Presentation on theme: "Does transparency make local governments more responsive? Evidence from the Philippines using difference-in-difference approach Joseph Capuno (University."— Presentation transcript:
Does transparency make local governments more responsive? Evidence from the Philippines using difference-in-difference approach Joseph Capuno (University of the Philippines) Maria Melody Garcia (University of Rome – Tor Vergata)
Objective The paper tests the proposition that transparency make local governments more responsive using data from a local governance project piloted in 12 municipalities/cities Specifically, we test if public information on local government performance would have a positive impact on public service delivery and assessed responsiveness of officials to the needs of their constituents
Related Literature The evidence is mixed regarding the responsiveness of local governments (LG) to local needs under decentralization Faguet (2004) found supporting evidence in Bolivia Lewis (2005) found in Indonesia that LGs are only partly responsive to local needs, and also partly captured by local elites Ahmad et al (2005) found mixed results
The Philippine experience under decentralization There have been proliferation of innovative local public services since 1991 when the Local Government Code was adopted (Capuno, 2007). There are also cases where middling leaders or corrupt ones further entrenched their hold to political power (Lacaba, 1995) Azfar et al (2001) found that local officials do not necessarily make use of their superior information in making fiscal decisions
The Good Governance and Local Development Project Aimed to develop and advocate the institutionalization of a set of indicators of good governance - the Governance for Local Development Index (GI) GI was piloted for two years (2001-2002) in 12 municipalities/cities of the provinces of Bulacan and Davao del Norte The pilot test was conducted to investigated the impact of public dissemination of local government performance on the citizens’ perceived responsiveness of local officials
Pilot Areas and Local Partners Relative Levels of Development BulacanDavao del Norte Treatment AreasControl AreasTreatment AreasControl Areas LGU Partner Civil Society Partner Civil Society Partner LGU Partner Civil Society Partner Civil Society Partner High San Jose del Monte City (City Planning and Development Office) Baliwag (Soropti-mist Internatio-nal of Baliwag) Plaridel (Bulacan State University- Bustos Campus*, Rotary Club of Bustos**) Panabo City (City Planning and Develop- ment Office) Sto. Tomas (Davao Provinces Rural Develop-ment Institute, Inc.) Tagum City (St. Mary’s College-Tagum City*, University of Southeastern Philippines**) Low Guiguinto (Municipal Planning and Development Office) Angat (Rotary Club of Angat) Bustos (Bulacan State University- Bustos Campus*, Rotary Club of Bustos**) Braulio E. Dujali (Municipal Planning and Development Office) Island Garden City of Samal (LAWIG Foundation) Asuncion (PhilNet-Rural Development Institute*, University of Southeastern Philippines**)
The Governance for Local Development Index (GI) Public Service NeedsExpenditure Prioritization Participatory Development
The GI Scores Ranges from 0 to 100 The scores were not announced in the control sites The scores were announced in the treatment sites through posters, stickers, magazines The scores were also presented by the local partners in public forums for at least three times and an extra forum was held exclusively for local officials The public dissemination of the assessed performance of LGs is expected to influence the behavior of the local officials and their constituents
The Data Three rounds of random household surveys Same sampling design and instrument 100 household respondents per municipality Sampling weights were used Baseline survey Apr-May 2001 Pilot period 1 Feb-Mar 2002 Pilot period 2 Feb-Mar 2003 First round of GI scores Jun-Aug 2001 Second round of GI scores Mar-Sep 2002
Demographic characteristics Variables BaselinePilot period 1Pilot period 2 Mean Control Mean Treatme nt p- value Mean Control Mean Treatme nt p- value Mean Control Mean Treatme ntp-value Total Other index0.4460.5000.0810.4550.3440.0000.2560.1990.0260.360 Age40.39041.3610.22641.75141.9490.83643.31542.4920.38241.895 Income(ln)8.6578.6960.4868.7128.5870.0498.7108.5020.0008.628 College0.3020.2920.7110.2210.2480.3020.2380.2480.7030.260 Electric bill488.39458.110.404411.24478.230.185452.43467.700.653462.29 Regular job0.5260.5120.6400.6160.6290.6480.6010.5320.0260.566 Government employee0.0630.0640.9640.0620.0640.8930.0690.0610.5980.064 Owner0.7530.7450.7730.5510.6010.1060.7110.6780.2500.674 Married0.8340.8010.1770.7950.7780.5130.7900.8000.6980.798 Household head0.3350.3540.5470.4680.4190.1190.4090.3600.1000.386 Spouse0.5420.5090.2980.3820.3980.5930.4550.4810.4150.462 Family size5.3075.2000.4625.0425.1270.5345.1975.3420.2935.210 Male0.3170.2960.4490.2780.3250.1070.2970.3060.7310.305 Re-elected Mayor0.5010.8700.0000.4940.8860.0000.5010.8860.0000.751 High income barangay0.7980.6760.0000.8000.6790.0000.7980.6790.0000.719 No. of observations397754 385761 391770 3458
Evaluation framework DiD – differences in responsiveness of LG before and after the introduction of the index in the control site is calculated, and then subtracted from the differences in the responsiveness of the LG officials before and after the introduction of the index in the treatment sites
Desirable changes in the delivery of public service Desirable changesCoefficientZ-statistic Treatment x Pilot period 10.222***4.341 Treatment x Pilot period 20.101**2.392 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.148***3.419 Desirable changesCSO/NGO partnersLGU partners CoefficientZ-statisticCoefficientZ-statistic Treatment x Pilot period 10.115**2.1080.285***3.092 Treatment x Pilot period 2 0.056 1.1570.133**2.369 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.0551.0980.198***3.74 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Mayor’s responsiveness to complaints Mayor's responsiveness to complaintsCoefficientZ-statistic Treatment x Pilot period 10.111**2.201 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.07-1.424 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.0290.67 Mayor's responsiveness to complaintsCSO/NGO partnersLGU partners CoefficientZ-statisticCoefficientZ-statistic Treatment x Pilot period 10.0020.0330.182**2.326 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.205***-3.6490.0380.668 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.089**-1.9020.115**2.232 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Responsiveness of local officials CoefficientZ-statistic Mayor Treatment x Pilot period 10.0330.661 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.098**-2.067 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.026-0.611 Vice Mayor Treatment x Pilot period 10.0370.859 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.002-0.045 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.0140.339 Municipal councilors Treatment x Pilot period 10.0591.298 Treatment x Pilot period 2 -0.046 -0.978 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.0080.189 Barangay councilors Treatment x Pilot period 10.174***3.488 Treatment x Pilot period 20.071.361 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.129***3.108 Barangay captain Treatment x Pilot period 10.113**2.345 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.011-0.303 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.061.532 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Responsiveness of officials Responsiveness of local officialsCSO/NGO partnersLGU partners CoefficientZ-statisticCoefficientZ-statistic Mayor Treatment x Pilot period 1-0.066-1.2210.106*1.472 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.170***-3.018-0.004-0.1 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.115**-2.4260.0480.915 Vice Mayor Treatment x Pilot period 1-0.008-0.1470.081.263 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.05-0.9040.0661.195 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.032-0.6640.0460.912 Municipal councilors Treatment x Pilot period 1-0.004-0.080.126*1.908 Treatment x Pilot period 2 -0.071 -1.3030.0290.544 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.038-0.7870.0480.94 Barangay councilors Treatment x Pilot period 10.0651.3040.258***2.969 Treatment x Pilot period 20.0190.4630.198***3.444 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 20.0350.870.200***3.827 Barangay captain Treatment x Pilot period 10.0090.1750.171*1.847 Treatment x Pilot period 2-0.049-1.0990.11.956 Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2-0.017-0.4340.112**2.333 *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Conclusion (1) Overall, the result shows that the index has increased the probability of improving delivery of public service. Mayor’s responsiveness to complaints appeared short-lived The effect of the index on local officials’ probability of being responsive is mixed. Municipal officials tend to be less responsive than their village counterpart.
Conclusion (2) Impact of index on improved public service delivery is strongest if disseminated by LGs Positive effect on responsiveness if the LGs made the announcement and negative effects if the announcement is made by CSO/NGOs. The effectiveness of the index may depend on the characteristic of the local partner.
Implications in the design of performance rating systems An effective accountability mechanism is a performance benchmarking system Rating or assessment matters. Has to be simple to be understood by an average resident Designating the announcement of scores to local NGO/CSO should be proceeded with care The presence of a neutral body can help lend credibility if scores are generated by LGs Perhaps the best solution in carrying out a local scorecard would be a partnership between LG units and CSO/NGO.