Presentation on theme: "Characteristics of Presidencies and the PMP February 28, 2005 Mark Payne, IDB."— Presentation transcript:
Characteristics of Presidencies and the PMP February 28, 2005 Mark Payne, IDB
What about presidencies/executives matters to the PMP of state reform? (Inner Black Box) Effective decision-making, strategizing Competence of core decision-makers and broader cabinet Cabinet stability Cabinet cohesion in policy-making Effective articulation of cabinet with the bureaucracy Cooperativeness of relations between the executive and congress Effective communications/relations with broader society
Presidents are central to this. Why do they govern in the way they do? Why do they appoint who they appoint? INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT Institutionalization of governing party and broader party system. Level of legislative support and level of initial popular support. Constitutional powers of the president (legislative, appointment etc.) PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS Leadership experience, style and skill. Political career background – party experience. Intelligence (education experience). Communication ability. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT e.g. Severity of problems/challenges confronted.
What personal characteristics might matter for promoter of state reform? Long term vision Clear set of policy priorities with national public good orientation Flexible/adaptive Competent/open to expert advice Firm, decisive, but consensus-building in approach Effective leader, good communicator - charisma, cognitive intelligence, “emotional intelligence” (Greenstein, 2000 and Gergen, 2000)
Some preliminary questions How much do personal characteristics and styles of leadership matter? (Cardoso vs. Collor; de la Rua vs. Kirchner…) If they do matter how do we escape tautologies or go beyond stating the obvious? Effective leadership makes for good outcomes. Especially given small N are there any generalizations that can be made linking personal background/recruitment process to leadership qualities or independently measurable characteristics to governmental outcomes? What links can be drawn between presidential leadership qualities/styles and other institutional features of the PMP?
Other than sheer luck, what broad factors might matter for getting “good” presidents and presidencies? Recruitment process Electoral rules Institutional context for governing Constitutional legislative and non-legislative powers; partisan legislative support; governing party cohesion/institutionalization; polarization of party system etc.
Institutional Setting vs. Luck Institutional context: can make more or less probable the nomination of candidates and the election of presidents constrained by party ties, helped by experience in the legislature, with ample experience in public office etc. But, institutional context cannot fully account for competence, skill, charisma etc.
Some Links between Presidency Qualities and Institutional Context Presidential Recruitment Process Type of Candidate* Quality of Presidency General Election Process Source: Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2004 Type of Pres-Elect* Residual Personal Qualities* Legis. Support* Presidential Powers* Cohesive Cabinet
Recruitment: Factors Affecting the Type of Candidates/President-Elects That Emerge Party Variables Party institutionalization/ party system institutionalization Candidate nomination process Campaign financing Electoral/Legal Variables Presidential electoral system Timing of elections Rules on Reelection Barriers to independent candidates Source: Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2004
Types of Candidates Party insiders: Candidates emerge from long-standing, institutionalized party with fairly cohesive ideology; have held positions in party (e.g. Lagos, Sanguinetti, Cardoso) Party adherents: Candidates emerge from outside the core of established party or from more personalized or fragmented party (e.g. Menem, Febres Cordero) Group agents: Recognized leaders of specific societal groups: business, labor, indigenous, religious. No elected presidents with this profile. (e.g. Evo Morales) Free-wheeling independents: No long-term identification with a party; typically such candidates use an existing small or new party as an electoral vehicle; or split-off from existing party (e.g. Collor, Gutierrez, Chavez)
Some sample hypotheses: how institutions might affect type of candidate Party insider nomination/election encouraged by: 1) institutionalized party systems; 2) selection by party elites; 3) plurality election systems; 4) concurrent elections; 5) centralized campaign finance; 6) high barriers to independent candidates; 7) low party system fragmentation Party adherent nomination/election encouraged by: 1) more weakly institutionalized, personalistic party systems; 2) use of closed or open primaries; 3) financing somewhat decentralized Free-wheeling independent nomination/election encouraged by: 1) weakly institutionalized/fragmented party system; 2) low barriers to independent candidates; 3) majority runoff system Source: Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2004
Dataset on Backgrounds of Presidents 105 presidencies in 18 LA countries (complete data for 96 presidencies) (Reelected presidents appear as additional observation) Covers party background, how nominated, educational experience, previous public offices Sources: Case studies from the project of “Pathways to power: Political recruitment and Democracy in Latin America ” Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2004; Biographies of political leaders. Fundación CIDOB. http://www.cidob.org/bios/ http://www.cidob.org/bios/ Created by Juan Cruz Perusia, IDB.
Process Used to Select Presidents (No. of Presidencies)
Party Backgrounds (% of Presidencies by Country)
University Education Abroad (% of Presidencies by Country)
University/Graduate Fields of Study of Presidents
Institutional Context for Governing Presidents/executives that can count on strong partisan support in legislature or lack strong proactive powers may be more inclined to pursue strategy of cooperation: rely on appointment powers, agenda-setting powers instead of legislative powers; appoint party leaders in cabinet Presidents/executives with weak partisan support and greater proactive powers are more likely to try to circumvent congress by use of decree powers and pack cabinet with personal loyalists and technocrats But Collor vs. Cardoso suggests that different strategies may be possible in similar institutional context Source: Cox and Morgenstern, 2002; Amorim Neto (1998)