Presentation on theme: "Prevention and Control of Cross Country Natural Gas pipeline Emergencies 04 th December’2009."— Presentation transcript:
Prevention and Control of Cross Country Natural Gas pipeline Emergencies 04 th December’2009
2 Pipeline Transportation The increasing demand of Natural Gas and the distance between the source and the consumers point necessitated the transportation of NG through Pipelines. Pipelines specially underground are the Safest and Most Reliable, Economical and Eco -friendly Mode of Product Transportation. Unlike Other Business/ Industrial activities, Pipeline Transpiration also has Risk. Pipeline Incidents are Low Frequency and High Consequence in Terms of Cost.
3 Hazards of Natural Gas Fire Hazards – Jet Fire – Flash Fire – Pool Fire Explosion – Vapor Cloud Explosion / Delayed explosion Toxicity – Comparatively less toxic
4 Transco Pipeline Incident 14 th Sept’08 At 7.44 am on 14 th September’ 2008 TPL line-B failed at MP near town of Appomattox, Virginia State and was reported to National Response Centre.
5 Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008 Gas cloud ignited producing a large fireball and resulting in a 37’ wide, 15’ deep crater and a burn zone of 1125 ‘ in diameter. 30’ section of pipe was blown out. No damage to adjacent lines.
6 Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008 Appomattox Fire Dept, Virginia State Police responded
7 Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008
8 23 family evacuated, 5 injured, 2 houses burnt.
9 Transco Pipeline Incident 14 th Sept, 08 TPL is a n interstate gas P/L system that extends from Gulf of Mexico to New York and it passes through Verginia having two compressor stations (Reidville Cs at MP 1369 & Ellicott at MP Three lines, A,B & C, laid parallel to each other with 20’ distance apart. – Line A: 30” dia, Grade-X52, Coal tar enamel coated, 1950 – Line B: 30” dia, X52 Grade, Asphalt enamel coated, 1955 – Line C: 36” dia, X52 Grade, Asphalt enamel coated, 1962 – MAOP : 800 psi, Actual pressure: 799 psi
10 Hazards of Natural Gas All lines had a common corrosion system with rectifier connected to all three lines. Explosion Close internal electrical survey was performed in Action taken were unknown. Line B & C were internally inspected in 2008 with a high resolution magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool and deformation tool. This led to replacement of 200 ft section of Line C. PSP at blast location was low. Readings taken in 2006 indicated PSP remained low.
12 Details of the Pipeline Pipeline: Natural Gas Pipeline Number:2 Owner: Fluxys (network manager) Route: Zeebrugge - Blaregnies Diameter: 39” (1000 mm) Pressure in the pipeline: 80 bar Size of the opening: Guillotine break
13 What went wrong? Pipeline undergoing maintenance (pressure from 80 to 50 bar); Work on site (levelling the ground using excavator/ spreder); Reduced cover above the pipe; Pipe damaged during work (75% reduced wall thickness); 30 July 2004 pipe back in use. (pressure from 50 to 80 bar); At 8:45 smell of gas reported; 9:00 fire on site and pipe splits open; 9:01 Explosion!!!!
14 Victims 24 dead including 5 firemen and 1 policeman. 132 injured of which 25 with life-threatening burns Chief inspector Stéphane Delfosse of Ath police force was the only person to survive the zero perimeter. He was standing 15 metres from the leak when the pipeline failed under the high pressure. Why were there so many victims? No central direction!
15 Victims People ran towards the leaking pipe instead of keeping a safe distance. He owes his life to a driver who took him to the hospital in Ath, and the doctor at the hospital who immediately transferred him to Neder-Over-Heembeek. He was in a coma for 4 months, and suffered 3rd degree burns over 50% of his body. He has already undergone 25 operations …
16 A cloud of gas 9:00 AM 9:01AM Photo taken approx. 15 km from Gellingen Photos taken from a distance of approx. 9 km At approx. 1 min intervals
17 Max. height 450m Av. height 250m Other observations - a sea of flames
18 Details of the action plan The action plan indicates that if there is a fire as a consequence of a guillotine break in a gas pipeline with a diameter of 1000 mm, the following zones are assigned: Zone 1 (10 kW/m 2 after 30 secs): 210 m Zone 2 ( 3 kW/m 2 after 30 secs): 710 m Zone 3: 1000 m
19 Heat radiation 1 kW/m² : Sun (warm summer day) 3 kW/m² : 10 s = pain threshold (unprotected skin), an individual (without protection) is still just able to get away from the seat of the fire in these 10 s 5 kW/m² : 5 s = pain threshold (unprotected skin) minutes = 2nd and 3rd degree burns 8 kW/m² : 0.1 % chance of death after 20 s 10 kW/m² 1% chance of death after 20 s cooling of installations to prevent collapse secondary burns after minutes of exposure
20 Crater 190 m 240 m 210 m Zone heavily affected by the heat = House burning distance Verification
21 approx. 160 m from crater Observations: Damage from heat radiation
22 Along the road Approx. 210 m from crater Dried leaves Observations: Damage from heat radiation
23 Crater Wood ignited approx. 130 m from crater Following slide : inside the building Observations: Damage from heat radiation
24 Details of the action plan The action plan indicates that if there is a fire as a consequence of a guillotine break in a gas pipeline with a diameter of 1000 mm, a sound level of 90 dbA will extend 250 metres. Observation: the sound exceeded the pain threshold!
25 View of the crater. app. 14 m app. 4 m The explosion
26 The section of pipeline was found approx. 155 m from the crater. The explosion
Damage caused by the explosion
28 Causes of Pipeline Incidents Third Party (Instantaneous, Previously Damaged Pipe & Vandalism) Corrosion (External & Internal) Incorrect Operations Material and Construction Defects Weather (Heavy Rain/ Flood and Lightning) Weld/ Fabrication (Defective Pipe Girt & Fabrication Weld) Natural Calamities (Earthquakes) Environment (Stress Corrosion Cracking)
30 Pipeline Integrity Management Program Detection and Prevention of Threats to Enhance Pipeline Integrity: Third Party Damage – One Call System – Increased Cover Depth – Increased Line Markers – Hazard Protection – Marker Tape at Top of Pipe – Increased Patrol Frequency (Line Walk & Aerial) – Public Awareness / Education – Reward for Report of Encroachment – Liaison with Local Development Authorities – Leak and Soil survey
31 Pipeline Integrity Management Program Corrosion - External – In-Line Inspection (ILI) and Rehabilitation Program* – Direct Current Voltage Gradient (DCVG) Survey – CP Coverage & Reading Analysis – Bell Hole / Visual Inspection – Soil Corrosivity Inspection – Buried Coupon Monitoring Corrosion - Internal – In-line Inspection – Impurities /Moisture Reduction – Biocide Inspection – Inhibitor Injection – Internal Coupon Monitoring – Cleaning Pig Run
32 Pipeline Integrity Management Program Construction and Material Failure – Pipe Manufacturing Inspection – Pipe Loading and Transportation Inspection – Construction Activity Inspection Incorrect Operations – Pressure Relief Design – SOP for Normal, Abnormal and Emergency – Operators Qualification Test Fatigue Analysis and Monitoring program Management of Change Process Periodic Pipeline Integrity and Safety Audits Incident Investigation & Corrective Action Tracking Risk Assessment based on Population Density Index
33 Categorization of Emergencies Emergency Organization Emergency Notification Matrix Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) First Responders Kit Liaison with Local Fire Services, Hospitals, Police etc Emergency Drills Training and Rehearsal Dealing with Press/Media Siren Code Evacuation Plan Assembly Points & Emergency Control Centre. EWPL ERDM Preparedness
34 EWPL Level of Emergencies
35 First Person at site Notification of incident Pipeline Operation Centre (POC) in Command Emergency under control POC to initiate Level-1 Notification by informing Level-1 team members Emergency Under control No POC to intimate to all concerned Emergency Escalates to Level - 2 Emergency Terminated Yes EMT Leader activates ECC at RCP, Mumbai Yes No Emergency Response Team (ERT) to site Incident leading to emergency Emergency Escalates to Level - 3 EMT Leader informs CMT Leader Mumbai and POC CMT Activated Incident handling at site by ERT & ERT Leader ERT Leader informs POC/ EMT Leader POC initiates Level-2 Emergency Notification Emergency Escalation
36 EWPL Emergency Notification/Communication Matrix Input from emergency site through F & G, SCADA, Manual Call Point, One-call number, Telephone, Public, Reliance Mitra etc Pipeline Operation Centre Shift Engg. ERT Leader & Lead Operations Head- Field O&M Head- HSEF OT Control Room Head- POC Security Operation Centre Emergency Response Team State Security Manager Sec. Guard & Reliance Mitra Head- ROU Land Owners/ Stake holders District Authorities Mutual Aid Industries POC Emergency Mgmt Team Members Crisis Mgmt Team (PMSP/RKD/JSY) Informed by EMT Leader LEVEL-1LEVEL-1 EMT Leader Fire / Police / Hospitals LEVEL-2LEVEL-2 LE V EL -3
37 EWPL Emergency Organization EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM LEADER (Area / RHQ Manager) Security Staff on duty Lead- Ops Lead-Elec Lead- Inst IT Lead Gate Security Lead- Mechanica l Exec. Inst. Medical Services & Ambulance Fire Brigade Services Police Services Affected Stake Holders (land Owners) and Govt. Authorities Off-Site Incident Commander (District Magistrate) First Responder/ Reliance Mitra Rescue & First Aid Team Auxiliary Fire Team Operations Team Communicatio n Team Contract Workers Emergen cy Mgmt Team Crisis Mgmt Team State Security Manager Head-ROU Note: Level I Level II Level III
38 Organizational Focus - Standards and Code of Practices Statutory and Regulatory Compliances Surveillance (Aerial and Line Walk Patrolling) Integrity and Reliability of Pipeline Compliance to HSE Requirements Periodic Audits Emergency Response & Disaster Management Readiness. Monitoring Process Summary