Presentation on theme: "Space Countermeasures Hands On Program (CHOP) Capt Mark W. Marasch Chief, Space CHOP Space Vehicles Directorate Air Force Research Laboratory."— Presentation transcript:
Space Countermeasures Hands On Program (CHOP) Capt Mark W. Marasch Chief, Space CHOP Space Vehicles Directorate Air Force Research Laboratory
2 Where We Have Been: Space CHOP AFSPC Contacts 26 Jan 01 Col Tom Fitzgerald, SMC/AX & Lt Col Clay, SMC/MT 9 Jan 01 Maj Gaines, DRCC & LtCol Moss, DOYD 13 Nov 00 Col Roberts,DRC 22 Sept 00 Lt Gen Dekok, CV & BGen Hamel, DR 10 Aug 00 BGen Hamel, DR 3 May 00 SWC/DOG / Air, Space & Aggressor Symposium 23 Feb 00 Col Ryals, SWC/CV
3 What is Space CHOP? Definition of Countermeasure From Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (www.m- w.com) : coun·ter·mea·sure Pronunciation: -"me-zh&r, -"mA- Function: noun Date: 1923 : an action or device designed to negate or offset another; especially : a military system or device intended to thwart a sensing mechanism (as radar) www.m- w.com Space CHOP uses the broadest definition Space CHOP is named and modeled after BMDO CHOP (now called HARDFAC) The term CHOP implies the “bad guy” element
4 What is Space CHOP? Why We Exist Our purpose is nicely stated in the Rumsfeld Space Commission Report (Jan 2001): “If the US is to avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbor,’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on US space systems.” “Those hostile to the US can acquire on the global market the means to deny, disrupt or destroy US space systems by attacking satellites in space, communication links to and from the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and process their data.”
5 What is Space CHOP? Mission To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by: – Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development, – Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge
6 What is Space CHOP? Why We are Unique To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by: – Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development, – Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge Identification--we focus on the unknown threat Space Systems--we do not duplicate BMDO CHOP Open Source--have no access to classified system information, and use COTS hardware Hardware Development--not typically involved in excercises Limited System Knowledge--teams are calibrated
7 What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 1 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Unknown *Proportions are not necessarily equal.
8 What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 2 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Unknown Secrets
9 What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 3 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Private Unknown First-World Assessments Blind = DANGER
10 What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 4 Known to Owner Unknown to Owner Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Private Unknown First-World Assessments Blind = DANGER Space CHOP Vulnerability Assessments & Hardware
11 What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari RESULT Unknown by Others Known by Others Public Blind Private Un-known
12 How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation Built on BMDO CHOP’s successful history & methods Rapid prototyping of less-than-peer Rest Of World (ROW) hardware – Fast response – Strict ROW simulation Referee team monitors the team’s activities Small, custom-built teams (CGOs and junior DoD civilians) – Perform studies, design, and build hardware How vulnerable is this ground station?
13 Streamlined acquisition process All missions are funded by the customer – Space CHOP does not receive AFRL/VS funds Wide potential customer base--all space-dependent organizations and systems are potentially vulnerable – AFSPC, USSPACECOM, NRO, AFRL, SMC, NASA... – Commercial and allied governments’ assets How Space CHOP Does Business: Space CHOP Operation
14 How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Architecture S CHOP Manager S CHOP Advisor CHOP Team CHOP Core MISSION TEAM (ROW SIMULATION) Space CHOP MANAGEMENT Referee Team CUSTOMER = Customer/ US Asset = Briefed Mission Control Team = Non-briefed Mission Execution Team Defines the mission Provides funding Populates Referee Team Custodian of final results Recognized experts that focus the team Customer representatives Technical Experts Others as required Guides each Red Team “Stewards” customer’s funds Provides infrastructure Red team ROW simulation Researches the mission Develops solutions Builds Hardware
15 How Space CHOP Does Business: Potential Targets Abstract Direct Bomb Attack Cyber Attack Directed Energy RF Jamming Threat Spectrum
16 How Space CHOP Does Business: Mission Flow Start Freewheeling Mission Open Source Research General Vulnerability Analysis Concentration on Specific Vulnerabilities Threat Plan, Design, Cost Estimate Fabrication Team Testing 1st World Testing Start Directed Mission End Customer End Customer End
17 Benefits to Space CHOP Team Members Develop Understanding of System and Mission Understand Enemy Thought Processes – See Vulnerabilities of Our Own Systems – Understand What Information to Protect Hands-On Experience Fun and Satisfying Who we can use: – Junior Military and Civilian With Technical Degrees – Properly Calibrated--Must NOT Know Too Much! – Permanent Party and Borrowed – Hardware-Oriented People With Initiative
18 Mission History Since July 99 SCM-1 Threat-Representative RF Noise Source AFSPC/SWC Completed Fall 99 SCM-3 GPS Data Collection Mission AFSPC/CN Completed Jan 00 SCM-4 Theater Events System Vulnerability Study USSPACE J33 Completed Dec 00 SCM-5 Satellite Emulator AFRL, SMC Completed Dec 00 SCM-6 Sensitive Mission AFRL/VS In Progress
19 Summary Facilities are in place The Core Team is in place Security procedures are in place to protect the results Ready for business
20 Points of Contact Captain Mark W. Marasch, USAF DSN 246-7547, Comm (505) 846-7547 email@example.com Mr. John Holbrook, USAF DSN 246-2875, Comm (505) 846-2875 firstname.lastname@example.org
21 Example Mission: Donutsat Freewheeling Mission: Attack the morale and effectiveness of US law enforcement agencies by disabling the Donutsat System. Team is simulating a terrorist threat.
22 Example Mission: Donutsat Team analyzes entire Donutsat system using open- source materials.
23 Example Mission: Donutsat The team identifies vulnerabilities of the system, and proposes threats. SUGAR VIRUS
24 Example Mission: Donutsat The customer asks the team to do a detailed design of a donut decoy. The team designs, builds, and tests this device. The customer takes delivery of this device, and does their own testing to determine its effectiveness. The customer chooses whether or not to share this data with other organizations using this system. – Local Police – County Sheriff – State Patrol – FBI