11 JointJoint – Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 0-2)Joint can refer to commands or operations following the definition.Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) is an example of a Joint HeadquartersBottom line up front is we are talking Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard here. The joint world can be confusing to personnel that have never served in a joint environment. In some cases there are static joint command structures where the same component serves in a slot over and over again. In other cases it can be a rotating slot where a different component rotates through after each tour of duty. Joint operations can include component forces working together in an actual or training exercise. They can also include within the task organization subordinate units from other services. For example, a Brigade Task Force can be comprised of two battalions of Army infantry and one battalion of Marines. As we look deeper into this you will see what types of concerns can impact joint teams working together effectively. Each component brings their experience, expertise and differences into the situation.
12 InteragencyThe coordination that occurs between agencies of the US government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 3-08)An example of this is when the Army works with the Office of Homeland Security in performing airport security.Ever since 9/11 I believe we have learned what it means to work with interagency coordination. If you read the 9/11 report you can see where in many areas governmental agencies did not work together towards the common good of accomplishing the mission. One of the goals of the JIIM concept is to help us understand that while each agency may have a specific purpose, they work together in accomplishing the bigger mission. It is important for us as Religious Support Team members to learn how interagencies coordinate functions. In performing religious support operations RSTs may be in areas where other government agencies are also working and they can also be parishioners in the RST congregations. You may also have to coordinate with them regarding things like humanitarian assistance operations. It is important to understand their roles and how they interact with military operations.
13 IntergovernmentalAn organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, NATO, and the African Union.(JP 3-08)As countries work together for a common goal or mission, military forces under those countries must operate within the policy framework established by the treaties and agreements countries establish. Understanding the motives and drives of different nations not only involves understanding the culture, but it also involves understanding the moral, ethical, and religious values that those countries bring into the overall agreement process. RSTs at all echelons must understand the intergovernmental agreements and influences as affected by religion. As RSTs become involved in the role of advising the commander on issues as affected by religion, commanders will call on the RST at the lower levels to explain religion and its implications on the indigenous people in the operational area. Also some alliances and agreements can be formed impacting on some religious factors of the different countries involved. RSTs must understand the limitations of their role and know when to coordinate with other agencies to properly provide the commander with the right information. Also RSTs may serve at embassy levels often being a part of intergovernmental operations.
14 MultinationalA collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)Combat operations in Afghanistan are being conducted by a multinational coalitionIn today’s world the United States cannot afford to embark on any military operation without the cooperation and assistance of allied nations. Many situations and threats the US faces has global implications. Therefore treaties, alliances and coalitions are the rule rather than the exception. This means that forces from other nations become involved. RSTs at all echelons must learn and understand how participating country’s militaries operate. Especially how the religious support personnel from those countries perform and provide religious support. In some cases lower echelon RSTs may even be stationed on Forward Operating Bases with multinational forces. Many of these countries will have chaplains and assistants serving in their forces. In some cases you may even end up sharing the same religious support facility to perform your mission. Senior RST leaders must plan for such contingencies and establish at the command level policies and memorandums of understanding between intergovernmental militaries to facilitate a smooth capability of the provision of religious support.
15 JIIM and Religious Support Operations around the world today and within the confines of the United States are functioning using a JIIM concept. Religious Support Personnel at all echelons must understand how each of elements of JIIM impact on their ability to effectively provide for and manage religious support operations.Applying JIIM considerations in religious support planning is imperative to maximizing the ability of the RST to provide quality religious support. The contemporary operating environment is a dynamic battle space that encompasses the entire JIIM environment. RSTs must broaden their perspective in looking strategic, operational, and tactical in the application of religious support operations.
16 Just For Fun Q: What is battlespace? A: A legacy term, replaced by Contemporary Operational Environment (COE).Q: How many MACOM are there?A: None – there are 3 Army Commands (AMC, FORSCOM, and TRADOC).Q: What is the FM the Army and USMC use to conduct operations.A: FM 3-0, Operations
18 Operational Environment 12To comply with the CSA’s guidance we projected forward to the year 2017 and created a world situation which required the US to be engaged in all geographical command AORS in various types of conflict but where Irregular War was the dominant form.To get down into the details of our world we created a fictional Islamic country called Redland in the SE part of Europe—Balkans, Ukraine. This country is about five times the size of Iraq with about five times the forces.Forces organized with OTS technology that would be available to any country in the year 2017.We pickup the war in 2017 after a UN brokered ceasefire which effectively partitioned Redland. In the Southern portion of Redland, the US is assisting the newly formed government in establishing stability.Challenges to this stability is an Al-Qaeda like organization called the Global Brotherhood of the Faithful, there are vertical insurgents working against the government, and there are horizontal insurgents competing amongst themselves.The criminal element is taking advantage of this situation and is working both sides.The other half of Redland poses a complex threat because of its substantial conventional capability and use of proxies and third parties to destabilize SEEF. – Redland proper does not recognize the UN agreement and has long term aims to re-annex the SEEF.Globally, the strategic demand stressed the Army’s forces generation model and its strategic agility.To address these issues, we built the game around these issues and used this approach (next)34
19 Operational Concept 3 4 2 1 Illustrative A Mission: On order, Combined Joint Task Force - Redland (CJTF-R) attacks to replace the Regime of REDLAND and establish a stable federal republic in order to remove a source of global instability, source of WMD proliferation, and breeding ground for terrorist organizations.Shaping Operation: Multinational Corps – Alpha (MNC-A) clears RED conventional forces in AO 1 and secures PL BLUE in order to establish the conditions for unhindered stability and reconstruction operations.Illustrative234PL BLUEPL AMBERPL GREENAXXX1CJTFRXXXXDCJFSOCCXXACCNCC= strategic raidNote: Component Command locations are notional.Decisive Operations: CJTF-R conducts information operations and unconventional warfare in order to gain international support, to undermine REDLAND government’s legitimacy, to deceive the RED Army about the timing and location of CJTF-R attacks, to disrupt RED defenses, and to destroy WMD. Combined Joint Force Naval Component Command (CJFNCC) and Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) conduct strategic raids throughout REDLAND. Combined Joint Force Air Component Command (CJFACC) destroys strategic targets throughout REDLAND , interdicts and disrupts operational targets, and conducts close air support of all land forces.Once the conditions for decisive operations are set, MNC-A will conduct forcible entry and clear RED conventional forces company size and larger from AO 1. As MNC-A advances, MNC-B will secure the MNF-R rear area, conducting stability operations in AO 1 in order to re-establish effective local and regional government, generate indigenous security forces, and conduct foreign internal defense. MNC-B psychological operations will both build popular support for new government institutions within AO 1 and undermine REDLAND government’s legitimacy in areas outside coalition control.Sustaining Operations: Combined Joint Force Theater Sustainment Command (CJFTSC) opens sea ports and airfields, and executes all distribution operations within the theater.Transition: Phase I ends once MNC-A has cleared RED conventional forces company size and larger from AO 1 and secured PL BLUE.Future Full Spectrum Operations: Joint, Interagency, and Multinational forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent Unified force. They employ synchronized action—lethal and non-lethal, proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of the unique aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of the instruments of power.
23 MISSION STATEMENTWHEN DIRECTED, JOINT TASK FORCE LIBERIA DEPLOYS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MULTINATIONAL INTERIM FORCE STABILITY OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF MONROVIA, LIBERIA IN ORDER TO MITIGATE A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND SET CONDITIONS FOR INTRODUCTION OF A FOLLOW ON UNITED NATIONS LED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE.WE HAVE MODIFIED OUR MISSION STATEMENT TO REFLECT THE TERM “MIF” FOR THE MULTINATIONAL INTERIM FORCE. THIS TERM REPLACES THE PREVIOUSLY USED ECOWAS FORCES.
24 DESIRED ENDSTATE(1 of 2)ECOMIL DISPOSITION ADEQUATE TO PREVENT MILITARY CULMINATION IN MONROVIA.Force structure adequate to establish own reserve.Command & Control adequate for forces available.Sustainment organization in place and functioning.Medical plan adequate for treatment of casualties.ABSENCE OF ORGANIZED, INTER-FACTIONAL VIOLENCE IN MONROVIA.Freedom of movement for ECOMIL patrols in Monrovia.Compliance with declared “Weapons Free Zone.”No factional fighting in Monrovia.Civilian activities return to pre-crisis level.CONDITIONS PERMIT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS IN MONROVIA.Air/Sea Ports of Debarkation & Lines of Communication operational.Freedom of movement for International Organizations/Non-Government Organizations in Monrovia.Transportation available for Humanitarian Assistance supplies.As discussed yesterday, we are monitoring the recent and upcoming delivery of equipment to ECOMIL for Condition 1.Recommend upgrade to first bullet under Condition 1:Final ECOMIL contingent has been on the ground now for six days.ECOMIL has occupied the positions that we expect they will maintain until 01 Oct.Although we have not seen BG Okonkwo designate a reserve, he has sufficient combat power to do so if he chose.
25 DESIRED ENDSTATE 4. POST-TAYLOR GOVERNMENT IN PLACE. (2 of 2)4. POST-TAYLOR GOVERNMENT IN PLACE.Taylor relinquishes power.Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed5. ACCEPTED PLAN IN PLACE FOR ECOMIL / UN TRANSITION.United Nations Security Council establishes mandate for United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).ECOMIL forces identified for transition to United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).United Nations plan developed.
27 Humanitarian Community Liberia Organizational Relationships Special Representative of the Secretary GeneralAmbassador Jacque Klein(Retired USAF MG)UN Resident Representative for UN Development ProgramUN Designated OfficialUN Resident/Humanitarian CoordinatorMarc de Bernis (Ross Mountain, Acting next 3 weeks)(Triple Hated, Runs UN Country Team)Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, OCHAMs. Carolyn McAskie, Deputy Regional DirectorUNICEFUN High Commissioner for RefugeesUNHCR(Iain Hall, Senior Officer, Refugee Returen)(Moses Okello)UN Development ProgramUN Country Team-- UN Joint Logistics Center (Dave Pittfield)-- Humanitarian Info Center (OCHA LED)-- Civil Military Coordination (Barry Jones)World Health Organization(Mr. Kamara)Ms. Rima SalahRegional DirectorUN Humanitarian Air Service(UNHAS)Stig Larsson, Air CoordinatorInternationalOrganizationsInternational Committeeof the Red CrossInternational RescueCommitteeNGOsMedecins SansFrontieresMedical EmergencyRelief InternationalWorld VisionSave the ChildrenAction Against HungerOxfamLutheran WorldFederationWorld Food Program(Arnold Vercken-Regional Director)(Justin Bagarshira, Country Director)(Hans Vikoler, Team Leader)
28 (Example of evening BUB Brief) Religious Considerations Joint Task ForceLIBERIA(Example of evening BUB Brief) Religious ConsiderationsGen Sec of the Liberian Council of Churches- Rev. Benjamin DormeCatholic Archbishop/United Methodist Bishop/AME Bishop/AME Zion Bishop/Interfaith Council/Nat Repentant Muslims in dialogue with U.S. EmbassyTraining U.S. personnel in religious culture issues
29 COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE – 76 AFGHANISTANGood Morning / Afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen. I’m CSM Savusa, the Combined / Joint Task Force – 76 Command Sergeant Major. On behalf of the Commanding General, Major General Jason Kamiya, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I will present an Operations and Intelligence Update that will provide an overview of where we have been and the way ahead for Combined Joint Task Force – 76.Next slide please.
30 From Little Rock to Charlotte From Baltimore to Baton Rouge Afghanistan In ContextUnclassifiedFrom Little Rock to CharlotteIn order to appreciate our battle space and some of the challenges we face, we have overlaid Afghanistan onto the southwest United States to help visualize the scope of Afghanistan. We command and control operations from southwest Virginia to southern Mississippi. Key point is the challenges when moving forces and equipment around the battlefield. In most areas the road network is undeveloped and limited. We are further challenged by the environment with mountain ranges topping at over 20,000 feet, isolating areas in the Central, Eastern, and Northeastern regions.Next slide pleaseFrom Baltimore to Baton RougeUnclassified
31 Task OrganizationCJTF-76TF BAYONETTF DEVILCJSOTF ATF GRIFFINThe foundation of Combined Joint Task Force – 76 headquarters is the Southern European Task Force from Vicenza, Italy. Serving as Regional Commands are the 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 3d Special Forces Group. Supporting units TF Griffin to the Joint Logistics Center are from throughout USAREUR. Also included within CJTF-76 are our Coalition partners who provide significant contributions.Next slide pleaseCTF SWORDTF GUARDIANTF 165 MITF EAGLETF SIGNALTF STRENGTHJLCAdditional Coalition ForcesRomanian Infantry BattalionEgyptian, Jordanian, Korean HospitalsPolish, Slovakian and Korean EngineersCoalition Special Operations Forces
32 Insert picturesThese pictures depict the future of Afghanistan…an Afghanistan secured and protected by its people.Next slide please
33 Campaigning … In a Long War Context “Winning on the Offense”Coalition KineticOperationsNon-KineticActivityAs of February 06, resumption of kinetic will occur, during RIP activitiesEnemy Activity200420052006SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPLRLFDRVSSPOP XXOP YYOP ZZPres ElectionNAELR = Lightning ResolveLF = Lightning FreedomDR = Determined ResolveVS = Vigilant SentinelSP = Secure ProsperityOP XX, YY, ZZ =Future Operations
34 Threat Complexity POLITICAL SAFETY & SECURITY ECONOMIC TB, AQ, HIG THREAT: Any person or group who seeks to prevent the establishment of a legitimate government in Afghanistan.POLITICAL SAFETY & SECURITY ECONOMICTB, AQ, HIGTRIBAL/ETHNIC INFIGHTINGCHECKPOINT TAXATIONNARCOTRAFFICKERSINTERNAT’L AGENDAS/FUNDINGMINESILLITERACYThe previous slide depicted the environmental complexity. Now I will define the complexity of the threat effecting political, security, and economic areas. As you can see threats to the legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan are more than the Anti Coalition Militia, or ACM groups, Taliban, Al Qaida, and Hizb-e Islami Gulbiddin. Tribal and ethnic infighting threatens stability through a continuation of long held ethnic and tribal animosities. Loyalty for Afghans lies first at the family and tribal level. Narco-trafficking threatens security through corruption of government officials and attacks on Government of Afghanistan security apparatus in order to secure lab sites or smuggling routes. Porous borders are a major contributor to a lack of security and revenue as ACM , narco-trafficers, and powerbrokers exploit limited the controlled borders. The complexity of our operating environment often poses challenges in determining the cause or motivation of an incident. More often than not, it is not clear and takes some time and subsequent reporting before we can determine just who was behind a given incident – whether it was insurgent related, drug related, a land dispute, or ongoing ethnic/tribal rivalries.Next slide pleaseILLEGAL COMMERCEREGIONAL LEADERSPOROUS BORDERSLACK OF INFRASTRUCTUREPAKISTAN REGIME CHANGE
44 Joint Logistics Command Religious Support Operations for the JLCWidely dispersed throughout CJOAMust utilize area coverageTap internal assets for movementPrioritize RSOWork relationships for success
45 Joint Logistics Command JLC and Higher RSODirect link to aviation assets (fixed and rotary wing)Direct link to postal ops for greater movement opportunityExcellent source of “BIG” picture of operations
46 TTPsHave a religious team tng meeting prior to deployment allowing CG and CSM to address the group on RS vision.Rehearse joint and multinational language and unique METT-TC issues.Communication, communication, & communication with the religious teams.
47 TTPs cont. Pastoral care to chaplains through spiritual renewal days. Other religious team members at special functions for one team member. i.e. promotions, awards, recognitions.Send J2 intel updates to teams via SIPR (situational understanding)Training of teams with cultural advisors on staff for Mullah Engagements.
48 TTPs cont.Have a set of PIRs that reflect RS ops issues in concert with commanders.Up front ensure area support requirements with commanders after CGs approval.
49 Religious Support during Joint CBRNE-CM Operations CBRNE-CM attacks will quickly overwhelm local, state, tribal, and federal capabilities,In many cases civilian care givers-social leaders will themselves be traumatized victims of the event.The lessons from the Twin Towers and Hurricane Katrina have taught us the need for:Clear understanding of legal issues surrounding Title 10.Understanding of Joint Operations and Joint Operations center.The National Response Plan (NRP) does not address spiritual care.Chaplain activities during civil support operations in CONSUS are complicated because of the perception of legal obstacles and the absence of consistent DoD policy and doctrinal guidance.Command relationships are not well understood by RST deployed to Joint Operations Areas.RST role during CBRNE-CM requires clarification Operations to include doctrinal guidelines, aggressive training and explained chaplain involvement.Clear and constant communication (beyond personal cellular phones)Thinking outside the organizational resources and communication channels.
50 Training suggested for operating in the CRBNE-CM environment Training in Religious Support during CBRNE-CM should be consistent and coordinated.Religious Support Teams identified and trained similarly as a CBIRF RST.Chemical Biological Operator’s courseFEMA Independent study coursesVA/Red Cross/EMHC “Disaster Preparedness Course”CISMBasic Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE)Mass Casualty Disaster TrainingLocal training with in and out of state civiliansRST should drill with WMD-CST.Participation in training exercises both with military and civilians responders.Awareness and involvement in available training.
51 Skills We KnowWhat’s the “stuff” you already know and use to provide religious support where you are?LanguageCultureRules of EngagementSituational AwarenessUnit LocationsOperating EnvironmentLeft, Right, Higher, LowerCo-operative Spirit (give/get)Personal Connections________________________
53 What’s in a Name? Top Row: All E-7 Sergeant First Class United States Army“Sergeant” O.K.Gunnery Sergeant U.S.M.C.Never “Sergeant”Chief Petty OfficerUnited States Navy“Chief” O.K.Master SergeantUnited States Air ForceWhat’s in a Name?Top Row: All E-7Bottom Row: Both called “Chief”, one an Air Force E-9, the other an Army CW-3 (see “Chief” above)Chief Master Sergeant, USAF“Chief”CW-3, U.S. Army“Chief”
54 Match the Rank Insignia with the Correct Flag And name the Correct Rank for Each InsigniaAnd Name each Flag’s country
55 Match the Rank Insignia with the Correct Flag CaptainCaptainCaptainColonelLieutenant GeneralUSAPolandSpainNorwayItalyAnd name the Correct Rank for Each InsigniaAnd Name each Flag’s countryNote: Color for USA insignia is incorrect. Double-check info from internet!
56 Joint Religious Support Personnel Advisory Group(PAG)Logistics Advisory Group(LAG)Armed Forces Chaplains BoardMinistry Advisory Group(MAG)Training Advisory Group(TAG)
57 JIIM and the Chaplain Assistant By SGM Stephen StottGood Day. Today we will discuss the issues that chaplain assistants, religious program specialist and other enlisted support personnel must consider when working in a JIIM environment. It is not my intention to go deeply into the definitions of JIIM since that has been covered in other briefings. My focus is to discuss how we will operate in that environment. NEXT SLIDE
58 Outline Pre-Deployment Issues During Deployment Concerns Post-Deployment IssuesSummaryHere is the outline of what we will discuss. To start off we will take a look at the JIIM definition then we will look at things the assistant should consider before, during and after a deployment. Most of what we will discuss will be common sense types of issues that can apply in the normal operating environment for a individual service components training cycle. However as we look at these things we will highlight how the JIIM impacts on these issues.
59 Pre-Deployment Issues Understand Scope of MissionPlanning with a JIIM mindsetSupporting DocumentationCoordinationCollaborationCommunicationDefine RS Role in each of the facets of JIIM at your echelonUnits preparing for deployment must understand that they are going into a combat environment that has many foreign elements to what they are used to in training. Many division size elements are being task organized in a different types of formations. Some may have active and reserve component forces working together. Others may have Army and Marine battalions in their formations while others may have an Air Force or Navy detachment assigned for a specific mission in support of a joint operation. RST leaders must learn to incorporate JIIM implications in the early planning stages of religious support for their troops and area of operations. As we work through the different phases of a battle, different elements of JIIM come into play and RSTs must know how to interact with each of the JIIM elements. Even in operations at the battalion level commanders and their staffs may have to deal with daily operational situations that impact on all aspect of JIIM. Subordinate level RSTs may have to function as subject matter experts regarding religions and interact, for example with small government agency teams operating in the battalions operational area.
60 Pre-Deployment Issues Joint Manning Document (JMD)Religious Support PlanUnderstanding strengths of your assetsUnderstanding how each component operates in their environmentAdjusting your plan to maximize capability effectivenessJoint units are manned via the Joint Manning Document or the JMD. Senior level RSTs at the Combatant Commander and Regional Command levels assist lower echelon joint units in developing the JMD based on mission requirements. It is important that RSTs understand how the JMD is put together and also what types of chaplains and assistants go into their formations. For instance, why do you put an Air Force Tsgt at a particular position instead of an Army SSG. Chaplain Assistants really must understand and train on how not only the different components of active and reserve forces function but also how the other services, agencies, and governments function. Of course the mainstay of the planning process for us is the religious support plan. Early in the planning stages RSTs must consider JIIM across the whole spectrum of the plan. At the higher echelons it is imperative that policy and guidelines are set in how to perform certain tasks and functions in the JIIM environment. This ensures that RSTs at the lower levels have a clear understanding in how to coordinate and properly advice the commander.
61 Pre-Deployment Issues Pre-Deployment ConferenceIdentification of JIIM Players in AOCommunication with JIIM Points of ContactUnderstanding how daily operations run in a JIIM environmentInclude JIIM in the pre-deployment training for the teamSenior RSTs in charge of a JTF should conduct a pre-deployment conference with all identified major subordinate commands. Where possible they should invite applicable agency and government representatives in areas with they will work together in religious support missions. This will give the senior RST the opportunity to discuss the religious support plan and also foster an environment of mutual understanding early on in the team process. By incorporating in both the training and meeting process all aspects of JIIM where applicable it will help RSTs to become comfortable and informed thus facilitating mission accomplishment.
62 During Deployment Work the Religious Support Plan Make necessary adjustments based on changes to the missionContinue to trainValidate planned JIIM contacts and update as necessaryCounsel subordinates within the standards of their individual componentConstant evaluation of the RSP is essential to keeping it current and relevant on the ever changing contemporary operating environment. It is important to have staff members dedicated to the future operations planning and to adjust the RSP to meet new contingencies on the battlefield. Also utilize joint staff in concert with their strengths. Each component brings a unique perspective to the team. Don’t try to make your joint staff turn green for example. Let them operate within the normal standards to which they are used to.
63 During Deployment Cross train to standard in all functional areas Develop all members of the team for excellence and professional developmentUse battle drills as a means of working issuesEducate the whole team on implications of JIIM in all missionsEnsure all members of the team understand the functions of all division areas. Given emergencies any member of the team should be able to cover down on another area when needed. Initiate a system of battle drills and practice, practice, practice. Continually educate the team on all aspects of JIIM so that they understand who different agencies and organizations impact on the military’s mission.
64 During Deployment Strategic Concerns Operational Concerns Tactical ConcernsKnow which is your laneEducate your team to understand all three as it relates to JIIMCoordinate with proper sections when working JIIM issues
65 During Deployment Differences in deployment schedules Reports to include efficiency and evaluationsAwards and decorationsPreparing for your replacementsContinuity FilesBattle BooksRe-supplyAll organizations within the JIIM world come with their own set of rules. Learn what those rules are and apply them when applicable to your daily operation. Understand how staff member’s evaluation work in accordance with their component. Maintain a set system for tracking and have solid continuity files and battle books for an ever changing staff due to high turn around.
66 Post Deployment Maintain Contact After Action Reviews Identify new or adapting Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs)Inform all service component schoolsImprove Battle Books and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)Upon redeployment it is important to maintain contact with agencies and organizations you worked with during the deployment. This fosters a continued healthy working environment in the JIIM world. Make sure that you highlight JIIM implications and issues in your AARs. Inform the service component schools about expected changes as affected by JIIM issues. Continue to update and improve on SOPs and battle books.
67 Post Deployment Revise JMD based on mission changes Continue to train with a JIIM mindsetInvolve JIIM POCs in training exercises or conferencesRevise the RSP based on JIIMEnsure all JIIM team members are involved in reunion trainingPrepare for the next deploymentAlways review Joint force structure and update as appropriate due to changes and mission requirements. Continue to keep JIIM incorporated in all applicable aspects of training.
68 SummaryTo win the global war on terrorism we will have to work together. Religious Support Teams must understand how the JIIM environment works and know how to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate across the contemporary operating environment to ensure all authorized personnel receive the best quality religious support they deserve.
70 Some Classes J1OP-MN067 Law of Armed Conflict Course J1OP-MN071 Introduction to Medical Intelligence CourseJ1SN-MN043 Introduction to Human Rights CourseJ1ST-MN041 Introduction to International Humanitarian Law CourseJ2OP-US JTF 101 Module 1: The Operational EnvironmentJ3OP-MN040 Conflict Management and NegotiationJ3OP-MN060 Operations in the Information AgeJ3OP-MN061 Security in the Information AgeJ3OP-MN062 The Revolution in Military AffairsJ3OP-MN066 Ethnic Conflict and Peace Operations CourseJ3OP-MN070 Introduction to Maritime Operations CourseJ3OP-MN076 The Combined Joint Task Force CourseJ3OP-MN088 Improvised Explosive Device AwarenessJ3OP-MN091 Combined Joint Task Force Training ModulesJ3OP-US011 Military Response to Domestic CBRNE Attacks CourseJ3OP-US012 Joint Interagency Coordination Group Course (JIACG) CourseJ3OP-US JTF 101 Module 2: Forming a Joint Task Force HeadquartersJ3OP-US JTF 101 Module 3: Joint Task Force Command and Control ConsiderationsJ3OP-US JTF 101 Module 5: Joint Operation Planning
71 Some More ClassesJ3OP-US JTF 101 Module 10: Joint Information OperationsJ3OP-US023 Joint Antiterrorism CourseJ3OP-US027 JTF State StaffJ3OP-US028 Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) CourseJ3OP-US029 Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO-JPME) CourseJ3OP-US094 The Interagency Process: Full Spectrum Implementation PresentationJ3OP-US095 Joint Operations Center (JOC) PresentationJ3OP-US097 Joint Individual Augmentee Training (JIAT)J3OP-US156 The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)J3SN-MN038 Combating Terrorism and Illegal Trafficking CourseJ3SN-MN047 Terrorism and Its Implications for Democratic States CourseJ3SN-MN105 Introduction to Rules Of Engagement (ROE)J3SN-US005 Joint Staff Business Processes (JSBP) CourseJ3SN-US JTF 101 Module 11: Interagency CoordinationJ3SN-US JTF 101 Module 12: Multinational OperationsJ3ST-MN045 NATO Peace Support Operations CourseJ3ST-MN046 Peace Keeping Techniques CourseJ3ST-MN048 UN Peace Support Operations Orientation CourseJ3ST-MN053 International Security Risks (Drugs, Migration, Climate, Finances, Terrorism) CourseJ3ST-MN056 The Interagency Process Course
72 Even Some More ClassesJ3ST-MN057 Introduction to Information Operations CourseJ3ST-MN059 Fundamentals of CBRN Defence CourseJ3ST-MN069 Introduction to NATO CourseJ3ST-MN077 Multinational Crisis Management CourseJ3ST-MN082 NATO/Partner Op. Staff Officer’s CourseJ3ST-MN102 Peace Support Operations, Civil Military Cooperation for Commanders and StaffJ3ST-US009 Homeland Security and DefenseJ3ST-US010 Defense Support of Civil AuthoritiesJ3TA-US016 Introduction to Joint Interdiction Operations CourseJ4OP-US JTF 101 Module 8: Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, & Integration (JRSOI)J4SN-US JTF 101 Module 6: JTF Transition and Redeployment OperationsJ4ST-MN084 NATO’s Reserve Forces CourseJ50P-US001 Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJ50P-US002 Joint Planning Orientation CourseJ3ST-US026 Joint Special Operations Task Force Course (JSOTF)
73 ReferencesDOD Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) OperationsJP 3-08 – Volumes 1 & IIJP 3-16 – Multinational OperationsJP Joint OperationsJTF HQ Master Tng Guide – CJCSM aFM 1-05 – Religious SupportFM 7-0 – Training the ForceFM 7-1 – Battle Focused Training
74 More complex demands from Chaplains & Chaplain Assistants
77 Any Questions or Cheap Shots? I DON’T KNOW ALL THE ANSWERS BUT I’M DRAWING UPON MY EXPERIENCE, OBSERVATIONS HERE AND OTHER PLACES, LAY RESPONSES, AND GUIDANCE FROM THE CHAPLAINCYDON’T TAKE IT PERSONAL. BE PROFESSIONAL. WE ALL CAN DO BETTER AND BE A BETTER CHAPLAIN AND HONOR OUR CALLING