Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Michael Schearer (“theprez98”)

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Michael Schearer (“theprez98”)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Michael Schearer (“theprez98”)
presents A Hacker in Iraq Michael Schearer (“theprez98”) Opening title slide

2 Plan of Attack Introduction Disclaimers My Background
Why is the Navy in Iraq? IEDs Composition, Typology, Counter-IED Strategy The Future Plan of Attack—what I hope to accomplish Introduction—OPSEC, challenges and limitations Disclaimers My background—why I am here Why is the Navy in Iraq?—why was I in Iraq The main portion of the brief—the Improvised Explosive Device—makeup, typology, and strategies to reduce and eliminate them Prospects for the future

3 Introduction Operational Security (OPSEC) Challenges and Limitations
Operational Security—unclassified information can be assembled to reveal important details…the importance of protecting sensitive but unclassified info. Challenges and limitations--this speech is narrowly tailored such that a conference attendee can walk out of the room thinking “Wow, that was cool!” while an insurgent could see the same information and think “we didn’t learn anything here we didn’t already know”.

4 Disclaimers This presentation is UNCLASSIFIED. On some issues I may be able to speak in generalities but not specifics. Nothing in this presentation is classified or “For Official Use Only,” nor does it contain information regarding incidents under ongoing investigation or any information protected by the Privacy Act. These disclaimers are necessary because of my ongoing role as an active duty Naval Officer and the requirements of OPSEC.

5 Disclaimers This presentation complies with DOD Directives , , and All images, videos and/or media within this presentation were obtained from open sources using unclassified search terms. I am not here as a representative of the U.S. government or U.S. Navy. I am not here to be “for” or “against” the war. Please leave your politics at the door! DOD Directive is “Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release.” DOD Directive is “DOD Freedom of Information Act.” DOD Directive is “Standards of Conduct.”

6 My Background Active Duty, U.S. Navy Lieutenant (O-3)
EA-6B Prowler Electronic Countermeasures Officer (Naval Flight Officer) Licensed Extra Class Amateur Radio Operator (N3WI) Church of Wifi Forums Administrator “Regular” on DEFCON and NetStumbler forums A little bit about myself… Also, NROTC instructor at Penn State NROTC and IT responsibilities at Penn State

7 This is what I used to do…

8 This is what I did in Iraq. And yes, I visited the pool at the U. S
This is what I did in Iraq. And yes, I visited the pool at the U.S. Embassy!

9 Why is the Navy in Iraq? Threat from Improvised Explosive Devices +
Army asked for help + Indigenous Navy electronic warfare capability Simple math. The threat was there, the Army asked for help, and the Navy answered the call. The result was JCCS-1 (Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE). CREW is an acronym for Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare. RCIED is an acronym for Radio-Controlled Improved Explosive Device. The military LOVES acronyms so much they embedded three of them in one word! = JCCS-1

10 Improvised Explosive Devices
“The majority of insurgent attacks come in the form of IEDs targetting Iraqi and Coalition convoys and patrols. Most IEDs are made from leftover munitions and foreign explosive materials which are often hastily put together. Vehicle borne IEDs, VBIEDs, are devices that use a vehicle as the package or container of the device. These IEDs come in all shapes and sizes, from small sedans to large cargo trucks. There have even been instances of what appeared to be generators, donkey-drawn cards, and ambulances used to attempt attacks on Coalition forces and the new Iraqi government.”1 “Car bombs and IEDs are responsible for about 65 percent of the coalition casualties in Iraq” (ret Gen Meigs/JIEDDO) 1http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=727&Itemid=44

11 Letter to Admiral Mullen (Chief of Naval Operations) to LG Chiarelli, CG of MNC-I.
Published into the public domain on the JCCS-1 homepage 2http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil/campvictory/

12 The Electronic Warfare Mission
“Suppress the RCIED threat to Coalition Forces and reduce casualties through enhanced electronic warfare coordination and JCREW operations, training and readiness.”3 Mission statement of JCCS-1 according to the JCCS-1 homepage 3http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil/campvictory/

13 Improvised Explosive Devices
What makes up an IED? Initiator Detonator Explosive charge Three basic components of the IED

14 4MNC-I Public Affairs Office; reprinted at
Initiators Command-wire (CWIED) Victim-operated (VOIED) Vehicle-borne (VBIED) Radio-controlled (RCIED) MNC-I Public Affairs remarked that these were the most common form of IEDs encountered by coalition forces in Iraq. 4MNC-I Public Affairs Office; reprinted at also

15 RC Initiators Common radio controlled initiators: Standard key fob (cheap and easy to obtain); FRS radios, Long Range Cordless Telephones, Cell Phones

16 Detonators Det cord, various types of fuses, Blasting caps, more det cord

17 Explosive charges Artillery shells, mortar shells, unexploded ordnance, anti-tank mines, also homemade explosives (not pictured)

18 Attacking the IED Problem
Eliminate source materials Eliminate the IED network A multi-step problem that requires attention to each level. Eliminating source materials “Just getting at the source of the explosives is part of the problem,” he said, “then the factories where they're built, and the individuals who build them, and then the individuals who deliver them, and then the individuals who put them in place. So we go after the entire chain of events.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. Peter Pace; The military’s IED defeat strategy is focused on defeating the entire IED system, the insurgent network of bomb suppliers and makers, and the insurgents that emplace the devices. Taking down these networks requires precise, primarily human, intelligence. Eliminate bomb emplacers Prevent detonation Protect against explosion

19 Eliminating Source Materials: Initiators
Initiators have become dual-use technologies Designed for non-military purposes Exploited as initiation devices for IEDs Plentiful supply Virtually impossible to track Required for basic governmental functions Initiators as a whole are plentiful in number, virtually impossible to track, and (in the case of cell phones) necessary for the basic functions of government. It is virtually impossible to control or eliminate them as a source material.

20 Eliminating Source Materials: Initiators
Iraqi landline network virtually non-existent Extremely costly to rebuild ($1+ billion) Cell networks began installation Iraqi cell phone providers (GSM 900) Iraqna, Asia Cell, Atheer, Korek, SanaTel 2004: 1.4 million subscribers 2006: 7.1+ million subscribers Iraqi landline system virtually destroyed by 1991 Gulf War Extremely costly to rebuild ($1+ billion) Cell networks began installation 2003/2004 Subscribers: 1.4 million (2004) now 7.1 million (2006) Total population 26.8 million (2006) Iraqna revenues $333 million (2005) $520 million (2006)

21 IRAQNA COVERAGE MAP IRAQNA coverage map

22 ASIA CELL COVERAGE MAP ASIA CELL coverage map

23 Eliminating Source Materials: Detonators
Detonators are also dual-use technologies Legitimate uses particularly in construction (especially given the massive rebuilding effort) Exploited as initiation devices for IEDs Plentiful supply Virtually impossible to track As with initiators, detonators are plentiful in number, virtually impossible to track, and often used for legitimate purposes. It is extremely difficult to control or eliminate them as a source material.

24 Eliminating Source Materials: Explosive charges
Huge caches of unused ordnance left over from the Iran-Iraq War ( ) and Gulf War (1991) Artillery shells, mortar shells, unexploded ordnance Focus on WMD and major conventional weapons systems Plentiful supply Virtually impossible to track The focus on WMD and transfers of major conventional weapons systems meant that huge caches of ordnance were virtually ignored; this is now the primary supply of explosives for IEDs.

25 Attacking the IED Problem
Eliminate source materials Eliminate the IED network A multi-step problem that requires attention to each level. Eliminate the IED network Eliminate bomb emplacers Prevent detonation Protect against explosion

26 Eliminating the IED Network
Locate and eliminate the financiers and support structure behind IED-making cells5 JIEDDO Budget for “offensive operations” grown from 13% in FY06 to 31% in FY076 Notice how the budget for “offensive operations” is increasing The number of tips reported to coalition forces is increasing steadily 5http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3901 6http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3275

27 Eliminating the IED Network: CEXC
Combined Coalition Explosives IEDs Exploitation Forensic investigation and hardware hacking Cell Group Otherwise known as CSI: Bahgdad

28 Eliminating the IED Network: CEXC
“CEXC provides technical and operational analysis of the improvised bombs the insurgents have used against coalition forces, and develops measures to counter the bombing campaign.”7 CEXC is in theater… 7http://www.washtimes.com/national/ r.htm

29 Eliminating the IED Network: TEDAC
The U.S. Government explosives community, including the FBI, the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, collectively formed the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (“TEDAC”). Located at the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, the TEDAC acts as a single inter­agency focal point to coordinate and manage the unified effort of law enforcement, intelligence and military assets as it relates to terrorist IEDs, and to technically and forensically exploit all IEDs …8 TEDAC is stateside. 8http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/motion_dna.pdf; see also

30 Attacking the IED Problem
Eliminate source materials Eliminate the IED network A multi-step problem that requires attention to each level. Eliminate bomb emplacers Eliminate bomb emplacers Prevent detonation Protect against explosion

31 Eliminate Bomb Emplacers
Emplaces IED at target location May or may not be part of the IED network May or may not arm/initiate the device May be involved in video-taping the incident Eliminating bomb emplacers: Tips Community pressure $$$ The number of attacks is going up because the opportunity is there. “It’s very easy for a young, unemployed, angry male to collect $300 for setting out an IED and (video)taping it,” Meigs said. “There’s a lot of money on the street, so market factors also play a part.”

32 Attacking the IED Problem
Eliminate source materials Eliminate the IED network A multi-step problem that requires attention to each level. Prevent detonation Eliminate bomb emplacers Prevent detonation Protect against explosion

33 Prevent Detonation My primary job in Iraq
“Suppress the RCIED threat to Coalition Forces and reduce casualties through enhanced electronic warfare coordination and JCREW operations, training and readiness.”9 Jammers Airborne, Vehicle-mounted, Dismounted Different models/manufacturers Different capabilities That’s all I have to say about that… Consider the limitations of a Humvee: 24VDC battery, 60+ amps (depending upon modifications) 9http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil/campvictory/

34 Attacking the IED Problem
Eliminate source materials Eliminate the IED network A multi-step problem that requires attention to each level. Protect against explosion Eliminate bomb emplacers Prevent detonation Protect against explosion

35 Protect Against Explosion
Armor protection: It’s not really just about “more” HHS/brittle/spalling RHA/spall protection The solution is not as easy as adding more armor. Spalling video Consider effects of small arms fire vs. IEDs on armor (High Hard Steel and Rolled Homogeneous Armor)

36 Protect Against Explosion
More armor means more weight Decreases maneuverability/speed Increases rollover potential (higher COG) Increases maintenance on engines and transmissions Underbody vs. sides V-shaped hulls Limitations of more armor Effects of explosions on underbody vs. sides (especially M1114) Role of vehicles with V-shaped hulls and the effects of explosions on such hulls

37 The Future Detection of IEDs using unintentional radiated emissions10
Explosive resistant coating to add protection without adding significant weight11 “Local Eyes” sensor network12 Detection of IEDs using unintentional radiated emissions being done at University of Missouri-Rolla “Local Eyes” uses existing cell infrastructure and people (basically informants) to collect intel 10http://web.umr.edu/~daryl/IEDs/ 11http://www.ara.com/whatnew/lead/dragonshield/explosive%20resistant%20coating.htm 12http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/December/ResearchersTout.htm

38 The Future Hyperspectral sensors13
Answers to the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) The Aurora Generation IV hyperspectral sensor, manufactured by BAE Systems, can be placed on a Shadow UAV. The sensor searches for disturbed earth, changes in vegetation or potholes, where roadside bombs have been hidden. The Shadow would have to fly over an area more than once to make comparisons, he said. More on EFPs (click…) 13http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/December/ResearchersTout.htm

39 Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)
Misznay-Schardin effect All you ever wanted to know about EFPs…

40 Acknowledgements See Also
The Shmoo Group/Shmoocon Staff The Church of Wifi My Family See Also I’d like to thank… WPA hash tables DEFCON Wireless Village

41 Questions? I’d be happy to answer any of your questions…

42 Michael Schearer (“theprez98”)
presents A Hacker in Iraq Michael Schearer (“theprez98”) THANKS!


Download ppt "Michael Schearer (“theprez98”)"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google