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The Family as an Economic Unit. The Neoclassical Model of Specialization & Exchange Basic underlying assumption: The family is a unit whose adult members.

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Presentation on theme: "The Family as an Economic Unit. The Neoclassical Model of Specialization & Exchange Basic underlying assumption: The family is a unit whose adult members."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Family as an Economic Unit

2 The Neoclassical Model of Specialization & Exchange Basic underlying assumption: The family is a unit whose adult members make informed and rational decisions that maximize the well-being of the family.

3 Family well-being or utility is maximized by selecting the combination of commodities from which the family derives the greatest satisfaction. These commodities are produced by combining home time of family members with goods and services purchased in the market using labor market earnings. One such commodity might be a family evening at home watching a movie on TV. This commodity requires a TV and the time of the family members spent watching it.

4 Law of Comparative Advantage The total output of a group, an economy, a group of nations or a family will be greatest when the output of each good is produced by the person (or firm or nation) with the lowest opportunity cost.

5 It is frequently the case that women are relatively more productive in the home and men are relatively more productive in the market. This can be true because men and women are traditionally raised with different expectations and receive different education and training. It may also be the case that women are discriminated against in the labor market and that discrimination lowers their market earnings. Moreover, the traditional division of labor is likely to magnify differences in the household and market skills of men and women because both types of skills tend to increase with experience.

6 While the preceding factors tend to produce gender differences in comparative advantage for homemaking versus market work, it is not necessarily the case that the traditional division of labor is the optimal arrangement. Raising children according to gender rather than individual talents and discriminating against women workers in the labor market introduces distortions. To the extent that women’s relative advantage for homemaking is socially determined and reflects unequal access to market opportunities, the traditional division of labor is not always efficient or desirable.

7 In the following discussion, we assume that women have a comparative advantage in housework relative to men, because we are exploring a reality in which women generally have primary responsibility for homemaking. This does not imply that the traditional division of labor is inevitable or that it will persist indefinitely into the future.

8 Example of gains from specialization & exchange Consider two people: Dave and Diane.

9 Dave Dave makes $10 an hour in the labor market. Alternatively, with an hour he can produce $5 worth of home production (perhaps a mediocre dinner). So for Dave, the opportunity cost of $10 worth of home production is two hours of market work, which is worth $20. For Dave the opportunity cost of $10 worth of market goods is one hour of home production, which is worth $5.

10 Diane Diane makes $15 an hour in the labor market. Alternatively, with an hour she can produce $15 worth of home production (perhaps a very good dinner). So for Diane, the opportunity cost of $10 worth of home production is 2/3 of an hour or 40 minutes of market work, which is worth $10. For Diane, the opportunity cost of $10 worth of market goods is 2/3 of an hour or 40 minutes of home production, which is worth $10.

11 Suppose Dave and Diane both work and perform home production. Value of Market Goods Value of Home Production Total Value Dave6 hrs x $10 = $602 hrs x $5 = $10$70 Diane7 hrs x $15 = $1051 hrs x $15 = $15120 Total$165$25$190

12 Comparison of opportunity costs Person Opp. cost of $10 of home production Opp. cost of $10 of mkt production Dave$20$5 Diane$10 So, we can see that Dave has a lower opportunity cost of market production and therefore a comparative advantage in market production. Diane has a lower opportunity cost of home production and therefore a comparative advantage in home production.

13 The law of comparative advantage indicates that their total production should be greater if there is specialization and Dave does more work and less home production and Diane does less work and more home production. Suppose Diane reduces her market work by 1 hour & increases her home production by 1 hour, while Dave does an additional 2 hours of market work instead of his 2 hours of home production.

14 By having Dave only do market work, in which he has a comparative advantage, and having Diane do the home production, in which she has a comparative advantage, they have increased their total production value by $10, from $190 to $200. Value of Market Goods Value of Home Production Total Value Dave8 hrs x $10 = 80 0 hrs x $5 = $0$80 Diane6 hrs x $15 = $90 2 hrs x $15 = 30120 Total$170$30$200

15 Note that it is comparative advantage, not absolute advantage, that makes possible the gains from specialization and exchange. In the example we used here, Diane had an absolute advantage over Dave in both market and home production. In an hour she could make either $15 of market production or $15 of home production, while Dave, in a hour, could only make $10 of market production or $5 of home production.

16 Let’s look at the story using a graph. Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) Suppose each person has 8 hours a day to allocate to market and/or home production. Remember, in a hour Dave can make either $10 dollars of market production or $5 of home production. So if he only does market work, he’ll have $80 worth of production, and if he only does home work, he’ll have $40 work of production. So Dave’s production possibility frontier has a slope of -2, which is the rate at which he trades market production for home production. Dave 80 40

17 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) Diane 120 Remember, in a hour Diane can make either $15 dollars of market production or $15 of home production. So if she only does market work, she’ll have $120 worth of production, and if she only does home work, she’ll have $120 work of production. So Diane’s production possibility frontier has a slope of -1, which is the rate at which she trades market production for home production.

18 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) If Dave & Diane combine production and they both do only home work (pt. H), they’ll have $160 of production. If they both do only market production (pt. M), they’ll have $200 of production. H 160 M 200 Y

19 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 Starting from H, with both doing only home work, if they were to exchange some home time for market time, it would be some of Dave’s time they trade first since we found earlier that he has a lower opportunity cost of market production & a higher opportunity cost of home production. So they’re initially trading at his tradeoff rate (slope = -2). Y H M

20 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 If they trade all of Dave’s home production time for work time but none of Diane’s, they will be at Y. They have $120 of home production and $80 of market production. Y 120 H M 80

21 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 At points between H & Y, Diane does only home work and Dave does both home & market work. Y 120 H M 80

22 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 At points between Y & M, Dave does only market work and Diane does both home work & market work. Y 120 H M 80

23 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 At points between Y & M, they are exchanging Diane’s home production time for her market time, so the slope of the production possibility frontier (PPF) is based on her tradeoff rate of –1. That’s why the PPF is flatter at the top than at the bottom. Y H M

24 Mkt Production ($) Home Production ($) 200 160 What determines the point on the PPF at which they operate? That depends on their tastes, that is, their preferences for market goods versus home goods. To understand that, we need the concept of indifference curves. Y H M

25 Indifference Curve: A curve that shows the consumption alternatives that yield the same level of satisfaction or utility. In other words, a couple is indifferent between the points on the indifference curve.

26 Characteristics of indifference curves: 1)Downward sloping (negative slope) 2)Two curves cannot intersect. 3)Each point on the graph has exactly one indifference curve passing through it. 4)Utility is greater for curves that are higher and further to the right. 5)Usually assumed to be convex. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4

27 Indifference curves are downward sloping because you can be equally happy with fewer goods from market production if you have more goods from home production. At point B you have fewer goods from market production than at point A, but you have more goods from home production. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U1U1 8 3 410 A B

28 Indifference curves can not intersect, because that would imply that the point of intersection gives two different levels of satisfaction. Point A gives the satisfaction associated with U 1 but also the satisfaction associated with U 2. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 A

29 Each point on the graph has exactly one indifference curve passing through it. For any point you can pick, there is one indifference curve passing through it. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($)

30 Each point on the graph has exactly one indifference curve passing through it. For any point you can pick, there is one indifference curve passing through it. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) A

31 Each point on the graph has exactly one indifference curve passing through it. For any point you can pick, there is one indifference curve passing through it. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U1U1 A

32 Utility is greater for curves that are higher and further to the right. Indifference curve U 1 has a lower utility or satisfaction level than U 2 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1

33 Utility is greater for curves that are higher and further to the right. Indifference curve U 1 has a lower utility or satisfaction level than U 2, and U 2 has a lower utility level than U 3 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3

34 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4 Utility is greater for curves that are higher and further to the right. Indifference curve U 1 has a lower utility or satisfaction level than U 2, and U 2 has a lower utility level than U 3, and U 3 has a lower utility level than U 4.

35 Indifference curves are usually assumed to be convex. This means that the magnitude of the slope decreases as you move from left to right. At a point like A, where market goods are relatively plentiful and home goods are relatively scarce, it would take a fairly large amount of market goods ($10) to induce a couple to give up a little bit of home goods ($2) and still remain equally well off. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U1U1 A B 110 100 810

36 At a point like C, where home goods are relatively plentiful and market goods are relatively scarce, it would only take a small amount of market goods ($3) to induce a couple to give up even a fairly large amount of home goods ($12) and still remain equally well off. This seems realistic because when goods are scarcer they are usually valued more highly. Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U1U1 C D 8 5 100112

37 Now we can combine the production possibilities frontier (PPF) with the indifference curves to see what choices a couple would make. A couple will choose a point where they have the highest level of satisfaction that they can achieve given their PPF.

38 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4 B A C No points on U 4 are attainable. Notice that both point A on U 1 and point B on U 2 make full and efficient use of resources, but they do not maximize the couple’s satisfaction. The couple is best off at point C on U 3.

39 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4 B A C In this particular case, Dave does only market work and Diane does both home work & market work. The couple has relatively strong preferences for market goods.

40 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4 A In this case, the couple would be best off at point A on U 3. Here, Diane does only home production and Dave does both home work & market work. The couple has relatively strong preferences for home goods.

41 Home Production ($) Mkt Production ($) U2U2 U1U1 U3U3 U4U4 A In this intermediate case, the couple would be best off at point A on U 3. Here, Diane does only home production and Dave does only market work.

42 These advantages include 1.Economies of scale 2.Public goods 3.Externalities in consumption 4.Opportunities for marriage-specific investments 5.Risk pooling and 6.Institutional benefits There are other advantages to forming a family, besides gains from specialization and exchange.

43 Economies of scale Housing for two people does not cost twice as much as housing for one. It does not take twice as long to prepare meals for two people as it does to prepare them for one person.

44 Public goods A public good has the characteristic that the consumption of the item by one person does not diminish the amount available for consumption by others. For example, if there is a movie on television, the amount of consumption and satisfaction an individual obtains from the movie is probably not reduced if another person is watching it too.

45 Externalities in consumption When two people care for one another, one partner may derive satisfaction from the enjoyment and happiness of the other.

46 Opportunities for marriage-specific investments Marriage-specific investments refers to the development of skills, knowledge, and other items that are worth more in the marriage than if the marriage were terminated. The prime example is the rearing of children. Children provide their parents with considerable satisfaction. However, they may form an obstacle to forming a new relationship with another partner.

47 Risk pooling If one spouse becomes unemployed, the couple can rely on the other spouse to cover at least part of the household expenses.

48 Institutional benefits These benefits include coverage by a spouse’s health insurance, pension benefits, and Social Security benefits.

49 There are also potential problems associated with specialization of market and household production.

50 Market/Household Specialization - Problem 1 It is unlikely that one person has a comparative advantage in all household tasks. It is therefore likely that both members of a couple will do some household production. Furthermore, if the level of utility or disutility of work is influenced by the amount performed, it may be preferable that both members of a couple do both market and household production.

51 Market/Household Specialization - Problem 2 An individual’s comparative advantage may not remain constant over the life cycle. The value of home production for women is greatest during the child-rearing years and declines as the children grow up and become more self-sufficient. In addition, labor market earnings increase with experience and decline as skills depreciate during periods out of the labor force. So a woman pays a high price in terms of career advancement and earnings when she exits the labor force to care for children and then re-enters the labor force later.

52 Market/Household Specialization - Problem 3 There are costs of interdependence. When each spouse is able to manage a household and earn a living, the family will not be devastated if the “breadwinner” is laid off or if the “caregiver” becomes seriously ill. Each will also be better equipped to manage alone in the case of divorce or death.

53 Market/Household Specialization - Problem 4 When there are differences of opinion, the “breadwinner” tends to dominate and the homemaker’s wishes become subordinate. In families where husband and wife have similar earning power, they are more likely to make major decisions jointly.

54 Market/Household Specialization - Problem 5 Spouses who are not employed are less likely to have the financial means to leave an abusive relationship.

55 Bargaining Models of Families The neoclassical model of the family assumed that families operate efficiently and without friction either because there is a consensus on preferences or because decisions are made by an altruistic family head and are accepted by the other members. Bargaining models do not make this assumption and allow for differences of opinion.

56 Bargaining Models of Families – cont’d In these models, the bargaining power of each spouse is determined by his/her threat point, the level of well-being that each would attain if they cannot reach a cooperative solution within the marriage. The final solution to a problem is likely to more closely reflect the preferences of the party with the stronger threat effect, who is better able to walk away from the deal.

57 Bargaining Models of Families – cont’d Factors affecting threat points include an individual’s control of resources outside the marriage, laws defining division of marital property, the probability of remarriage, and eligibility rules for benefit levels under welfare programs.

58 Perspectives on the Family of Other Schools of Thought Other perspectives on the family include the Marxist and Radical Feminist approaches. Like the bargaining models, they focus on the role of power and the potential for exploitation.

59 Marxists Marxists see the capitalist economy as one in which capitalists wield power over workers who do not own the means of production and are therefore forced to sell their labor for low wages. They see women as doubly exploited because they supply unpaid services in the family and that enables capitalists to pay workers low wages.

60 Radical Feminists Although radical feminists recognize the existence of emotional ties and some unified interests within the family, they see the family as the locus of struggle and women’s oppression. They see the usual household division of labor as not merely the result of private decisions but to a great extent influenced by patriarchal tradition.

61 Nonmarket Work Economists have traditionally focused their attention on market work. However, much work is performed outside the market, both in the household and in the voluntary sector. Such work contributes substantially to the well-being of individuals, their families, and society at large.

62 Housework Consider the allocation of time by men and women to market work and housework in 1978 and 1988. What patterns persist and what has changed?

63 Although the division of labor remained quite unequal, the difference in the allocation of time to market work and nonmarket work narrowed between 1978 and 1988. Average Weekly Hours of Housework and Market Work 19781988 Mkt WorkHouseworkTotalMkt WorkHouseworkTotal Women20.126.746.826.421.347.7 Nonmarried27.217.244.432.113.445.5 Married18.329.147.424.923.648.5 Not Employed0.337.137.40.333.033.3 Employed29.324.353.632.220.853.0 Men42.56.148.643.37.450.7 Nonmarried38.38.246.541.27.048.2 Married43.15.848.943.77.551.2 Wife not empl.42.55.047.541.36.447.7 Wife employed43.56.449.944.47.852.2

64 Average Weekly Hours of Housework and Market Work 19781988 Mkt WorkHouseworkTotalMkt WorkHouseworkTotal Women20.126.746.826.421.347.7 Nonmarried27.217.244.432.113.445.5 Married18.329.147.424.923.648.5 Not Employed0.337.137.40.333.033.3 Employed29.324.353.632.220.853.0 Men42.56.148.643.37.450.7 Nonmarried38.38.246.541.27.048.2 Married43.15.848.943.77.551.2 Wife not empl.42.55.047.541.36.447.7 Wife employed43.56.449.944.47.852.2 On average, for women, hours of market work increased and hours of nonmarket work decreased, while for men, hours of both market work and nonmarket work increased.

65 Average Weekly Hours of Housework and Market Work 19781988 Mkt WorkHouseworkTotalMkt WorkHouseworkTotal Women20.126.746.826.421.347.7 Nonmarried27.217.244.432.113.445.5 Married18.329.147.424.923.648.5 Not Employed0.337.137.40.333.033.3 Employed29.324.353.632.220.853.0 Men42.56.148.643.37.450.7 Nonmarried38.38.246.541.27.048.2 Married43.15.848.943.77.551.2 Wife not empl.42.55.047.541.36.447.7 Wife employed43.56.449.944.47.852.2 Total time at market and nonmarket work increased for both men and women.

66 Average Weekly Hours of Housework and Market Work 19781988 Mkt WorkHouseworkTotalMkt WorkHouseworkTotal Women20.126.746.826.421.347.7 Nonmarried27.217.244.432.113.445.5 Married18.329.147.424.923.648.5 Not Employed0.337.137.40.333.033.3 Employed29.324.353.632.220.853.0 Men42.56.148.643.37.450.7 Nonmarried38.38.246.541.27.048.2 Married43.15.848.943.77.551.2 Wife not empl.42.55.047.541.36.447.7 Wife employed43.56.449.944.47.852.2 Overall, between 1978 and 1988, women’s time spent in housework decreased from about four times that of men to about three times that of men.

67 Average Weekly Hours of Housework and Market Work 19781988 Mkt WorkHouseworkTotalMkt WorkHouseworkTotal Women20.126.746.826.421.347.7 Nonmarried27.217.244.432.113.445.5 Married18.329.147.424.923.648.5 Not Employed0.337.137.40.333.033.3 Employed29.324.353.632.220.853.0 Men42.56.148.643.37.450.7 Nonmarried38.38.246.541.27.048.2 Married43.15.848.943.77.551.2 Wife not empl.42.55.047.541.36.447.7 Wife employed43.56.449.944.47.852.2 Hours of housework done by women decreased consider- ably, while hours done by men increased slightly. Overall, total housework done has decreased.

68 Avg. Weekly Hours in Market Work & Housework, 2006 Market WorkHousework Women24.316.5 Nonmarried26.113.1 Married23.418.3 Employed33.415.0 Not Employed0.225.8 Men36.09.5 Nonmarried32.49.2 Married37.89.7 Wife employed38.79.9 Wife not employed35.89.2 Gender Ratio of Time Use Women to Men0.71.7 Married Women to Married Men0.61.9 More recent figures show that women’s hours of housework have dropped further and men’s hours of housework have risen slightly.

69 The drop in total housework done may be attributable to a trend toward smaller families, changes in household technology, and availability of market substitutes.

70 Allocation of housework in various types of households In both married couple households and households of cohabitating men and women, women do considerably more housework than men, but the gender gap is wider among married couples. On average cohabitating men spend 7% more time in housework than married men, and cohabitating women spend 18% less time in housework than married women. It is also expected that there would be less specialization among partners in gay and lesbian couples.

71 Volunteer Work Volunteer activities are defined as tasks performed without direct reward in money or in kind that mainly benefit others rather than the individuals themselves or their immediate family.

72 Percentage Volunteering Avg Wkly Hrs of Volunteers Women 198746.74.7 199351.24.2 199861.73.4 Men 198743.84.8 199343.94.3 199849.43.6 Total 198745.34.7 199347.74.2 199855.53.5 Women volunteer at higher rates than men. The percentages of persons volunteering has increased for both men and women, despite the increase in women’s labor force participation. On the other hand, the average number of weekly hours of volunteers has decreased. Trends in Volunteering

73 Gender Differences in Types of Volunteer Work Women contribute more time to health organizations and educational institutions, while men do more volunteer work for civic and political organizations, as well as sport and recreational organizations.

74 Racial and Ethnic Differences in Rates of Volunteerism Group Percent Volunteering Population as a Whole 56 Blacks47 Hispanics46 Rates of volunteerism are lower for blacks and Hispanics. This difference is likely attributable to the fact that volunteerism is greater among higher- income individuals.

75 1998 Family Structure by Race & Hispanic Origin All RacesWhitesBlacks Hispanics (any race) Unmarried births as a % of all births 32.826.369.141.6 % of children under 18 living with 2 married parents 68.174.036.263.6 % of adults who are married59.762.141.858.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 as % of all families with children under age 18 26.120.957.329.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 and a never-married mother as % of mother-only families with children under age 18 42.231.663.744.3 Marriage is much less common among blacks than among whites.

76 1998 Family Structure by Race & Hispanic Origin All RacesWhitesBlacks Hispanics (any race) Unmarried births as a % of all births 32.826.369.141.6 % of children under 18 living with 2 married parents 68.174.036.263.6 % of adults who are married59.762.141.858.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 as % of all families with children under age 18 26.120.957.329.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 and a never-married mother as % of mother-only families with children under age 18 42.231.663.744.3 The percentage of births to unmarried women is much higher for blacks than for whites.

77 1998 Family Structure by Race & Hispanic Origin All RacesWhitesBlacks Hispanics (any race) Unmarried births as a % of all births 32.826.369.141.6 % of children under 18 living with 2 married parents 68.174.036.263.6 % of adults who are married59.762.141.858.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 as % of all families with children under age 18 26.120.957.329.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 and a never-married mother as % of mother-only families with children under age 18 42.231.663.744.3 The percentage of children under 18 who are living with 2 married parents is much lower for blacks than for whites.

78 1998 Family Structure by Race & Hispanic Origin All RacesWhitesBlacks Hispanics (any race) Unmarried births as a % of all births 32.826.369.141.6 % of children under 18 living with 2 married parents 68.174.036.263.6 % of adults who are married59.762.141.858.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 as % of all families with children under age 18 26.120.957.329.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 and a never-married mother as % of mother-only families with children under age 18 42.231.663.744.3 Mother-only families are much more common among blacks than among whites.

79 1998 Family Structure by Race & Hispanic Origin All RacesWhitesBlacks Hispanics (any race) Unmarried births as a % of all births 32.826.369.141.6 % of children under 18 living with 2 married parents 68.174.036.263.6 % of adults who are married59.762.141.858.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 as % of all families with children under age 18 26.120.957.329.9 Mother-only families with children under age 18 and a never-married mother as % of mother-only families with children under age 18 42.231.663.744.3 Among mother-only families, the percentage in which the mother was never married is much higher for blacks than for whites.

80 Changes in the Demographic Composition of the U.S. Population Changes in race and ethnicity have been the result of changes in the patterns of immigration and differences in birth rates among various groups. The largest increase is projected among Hispanics (both white and black) from 9% of the population in 1990 to 16.3% in 2020. The non-Hispanic black population is projected to increase slightly from 11.8% to 12.9% of the total population. The non-Hispanic white population is projected to decrease from 75.6% to 64.3% of the total population.

81 Intermarriage Intermarriage among race and ethnic groups is becoming more common. Of new marriages involving at least one African American, 12.1% were with a white partner in 1993 compared to only 2.6% in 1970. The rates were even higher among Asians and Native Americans.

82 The “Typical” American Family? It is clear that the American family today is very different from the 1950s television characterization of the American family, which was invariably white and consisted of a homemaker wife and breadwinner husband with two or three children and a dog.

83 Bianchi et al decomposed the change in the amount of housework done between 1965 and 1995 into three parts. 1.The change due to a change in the propensity to do housework (behavioral differences). 2.The change due to changes in the composition of the population (the characteristics of the people). 3.The change due to an interaction between behavior and characteristics. “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al

84 The authors found that, for women, the change in the amount of housework done that is due to a change in the propensity to do housework was larger than the change due to the differences in the characteristics. Both effects were negative, indicating that women had a lower propensity to do housework and the characteristics of the women (more education and market work, etc) also reduced the amount of housework done.

85 “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al The interaction effect was positive, which means that as women became more educated and more often employed, the negative propensity to do housework has declined for the employed relative to the nonemployed and for the better educated relative to the less educated. Thus, the likelihood of doing housework was declining fastest for those with the most time available for domestic work – nonemployed, unmarried, childless women.

86 “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al Effect of Market Work & Earnings on Housework: The wife’s hours of market work increase her husband’s housework and decrease her own housework. The husband’s hours of market work decrease his own housework and increase his wife’s housework slightly. Children increase housework hours for both mothers and fathers, but more so for mothers. The greater the proportion of couple income that the wife earns, the less housework she does and the more her husband does.

87 “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al How does gender attitude affect housework? Wives with a more egalitarian gender attitude do less housework, but their husbands’ housework hours are unaffected. So the gap between housework done by the wife and the husband is reduced. Husbands with a more egalitarian gender attitude do NOT do less housework, but their wives do. Again the gap between housework done by the wife and the husband is reduced.

88 “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al Other factors influencing housework: White husbands and wives do fewer hours of housework than nonwhite husbands and wives. If the wife is enrolled in school, she does less housework and her husband does more. There is no significant impact on the housework of either spouse, when the husband is enrolled in school.

89 “Is Anyone Doing the Housework” Bianchi et al Gender segregation of household tasks continues, with wives performing the “core housework” (cooking, meal cleanup, housecleaning, and laundry) and men doing other more “episodic” tasks (outdoor chores, and repairs).


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