Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007 David Agnew Imperial College/MRAG.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007 David Agnew Imperial College/MRAG."— Presentation transcript:

1 COBECOS Salerno Feb 2007 David Agnew Imperial College/MRAG

2

3 CFCA project tasks A full description of existing MCS capacity and costs for each MS; A full description of existing MCS capacity and costs for each MS; To establish the views of MS, the Commission, third parties (fishery partner counties and Regional Fisheries Organisations) and other industry stakeholders on the operation of the Agency indicators of MS ‘interest’; To establish the views of MS, the Commission, third parties (fishery partner counties and Regional Fisheries Organisations) and other industry stakeholders on the operation of the Agency indicators of MS ‘interest’; To examine options for joint deployment plans, their efficiency and cost/benefit To examine options for joint deployment plans, their efficiency and cost/benefit To examine options for Agency activity, and costs from case studies and other means To examine options for Agency activity, and costs from case studies and other means To examine options for Agency structure To examine options for Agency structure

4

5 Current costs are related to EEZ area

6 Table 3.20 Inter regional differences Cost / inspection (€) SeaLandAir Baltic Denmark Sweden Germany Na Poland Estonia North Sea ,650.7 Denmark UK Germany France Cost / inspection (€) Mediterranean France Spain Cyprus Malta175.0Na100.0 Atlantic UK France Spain

7

8

9 Efficient implementation requires: uniform and effective inspection probability on sea and land uniform and effective inspection probability on sea and land uniform quality of inspection uniform quality of inspection uniform deterrent effect of inspections uniform deterrent effect of inspections

10 Different models for compliance coordination Model 1: Partial information exchange and no coordinated activity. DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS Model 1: Partial information exchange and no coordinated activity. DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS Model 2 MS engage in joint patrols and extensive information exchange. PARTIALLY SATISFIES CFP, BUT DOES NOT ENSURE EQUAL INSPECTIONS Model 2 MS engage in joint patrols and extensive information exchange. PARTIALLY SATISFIES CFP, BUT DOES NOT ENSURE EQUAL INSPECTIONS Model 3 JDP with equivalent levels of inspection created by MS within their EEZs. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES MAY NOT BE AS EFFICIENT AS MODEL 4 BUT IS EASIER TO IMPLEMENT Model 3 JDP with equivalent levels of inspection created by MS within their EEZs. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES MAY NOT BE AS EFFICIENT AS MODEL 4 BUT IS EASIER TO IMPLEMENT Model 4 MS achieve uniformity through full pooling of resources. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES WILL BE MORE EFFICIENT THAN MODEL 3 BUT MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT Model 4 MS achieve uniformity through full pooling of resources. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES WILL BE MORE EFFICIENT THAN MODEL 3 BUT MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT

11 Compliance – the essential building blocks The Agency will need to develop quantitative risk-based assessment of JDP requirements to ensure efficient deployment – this is not being done in any MS. The Agency will need to develop quantitative risk-based assessment of JDP requirements to ensure efficient deployment – this is not being done in any MS. 1. How is the amount of compliance related to the amount of inspection effort? 2. Is there an optimum level of inspection effort that yields the most cost-effective benefits – minimum costs and maximum compliance? 3. What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort within a JDP? 4. What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort between inspection means? Theory: compliance = 1 – (n. infringements / n. inspections) Theory: compliance = 1 – (n. infringements / n. inspections) i.e. proportion of inspected events that do not have infringements, assuming an equal detection probability in all inspection systems.i.e. proportion of inspected events that do not have infringements, assuming an equal detection probability in all inspection systems.

12 Question 1 – answer: yes there is a relationship between inspection effort and compliance optimum complianc e is achieve optimum complianc e is achieve Maximum compliance is at high levels of inspection coverage (1- infringements/inspection) Inspection rate is expressed as sea inspections per 1000 tonnes of demersal catch This relationship will need to be developed for each JDP and inspection means by the Agency

13

14 Question 3: the optimum distribution of inspections is in direct proportion to fishing effort (catches) A 20% discrepancy between the current distribution of inspections, and the distribution of the catch, is predicted to lead to a 10% higher level of infringements than a perfectly distributed system ideal current

15 Northern Hake Southern Hake Baltic (22-32) cod Mediterranea n bluefin tuna NAFO NEAFC Case studies

16 Testing the application of criteria for allocation of responsibility (“interest”) from the proposed regulation the quantity of fish landed on its territory as a proportion of the total landings from the fishery that is subject to the JDP; the quantity of fish landed on its territory as a proportion of the total landings from the fishery that is subject to the JDP; the relative number of community fishing vessels flying its flag (engine power and gross tonnage) that are actively involved in the fishery that is subject to the JDP in relation to the total number of vessels that are actively involved in that fishery; the relative number of community fishing vessels flying its flag (engine power and gross tonnage) that are actively involved in the fishery that is subject to the JDP in relation to the total number of vessels that are actively involved in that fishery; the relative size of its quota allocation or, in the absence of a quota, its catch in a given reference period in respect of that fishery; the relative size of its quota allocation or, in the absence of a quota, its catch in a given reference period in respect of that fishery; the relative extent of the waters subject to its sovereignty or jurisdiction, if any, that are covered by the plan. the relative extent of the waters subject to its sovereignty or jurisdiction, if any, that are covered by the plan.

17 Hake case study

18

19 Cost-benefit: Baltic cod

20

21

22 Baltic cod Predictions: continued imbalance in inspections will lead to continued IUU! Predictions: continued imbalance in inspections will lead to continued IUU!

23 Baltic cod –cost/benefit of JDP Value of a JDP is the catch value accruing to legitimate vessels due to the elimination of illegal (unreported) catches through better control in a JDP Value of a JDP is the catch value accruing to legitimate vessels due to the elimination of illegal (unreported) catches through better control in a JDP Estimated JDP cost to the agency is €0.5 annually, included in these calculations. Estimated JDP cost to the agency is €0.5 annually, included in these calculations. Improvements in compliance achieved by Improvements in compliance achieved by Equalisation of inspections (current 17% imbalance: equalisation should reduce infringements from 5% to 4% of inspections, i.e. reduction in IUU from 40% to 30%)Equalisation of inspections (current 17% imbalance: equalisation should reduce infringements from 5% to 4% of inspections, i.e. reduction in IUU from 40% to 30%) Increasing inspections from 125/1000 tonnes to 175/1000 tonnes (reduce infringements from 5% to 2.6%))Increasing inspections from 125/1000 tonnes to 175/1000 tonnes (reduce infringements from 5% to 2.6%)) Combined effect: IUU from 40% to 15%Combined effect: IUU from 40% to 15%

24 Answer 2: Cost benefit of a JDP – Baltic Cod Benefit of implementing a JDP (equalising inspections) retaining current levels of inspection. optimum

25 Starts and ends of JDPs A JDP is in force from the time that a stock drops below Blim, until the time that it reaches Bpa (ie. Until it is recovered) Efficient JDP Inefficient JDP

26 Significant problems Quantifying relationships Quantifying relationships Predicting results of qualitative improvements Predicting results of qualitative improvements Baltic cod – real problem is ineffectiveness of Polish inspections, not just equalisationBaltic cod – real problem is ineffectiveness of Polish inspections, not just equalisation

27 Review of impacts of IUU fishing on developing country fisheries

28 Case Studies -poor/good MCS -High/low vulnerability -High/low ecosystem impact -Tuna/shrimp/pelagics -High seas/domestic issues case studies of developing countries with

29 Photos courtesy Kieran Kelleher (top) and Jon Klepsvik (bottom)

30 Estimates of total world value Extrapolation to sub-Saharan Africa = $0.9bn landed value Extrapolation to sub-Saharan Africa = $0.9bn landed value 95% range $0.4 - $2.3bn 95% range $0.4 - $2.3bn IUU is an additional 19% of declared landed value IUU is an additional 19% of declared landed value

31 Governance IUU catch IUU as % of declared catch

32 Targeting resources Fisheries as % GDP


Download ppt "COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007 David Agnew Imperial College/MRAG."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google