Presentation on theme: "Fukushima Regulatory Impacts"— Presentation transcript:
1Fukushima Regulatory Impacts NRC Region I Spring SeminarMay 13, 2014Dave LochbaumDirector, Nuclear Safety ProjectUnion of Concerned Scientists
2Fukushima - Many Barriers Multiple connections to offsite power gridTwo emergency diesel generators per unitEight hour battery backups to grid and EDGs15-foot tall seawallMultiple onsite fire trucks with diesel pumpsSevere accident management guidelines
3Fukushima - More Barrier Busters Multiple connections to offsite power grid9.0 earthquake took away gridTwo emergency diesel generators per unitLocated in basements vulnerable to floodsEight hour battery backups to grid and EDGsOnsite power outage lasted 9 days15-foot tall seawall45-foot tall tsunami waveMultiple onsite fire trucks with diesel pumpsInfrastructure damage impaired useSevere accident management guidelinesGood on paper (and only on paper)
4Fukushima – One Barrier Shy Fukushima had many barriers.Had just one barrier been sufficiently robust, we wouldn’t be here today discussing Fukushima.More importantly, had just one barrier been sufficiently robust, tens of thousands of Japanese civilians would be home today instead of being displaced.
5Disconnected Safety Regimes NTTF Recommendation 1EPGs/SAMGsFLEXPRAsReally just one disconnection with three consequences from this disconnection.
6Disconnected Safety Regimes NTTF’s foremost recommendation:Commission moved Recommendation 1 to last place
8Disconnected Safety Regimes Regulatory requirements for safety-related SSCsHopes about FLEX
9Disconnected Safety Regimes PRAs for design basis accidentsFond wishes for severe accidents
10Disconnected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 One way to deal with “cliff-edge” effects is to pretend there are none
11Disconnected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 Commissioner Magwood during March 15, 2012, Senate oversight hearing:I think that our infrastructure, our regulatory approach, our practices at plants, our equipment, our configuration, our design bases would prevent Fukushima from occurring under similar circumstances at a U.S. plant. I just don’t think it would happen.
12Disconnected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 Commissioner Apostolakis during March 15, 2012, Senate oversight hearing:I don’t think what happened in Fukushima can happen here.
13Connected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 A better way is to accept cliffs exist and to manage their hazards
14Connected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 Someone should remind Commissioners Thelma and Louise about the cliff-edge
15Disconnected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 NRC November 2013 report “A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese regulatory requirements in effect at the time of the Fukushima accident” (ML13326A991), page 20:Prior to the Fukushima accident, both Japanese regulators and industry publicly stated that the possibility of severe accidents was sufficiently low, to the extent that a severe accident could not occur from an engineering viewpoint.
16Disconnected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 NRC November 2013 report “A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese regulatory requirements in effect at the time of the Fukushima accident” (ML13326A991), page 3:Staff cautions, however, that there should be no implication that the Fukushima accident and associated consequences could or would have been completely avoided assuming Japan had the same U.S. regulatory framework prior to the accident.
17Connected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 NTTF’s foremost recommendation:Establishes regulatory footprints for design bases and beyond design bases events
18Connected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 Template for viable NTTF 1 connection between design basis and beyond design basis might be operator licensing.NRC will license/relicense reactor operators and senior reactor operators.Under NRC-established conditions monitored by NRC, licensees can perform some of this testing.
19Connected Safety Regimes – NTTF 1 There must be a regulatory footprint for design basis and beyond design basis measures.
20Disconnected Safety Regimes - SAMGs 100% developed SAMGs89% had SAMGs in control rooms72% had SAMGs in EOFs92% trained workers on SAMGs77% re-trained workers on SAMGs75% required SAMGs to reflect plant mods42% had configuration mgmt for SAMGs
21Disconnected Safety Regimes - SAMGs SAMGs protect the public during a severe accident – unless a severe accident occurs
22Connected Safety Regimes - SAMGs NRC inspects requirements, not voluntarismsNRC finds compliances, or issues sanctions
23Disconnected Safety Regimes - FLEX 100% develop FLEX??% have adequate quality standards for FLEX??% have adequate testing standards for FLEX??% train workers on FLEX??% re-train workers on FLEX??% require FLEX to reflect plant mods??% have configuration mgmt for FLEXFLEX protects the public during a severe accident – unless a severe accident occurs
24Disconnected Safety Regimes - PRAs For the RA to truly stand for risk assessment, the P cannot stand for:partialpretendpseudo
25Connected Safety Regimes - PRAs must cover all modes of operation, all transients, and all accidents (not just those that follow design basis scripts)
26Are we there yet?NTTF recommended nearly 3 dozen ways to reduce vulnerabilities at U.S. reactorsNot there yet with even 1 safety IOUs still outstandingNot there yet even when ALL of these safety IOUs are fully and effectively doneOnly there if NTTF after next disaster finds few vulnerabilities left to remedy
27Moving in the right direction, but clearly not there yet