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Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks Dan Veeneman dan@decodesystems.com www.decodesystems.com/blackhat/bh-2.ppt.

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Presentation on theme: "Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks Dan Veeneman dan@decodesystems.com www.decodesystems.com/blackhat/bh-2.ppt."— Presentation transcript:

1 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks
Dan Veeneman

2 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Focus of this talk Practical security problems Industry responses Lessons (hopefully) learned from mistakes Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

3 Practical Operator Considerations
Getting paid Prevent (limit) subscriber fraud Ensure accurate clearing with other operators Reduce churn Ensure sufficient capacity Provide CALEA compliance Maintain public perception of security Provide additional features (marketing) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

4 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Analog Digital - TDMA Digital - CDMA Digital - GSM Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

5 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Cellular Signaling Control channel Forward is continuous Reverse is shared Voice (Traffic) channel Assigned for the call Shared in digital systems Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

6 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Analog Cellular Authentication is valid Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and Mobile Identification Number (MIN) pair Sent from mobile to base in the clear Early systems had just a “deny” list Not all systems initially available to each other for roaming verification Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

7 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Phone Theft Automobile “smash and grab” Use until service is canceled Call-sell operations Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

8 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Database Theft Dumpster diving Insider account maintenance Hack into authorization database Hack into switch maintenance port Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

9 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Rogue Base Station Forward link has no authentication Mobiles lock to false outbound Cell phone suppressor Test equipment (ESN readers) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

10 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Network Interception Read pairs on link between base station and switch Microwave in many areas Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

11 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Tumbling ESN/MIN pair sent to home system Pre-call validation not available First call allowed to go through “Tumble” through random ESN/MIN pairs Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

12 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Cloning Replace legit ESN with snarfed ESN Reprogram MIN “Extension” phones Rewrite phone firmware (Chip in lower left corner is conveniently socketed) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

13 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Snarfing Tune scanner to control channel Decoder monitors inbound data Computer stores ESN/MIN pairs when the mobile registers AMPS data is simple FSK, in the clear Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

14 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Subscription Fraud Sign up for service under false identity “Identity Theft” Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

15 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Session Hijacking Overpower base station during legitimate call Use cell phone test mode to match Supervisory Audio Tone (SAT) Flashhook and place another call Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

16 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Fighting Analog Fraud Legal Illegal to eavesdrop Illegal to clone Illegal to possess equipment that might be used to clone Technical PINs Customers hated this Velocity checks Good for roaming, not great for local clones Don’t allow more than one active at a time RF Fingerprinting Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

17 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
2G Authentication Generally, mobile is given a challenge and network checks the response US Digital Cellular Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) Control Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) Voice Privacy Mask (VPM) GSM A3 Authentication A8 cipher key generation A5 privacy Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

18 Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption
A-key, 64 bits (20 digits plus 6 check digits) RANDSSD: 56 bits Electronic Serial Number (ESN): 32 bits Shared Secret Data (SSD) SSD_A: 64 bits, for authentication SSD_B: 64 bits, for encryption Authentication Result, AUTHx: 18 bits Unique Challenge Uses voice channel during call attempts Global Challenge Uses control channel, checks during registration, call attempt and call delivery All phones challenged with the same number Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

19 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Authentication Phone attempts to access the network indicates authentication capability Serving MSC contacts HLR and AC indicates whether it can do CAVE (if not, SSD cannot be shared, AC must do all the work) Gets profile Includes whether authentication should be done Generates random number RANDU and sends it to phone Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

20 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Authentication Phone runs CAVE ( RANDU, SSD, MIN, ESN ) Produces AUTHU Sends AUTHU to MSC MSC runs CAVE ( RANDU, SSD, MIN, ESN ) Produces local AUTHU At MSC, if received AUTHU matches local AUTHU, authentication is successful Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

21 Shared Secret Data Update
Phone and AC update their SSD AC generates RANDSSD Sends it to Serving MSC Computes SSD from RANDSSD, ESN, A-key MSC sends RANDSSD to phone Phone generates SSD from RANDSSD, ESN, A-key Phone authenticates Base Station (or AC) Generates RANDBS Calculates AUTHBS from RANDBS and new SSD Sends RANDBS to Serving MSC Either MSC or AC uses RANDBS and new SSD to calculate AUTHBS MSC sends AUTHBS to phone If phone AUTHBS and MSC AUTHBS match, phone stores new SSD Another authentication process is performed If successful, AC stores new SSD Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

22 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Count Mobile maintains a 6-bit COUNT variable Incremented on instruction from AC AC maintains COUNT for each mobile COUNT values must match in order for mobile to gain access Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

23 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Weaknesses Information sent in the clear on interconnection networks (SS7, etc) Secret information held in vulnerable locations (HLR, VLR, etc) CMEA “broken” Small keysize Poor A-keys VPM fixed for the length of the call XOR against known voice (e.g. silence) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

24 Global System for Mobiles
Handsets and SIMs International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

25 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
GSM Network Elements AuC: Authentication Center BTS: Base Transceiver Station BSC: Base Station Controller EIR: Equipment Identity Register (white, black, grey) HLR: Home Location Register ME: Mobile Equipment MSC: Mobile Switching Center OMC: Operations & Maintenance Center SIM: Subscriber Identity Module Visitor Location Register Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

26 GSM Security Goals The objective of security for GSM system is to make the system as secure as the public switched telephone network. The use of radio at the transmission media allows a number of potential threats from eavesdropping the transmissions. It was soon apparent in the threat analysis that the weakest part of the system was the radio path, as this can be easily intercepted. The GSM MoU Group produces guidance on these areas of operator interaction for members. The technical features for security are only a small part of the security requirements, the greatest threat is from simpler attacks such as disclosure of the encryption keys, insecure billing systems or corruption ! A balance is required to ensure that these security processes meet these requirements. At the same time a judgment must be made of the cost and effectiveness of the security measures. Charles Brookson Chairman GSM MoU Security Group Mercury one2one Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

27 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Anonymity Temporary identifiers. When a user first switches on his radio set, the real identity is used, and a temporary identifier is then issued. From then on the temporary identifier is used. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

28 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Authentication A random challenge is issued to the mobile Mobile encrypts the challenge using the authentication algorithm (A3) and the key assigned to the mobile (Ki) Mobile sends response back (SRES) Network checks that the response to the challenge is correct. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

29 User data and signaling privacy
A8 algorithm to compute Kc Used to encrypt the airlink A5 series privacy algorithms Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

30 Cryptographic Algorithms
A3 and A8 are in the SIM Operators can choose their own A3/A8 COMP-128 provided as example algorithm Can securely pass (RAND,SRES,Kc) while roaming A5 is built into the hardware A5/1 - more secure A5/2 - less secure Unencrypted Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

31 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
GSM weaknesses COMP-128 leaks Ki (April 1998) A8 has effective security of 54 bits (last 10 bits set to 0) A5 64-bit key (Kc) and 22-bit frame number, three shift registers A5/1 (western Europe) A5/2 (used in North America) A5/0 (no encryption) Rogue base station Unencrypted network links Eavesdropping Query HLR/AuC for new triples Kc refreshed only occasionally Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

32 Subscriber Identity Module
C1: Supply voltage (4.5 to 5.5 volts DC). C2: Reset signal C3: Clock signal (1 to 5 MHz, external) C4: Reserved C5: Ground C6: Programming voltage (if available) C7: Input/Output Baudrate is (clock frequency) / 372. C8: Reserved Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

33 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Talking to a SIM Defined by ETSI document GSM 11.11 Five bytes: Class of instruction (CLA) (always 0xA0 for GSM) Instruction Code (INS) Parameter 1 (P1) Parameter 2 (P2) Parameter 3 (P3) (length of optional data segment) SIM card readers may require additional bytes Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

34 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Listening to a SIM Three fields: Data (variable length) Status Word 1 (SW1) Status Word 2 (SW2) 90 00 is normal response Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

35 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Commands COMMAND INS P1 P2 P3 SELECT A STATUS F length READ BINARY B0 offset (high) offset (low) length UPDATE BINARY D6 offset (high) offset (low) length READ RECORD B2 record number mode length UPDATE RECORD DC record number mode length SEEK A2 00 type/mode length INCREASE VERIFY CHV CHV number 08 CHANGE CHV CHV number 10 DISABLE CHV ENABLE CHV UNBLOCK CHV 2C (for CHV1) 10 02 (for CHV2) 10 INVALIDATE REHABILITATE RUN GSM ALG SLEEP FA GET RESPONSE C length Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

36 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Conversation Setup card for access Activating card...01 Sending ATR 1... Sending Inverse ATR 1...3F 2F AF E 83 3E 9F 16 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

37 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Conversation Read Master File A0 A Select file A4 ok 3F Master File 9F file access ok, 0x16 byte response A0 C Read 0x16 byte response C F FF FF FF A 83 8A 90 00 Master File Header [MF/DF] RFU: 85 14 Free Memory: 00 00 File ID: 3F 00 (MF) File Type: 01 (Master File) RFU: FF FF FF 43 Length: File characteristics: 89 Clock stop: Allowed, low level preferred Required speed: 13/8 CHV: Disabled Child DFs: Child EFs: CHVs, Unblock CHVs, etc: 04 RFU: CHV1 Status: (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV1 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) CHV2 Status: (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV2 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

38 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Conversation Read Dedicated File A0 A Select file A ok 7F GSM Dedicated File 9F access ok, 0x16 byte response A0 C Read 0x16 byte response C F FF FB FF A 83 8A 90 00 Dedicated File Header [MF/DF] RFU: 85 14 Free Memory: 00 04 File ID: 7F 20 (DF-GSM) File Type: 02 (Directory File) RFU: FF FB FF 23 Length: File characteristics: 99 Clock stop: Allowed, low level preferred Required speed: 13/8 CHV: Disabled Child DFs: Child EFs: CHVs, Unblock CHVs, etc: 04 RFU: CHV1 Status: (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV1 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) CHV2 Status: (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV2 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

39 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Conversation Read Elementary File A0 A Select file A ok 6F (GSM) EF-IMSI 9F 0F access ok, 0x0F byte response A0 C F Read 0x0F byte response C0 85 0D F B FF 1B Elementary File Information [EF] RFU: D File Size: File ID: 6F 07 ((GSM) EF-IMSI) File Type: 04 (Elementary File) RFU: Access: B FF 1B Read/Seek: CHV1 Update: Admin 11 Increase: Never RFU: Never Rehabilitate: CHV1 Invalidate: Admin 11 Status: (Not Invalidated) Length: EF Structure: 00 (Transparent) Record Length: 00 A0 B Read file, 9 bytes B IMSI Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

40 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM Conversation Select GSM Dedicated File A0 A Select File A ok 9F GSM Dedicated File Perform A3A8 computation A A3A8 with 0x10 bytes ok RAND challenge 9F 0C ok, 0x0C bytes waiting A0 C C get response C0 D C4 8F 23 C4 EB EC RAND challenge C0 9B 8E FF 8A E A Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

41 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
SIM attacks Repeated authenticate, leaks Ki (New SIMs have a limit (about 50k) on the number of times the authentication algorithm can be run) Side-channel attacks Power consumption Timing Electromagnetic emanations Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

42 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
COMP-128 Updates COMP128-2 54-bit Kc Secret algorithm COMP128-3 64-bit Kc Proposal for new A3A8 based on MILENAGE Milenage based on Rijndael (AES) Algorithm will be public New A3A8 requires AuC software upgrade New SIMs Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

43 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Based on the Kasumi algorithm 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms. Kasumi derived from the MISTY algorithm, created by Mitsubishi. Specifications are publicly available on the 3GPP web site (www.3gpp.org). Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

44 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Cellular Jamming Low-power private base station transmits a forward link overhead message Mobiles register with base station Base station never sends a page The FCC view on this: The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the Commission's rules do not permit the use of transmitters designed to prevent or jam the operation of wireless devices in hospitals, theaters and other locations. Section 302(a) of the Communications Act, 47 USC 302(a), prohibits the manufacture, importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of devices that fail to comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Based on the above, the operation of transmitters designed to jam wireless communications is a violation of 47 USC 301, 302(a), and 333. The manufacture, importation, sale or offer for sale, including advertising, of such transmitters is a violation of 47 USC 302(a). Parties in violations of these provisions may be subject to the penalties contained within 47 USC Fines for a first offense can range as high as $11,000 for each violation or imprisonment for up to one year. The equipment can also be seized and forfeited to the U.S. Government. These regulations apply to all transmitters that are designed to cause interference to, or prevent the operation of, other radio communication systems. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

45 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Satellite Networks Big LEOs Little LEOs Mobile Satellite Ventures INTELSAT INMARSAT VSAT GPS Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

46 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Big LEO Constellation of satellites in Low Earth Orbit (as opposed to geosynchronous) Base stations in the sky Linked to network of ground stations Voice as primary service 1610 to MHz up to 2500 MHz down Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

47 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Iridium $5 billion 66 satellites (plus spares) TDMA, processing on-board to up and down 2.4 kbps data service Service start November 1998 Bankruptcy in August 1999, only 55,000 customers Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

48 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Iridium Satellite LLC Paid $25M for Iridium assets Relaunched commercial service in 2001 Large government contract ($72M/2 years via DISA) Dedicated gateway earth station in Hawaii Defense Information Systems Agency Department of Defense Department of State Inter-satellite links Enough money to replenish satellites? Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

49 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Globalstar Loral, Qualcomm 48 satellites in LEO Start of operations February 2000 Currently under bankruptcy protection Bent-pipe CDMA service Underpowered satellites Recharge over oceans 9.6 kbps data Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

50 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
ICO $4.7 billion Hughes-built satellites 10 satellites in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) GSM-based New ICO Craig McCaw Merged with Teledesic Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

51 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Orbcomm (Little LEO) 28 satellites 14 earth stations VHF operation Data only Store and Forward if ground station not in view “GlobalGrams” = X.400 Latency Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

52 Mobile Satellite Ventures
Motient AMSC-1 ($500M) Spar Aerospace TMI MSAT-1 (identical) Mobile satellite voice and data L-band Digital voice Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

53 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Interception Gateways require tapping FBI, CALEA requirements Iridium agreement Globalstar agreement TMI on-demand access National intelligence and police forces Test equipment Limited use of encryption Modifiable phone equipment Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

54 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
INTELSAT Was a consortium of nations as signatories Now privatized Large fleet in geostationary orbit Primarily telephone and television traffic Carries unencrypted voice, data and fax Used by US DoD for UAV datalink Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

55 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization AOR, POR, IOR coverage L-band Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

56 Global Positioning System
24 satellites Selective Availability turned off May 2000 30 meter accuracy Can be jammed (denial of service) Can be spoofed Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

57 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
GPS Frequencies L1: MHz: Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code L2: MHz: Precise (P) or Y (encrypted) code L3: MHz: Nuclear burst detectors L4: MHz: Ionospheric correction (under study) L5: MHz: Civilian safety-of-life signal (proposed) Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

58 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
GPS Enhancements The new architecture also requires new user equipment and an upgraded ground control segment, as well as M-Code. All of those elements should be in place by 2008, when 18 satellites with M-Code - 12 IIRs and 6 IIFs - will be up. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

59 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
GLONASS Global Orbital Navigation Satellite System 1606 to 1616 MHz Full operational status achieved once Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

60 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Satellite Failures PanAmSat Galaxy 4 Attitude control and backup failed Major supplier of service to paging towers AT&T Telstar 401 launched 1993, failed 11 January 1997 abrupt failure, solar activity? (large solar flare 6 January 1997) Galaxy 7 Primary control processor failed June1998. Secondary processor failed November 2000. Suspected electrical shorts in spacecraft control processor (SCP). Solidaridad 1 Primary SCP failed May Secondary SCP failed August 2000. Anik E1 1996, Power Subsystem Failure, Partial Loss EchoStar 4 1998, Solar Array Failed to Deploy, reduced electrical power available Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

61 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Questions? Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

62 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks
Satellite Glossary BEACON Modulated oscillator, usually containing telemetry. Sometimes referred to as a “pilot.” Used to locate a satellite and determine received signal strength. BEAM Uplink or downlink channel to or from the satellite. May cover a wide area, or be focused on a particular location (“spot beam”). BENT PIPE Big repeater in the sky. Simply repeats uplinked signal on downlink side, with amplification. Also called non-processing. DOWNLINK, UPLINK Downlink is signal from satellite to ground station. Uplink is signal from ground station to the satellite. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

63 Satellite Glossary (con’t)
EOL End of Life. Satellite lifetimes, barring accident or other damaging incident, are determined by the amount of maneuvering fuel (typically hydrazine) on-board. When the fuel runs out the satellite can no longer be maneuvered to stay in it's assigned orbital location. The orbit then becomes inclined. Current satellites have an expected life of years. ECLIPSE Satellite's solar panels are blocked by the earth (22 days before and after spring and autumn equinox, maximum of 70 minutes) or the moon (irregular). EIRP Effective Isotropic Radiated Power. A measure of satellite transmitter strength, usually in dBw (decibels above one watt). Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

64 Satellite Glossary (con’t)
FDMA, TDMA, CDMA, DAMA Modulation schemes to allow resource (bandwidth) sharing. Frequency Division Muliple Access: standard for video. Time Division Multiple Access: standard for telephone, most data. Code Division Multiple Access: spread spectrum, originally military. Demand Assign Multiple Access: shared data systems, including VSAT. FEEDERLINK Communications link between the ground station and the satellite. This link is distinct from the user links. FOOTPRINT Geographic area on the earth covered by a particular satellite beam. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

65 Satellite Glossary (con’t)
INCLINED ORBIT When maneuvering fuel runs out. Requires tracker at ground station. Traces a figure-eight pattern above and below the equator over 24 hours. INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization. Covers Atlantic (AOR East and West), Pacific (POR) and Indian (IOR) Oceans. Has spares in orbit, not always in contact with TT&C. LOOK ANGLE Elevation from a given location to a satellite. 90 degrees is directly overhead, 0 degrees is on the horizon. PSEUDOLITE Pseudo-satellite. Ground-based or airborne transmitter emitting satellite-like signals. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks

66 Satellite Glossary (con’t)
TRANSPONDER Discrete frequency slot assigned to an uplink/downlink. TT&C Telemetry, Tracking and Command. Ground Station monitoring and controlling satellite operation. TWT Traveling-Wave Tube amplifier. Has nearly flat response across a wide bandwidth. Newer satellites are using solid state amplifiers. VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal. Usually dedicated data links in a star configuration. Popular with gas stations for credit card verification; car dealers for sales information. Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice & Data Networks


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