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AICE International History 1945-1991 Topic Three The Crisis of Communism Kevin R. Sacerdote Mandarin High Jacksonville, FL.

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Presentation on theme: "AICE International History 1945-1991 Topic Three The Crisis of Communism Kevin R. Sacerdote Mandarin High Jacksonville, FL."— Presentation transcript:

1 AICE International History Topic Three The Crisis of Communism Kevin R. Sacerdote Mandarin High Jacksonville, FL

2 The Sino-Soviet Split Origins and Main Features

3 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 3 Background In Mao wanted to create the best possible balance of power for China in the international environment: leaning neither toward Moscow nor toward Washington…[but] Washington did not take him seriously…For Mao this was both an end to his hopes and a personal insult. He proclaimed a policy of leaning on the USSR (Zubock, 1996, p. 213)

4 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 4 Background Zhou Enlais reason for supporting non-alignment- they were, of course, those of Mao Zedong-also had to do with the fear of hegemony, which from Chinas perspective could come from either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Washington had continued to support Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jeshi) and the Chinese Nationalists after they had fled to Taiwan in 1949…But Mao was not prepared to rely, for deterrence against this danger, solely on the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance. It made sense, therefore, for China to align itself with nationalists in former colonial and dependent regions (Gaddis, p. 126)

5 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 5 Death of Stalin March of 1953 Moscows iron fist begins to weaken A totalitarian party state, can function at its best…only with full-scale terror and a leader who completely adheres to the principles of absolute power and control (Powaski, p. 214) Totalitarianism cannot exist forever without changes in attitude and relaxation of the terror mechanism that usually occurs with the death of a leader (Powaski, p. 214)

6 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 6 Arnold ToynbeesDominant Minority Theory (Powaski, p. 214) A new dominant minority emerges after the revolution (Vanguard of Bolsheviks) Step by step it becomes independent from the revolution and seeks to establish control The new elite in the post-revolutionary society demand the natural privilege of their high status: personal safety They want more security in the international arena. They do not want all-out wars, for defeat can undermine their power (Especially true about Khrushchev & his peaceful coexistence with the USA)

7 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 7 Arnold ToynbeesDominant Minority Theory (Powaski, p. 214) By the end of the 1950s Moscow was more inclined to manage international relations in its own interests than to stick to the principles of revolutionarism Here was the source of the ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing. Mao was in his prime. His revolutionary absolutism was quite young and could function at its full capacity

8 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 8 Khrushchevs Thaw & Maos Thoughts About It When Khrushchev and others began to soften the regime, Mao was on the way to tightening control and dragging peasant China into the projects of Socialist construction. He simply could not afford any rapprochement with the U.S., for détente with the West would have inevitably loosened his grip on Chinese society (Powaski, p. 215)

9 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 9 Mao Mid-1950s Feels Khrushchev is turning his back on Lenin and Trotskys World Revolution Mao also wants world recognition as the leading Communist in the post-Stalin era –Especially in the eyes of the emerging Third World Countries –Once again he feels that the USSR is only out for themselves and has turned its back to the concept of world revolution Khrushchevs denouncement of Stalin is proof

10 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 10 Afro-Asian Conference Tito, Nehru, Zhou [convened] the first conference of non-aligned nations at Bandung in Indonesia, In April, 1955: Its purpose was to expand autonomy by encouraging neutrality in the Cold War. Among those invited was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who would soon prove to be the most skilful of all practitioners of non-alignment. (Gaddis, p. 126)

11 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 11 Bandung Conference (April 1955)

12 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 12 Bandung Conference: 1955 The April 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia had its origins in an initiative taken by the leaders of five Asian states- Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka- but during its preparation the conference developed into the biggest and most influential gathering of Third World leaders held during the colonial era…the importance [of the conference] was timing: coming right after the French withdrawal from Indochina and at a time when several African countries seemed headed for independence (Westad, p. 99)

13 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 13 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Signed by Stalin & Mao February 14, 1950 Soviets promised technical help and $300 million in loans –Far less than the Chinese expected –Mao stated that, getting money from Stalin was like taking meat out of a tigers mouth (Powaski, p. 83) –The Soviets retained rights over the Manchurian rails and bases in Port Arthur and Darien

14 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 14 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance The Sino-Soviet partnership was based on three elements: 1.Party 2.Military, and 3.Economic Relations (Luthi, p. 32)

15 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 15 Friendship With The CPSU Unlike the East European states, China voluntarily joined [the socialist camp] on the assumption that only the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist Soviet Union would support the PRC in its struggle to regain prosperity and international standing (Luthi, 19)

16 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 16 Taiwan Strait Crisis One (1954) China felt that there was NO prospect for a Sino-American reconciliation at the Geneva Conference in July of 1954 (WHY?) –J.F. Dulles & the South Vietnamese concern –China fears that the Nationalists & USA were going to attack mainland China September 3, 1954: China shells TWO of the TWENTY-FIVE Nationalist Islands (all of which were between five and twenty-five miles from mainland China): Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu ( Matsu)

17 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 17 Taiwan (Formosa) Strait

18 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 18 Taiwan Strait Crisis One (1954) The strong U.S. stand during the crisis was designed not only to prevent the humiliation of Jiang Jeshi, but also to drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. By threatening to conduct a nuclear war with china, Eisenhower and Dulles purposely tried to put the Soviets in a position where they either would have to abandon their Chinese ally or risk nuclear devastation from the far superior U.S. nuclear arsenal (Powaski, pp )

19 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 19 Taiwan Strait: Crisis One (1954) Despite these agreements, the Soviets did not give the Chinese all the support they expected to receive during the offshore island crisis…determined to put more emphasis on domestic reform, Khrushchev and Bulganin quickly signaled their interest in improving relations with the West…the lack of Soviet support for China during the crisis proved to be a major reason for the subsequent Sino-Soviet split (Powaski, p 113)

20 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 20 Trouble Pending It was only Maos ideological radicalization, still inchoate in 1955, and Khrushchevs de- Stalinization in early 1956…that set a train of events in motion which eventually undermined the alliance (Luthi, p. 45)

21 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 21 De-Stalinization v. Peaceful Coexistence (with the USA) At the end of 1957, the CCP confidentially notified the CPSU that it no longer supported peaceful coexistence…Nevertheless, in , peaceful coexistence never grew into a point of disagreement in the way de-Stalinization did (Luthi, p. 79)

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23 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 23 De-Stalinization PLUS Peaceful Coexistence Too much for the Chinese to swallow Chinas positive evaluation of Khrushchevs pursuit of peaceful coexistence evaporated because of… 1.Deadlock in the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, 2.The October events in Poland and Hungary, and 3.The U.S. decision to introduce tactical nuclear missiles in Taiwan… 4.Talks suspended on December 12, 1957…it was a turning point that would lead to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. (Luthi, p. 48)

24 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 24 De-Stalinization: A Catalyst For Schism February 25, 1956: Khrushchevs Four-Hour Speech The twentieth congress [of the CPSU] established the ideological foundation for the disagreements that would rock the Sino- Soviet partnership in the years to come. Most importantly, de-Stalinization threatened to undercut Maos domestic position (Luthi, p. 46)

25 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 25 De-Stalinization: A Catalyst For Schism The eight CCP congress in September [1956] introduced policy REVERSALS and checks on Maos freedom of political action, though the Chairman still enjoyed preeminence among Chinese leaders ( Luthi, p. 46) Mao Despises De-Stalinization

26 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 26 Chinas Reaction to De-Stalinization Mao could never forgive Khrushchev for his secret speech denouncing Stalin without consulting the Chinese. He believed that de- Stalinization was a grave error, perhaps even a challenge to his own authority. And Khrushchevs vision of nuclear bipolarity became anathema for Mao, because it relegated China to a secondary position in the pecking order of great powers (Zubok, 2007, p.136)

27 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 27 Mao on De-Stalinization The sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians…We Chinese have not thrown it away…Stalinism is just Marxism…with shortcomings…the so-called de-Stalinization thus is simply de-Marxification, it is revisionism (Luthi, p. 63)

28 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 28 Maos Cult of Personality Strengthens The seventh CCP congress in 1945 had agreed to build up Maos personality cult in order to create a rallying point for the party and the masses in the impending civil war, but the party convention also made clear that the Chairman still had to submit to collective leadership (Luthi, p. 44)

29 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 29 Maos Cult of Personality Strengthens The 1945 agreement unraveled when Mao, in the second half of 1955, abused his by now full-fledged personality cult to push through the Socialist High Tide (a.k.a. Little Leap Forward) accusing his fellow leaders of walking like a woman with bound feet and of Right deviationist mistakes. (Luthi, p. 44)

30 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 30 The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) The Chinese resumed the bombardment of the offshore islands in an attempt to force a resolution of Taiwans status (Powaski, p. 125) –Khrushchev warns the US that he will defend the Chinese –Eisenhower ignores Khrushchev and sends the U.S. Seventh fleet to escort Nationalist Chinese supply ships from Taiwan to within three miles of the offshore islands –Khrushchevs diplomatic support was offered AFTER it became obvious that the U.S was not preparing to attack China. (Powaski, p. 125)

31 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 31 The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) China was upset by the lackluster support that they received with this crisis AND the Soviet tilt toward India in the Sino-Indian border dispute…but the Chinese were angered even more by the termination of Soviet nuclear assistance in 1959, a move that convinced Beijing that Moscow could not be trusted (Powaski, p. 146) Khrushchev was horrified by Mao Zedongs insistence that the Soviet Union must risk nuclear war with the U.S. to advance the communist cause (Powaski, p. 146)

32 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 32 Maos Logic on Nuclear War The whole world has 2 billion 700 million people, possibly it will lose a third; or even more, possibly it will lose half…but there will be another half; the imperialists will be hit completely, [and] the whole world will become socialist (Luthi, p. 77)

33 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 33 The Soviets About a Nuclear Confrontation The Soviets shared neither Maos opinion that the imperialists were warmongers nor his belief that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity (they would not until 1969) (Luthi, p. 77) Is it any wonder that Khrushchev changed his mind about giving Mao an A bomb?

34 Mao – Khrushchev Split The crushing of the Hungarian uprising Problems in East Germany and Poland Viewed by Mao as failures by the USSR to contain reactionary forces

35 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 35 Sino-Soviet Split The turning point came sometime in , after Khrushchev denounced Stalin as a criminal, and Mao proclaimed his Great Leap Forward policy and unleashed an anti- rightist campaign. One country shut the doors to concentration camps and the other opened them (Powaski, p. 215)

36 Conference of Communist Parties Mao called on the USSR to abandon revisionism (Khrushchev had denounced Stalin) Mao declared that an international revolution could not be achieved by working along side class enemies (the Western Capitalists) Mao believed that the USSR was initiating détente with the West, further isolating China

37 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 37 November 1957 World Conference of Communist Parties Mao hails the USSRs new missiles as the source to become more aggressive against Western imperialism Mao asks Khrushchev to share missile technology From 1957 to 1959, the Chinese received the technology for the medium-range R-12 missile and cruise missiles (Zubok, 2007, p. 136) The Soviets even promised the Chinese a working sample of an atomic bomb

38 Conference of Communist Parties Deng had ultimately embarrassed the Soviets Out-argued Mikhail Suslov, leading Soviet theorist PRC presented themselves as the real leaders of the international revolutionary Communism

39 Khrushchevs Beijing Visit In 1958, Khrushchev visited Mao Mao had apparently deliberately made Khrushchev feel uncomfortable 1) Khrushchevs hotel had no air conditioning and was plagued by mosquitoes 2) Mao had arranged for one round of talks in a swimming pool, embarrassing Khrushchev, who had to put on a rubber ring

40 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 40 August 20, 1959 Khrushchev, however, began to rethink the Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation…the tactical bomb was ready and about to be shipped…[but] on August 20, 1959 the Kremlin leaders sent a letter to Beijing…that they would not provide them with a prototype of the Bomb (Zubok, 1996, 228)

41 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 41 October 1959 (10 th Anniversary of the PRC) Khrushchev proposed the unilateral cuts of Soviet troops…in October 1959, immediately after his triumphant trip to the U.S.. Evidently, the Soviet leader believed he was arriving in Beijing in triumph. He had obtained from President Eisenhower a commitment for a conference of great powers in Paris on Germany and Berlin. Mao Ze-dong, however, openly mocked what seemed to look like the second edition of the Yalta-Potsdam system…the Chinese blamed him for accommodating the U.S. at their expense…Khrushchev lost his temper, and the meeting degenerated into an angry exchange ( Zubok, 2007, p. 137)

42 After Stalin Sino-Soviet relations entered a honeymoon period New Soviet leaders appeared willing to supply further loans and technology to China Treaties were made more equal Facilitated easier credit for the PRC

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44 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 44 April 1960 The Chinese Communist daily Renmin Ribao published the article, Long Live Leninism – the opening salvo in the Chinese campaign against Khrushchevs revisionism and appeasement of imperialists…[it] stressed the inevitability of wars as long as imperialism existed (Zubok, 1996, 232) All of this as Khrushchev was still toying with the idea of peaceful coexistence and disarmament with the U.S.

45 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 45 July 1960 The Chinese leaders…directly and openly opposed the foreign policy of the CPSU…In July of 1960, Khrushchev decided to withdraw all Soviet specialists from China (Zubok, 1996, p. 233)

46 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 46 Sino-Soviet Split By 1963 the Soviets view China as a security risk –China was passing out leaflets in Algeria that said: Russians are Euros (due to their peaceful coexistence stance with the west) –While Che Guevera criticized both China & the USSR for standing by and bickering while their Communist comrades in Vietnam were dying

47 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 47 Wasted Opportunities Due to the Split Limited sharing of technology Limited spread of a united Communist Ideology Looking ridiculous to the emerging countries –Poor timing due to the rash of decolonization

48 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 48 The Sino-Soviet Rift Grows The Soviet-Chinese rift was brought into the open by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which convened in Moscow October 17-31, 1961…Khrushchev denounced Albania and its leader Enver Hoxha, who refused to accept de-Stalinization, but everyone knew that the primary target of attack was Mao (Powaski, p ) Later, in September, 1963 the Chinese condemned the errors of the 22 nd congress

49 Mao – Khrushchev Split Public: International allies Private: Ideological enemies

50 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 50 Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism 1.Complex set of issues, much more than the popular wedge theory –The USA became a wedge between China & the USSR- playing one off of the other 2.Historical negative feelings, especially due to expansionism, atmosphere of distrust 3.Stalins desire not to have a single unified China (geopolitical), it might wake the sleeping giant 4.Stalins desire to prolong the Korean War, he rebuffs Chinas request for peace; not enough backing from the USSR throughout the war & Why does Stalin want the war to continue (mistrust) 5.Chinas dissatisfaction with economic assistance *Information from O.A. Westads: Brothers in Arms (1998)

51 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 51 Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism 6.Chinas little brother syndrome 7.Soviets stop supplying missile technology 8.Ideological PACE and METHODS: China is full- steam ahead with world revolution, as Khrushchev puts on the breaks 9.Khrushchevs wish for peaceful coexistence with the U.S.A. versus Maos feelings about confronting American imperialism (Mao considers this Marxist Revisionism, which he hates) 10.NOTE: Remember the United Nations will not formally recognize the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) until 1971, and the USA will not have full diplomatic relations with the PRC until Jan. 1 st, *Information from O.A. Westads: Brothers in Arms (1998) & Larres & Lane, (2001)

52 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 52 Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism 11. Outside enemies kept the Chinese population unified and orderly; Chinese nationalism fueled the us versus the world philosophy 12. Soviets withdraw Soviet Nuclear Technical Assistance in Soviets back India in a border dispute with China (Twice) 14. Chinas Cultural Revolution 15. Khrushchevs De-Stalinization Policies 16. Chinas treatment of Slavs living in Xinjiang –67,000 many of Russian heritage fled to Soviet Kazakhastan in 1962) (Luthi, p. 214). –Probable Sino/Soviet Border skirmishes were NOT a big deal when relations between the two were positive

53 Why did the Split Occur? Mao thought that the Soviets were retreating ideologically and militarily from Marxism- Leninism and the global struggle to achieve global communism, and by apparently no longer guaranteeing support to China in a Sino- American war; therefore, the roots of the Sino- Soviet ideological split were established by 1959.

54 Why did the Split Occur? The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward, had renounced aiding Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino- Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with India actions deemed offensive by Mao as Chinese Leader. Hence, he perceived Khrushchev as too-appeasing with the West, despite Soviet caution in international politics that threatened nuclear warfare.

55 Why did the Split Occur? Sino-Soviet split manifested itself indirectly; arguments between the CPSU and the CPC criticized the client states of the other; China denounced Yugoslavia and Tito, the USSR denounced Enver Hoxha and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; but, in 1960, they criticized each other in the Romanian Communist Party congress. In October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again argued openly. In December, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania, graduating the Soviet–Chinese ideological dispute from between political parties to between nation-states.

56 Why did the Split Occur? Beijing had begun trying to displace Moscow as the ideological leader of the world Communist movement. Mao (and his supporters) had advocated the idea that Asian and world communist movements should emulate Chinas model of peasant revolution, not Soviets model of urban revolution. The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung and the book Dawn Out of China stated that his intellectual accomplishment was to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form... in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream, which the Soviet government banned in the USSR.

57 Why did the Split Occur? Mao thought that the Soviets were retreating ideologically and militarily from Marxism- Leninism and the global struggle to achieve global communism, and by apparently no longer guaranteeing support to China in a Sino- American war; therefore, the roots of the Sino- Soviet ideological split were established by 1959.

58 Why did the Split Occur? The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward, had renounced aiding Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with India actions deemed offensive by Mao as Chinese Leader. Hence, he perceived Khrushchev as too-appeasing with the West, despite Soviet caution in international politics that threatened nuclear warfare.

59 Why did the Split Occur? Sino-Soviet split manifested itself indirectly; arguments between the CPSU and the CPC criticized the client states of the other; China denounced Yugoslavia and Tito, the USSR denounced Enver Hoxha and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; but, in 1960, they criticized each other in the Romanian Communist Party congress. In October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again argued openly. In December, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania, graduating the Soviet–Chinese ideological dispute from between political parties to between nation-states.

60 The Crisis of Communism China

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62 Chinese Communism in Crisis Under Mao Terrorization had always been Maos panacea whenever he wanted to achieve anything (Chang, p. 416)

63 The Blooming of the Hundred Flowers 1957 – 1958 (Mao is Aged 63-64)

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65 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 65 The Socialist High Tide Policy Announced by Mao in July 1955 –From Autumn 1955 to Spring of 1956 –Theme was the shift towards co-operativization –14.2 % of peasant families were involved in co- ops and early collectivization in 1955 ( 16.9 million out of 120 million peasant families) –By May of 1956: 91% of peasant families were in co-ops and 62% were on collectives –A shift from small privately-owned farms were replaced by Large co-ops and collectives –Source: High Tide of Terror (Time Magazine March 5, 1956)

66 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 66 Collectives (Luthi, p. 43) The results of the Socialist High Tide resembled those of Soviet collectivization. Many collectives lacked experienced leadership, know-how. And technology for large-scale farming. Although poorer peasants willingly joined…well-off peasants, who had worked hard to improve their lot, experienced collectivization as expropriation. Although Maos collectivization did not call for the smashing of the rich peasants as Stalins had done, most of the peasants fell silent after some resisters had been labeled and ostracized

67 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 67 Blooming of the Hundred Flowers (Chang, p. 417) On 27 February 1957, Mao delivered a four- hour speech to the rubber-stamp Supreme Council announcing that he inviting criticism of the Communist Party –Few guessed that Mao was setting a trap –We want them to speak out…let all those ox devils and snake demons…curse us for a few months –He was casting a long line to bait fish –How can we catch the snakes if we do not let them out of their lairs?

68 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 68 Blooming of the Hundred Flowers (Chang, p ) Maos trap was extremely successful…Dissent was thus kept rigidly fragmented, so a popular uprising was impossible On 6 June 1957…a hundred flowers is over Mao [had] set a quota for victims between 1 and 10 percent of intellectuals…as a result, at least 550,000-plus people were labeled as Rightists

69 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 69 Blooming of the Hundred Flowers (Chang, p. 420 & 421) Parallel with theatre came executions. Mao revealed later to his top echelon that one province, Hunan, denounced 100,000, arrested 10,000, and killed 1,000 The huge publicity was intended to instill fear in rural schools Most rightists were deported to do hard labour in remote areas, Mao needed labour, particularly to open up virgin lands You are here to redeem your crime! Dont dare to make trouble, or look for ways to be lazy…many died of malnutrition, illness, cold, overwork and in accidents

70 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 70 The Hundred Flowers Campaign NOTE: Some argue that Mao really was making a move towards de- Stalinization with this campaign, and it was not a preconceived plot by Mao –The failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign convinced Mao that not only was de-Stalinization incorrect but, paradoxically, China also needed more political and economic development along Revolutionary Stalinist lines (Luthi, p. 47)

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72 The Great Leap Forward Half of China May Well Have To Die (Mao is Aged 64 – 67)

73 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 73 The Great Leap Forward 1958 – 1961 The goal of the leap was for China to overtake all capitalist countries in a fairly short time, and become one of the richest, most advanced and powerful countries in the world (Chang, p. 426) The press was Maos voice, not the publics (Chang, p. 427) Sputnik fields mushroomed. They were usually created by transplanting ripe crops from a number of fields into a single artificial plot. These were the Maoist equivalent of Potemkin fields (Chang, p. 427)

74 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 74 The Great Leap Forward 1958 – 1961 The key difference [was] that Maos plots were not intended to fool the ruler, but instead produced by the ruler for the eyes of his distant underlings, grassroots cadres from other collective farms…Mao wanted them to see these Sputnik fields and then go back and make similar claims, so that the state could say: since you produced more, we can take more (Chang, p. 427)

75 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 75 The Great Leap Forward 1958 – 1961 In the summer of 1958, Mao pitch-forked the entire rural population into new and larger units calledPeoples Communes. The aim was to make slave- driving more efficient…the first commune Chayashan Sputnik… laid down every aspect of its members lives…All the 9,369 households had to hand over entirely their private plots…their houses, animals and trees. They had to live in dormitories…The communes were de facto camps for slave laborers… Mao even toyed with getting rid of peoples names and replacing them with numbers…one peasant described the situation as worse than under the Japanese occupation (Chang, p. 434)

76 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 76 The Great Leap Forward 1958 – 1961 As part of his Leap, in 1958 Mao also tried to turn the cities into slave-labour camps by organizing urban communes…this did not work out (Chang, p. 436) [This] famine which was nationwide, started in 1958 and lasted through 1961, peaking in 1960…the regimes own statistics recorded average daily calorie intake fell to 1,534. According to a major apologist for the regime, Han Suyin, urban housewives were getting a maximum 1,200 calories a day (Chang, p. 437)

77 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) Chinese Famine

78 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 78 The Great Leap Forward 1958 – 1961 Close to 38 million people died of starvation and overwork…the figure was confirmed by Maos No. 2, Liu Shao-chI (Chang also lists how these numbers were determined on p. 438) This was the greatest famine of the twentieth century- and of all recorded human history. Mao knowingly starved and worked these tens of millions of people to death. During the two critical years of , grain exports alone, almost exactly 7 million tons, would have provided the equivalent of over 840 calories per day for 38 million people-the difference between life and death (Chang, p. 438)

79 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) – 1960 Famine The 1959 famines were largely a rural problem, but they were not as deadly as those in Bo Yibo claimed that 25 million people suffered from famines in Chinese statistics published in the 1990s suggest that 310,000 people died of famines in 1959, compared with a staggering 13.5 million in 1960 (Luthi, p. 117)

80 The Tibetan Concern To Tibet, as to the whole of China, Maos rule brought unprecedented misery (Chang, p. 457)

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83 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 83 The Tibetan Concern (Chang, p. 453) Mao was determined to take Tibet by force…Stalins reply was: Its good that you are preparing for an attack…Stalin also advised flooding Tibet and other border regions with Han Chinese (bring the 5% up to at least 30% Han)

84 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 84 The Tibetan Concern ( Chang, pp. 453 & 454) During , 20,000 Chinese Communist troops forced their way into Tibet…a staggering 15 to 20 percent of all Tibetans- perhaps half of all adult males- were thrown into prison, where they were basically worked to death…prisoners were flogged with wire whips as they pulled the heavy ploughs…corpses were dragged down from the mountains and buried in a big pit, and the relatives were then summoned and told: we have wiped out the rebel bandits, and today is a day of festivity. You will dance on the pit of the copses

85 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Initiated Brings China to the Brink of Civil War!

86 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 86 Cultural Revolution In November 1965, Mao was finally ready to launch the Great Purge he had been long planning, to punish this Party of ours (Chang, p. 503) Under Mao, everyone had to do humiliating self- criticisms in public, but not Lin [Biao]…Mao expected him to come through for him in times of need…[Lin] invented the Little Red Book… as a mechanism of indoctrination…it was out of pure ambition that Lin stood by Mao…[Lin] was a man who specializes in hate, in contempt, in thinking the worst and basest of people…in scheming and doing other people down (from his wifes diary) (Chang, p )

87 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 87 The Red Guard

88 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 88 Cultural Revolution: May 1966 Badges started appearing with Maos head on them…some 4.8 billion were manufactured…the Little Red book was handed out to everyone (further pushing him as a cult of personality) (Chang, p 514) He first went after schools and universities, the hotbeds for activists…students were told to condemn their teachers…for poisoning their heads with bourgeois ideas…the young were told that their role was to safeguard Mao (Chang, p. 514)

89 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 89 Cultural Revolution: May 1966 June 2: A group from a middle school, in Peking put up a wall poster which they signed with the snappy name ofRed Guards, to show they wanted to safe guard Mao…Mao ordered schooling suspended fro 13 June…on 18 June scores of teachers and cadres at Peking University were dragged in front of crowds and manhandled…On 5 August… the first known death by torture took place…the headmistress…was kicked and trampled by the girls, and boiling water was poured over her. She was ordered to carry heavy books back and forth; as she stumbled past, she was thrashed with leather army belts with brass knuckles…they were not told to stop-which meant carry on (Chang, p. 517)

90 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 90 Cult of Personality

91 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 91 Cultural Revolution Mao directed his Red Guards to fan out into society at large…on 23 August he told the new authorities: Peking is not chaotic enough (Chang, p. 518) Red Guards broke into homes where they burned books, cut up paintings, trampled phonograph records and musical instruments-generally wrecking anything to do with Culture…many of those raided were tortured to death in their own homes… [or] were carted off to makeshift torture chambers…in August-September (1966) in Peking alone, 33,695 homes were raided and 1,772 were tortured or beaten to death…they confiscated tons of gold, silver, platinum and millions of dollars in hard currency (Chang, p )

92 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 92 Cultural Revolution: Sent to the Countryside To make people get back to the roots of Chinese Communism In Peking, nearly 100,000 were expelled (to rural areas) in less than one month (Chang, p. 521) By mid-September 1966, the country was thoroughly terrorized and Mao felt confident enough to start stalking his real target Party officials (Chang, p. 522)

93 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 93 Cultural Revolution Mao called the purge a fight against the four olds: 1.Old Cultures 2.Old Customs 3.Old Habits, and 4.Old Thoughts…the olds extended to old paintings, old books, antiques, and museum exhibits… nearly four hundred thousand people were killed (Hanes, Volume II p. 294)

94 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 94 Impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on the Schism Initiated in China between 1965 – 1966 Besides aggravating anti-Americanism in China, the Cultural Revolution raised animosity toward the Soviet Union to new heights…Fistfights broke out between Chinese and Soviet civilians in Moscow and Beijing (Powaski, p. 159) In 1969 military combat would erupt between the ground forces of the two nations along Chinas Manchurian border with Soviet Siberia (Powaski, p. 159)

95 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 95 Purge: Mao v. Stalin Stalin had carried out his purges using an elite, the KGB, who swiftly hustled their victims out of sight to prison, the gulag, or death. Mao made sure that much violence and humiliation was carried out in public… the first senior official tortured to death was the minister of coal, on 21 January Mao hated him because he had complained about the Great Leap Forward… He was exhibited in front of organized crowds, and had his arms twisted ferociously backwards in the form of torment known as being jet-planed (Chang, p )

96 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 96 Post GLF & CR Concerns The Taming of the Red Guard –Following July 1967 radical Red Guard factions used weapons stolen from local PLA munitions depots to clash with each other and PLA throughout China ( Reardon, p. 145) –Following this upsurge in internal chaos, Jiang Qing (Maos fourth wife and her fourth husband) reluctantly made a self-criticism; Mao…finally agreed that the civil war within Chinas urban areas had to be controlled…After September 1967 the more radical members of the Central Cultural Revolution…were purged, and the Chinese military [and Zhou] …took direct control over Chinese society (Reardon, p. 145)

97 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 97 Post GLF & CR Concerns From a political economic view, the Cultural Revolution ended with Premier Zhou reassuming responsibility for the routine affairs of the state on 13 September 1971 following the death of Marshal Lin Biao (plane crash) (Reardon, p. 149) Mao was physically and mentally unprepared for Lin Biaos failed military coup detat. (Reardon, p. 152) China gained global legitimacy after reassuming its UN seat on 25 October 1971 (Reardon, p. 149)

98 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 98 Zhou Enlai In December 1971, Zhou Enlai argued, we cant think all things from capitalist countries are bad (Reardon, p. 157) Mao designated Zhou Enlai as his successor in January 1972…[but] Zhou was being treated for bladder cancer (Reardon, pp ) As early as 1973, Zhou Enlai explored the establishment of a special zone within, attracts foreign capital that bring raw materials to establish factories, which in turn utilizes Taiwans cheap labor and fees to produce commodities that are sold abroad (Reardon, p. 165)

99 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 99 Gang of Four The Abbreviated Leftist Response Maos wife, Jiang Qing led an anti-Zhou campaign, they rejected Zhous use of the international marketplace and advocated the semi-autarkic (self-reliant) strategy of the Cultural Revolution (Reardon, p. 167) By the mid-1970s the politics-in-command coalition took advantage of Zhous worsening condition to initiate the Anti-lin, Anti-Confucius Campaign and an anti-rightist campaign (Reardon, p. 167)

100 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 100 Zhou Enlai & Deng Xiaoping Dying of bladder, colon, and lung cancer, Zhou with Maos approval appointed Deng Xiaoping on 1 February 1975 to take charge of State Council work…Deng reiterated the Four Modernizations… [and told the USA] we want to study and absorb world-class technology. As our economy develops, the prospects of our foreign trade will broaden…[Jiang Qing] denounces Deng (Reardon, pp ) Zhou Enlai dies on January 8 th, 1976

101 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 101 Post-Mao By April 1976, the stage was set for Dengs removal. Dengs major-patron, Zhou Enlai, had died in January; Maos directives (with a push from his bride) supporting Anti-Rightist Movement were published on 3 March (Reardon, p. 180) Following Maos death on 9 September 1976 and Jiang Qings downfall a month later, China began to exorcise the ghosts of Mao Zedong. Hua Guofong joined the majority of policy elites to excoriate the gangs ultra-leftist policies…[Hua] approved the arrest of Jiang Qing and company on the night of October 6, 1976 (Reardon, p. 181)

102 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 102

103 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 103 Deng Xiaoping

104 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 104 The Rise of Deng Deng Xiaoping made his successful comeback at the Third Plenum (a full assembly) of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978, after having been purged by Mao in the Cultural Revolution in 1965 and again in 1976 (Marti, p. xi) The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 and the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee in November 1993 form the bookends of Deng Xiaopings efforts at modernizing China (Marti, p. 207)

105 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 105 Deng Xiaoping Deng set China on the path of modernization, and that to ensure that the process survived him, he actively manipulated the inexorable generational change under way within the party, government, and army…this he did in late 1991 and 1992 when he effected a Grand Compromise among the party factions: elders, conservatives, liberals, regional leaders, technocrats, and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) (Marti, p. xii)

106 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 106 Dengs Grand Compromise: Part 1 of 3 (Marti, p. xii) 1.The PLA would support Dengs reforms, the primacy of the party, and the unity of the state; Thus the elders and conservatives would be ensured party control of a unified state and the funds to support it, but would have to compromise with reformers on the issue of central economic planning [ The PLA was perhaps the key ]

107 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 107 Dengs Grand Compromise: Part 2 of 3 (Marti, p. xii) 2. In return, the provincial party chiefs would ensure that revenues would be remitted to the central government : –The technocrats would be free to pursue capitalist economic policies and modernization without hindrance from leftist ideologues, but would have to submit to party discipline, and:

108 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 108 Dengs Grand Compromise: Part 3 of 3 (Marti, p. xii) 3.The central government, in turn, would finance the Armys continued modernization: The PLA which has been undergoing a process of professionalization and depoliticization since 1985, would be guaranteed funds for continued modernization and would have a voice in party policy, but would have to submit to the partys authority.

109 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 109 Democracy Wall: Late 1978 Beijing democracy activists were allowed to record news and ideas on a designated wall in the city from December In line with the party's new policy of "seeking truth from facts," the activists were encouraged to criticize the Gang of Four and failed government policies. But the CCP became dismayed as more and more posters began to call for a complete overhaul and even the abolishment of the CCP. As the current leadership and policies came under fire, a new wave of party intolerance at political dissent began. Overnight, the wall was torn down. Two of the more prominent leaders of the poster movement were placed on public trial and given heavy jail sentences. BBC News Special. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from China's Communist Revolution: A glossary Web site:

110 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 110 Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989 The death of an outspoken member of the Communist Party, Hu Yao Bang, sparked a mass demonstration of mourning students in Tiananmen Square, which was open to the public… Demonstrators soon began to call for greater democracy and liberalization within the CCP. And for the first time in Chinese history, the demonstration was captured live on television and broadcast around the world.

111 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 111 Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989 The authorities' response was initially lenient, but eventually martial law was declared and police entered the square. Still the activists were not ejected, and on 30 May students erected the "Goddess of Democracy" statue, cheered on by members of the police. Eventually the CCP became impatient

112 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 112 Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989 The demonstration was a grave embarrassment as it came during a Sino- Russian summit. On 4 June 1989 the cordial atmosphere came to an end. Under the orders of Deng Xiaoping, troops and tanks of the People's Liberation Army stormed into Tiananmen Square and ended the peaceful protest with a massacre in which thousands were killed.

113 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 113 Falun Gong Falun Gong says its philosophies and slow- motion meditation exercises aim to promote good health and moral living. It purports to be a spiritual movement. The Chinese government has been concerned by the group's ability to organize and says it is an "evil" cult controlled by its U.S.-based founder Li Hongzhi and it spreads superstition and malicious fallacies to deceive people. Source:

114 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 114 Falun Gong While Beijing has arrested and imprisoned hundreds of Falun Gong members since the movement was outlawed in 1999, followers continue to protest around the world and in Hong Kong where the sect is still a legally registered society. The debate surrounding Falun Gong's status as a harmless organization or evil cult continues with the Chinese government remaining implacable. Source:

115 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 115 Dengs Legacy Like the other watersheds in Chinese history, only with the passage of time will be the significance of Dengs actions in 1992 become evident. As for Deng, his health was failing him and after 1994 he gradually withdrew from politics and left it to his chosen successors to carry on. He died in History will now debate his legacy (Marti, p. xvi)

116 Communism in Crisis: The Soviet Union Troubles Within the USSR and Eastern Bloc

117 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 117 Ongoing Concerns Within the U.S.S.R. Human Rights & Liberties Violations –KGB Harassment / Big Brother Gulags Forced Labor Political Purges Show Trials Fear within a single party state Lack of an orderly system of succession for their leaders (confusion factor)

118 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 118 Crisis Within the Soviet Sphere of Influence Sign of Things to Come! February 25, 1945: –Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia –Concept of Free Elections off the board? –Future impact on the Eastern Bloc? March 5 th, 1953: –Death of Stalin, successor and his policies will no doubt impact the Eastern Bloc

119 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 119 The East German Uprising of 1953 June 17, 1953 Was the first real mass uprising within the Soviet sphere of influence. It provided poignant and indelible images of unarmed citizens of East Berlin as they challenged Russian tanks with fists and rocks. But the revolt was quickly suppressed (Ostermann, p. XV)

120 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 120 Crisis Within the Soviet Sphere of Influence In June 1956, riots broke out in Poland…Khrushchev ousted the Stalin- era Polish leaders. He installed a new communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who promised worker reforms…Khrushchev quickly became uncomfortable with the reforms…Khrushchev chose not to force the issue. ( Hanes, Vol. II, pp )

121 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 121 Discontent in Hungary: 1956 Students push for changes starting in Budapest Demonstrations turn violent ( Oct. 23 rd ) Imre Nagy states they will leave the Warsaw Pact November 4 th Khrushchev responds with force –200,000 Soviet troops and 5,500 tanks launch a surprise attack –Eisenhower does not want to risk nuclear war and stays away

122 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 122 Discontent in Hungary: 1956 Close to thirty thousand Hungarians and several thousand Soviet troops were killed. In addition, over two hundred thousand Hungarians fled into neutral Austria…the Soviets arrested and later executed Nagy…The Hungarian revolt and resulting massive Soviet response caused major repercussions. The incident weakened Khrushchevs standing at home. Soviet communist hardliners blamed Khrushchevs anti-Stalin speech for the turmoil in Eastern Europe (Hanes, p. 196)

123 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 123 The Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Hungary At dawn, on November 4, 1956, Russian communism showed its true character…Hungary has laid bare the great Russian lie…In Hungary, Russia demonstrated that her program is simple. Infiltrate a target nation (as she did in Bulgaria and Rumania, for example); get immediate control of the police force (as she did in Czechoslovakia); initiate a terror which removes all intellectual and labor leadership (as she did in Latvia and Estonia); deport to Siberia troublesome people (as she did in Lithuania and Poland (Michener, pp. 1-2)

124 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 124 The Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Hungary From this point on it is difficult to imagine native-born communists in Italy or France…or America…trusting blindly that if they join the Russian orbit their fate will be any different (Michener, p. 2)

125 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 125 Prague Spring, 1968 A brief thaw in Cold War communist policies when in 1968 Czechoslovakias Communist Party leader, Alexander Dubcek, sought to modernize communism with certain democratic reforms, including greater freedom of the press (Hanes, p. 252)

126 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 126 Prague Spring, : Czechoslovakias economy was in trouble –Government shifts control of industry from central to local control –Did not help, frustrations and demonstrations are sparked 1968: Dubcek is appointed the Communist Party leader –Dubcek offers new reforms, including freedom of the press

127 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 127 Prague Spring, 1968 Other Communist leaders fear Dubceks reforms and call on Brezhnev to step in July 1968: Brezhnev demands that Dubcek back off his reforms Dubcek continues with his reforms Brezhnev sends in Warsaw Bloc forces Dubcek arrested and taken to Moscow Hardliners are put in Prague to lead the Czech s (Hanes, Vol. II, pp )

128 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 128 Prague Spring, 1968 The party was now officially endorsing…a unique experiment in democratic Communism: Socialism with a human face as it became colloquially known…the Czechoslovak Communist Party [over a ten year transition] would allow the emergence of other parties with whom it would compete in genuine elections. These were hardly original ideas, but publicly pronounced from the official organs of a ruling Communist Party they triggered a political earthquake. The Prague Spring had begun. (Judt. P. 441).

129 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 129 Bibliography BBC News Special. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from China's Communist Revolution: A glossary Web site: /1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm /1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm In-Depth Specials. Retrieved July 3, 2008, from Falun Gong: China's Dilemma Web site: (2003) Chang, J. & Halliday, J. (2005). Mao: The unknown story. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Crockatt, R. (2001). The Vietnam war and the superpower triangle. In K. Larres & A. Lane (Eds.), The Cold War: The essential readings (pp ).London, England: Blackwell.

130 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 130 Bibliography Finnegan, G. Gary Finnegan. Retrieved June 24, 2008, Web site: -square-19-years-on.html -square-19-years-on.html Gaddis, J.L. (2005). The cold war: A new history. New York, NY: Penguin Books Hanes, S.M. & Hanes, R.C. (2004). Cold war almanac: Volume 2. Detroit, MI: Thomson Gale. Judt, T. (2005). Postwar: A history of Europe since New York, NY: The Penguin Press. Luthi, L.M. (2008). The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

131 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 131 Bibliography Marti, M.E. (2002). China and the legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From communist revolution to capitalist evolution. Washington, D.C.: Brassey. Michener, J.A. (1975). The bridge at Andau: The compelling true story of a brave, embattled people. New York, NY: Fawcett. Ostermann, C.O. (2001). Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German question, and the first major upheaval behind the Iron Curtain. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press. Powaski, R. (1998). The cold war: The United States and the Soviet Union, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

132 Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright (Design) 132 Bibliography Reardon, L.C. (2002). The reluctant dragon: Crisis cycles in Chinese foreign economic policy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Westad, O.A. (1998). Brothers in arms: The rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Westad, O.A. (2007). The global cold war: Third world interventions and the making of our times. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Zubok, V. (2007). A failed empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of Chapel Hill Press. Zubok, V. & Pleshakov, C. (1996). Inside the Kremlins Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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