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A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE : WHAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Antonio C. O. Barroso IPEN – CNEN/SP.

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Presentation on theme: "A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE : WHAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Antonio C. O. Barroso IPEN – CNEN/SP."— Presentation transcript:

1 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE : WHAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Antonio C. O. Barroso IPEN – CNEN/SP

2 P RESENTATION ROADMAP Origen of the term IAEA guidance Has the concept permeated? Assessment instruments What are we measuring?

3 Organizacional Culture O RIGEN OF THE TERM … C HENORBYL From the aftermath, at IAEA EquipmentsSystemsProceduresControlsManagementPeople A socio-technical system

4 O RIGEN OF THE TERM - IAEA IN 1986 INSAG1 – The Chernobyl Accident “A vital conclusion drawn from this behaviour is the importance of placing complete authority and responsibility for the safety of the plant on a senior member of the operations staff of the plant. Of equal importance, formal procedures must be properly reviewed and approved must be supplemented by the creation and maintenance of a “ nuclear safety culture”. Let’s get the proper understanding of

5 P RESENTATION ROADMAP Origen of the term IAEA guidance Has the concept permeated? Assessment instruments What are we measuring?

6 IAEA GUIDANCE - BASED ON S CHEIN Monica Haage at ICTP 2010

7 IAEA GUIDANCE - DURING THE 90’ S IAEA INSAG IAEA INSAG IAEA INSAG IAEA SRS IAEA SRS A “definition” “Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance”.

8 IAEA GUIDANCE AND...M ARCH 2011 IAEA TECDOC INSAG Series IAEA SRS IAEA TECDOC

9 P RESENTATION ROADMAP Origen of the term IAEA guidance Has the concept permeated? Assessment instruments What are we measuring?

10 H AS THE CONCEPT PERMEATED ? Humans alone and in groups are the root agents of organizations and, as such, we could build upon the definition stated in INSAG 4 Safety Culture is the assembly of systems, characteristics, mindset and attitudes at the organizational and individual levels which assures that: (a) as an overriding priority, nuclear safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance; and (b) adequate resources, information and actionable knowledge are empowered at the decision / action points where safety issues are dealt with.

11 H AS THE CONCEPT PERMEATED ? A BIBLIOMETRIC VIEW From Scopus data base until Dec/2011 From : nuclear safety culture seemed to be left out of the agenda of the nuclear industry. In relevant journals and conferences, the interest on the subject has been near stagnant, both in terms of publications and citations. At the same time for the other areas taken together, there is a vigorous increasing interest on the subject

12 H AS THE CONCEPT PERMEATED ? A BIBLIOMETRIC VIEW Safety culture in the nuclear area yearsPublicationsCitations AverageSlopeAverageSlope First period Second period Overall Safety culture outside the nuclear area yearsPublicationsCitations AverageSlopeAverageSlope First period Second period Third period Overall

13 H AS THE CONCEPT PERMEATED ? A BIBLIOMETRIC VIEW It could be unfair to compare numbers of nuclear area to all others, but it is wise and fair to compare the growth rates Safety culture in the nuclear area yearsPublicationsCitations AverageSlopeAverageSlope Overall Safety culture outside the nuclear area yearsPublicationsCitations AverageSlopeAverageSlope Overall Are we happy with that?

14 P RESENTATION ROADMAP Origen of the term IAEA guidance Has the concept permeated? Assessment instruments What are we measuring?

15 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IAEA documents provide thorough, diverse and valuable guidance, but they are only sketchy concerning quantitative assessment models. Note that there are other assessment methods and we need them all, but I am going to focus on the quantitative ones.

16 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS - REFLECTIVE OR FORMATIVE Is safety culture a reflective or formative construct? Health Diet (reflective) Health conservation (formative) Health Diet Health Cons.

17 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS - REFLECTIVE OR FORMATIVE Blood alcohol content # Wine glasses # beer cans # vodka drinks # whisky doses Drunkness level Blow test Physical reaction test Clocked memory test Observable variables (indicators) not necessarily correlated (should be complete) Observable variables (indicators) that should be correlated (some are enough) Formative construct Reflective construct

18 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS – RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

19 Dimensionality of the construct Content validity Convergent validity Discriminant validity Predictive validity Reliability “validation is cumulative” multiple studies, different settings …

20 A SSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS - “ VALIDATED ” MODELS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE ? Web of science – Apr/2014

21 P RESENTATION ROADMAP Origen of the term IAEA guidance Has the concept permeated? Assessment instruments What are we measuring?

22 W HAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Article 1 - LEE, T. Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. Work and Stress, v. 12, n. 3, p , Safety culture assessment of Sellafield reprocessing plant focusing safety related attitudes. Initial questionnaire had 172 itens and gather data from 5926 participants. Initially EFA by PCA resulted in 38 factors, but later reduced to 19 and 81 items. Predictive validity was done against the number of reported accidents with significant time loss. The model was not further evolved and it would be unpractical by todays standards

23 W HAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Article 2 - Lopes de Castro, B.; Gracia, F. J.; Peiró, J. M.; Pietrantoni, L.; Hernández, A. Testing the validity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety culture model. Accident Analysis and Prevention, v. 60, p , They have used as model the 5 characteristics (factors) and 37 attributes (indicators) recommended by AEA Safety Report Series no. 42 (2005) and have tried to validate it. The model failed to present adequate psychometric capacity. Most of the indicators were not good manifestations of their factors, low face validity and only moderate content validity. Most alarming was the lack of discriminating validity.

24 W HAT ARE WE MEASURING ? Not much, or Not nuclear safety culture But other segments are! For instance in Hospitals and similar organizations many steps of the “cumulative” validation have been done a model for patient safety culture, developed in 2005, has been applied, adapted and validated in different settings (10) and countries (5)


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