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The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera Daniel S. Morey.

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Presentation on theme: "The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera Daniel S. Morey."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera Daniel S. Morey

2 Trade Offs Investment in EconomySpending on Military Long run, latent power advantage Immediate war fighting advantage Risk losing warsDrag on economy “…states sometimes limit defense spending either because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state’s power in the long run.” Mearsheimer 2001

3 Trade Offs, cont’d Industrial WarCounterforce War Shorter warsBetter chances in head- to-head combat Resource bases sufferLong, cumulatively costly war Interestingly, models of conflict developed by economists generally do include a resource trade-off but not an explicit decision to fight or attack... whereas those developed by political scientists typically do include an explicit decision to attack but not a resource trade-off. (Powell 2006, 193, fn 58)

4 Question How do states weigh these options and ultimately choose a strategy for winning a rivalry? States compare the over time consequences of: – Peace-time competitions – Traditional wars – Industrial wars

5 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry Growth from investment Nation i’s aggregate resource base Nation i’s level of military spending Growth multiplier Guns vs. growth (Knorr 1970)

6 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry Limits to growth Nation i’s carrying capacity (Cohen 1995)

7 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry Drag on economy from military spending (Kennedy ’91, Morgenthau ’78) e.g., German armament in width vs. armament in depth

8 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry Military spending for security (Waltz ’79, Morgenthau…) Action-reaction (Richardson ‘60)

9 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry Military allocations limited by resources (Bellany ’99)

10 Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

11 Modeling Counterforce War Counterforce War = targeting military assets Interaction produces destruction “A thousand men fire twice as many rounds as five hundred, but of the thousand, more will be hit than of the five hundred, for it must be assumed that the thousand will be deployed more closely. Von Clausewitz Book 2 Chapter 12, page 205. “power to hurt” (Slantchev ’03)  i is j’s ability to “bear costs in return” (Slantchev ’03)

12 Modeling Industrial War Targeting economic resources Interaction produces destruction e.g., Allied bombing of Germany during WWII

13 Parameters ParameterState iState j α.2.1 β ρ.4.1 .22 K4050

14 Simulation Procedure

15 Representative Simulations

16 Information from Simulations 1.When/why state prefer 1 type of contest over another 2.Who wins 1.If anyone wins 2.How one side wins 3.Duration

17 Deduction 1: A state only prefers war when it has fewer resources and a weaker military than does its opponent. “painful peaces” (Powell ’06)

18 Deduction 2: Counterforce wars result in stalemates.

19 Deduction 3: Industrial wars lead to the shortest conflict duration

20 Conclusions Type of conflict matters – Provides advantage (or a chance) to states under certain conditions Not irrational to enter into a losing war Looking at where preferences come from

21 Future Directions 1.Process vs. outcome 2.Model modifications 1.Shooting 2.Mixed military and industrial 3.States using different strategies 4.Willingness to suffer (breaking points) 3.Empirics


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