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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Hidden inconsistencies David Stallibrass Shanghai | March 2013 Personal views of author. Does not represent opinion or position of any institutions to which he is affiliated.
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contents Economics, assumptions, and the law Market shares and equilibrium Collusion and profit maximisation Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Conclusion 2
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Economics, assumptions, and the law Joke 3 Engineer: how shall we get water? Lawyer: when we find water, who will own it? Economist: Lets just assume we have some water.
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Economics, assumptions, and the law Background All economic models require simplifying assumptions In economic law – such as antitrust – the results of economic models inform the substantive application of the law “Even the most practical man of affairs is usually in the thrall of the ideas of some long-dead economist” JM Keynes 4
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Economics, assumptions, and the law Example – market shares and mergers 5 Law Market share safe harbors Market share as major tool of merger control Model Market shares are a good proxy for market power Assumption Markets are in equilibriumFirms profit maximizeTransition costs are low
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Economics, assumptions, and the law Question in China Has China imported assumptions from other jurisdictions that are not suitable for the Chinese economy? 6 Chinese Law Assumptions about the European economy Inform European Law Based on Assumptions about the Chinese economy Imply Assess?
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Economics, assumptions, and the law Caveat Relative concision of Chinese antitrust decisions and guidance Exercise is necessarily one of speculative explanation But…throw some light on what might be different about antitrust in China 7
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contents Economics, assumptions, and the law Market shares and equilibrium Collusion and profit maximisation Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Conclusion 8
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Use of market shares in merger control MOFCOM relies heavily on market shares AML Article 27 HHI and market share Notification form 2 years of market share Proposal for fast-track (10% combined for horizontal, 20% for vertical) Cases All cases mention market share analysis All but three include market shares Google – just 1 quarter! Delphi – “growing market shares” suggests dynamic analysis 9
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Use of market shares dominance Less clear how important AML article 19 presumptions of dominance QQ / 360 very high market shares consistent across time, no decision yet Baidu, J&J market shares not sufficient (though perhaps market not well defined) Ad-hoc nature means perhaps a little less important 10
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Assumptions behind market share use Models of mergers utilize “comparative statics” 11 Model of market before the merger (market shares imply cost, product differentiation, etc) market shares ≈ market power Change in market structure Model of market after the merger (changes in price, production, output) ∆ market shares ≈ ∆ market power Requires equilibriumAssumes quickly move to new equilibrium
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Assumptions behind market share use No authority relies totally on these models PCAIDS / ALM experimentation by EU / OFT But central to determining safe harbours HHI and safe harbor discussions in the US (1970s and 1980s) still a major driver of thresholds in many jurisdictions Substantial modern criticism Market share a “lagging variable” Requires definition of a market (which doesn’t really exist in reality) 12
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Assumptions behind market share use The assumption of equilibrium requires: The speed of economic change is slower than the speed of firms ability to react to it In practice: Change is slow: consumer tastes, regulatory landscape, business opportunities Reactions are quick: access to capital, low regulation, easy entry 13
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Do the assumptions hold in China? Are tastes and business opportunities moving very quickly? High growth Very large regional and sectoral variation Can firms react quickly? Extensive regulation Limited and un-even access to capital markets Conclusion: assumption less likely to hold than in Europe 14
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Suggestions for Chinese enforcement Market shares a good proxy for young authorities Limited resources Learning Provides legal clarity Short-term changes Ask for three years’ market share Consider Adopting GUPPI doesn’t need market shares 15
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 16 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 17 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B If firm A raises price, loses sales, but makes extra profit on what it does sell. Profit Cost of production Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 18 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B In this instance, it will not raise it’s price. Increased profit < value of lost sales Profit Cost of production Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 19 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B Some of those sales go to competitors, who make extra profit Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 20 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B If Firm A owned firm C then it would count firm C’s profit when it thought about raising it’s price Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI introduction “First round incentives” of horizontal mergers always to raise price 21 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Firm B In this case, it would raise it’s price Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion Increased profit of firm A and B > value of lost sales to firm A
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI calculation The real drivers of horizontal unilateral effects are not market share or market definition, but diversion ratio’s and profit margins. 22 A has a stronger incentive to raise prices if it either A loses a lot of customers to C when it raises it’s price, or C has very high profits Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI calculation Two things we need to know for UPP UPP A = Diversion Ratio A C x Unit profit C Maybe a lot easier than market definition! 23 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion Diversion ratio (units diverted to Firm C as proportion of units lost by Firm A) Profit of Firm C
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium GUPPI calculation GUPPI puts that in context GUPPI A = UPPI A / Price A In US, if 10% raises concerns 24 Profit Cost of production Profit Cost of production Firm A Firm C Prof it Co st of pr od uct ion Price of Firm A
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Market shares and equilibrium Summary PRC enforcement (especially in mergers) very market share focused May not be appropriate given nature of PRC economy Could consider more direct ways of establishing competitive harm from mergers 25
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contents Economics, assumptions, and the law Market shares and equilibrium Collusion and profit maximisation Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Conclusion 26
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Collusion and profit maximisation PRC approach to collusion Merger control Co-ordinated effects commonly mentioned: the belief that the merger will increase the likelihood of collusion Novartis / Alcon, HDD, Potash All foreign firms. Nexus of competition often outside of China Administrative enforcement Unilever pricing intention case Foreign and domestic firms, competing in China 27
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Collusion and profit maximisation Assumptions behind collusion analysis Primary assumption: firms only collude if it is in their unilateral incentive to do so Expected gains from collusion > expected cost Collusion likely sustainable where Firms are symmetric Market is stable Goods are homogenous Collusion almost always harmful Raises price and lowers quantity compared to non-collusion 28
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Collusion and profit maximisation Do the assumptions hold in China? No strong evidence. But: Large number of family owned firms Theory that Chinese business sometimes more focussed on win-win than win-lose Theory that Chinese businessmen sometimes care more about winning than maximising profit Substantial state intervention Trade associations may sustain collusion where otherwise it would fail Etc. Perhaps they hold less 29
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Collusion and profit maximisation Implications for enforcement Enforcement – perhaps correct to be more concerned If features of market suggest collusion more likely No evidence that increased Chinese concern is linked to characteristics of Chinese business In mergers, all firms were foreign, and nexus of business largely outside China In administrative enforcement, then increased concern may be acceptable 30
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Collusion and profit maximisation Implications for enforcement There may be situations where cartel enforcement would be welfare reducing Current “Chinese equilibrium” sustains cartel with large number of firms (quantity high, price medium, output high, employment high) Busting the cartel leads to standard competition If market is highly competitive, then inefficient firms will leave the market until remaining firms re-enter tacit collusion This new collusion may involve lower production than previous Welfare effects may be ambiguous Further research required 31
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contents Economics, assumptions, and the law Market shares and equilibrium Collusion and profit maximisation Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Conclusion 32
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit PRC approach to Leveraging Merger control appears open to the idea of a dominant firm “leveraging” market power from one market into another CocaCola WalMart Shenhua Decisions are short and not much detail is given 33
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Leveraging theory Before merger, Firm 1 is dominant in Market A 34 Market A Market B Producers Consumers Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 Consumer
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Leveraging theory Firm 1 buys firm 3 in market B 35 Market A Market B Producers Consumers Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 Consumer
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Leveraging theory Firm 1 bundles the two goods together… 36 Market A Market B Producers Consumers Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 Consumer
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Leveraging theory Forcing other firms out of the market 37 Market A Market B Producers Consumers Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 7 Consumer
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Leveraging theory But the Chicago school (1970s, 1980s) says this is wrong: Before the merger, Firm 1 already charging “monopoly price” Forcing customers to buy the good of Firm 3 when previously they didn’t want to is the same as lowering the price of the good of Firm 1 This would be unprofitable, since they are already charging the profit maximising price for the good of Firm 1 Firm 1 has only “one monopoly profit” which it has already extracted – it can not extract it again! Post-chicago modifies this, but Chicago school still starting point for most analysis 38
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Application in other jurisdictions EU comparison DGCOMP, ‘EU non-horizontal guidelines’, 2008: "it is acknowledged that conglomerate mergers in the majority of circumstances will not lead to any competition problems.“ CFI (Tetra Lavell): “Since the effects of a conglomerate-type merger are generally considered to be neutral, or even beneficial, for competition on the markets concerned,... the proof of anti-competitive conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for a precise examination, supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly produce those effects.” Pure leveraging theory of harm is not credible Other arguments necessary: Raising rivals costs, Increased ability and incentive to foreclose, Increased ability and incentive to predate, etc. 39
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Key assumption behind Chicago School All firms are profit maximising Even dominant firms 40
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Does the assumption hold in China? Substantial intervention of state into management of firms Large firms SOE’s Medium and small firms Local development plans Different firm objective Sustain status quo? Sense of civic responsibility? OMP may not hold 41
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Implications for enforcement Leveraging theories of harm may be more plausible in China Monopoly profit not yet extracted in Market A, so may try and extract some in Market B through bundling / tying Power of government intervention may force firms to accept the bundle, despite not wanting to do so But unclear whether merger cases are compatible with this Do not appear to be firms with substantial state involvement 42
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contents Economics, assumptions, and the law Market shares and equilibrium Collusion and profit maximisation Dominance and One Monopoly Profit Conclusion 43
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Conclusion Problem of identification PRC decisions are short Hard to know why they were made Hard to know what assumptions underpinned analysis Makes it hard for external observers to understand Lawyers less able to advise firms Firms less able to self-police Government less able to benefit from advice and support of academia 44
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Conclusion Mixed sensitivity to different assumptions PRC enforcement appears to have a strong focus on market shares Not consistent with analysis of economic differences PRC enforcement appears to be more concerned about collusion Generally consistent with analysis of economic differences, but unclear in particular cases PRC enforcement appears to be more concerned about leveraging market power Generally consistent with analysis of economic differences, but unclear in particular cases 45
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Conclusion Further work RPM in China – a two headed dragon Practical analysis of GUPPI vs. Market Shares in PRC merger control Modelling of “Chinese collusion equilibrium” “Chicago in Shanghai”: how the Chicago school applies to Chinese antitrust 46
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS – SUBJECT TO MATERIAL CHANGE Contact details economics@davidstallibrass.com economics@davidstallibrass.com PRC Tel: (+86) 186 1307 4004 www.davidstallibrass.com 47
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