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2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 1 Responding to the Unexpected Earthquake Case Investigation 2/27/2002.

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Presentation on theme: "2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 1 Responding to the Unexpected Earthquake Case Investigation 2/27/2002."— Presentation transcript:

1 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 1 Responding to the Unexpected Earthquake Case Investigation 2/27/2002

2 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 2 Panel members l Howard Shrobe l Art Lerner-Lam l Fred Krimgold l Charles Scawthorn l Frieder Seible l Laura Steinberg

3 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 3 Issues l Identifying inadequacies –Preparation –Response and rehabilitation –Mitigation and preparation: identification of threat environment l Cross-cutting themes –Human resources –IT environment –Policy and legal environment –Cultural –Science and engineering research

4 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 4 Themes l Policy, regulation, and jurisdiction l Prior knowledge base, RT data collection l IT infrastructure l Human assistance and performance l Organizational models (virtual, ad hoc, etc) l Security l Integration and transfer

5 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 5 Major questions l Identifying inadequacies l Overcoming inadequacies l Identifying “unexpectedness”: transition from routine to unexpected l Security and open access to data l Integration of RT data l Role of standards l Role of monitoring and surveillance

6 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 6 Definition of unexpectedness l Uncertainty trajectories before, during, and after event –“non-linearity” and “discontinuity”, sensitivity l Cascading effects (include. Social) l Response –Impacts not known until after –Incorporation of information in real time: modifying assessments –Common processes generic to all events that can trigger action l “orgware” et al. as technologies to improve communication

7 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 7 l Technological challenges on execution –E.g. dynamic integration of information l Dealing with unexpected in absence of planning –Dealing without planning –Search and rescue precedents –“sensory alertness” l Capacity for rapid, flexible response –Not overdefining, but generalizing capabilities l Dealing with unexpected losses of capability l Existence of generic processes l speed

8 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 8 l Research in public choice and modifying behavior –Anticipate public choice arena –Decision making and drivers –Investment incentives l Reducing the envelope l Systematic investigation of eq impacts and experience l Reaction in real time, impact on choice, social science research l NTSB approach l Extreme pressure from public l Returning the system to normalcy –Never the same –Process of recovery lengthy –Expectations are very high

9 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 9 l Providing research in problem formulation l Case studies l Examples of success –WTC: understood vulnerability, if not specifics –CA in ‘89 and ‘94 l Highway rebuilds l OEM learning curve by ‘94 l Bringing different organizations together –Orgware –Administrative structures for decision making and response –Adjustable autonomy. l Models and prioritization of efforts to minimize risk, harm, etc l Where are there vulnerabilities? –Eq experience useful: land use and fault maps l Resources and characterization of hazards

10 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 10 l Flexibility of response –Composing capabilities out of combinations l Speed of response l Robustness of response l Scenarios and training l Info overload l Redundancy of capability, but not complete distribution l First response heterogeneity l Interoperability l Societal issues as well as technological l Robustness design of infrastructure couples to robust response.

11 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 11 l Characteristic design elements of infrastructure to improve robustness –Analogs in cs –Interoperation –Standards, common data elements –Cultural changes in the tech community l Information survivability l Redundancy not subject to common-mode failure –Engineering for variability –Meaningful fault models –Threat models ? l Adaptive vs. dumb threats

12 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 12 Swiren l unfamiliar hazards in unexpected places (eq in NYC) l Calibration of HAZUS: modification of default database (NY study) l Need more, better modeling e.g. hurricanes (coming out) –Educate decision makers, public l Correlating eq loss to other hazard loss: more “economical” solution

13 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 13 David l Better models Existing database Ability to get and incorporate new information Not coming close to timeline in events Traffic mgmt Building floorplans Deep infrastructure Collapse/ building damage data Losing communications Databases don’t exist or are not robust enough(fast, redundant) NYC data lost, new setup. Eq are good project because of complexity, spatial extent Evaluation for habitability Debris management and tasking Gaps in regional operations coordination (Northridge had 60 jurisdictions) Field checking before FEMA assistance/ data Connection between loss estimation and govt assistance Demographic data Overwhelming dispatch centers (unanswered 911 calls in CA) Quick environmental evaluation Processes in response environment (generic; analysis of timelines and meet them technologically) Monitoring systems not in place Validating and verifying socio-economic data, data integration issues End-user systems have to be simple: stress = stupidity l Ubiquitous sensoring l Scale, granularity, can change in time l Process

14 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 14 Data issues l New information vs. recasting of existing info l Process context should drive database research l Integration of different data formats l Recast software discussion in terms of characteristics of response processes l Problem solved for inter-company integration: what’sspecial about unexpected events? l Undesired linking / security and access management l Micro-metadata. Reliabiltiy, calibration of sensor nets l Common datga elements l Connecting operational data with incoming data, and modeling data l Information integration

15 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 15 If we had the data and could provid info: l What would they do differently? For an unexpected event. l What have we learned from the past that helps us deeal with data integration l Different groups operating in pararllel with different tasks, with operational integration l Tension arising from information overload l Active real time data integration, decided by ebd-users: not just passive.

16 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 16 Try to formalize exchange between practitioners and research

17 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 17 Concept of triage in information management l Info overload l Training to improve dialog

18 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 18 Feds don’t understand state and local aresponse l How do state and local governments respond to disasters? l How do policies and info get down to local level l Heterogeneous local response

19 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 19 Military AI model l Decisions in high-risk environments l Stand-off decision making / robotics/ stand-off sensors/ AI

20 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 20 NSF and practitioner interactions l Applications and bridging culture l Mel: what is the form of the research? –Pilots, test beds, scenario –Mission agencies –Private sector l Program structure is a challenge

21 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 21 Case study l Observer participants in response

22 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 22 Recent experience l Use certain examples to bring IT and social science community together –Airline security, communicalbe diseases –Half-life lessons, learn from experience, but take advantage of timing

23 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 23 Tech transfer access to practitioners

24 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 24 Flexibility l Improve interagency organization and coordination l Multiple agencies wil always be involved l Some organization streuctgure better than others l Best interagency structures l Improving adaptive behavior: analogy to war games and simulation tools l Factor in heterogeniety of population: need to be sensitive to feedback related to heterogeneity

25 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 25 Drawing in practitioners l “clinical” track l Working with regional govt agencies l Formal and informal l Tech partnerships l Testbeds with locals and regionals l Get some data from them, some infromation l Professional organizations l Effort to get eq simulation of Kobe (whole sim city) challenge posed as a competition “rescue simulation” robocup.org l Simulations should be used to generate unexpected event

26 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 26 Classified material l Data may not be available: dilemma l Access to infrasystems may be denied l “sanitized” data, abstracted form l Reduced precision, dithering l Policies on what can be shared govt: no risk approach CoE invnetory of dams off the web l Infrastructure security l Security clearance situaion has changed l Civilian classification systems l Privacy-preserving data mining l Study implications of classifying data on ability to respond to unexpected. l Time varying need to know and thus time-varying classification l Dithering context specific

27 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 27 Modality issues l Classification of data l Structure of reserasch program l Issues of transition

28 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 28 Cahan l 9/11 Research issues –Redundancy, mutual-aid, drills, pulling the trigger on contacts and technology –Management logistics and communications

29 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 29 Case study l Spirit of Pier 92: 9/11 case study l Folios for each specialty

30 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 30 Documentary of behind the scenes

31 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 31 Companion website to feature lessons and clips

32 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 32 I-Teams Implementation strategy: OMB geospatial initiative: state plans.

33 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 33 Consensus portal elements (life- cycle of 9/11 has not eneded) l Team lists l Calendar l Authoritites l GIS l Security l Public comments

34 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 34 Joe Picciano FEMA Reg 2 l Need to consider worst-case scenario: out of box, not capable of predicting l Federal partnership l Initial priorities –Life-saving support –Mobilization centers –Infrastructure –Devbris assessment

35 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 35 Effort coordination: existing capabilities (7000 people)

36 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 36 Driven by IT l Wireless l Dfo setup l Coordnation with major providers l Portable satellites

37 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 37 Possibilites l National all-response information management system for local and state governments Resource links Existing databases Critical first response availability Mainatined by public-private consortium R&D for high-rise and dirty fires Enhanced personal communications for first responders Real time computer simulation for first responders Review of crisis managmenet educatgional programs

38 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected hours to set up: critical need for local and stgate first response

39 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 39 Federal response plan Interagency WMD and terrorism Earthquaes

40 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 40 Transportations Lead agency DoT FAA closed down airspace Distribution of emergency supplies and officials Development of standards and models for catastrophic events in urban environments Pre-identification of critical routes Evacuation alternatives and event-dependence (NYC and hurricanse) Cricitacl asset transprotation planning Linkages to regional planning for wide-=spread events Enhanced Remote sensing systems for evac and id of critical assset requirements

41 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 41 Communications Needs Stadards Protocols Modernization training Develop a national emergency managmenenmt communications systems with applications at state and local levels

42 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 42 Public works and engineering (ACOE) Debris managmgnet New technologies for sseparation and managmenet Study on existing infrastufcture load impact and project life

43 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 43 Firefighting Incident managmenet teams

44 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 44 Information and planning FEMA lead on infomration Decision support

45 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 45 GIS Hot spots Site hazard analysis Estimate total debris

46 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 46 possibilities National response information managmenet system Enhanced urban infrrastrucgure database (911, hazus, etc) and loss modeling More use of remote sensing

47 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 47 Resource support GSA Development of immediate resource requirment list linked to national data base

48 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 48 Health and medical Us public health service

49 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 49 Urban search and rescue Nre first responder strategies

50 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 50 Hazmat (EPA New strategies for: Health registries Indoor and outdoor residential hazards

51 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 51 Food Disaster food stamp program

52 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 52 Energy Con ed coordination Radiation monitoring

53 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 53 DOD Colocate with defense coordinator Trained FDNY teams on specialized demolition equipe Robotics teams New technology Med assistance

54 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 54 Public assistance First funding Debris removal ($4B) Remibursement for OT Replacement of equip Cost estimating tames Review infrastructure recovery as it relates to insurance industry Impact of future coverfage Improved methodoloies in gov and industry coordinatio Insurance risk and its relationship to future urban development

55 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 55 Mitigation 5% added to mitigation fund NYC metro area projects Mitigation models forf WMD loss prevention Building performance standards for post 911 env Urban strategies for mitigation in high density communities The establishment of mitigation banks Insuracne cost incentives for mitigation beyond floodplain management

56 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 56 Public affiars Info vs perceived risks Media strategies Terrorism thrives on media impact and message

57 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 57 Long trem recovery

58 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 58 Missing response links Workable expedient housing program Enhanced management systems for domestic distribution of life sustaining goods Critical examiniation of urban risk in post 911 env. Enhanced corporate planning Access control and identification standardization Multi-organizational planning and shared resource Enhanced utilization of encrypted Web resources and portals

59 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 59 Response initiatives Fire support branch Forward coordinating teams External logistics: supporting state and local govt capabiliteies (NYClost its teams)

60 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 60 Alan Leidner Oem had no operating GIS system on 911 Standing start on 911 “Orgware” technology: learned how to interact and work together Locals had more accurate basemap, feds had better technology Local didn’t know about existing technology Need to be ahead of technology, particularly sensors Needed thermal sensors Ability to deploy immediately: need to know what’s available Asset databased and queries needed Breakdowns Effect of smoke and ash on health : no knowledge, no env mechanisms and testing, no trust, community panic Anthrax panic: threat not defined, procedures not defined How to work with neighborhoods and ocmmunity groups to make local leaders collaborators to calm panic, identifiy vulnerability. Local networks not developed. Need better ORGWARE to synch communications and agendas, and public communication OGC permanent NYC testbed

61 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 61 Edward Hammer (energy)Con Ed Used to Focus on just power. And customer Not appropriate way to respond Obstructions and obstacles arisign from coordination Incident command system: ICS very effective in field. Become part of team

62 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 62 Fred Krimgold Analogies to 911 Eqs are localized so expected to some extent, but unexpected somewhat Insurance has decided main terrorist threat in five cities NY, DC, LA, SF, Chicago Vulnerability due to land use, interdependent urban systems Standards sometimes wrong Cascading failures Questions Wha happened: how big and extent of impacts What has to be sent Initial reconnaissance: examples, but not a solved problem Search and rescue implementation Time as critical factor in response: shorten and focus on critical locations Think about designing for failure: think about how to take them apart, how to protect occupants, removal Simulation and public awareness Mitigation / deflection Unexpected by whom?

63 2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 63 Denton Aspects of TMI


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