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Electricity transmission network development FSR Workshop Improving and extending Incentive-based regulation Florence, 24 November 2006 Laurens de Vries.

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Presentation on theme: "Electricity transmission network development FSR Workshop Improving and extending Incentive-based regulation Florence, 24 November 2006 Laurens de Vries."— Presentation transcript:

1 Electricity transmission network development FSR Workshop Improving and extending Incentive-based regulation Florence, 24 November 2006 Laurens de Vries Delft University of Technology

2 1/29 Transmission investment Types of investment: maintenance capacity increase (existing links) network expansion (new links) Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

3 2/29 Current situation Transmission planning: CBA, based on load flow forecasts. Incentive based regulation (if applied) typically limited to operating & maintenance cost ─ popular method: network revenue growth rate = CPI-X+Q ─ the Netherlands exception: capital costs included  as a consequence major investments are made only if they are exempted from the revenue cap Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

4 3/29 What do we want to achieve - goals Functions of transmission: transport, reliability & trade Goal: economic efficiency, with respect to ─ maintenance ─ network availability (NTCs!) ─ congestion management ─ capacity increases ─ network expansion  Trade-offs between cost and quality Second goal: integration of national markets, increasing competitiveness? Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

5 4/29 Trade-off between cost and quality  reliability  price/ cost willingness to pay reliability frontier Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

6 5/29 Objectives for network regulation Incentivise network users ─ efficient use of the network  optimal balance between cost and service (in theory: marginal cost of service = marginal benefit) Incentivise the TSO ─ optimal network management  find optimal balance between cost and service ─ regulation of monopoly rents Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

7 So… what are network costs?

8 7/29 Categories of network investment In meshed AC networks  parallel flows difficult to control DC lines ─ flows are controllable Linear/radial networks ─ no parallel flows ─ trade-off with generation easier to calculate In last two cases: easier to determine the right incentives  better prospects for IBR of TSOs But most investment in meshed AC networks! Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

9 8/29 Example: counter flows (all types of network) AB Generator A: sells 500 MW to consumer B Consumer B: buys 500 MW from producer A contract: 500 MW Consumer A: buys 400 MW from producer B Producer B: sells 400 MW to consumer A contract: 400 MW physical flow: 100 MW  Short-term network capacity depends upon other contracts! Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

10 9/29 Counter flows Two transactions in opposite directions  smaller load flow.  More transactions can take place, but only if the counter flows really take place. The network costs of a transaction can be negative! When flows in a given direction double, energy losses quadruple  cost increase not linear! Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

11 10/29 Example: parallel flows R1R1 R2R2 A B Ohm’s Law: V = I  R Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

12 11/29 An ill-planned new power line… A B P 1 =500 MW R 1 =1 P 2 =100 MW R 2 =3 I 1 =V/R 1 =V I 2 =V/R 2 =V/ 3  I 1 =3I 2 P 2 =100 MW P 1 =300 MW P total =400 MW! Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

13 12/29 Conclusion parallel flows The load flow is mainly determined by the impedance (resistance) of the lines, but constrained by their capacity. Consequence: the load flow depends upon: ─ the location of generators ─ the location of loads and transformers to different networks ─ the resistance of the lines. Electricity flows do not necessarily use the available capacity fully. Load flow difficult to manage operationally.  New network capacity must be coordinated with existing capacity. Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

14 Given these complications, what are current incentives?

15 14/29 Incentives to network users: transmission pricing Ideal: ─ cost-based rates in case of no congestion ─ value-based rates in case of congestion Two groups of transmission pricing methods: ─ Fixed, cost-based tariffs. Congestion handled separately. (Decentralized market design, typical for Europe) ─ Locational marginal pricing (nodal pricing). (Integrated market design, typical of the USA.) Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

16 15/29 The American way: nodal pricing A different price at every node in the network You can only sell and buy electricity at the nearest node The system/market operator varies nodal prices to reflect network capacity ─ congestion management is integrated in the process ─ overall prices are minimized, given demand, generation bids and network constraints Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

17 16/29 Transmission pricing in Europe Fixed rates (typically not related to distance) allow market parties full freedom. TSOs intervene only when necessary to maintain balance or prevent congestion. Problem: load flows unpredictable untill all trades have been closed and reported. Therefore costs are unpredictable.  tariffs are not efficient Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

18 17/29 Current incentives to TSOs Build more capacity (especially interconnectors) Reduce NTC on existing NTCs In case of merchant interconnectors: reduce NTCs of other interconnectors to increase price difference.  TSOs should not be in merchant projects! (like Britned) Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

19 18/29 Links between incentives to TSO and network users The choice of transmission tariff, access rules, congestion management method affect the incentives to the TSO The degree of unbundling affects the interests of the TSO Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

20 19/29 But… incentives for what? How much capacity expansion in anticipation of demand growth? Which network configuration is optimal? When to build network capacity, when to rely on local generation investment? What is an optimal cost level?  We don’t know what is optimal Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

21 So the incentives are probably wrong!

22 21/29 Limits to incentives Further complication: lead time for investments  risk of investment cycle If we don’t know what is optimal, what are ‘good’ incentives? Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

23 22/29 Asymmetry of social costs Reliability  Costs  Cost of outages Cost of reliability Social cost Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

24 23/29 What if investment is not optimal? Asymmetry of welfare loss ─ transmission network costs in order of 1 €/MWh ─ VOLL in order of 1000 – €/MWh  Given uncertainty, some overinvestment is prudent (insurance against much higher cost of shortage). Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

25 What are the options?

26 25/29 Options for providing incentives Benchmark competition ─ each transmission network is unique Proxy incentives ─ for calculating NTCs ─ for reducing congestion ─ for estimating need for new capacity correctly Possible solution to the issue of coordination with generation: ‘auctions’ for subsidies to G (Stoft) FTRs? Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

27 26/29 Opportunities for incentives to TSOs Regulation of TSO revenues  efficiency ─ based on cost ─ based on benchmarks Performance incentives ─ congestion ─ available network capacity ─ network reliability ─ economic performance of investments  typically proxy incentives Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

28 27/29 Example of proxy incentives: NorNed Dutch & Norwegian TSOs Regulated investment (rate base, not merchant) Initial business case negative TSO’s response: ─ capacity increase 600 MW  700 MW at no cost (!) ─ guarantees from neighboring TSOs for full utilization of cable ─ lower connection costs Now business case neutral. Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

29 28/29 Incentives in NorNed Dutch regulator attached conditions to regulatory approval: incentives relating to ─ moment that cable is operational ─ under/over budget realisation ─ availability of cable Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives

30 29/29 Conclusion Options for incentive-based regulation limited ─ better in simple, linear networks and for DC links ─ when theoretically optimal incentives are not feasible, proxy incentives may be a solution ─ evolution of pragmatic regulations  credibility problem, also repeat games between sector and regulator (Joskow) The social cost of too little investment is much higher than the cost of some excess investment. ─ Given the complexity: better safe than sorry  simple regulation, slight overinvestment might be the most secure solution. Introduction Network costs What if we are wrong? OptionsConclusions Current incentives


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