Presentation on theme: "Lecture 7 UN Professor O’Malley"— Presentation transcript:
1Lecture 7 UN Professor O’Malley Collective SecurityLecture 7UNProfessor O’Malley
2Concept of Collective Security Directed outwardly toward potential external aggressor who may threaten a group of statesIntends to keep the peace among internal membersAttack on one state in group is attack on allAssumption: no state in group would attack another member due to overwhelming response of othersSubsumes traditional self-help techniques of states (alliance creation, declarations of war, individual and collective defense)* States are now ‘citizens’ of a rule-based institution!
3Concept of Collective Security Presumption that the common interests of states are in harmony or supersede national interestAssumption that members of a community of nations will have reasonable trust with other members and all will use rules to solve disputesIt is a ‘mental construction’ that changes as threats change (therefore, it evolves)
4Evolution of Collective Security Idea Traditionally was the idea of stopping an aggressor at its border or punishing an aggressorNow:Preventative DiplomacyDefense of community values (human rights, economic well-being)Peacekeeping and State buildingNATO and UN w/AIDS examples of evolution
5AggressionLeague of Nations Legal Basis for Collective Security (p.163)No definition of ‘aggression’Either in League or UNThis along with consensus decisions made the League unable to name an aggressor and take collective actionUN Security Council has only twice named an aggressor (for UN action): Korea and Iraq (1990)Argentina an aggressor in 1982 but only a UK response
6UN Collective Security Less robust than League of Nations‘Universal’ collective security institutionAll matters are ‘internal’ – no external aggressorLegal Basis for UN Collective Security (p.169)Security Council (and UN) is ‘legitimizer’ or ‘delegitimizer’ for use of force internationallyThis leads states to behave differently
7UN Charter and Collective Security Article 2, paragraph 4: refrain from threat or use of forceArticle 51: inherent right of individual or collective self-defense until Security Council acts to restore peaceArticle 35: any state can bring ‘any dispute or any situation’ to the attention of the Security Council if it endangers peaceChapter VI: means of pacific settlement of disputesChapter VII: allows enforcement measures through military force (for international peace – must respect state’s sovereignty in internal affairs)
8Chapter VI: Steps to Peace Council must establish a threat exists, then:Measures of Art. 33, para. 1: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial decisions and regional institutions to try and resolve threatArt. 36, para. 1 and Art. 37, para. 2: Sec. Council can make recommendations about procedure or method to settle disputeArt. 38: Council can make additional recommendations if requested by statesGoal: Not to establish good relations between states; just to prevent war!
9Chapter VI 1/2 Does not exist on paper Stands for the ‘reinterpretation of Chapter VI to solve particular conflicts’Peacekeeping and Observer missions come from thisAvoids the use of ‘overwhelming force’ by all members of the UN (which is Chapter VII)Term originally coined by Dag Hammarskjold to describe this new ‘gray area’ of operation for UN
10Uniting for Peace and Emergency Sessions *Despite the Charter, UN efforts to secure peace depend on circuitous methods, enhanced roles of the GA and Secretariat, and broad interpretations of Chapter VI.Uniting for Peace ResolutionBegun during Cold War deadlock on KoreaInformal amendment giving GA legal authority to recommend ‘the use of armed force’ when necessaryCircumvented anticipated use of vetoDoesn’t work if the offending state is a superpower
11Uniting for Peace and Emergency Sessions Uniting for Peace Resolution allows for Emergency Special Sessions of the GA:Can be convened at request of any 7 members of the Sec. CouncilCan be convened by a majority of GA membersHeld within 24 hours of being calledBecame accepted practice at UNTwo problems:Superpowers do what they wantUN members unwilling to pay for resolutions they don’t deem ‘Charter supported’
12Post-Cold War Collective Security Subcontracting – the new collective securityAuthorize a state or group of states to act on behalf of the world communityCase Study: Iraq 1991 (first of Chapter VII since Korea)Built law case first:Resolution 660 (condemnation of invasion)Resolution 661 (mandatory economic sanctions)Resolution 662 (annexation of Kuwait is null and void)Resolution 678 (Iraq gets 48 hours to withdraw or face military retaliation)
13Post-Cold War Collective Security 1992 – Sec. Council asks Sec.Gen. Boutros Butrous-Ghali to recommend ways to strengthen UN peacemakingReport: Agenda for Peace (1992)Preventative Diplomacy (resolve intra- and interstate conflicts before violence erupts)Peacemaking (bring hostile parties to negotiated settlement before or after the intervention of UN forces)Peacebuilding (construct an environment that sustains peace)Those three added to already used peacekeeping*Beyond UN financial and political abilities? Reminiscent of old League mandate system and neo-colonialism?
14Smart SanctionsArt. 41 allows for mandatory sanctions (all state’s obligated to follow)Most sanctions hurt common people and worsen humanitarian situationCase: South Africa a success (but many less than success)Smart sanctions – sanctions tailored to have ‘a high probability of directly hurting those responsible for the targeted policies while sparing the general population’Allow for humanitarian assistance and limited tradeCases: Sierra Leone (conflict diamonds), North Korea (luxury goods), Iraq (oil for food program)