procedural Due Process UNFAVORABLE OUTCOMES…WITH FAVORABLE DISSENTS 1.14 th Amendment due process rights not violated when counsel was not appointed on appeal o Dissent: failure of 15-year-old to timely appeal should not bar appellate review Defendant believed lawyer would “handle things” Minors should not be expected to understand the appeals process on their own 2.No pre-indictment right to counsel for juvenile defendants o Dissent: Even if adults do not have pre-indictment right to counsel, juveniles should be guaranteed counsel in pre-indictment interrogation, based on J.D.B. and other authorities 3.Confession made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and officer’s interrogation techniques comported with highest standards of fundamental fairness and due process o Dissent: Case is a “textbook example of the use of interrogation techniques that have the clear capacity to produce a false confession from a juvenile.” Defendant was only 13 years old Officer participated in “suggestive interrogation techniques,” Juvenile’s parent left the room
JUSTIFICATION Duress Justified Use of Force (self defense, defense of others, defense of property) EXCUSE Manslaughter & “Adequate Provocation” FORESEEABILITY Negligent Homicide Felony Murder Applying J.D.B. in Other Contexts: Proposed Applications