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Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks Dan Veeneman

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Presentation on theme: "Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks Dan Veeneman"— Presentation transcript:

1 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite-based Voice and Data Networks Dan Veeneman

2 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 2 Focus of this talk Practical security problems Industry responses Lessons (hopefully) learned from mistakes

3 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 3 Practical Operator Considerations Getting paid –Prevent (limit) subscriber fraud –Ensure accurate clearing with other operators Reduce churn Ensure sufficient capacity Provide CALEA compliance Maintain public perception of security Provide additional features (marketing)

4 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 4 Cellular Analog Digital - TDMA Digital - CDMA Digital - GSM

5 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 5 Cellular Signaling Control channel –Forward is continuous –Reverse is shared Voice (Traffic) channel –Assigned for the call –Shared in digital systems

6 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 6 Analog Cellular Authentication is valid Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and Mobile Identification Number (MIN) pair Sent from mobile to base in the clear Early systems had just a deny list Not all systems initially available to each other for roaming verification

7 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 7 Phone Theft Automobile smash and grab Use until service is canceled Call-sell operations

8 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 8 Database Theft Dumpster diving Insider account maintenance Hack into authorization database Hack into switch maintenance port

9 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 9 Rogue Base Station Forward link has no authentication Mobiles lock to false outbound Cell phone suppressor Test equipment (ESN readers)

10 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 10 Network Interception Read pairs on link between base station and switch Microwave in many areas

11 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 11 Tumbling ESN/MIN pair sent to home system Pre-call validation not available First call allowed to go through Tumble through random ESN/MIN pairs

12 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 12 Cloning Replace legit ESN with snarfed ESN Reprogram MIN Extension phones Rewrite phone firmware (Chip in lower left corner is conveniently socketed)

13 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 13 Snarfing Tune scanner to control channel Decoder monitors inbound data Computer stores ESN/MIN pairs when the mobile registers AMPS data is simple FSK, in the clear

14 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 14 Subscription Fraud Sign up for service under false identity Identity Theft

15 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 15 Session Hijacking Overpower base station during legitimate call Use cell phone test mode to match Supervisory Audio Tone (SAT) Flashhook and place another call

16 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 16 Fighting Analog Fraud Legal –Illegal to eavesdrop –Illegal to clone –Illegal to possess equipment that might be used to clone Technical –PINs Customers hated this –Velocity checks Good for roaming, not great for local clones –Dont allow more than one active at a time –RF Fingerprinting

17 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 17 2G Authentication Generally, mobile is given a challenge and network checks the response US Digital Cellular –Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) –Control Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) –Voice Privacy Mask (VPM) GSM –A3 Authentication –A8 cipher key generation –A5 privacy

18 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 18 Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption A-key, 64 bits (20 digits plus 6 check digits) RANDSSD : 56 bits Electronic Serial Number ( ESN ): 32 bits Shared Secret Data ( SSD ) –SSD_A : 64 bits, for authentication –SSD_B : 64 bits, for encryption Authentication Result, AUTH x: 18 bits Unique Challenge –Uses voice channel during call attempts Global Challenge –Uses control channel, checks during registration, call attempt and call delivery –All phones challenged with the same number

19 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 19 Authentication Phone attempts to access the network –indicates authentication capability Serving MSC contacts HLR and AC –indicates whether it can do CAVE (if not, SSD cannot be shared, AC must do all the work) –Gets profile Includes whether authentication should be done –Generates random number RANDU and sends it to phone

20 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 20 Authentication Phone runs CAVE ( RANDU, SSD, MIN, ESN ) –Produces AUTHU –Sends AUTHU to MSC MSC runs CAVE ( RANDU, SSD, MIN, ESN ) –Produces local AUTHU At MSC, if received AUTHU matches local AUTHU, authentication is successful

21 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 21 Shared Secret Data Update Phone and AC update their SSD –AC generates RANDSSD Sends it to Serving MSC Computes SSD from RANDSSD, ESN, A-key –MSC sends RANDSSD to phone –Phone generates SSD from RANDSSD, ESN, A-key Phone authenticates Base Station (or AC) –Generates RANDBS –Calculates AUTHBS from RANDBS and new SSD –Sends RANDBS to Serving MSC –Either MSC or AC uses RANDBS and new SSD to calculate AUTHBS –MSC sends AUTHBS to phone –If phone AUTHBS and MSC AUTHBS match, phone stores new SSD –Another authentication process is performed If successful, AC stores new SSD

22 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 22 Count Mobile maintains a 6-bit COUNT variable Incremented on instruction from AC AC maintains COUNT for each mobile COUNT values must match in order for mobile to gain access

23 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 23 Weaknesses Information sent in the clear on interconnection networks (SS7, etc) Secret information held in vulnerable locations (HLR, VLR, etc) CMEA broken Small keysize Poor A-keys VPM fixed for the length of the call –XOR against known voice (e.g. silence)

24 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 24 Global System for Mobiles Handsets and SIMs International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)

25 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 25 GSM Network Elements AuC: Authentication Center BTS: Base Transceiver Station BSC: Base Station Controller EIR: Equipment Identity Register (white, black, grey) HLR: Home Location Register ME: Mobile Equipment MSC: Mobile Switching Center OMC: Operations & Maintenance Center SIM: Subscriber Identity Module Visitor Location Register

26 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 26 GSM Security Goals The objective of security for GSM system is to make the system as secure as the public switched telephone network. The use of radio at the transmission media allows a number of potential threats from eavesdropping the transmissions. It was soon apparent in the threat analysis that the weakest part of the system was the radio path, as this can be easily intercepted. The GSM MoU Group produces guidance on these areas of operator interaction for members. The technical features for security are only a small part of the security requirements, the greatest threat is from simpler attacks such as disclosure of the encryption keys, insecure billing systems or corruption ! A balance is required to ensure that these security processes meet these requirements. At the same time a judgment must be made of the cost and effectiveness of the security measures. Charles Brookson Chairman GSM MoU Security Group Mercury one2one

27 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 27 Anonymity Temporary identifiers. When a user first switches on his radio set, the real identity is used, and a temporary identifier is then issued. From then on the temporary identifier is used.

28 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 28 Authentication A random challenge is issued to the mobile Mobile encrypts the challenge using the authentication algorithm (A3) and the key assigned to the mobile (Ki) Mobile sends response back ( SRES ) Network checks that the response to the challenge is correct.

29 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 29 User data and signaling privacy A8 algorithm to compute Kc Used to encrypt the airlink A5 series privacy algorithms

30 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 30 Cryptographic Algorithms A3 and A8 are in the SIM –Operators can choose their own A3/A8 –COMP-128 provided as example algorithm –Can securely pass ( RAND, SRES, Kc ) while roaming A5 is built into the hardware –A5/1 - more secure –A5/2 - less secure –Unencrypted

31 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 31 GSM weaknesses COMP-128 leaks Ki (April 1998) A8 has effective security of 54 bits –(last 10 bits set to 0) A5 –64-bit key ( Kc ) and 22-bit frame number, three shift registers –A5/1 (western Europe) –A5/2 (used in North America) –A5/0 (no encryption) Rogue base station Unencrypted network links –Eavesdropping –Query HLR/AuC for new triples Kc refreshed only occasionally

32 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 32 Subscriber Identity Module C1: Supply voltage –(4.5 to 5.5 volts DC). C2: Reset signal C3: Clock signal –(1 to 5 MHz, external) C4: Reserved C5: Ground C6: Programming voltage –(if available) C7: Input/Output –Baudrate is (clock frequency) / 372. C8: Reserved

33 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 33 Talking to a SIM Defined by ETSI document GSM Five bytes: –Class of instruction (CLA) (always 0xA0 for GSM) –Instruction Code (INS) –Parameter 1 (P1) –Parameter 2 (P2) –Parameter 3 (P3) (length of optional data segment) SIM card readers may require additional bytes

34 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 34 Listening to a SIM Three fields: –Data (variable length) –Status Word 1 (SW1) –Status Word 2 (SW2) is normal response

35 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 35 SIM Commands COMMANDINSP1P2P3 SELECTA STATUSF20000length READ BINARYB0offset (high)offset (low)length UPDATE BINARYD6offset (high)offset (low)length READ RECORDB2record numbermodelength UPDATE RECORDDCrecord numbermodelength SEEKA200type/modelength INCREASE VERIFY CHV2000CHV number08 CHANGE CHV2400CHV number10 DISABLE CHV ENABLE CHV UNBLOCK CHV2C0000 (for CHV1)10 02 (for CHV2)10 INVALIDATE REHABILITATE RUN GSM ALG SLEEPFA GET RESPONSEC00000length

36 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 36 SIM Conversation Setup card for access Activating card...01 Sending ATR 1... Sending Inverse ATR 1...3F 2F AF E 83 3E 9F 16

37 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 37 SIM Conversation Read Master File A0 A Select file A4ok 3F 00Master File 9F 16file access ok, 0x16 byte response A0 C Read 0x16 byte response C F FF FF FF A 83 8A Master File Header [MF/DF] RFU: Free Memory: File ID: 3F 00 (MF) File Type: 01 (Master File) RFU: 80 FF FF FF 43 Length: 09 File characteristics: 89 Clock stop: Allowed, low level preferred Required speed: 13/8 CHV: Disabled Child DFs: 03 Child EFs: 09 CHVs, Unblock CHVs, etc: 04 RFU: 00 CHV1 Status: 83 (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV1 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) CHV2 Status: 83 (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV2 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining)

38 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 38 SIM Conversation Read Dedicated File A0 A Select file A4ok 7F 20GSM Dedicated File 9F 16access ok, 0x16 byte response A0 C Read 0x16 byte response C F FF FB FF A 83 8A Dedicated File Header [MF/DF] RFU: Free Memory: File ID: 7F 20 (DF-GSM) File Type: 02 (Directory File) RFU: 00 FF FB FF 23 Length: 09 File characteristics: 99 Clock stop: Allowed, low level preferred Required speed: 13/8 CHV: Disabled Child DFs: 00 Child EFs: 19 CHVs, Unblock CHVs, etc: 04 RFU: 00 CHV1 Status: 83 (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV1 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining) CHV2 Status: 83 (Initialized, 3 remaining) Unblock CHV2 Status: 8A (Initialized, 10 remaining)

39 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 39 SIM Conversation Read Elementary File A0 A Select file A4ok 6F 07(GSM) EF-IMSI 9F 0Faccess ok, 0x0F byte response A0 C FRead 0x0F byte response C0 85 0D F B FF 1B Elementary File Information [EF] RFU: 85 0D File Size: File ID: 6F 07 ((GSM) EF-IMSI) File Type: 04 (Elementary File) RFU: 00 Access: 1B FF 1B Read/Seek: CHV1 Update: Admin 11 Increase: Never RFU: Never Rehabilitate: CHV1 Invalidate: Admin 11 Status: 23 (Not Invalidated) Length: 02 EF Structure: 00 (Transparent) Record Length: 00 A0 B Read file, 9 bytes B IMSI

40 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 40 SIM Conversation Select GSM Dedicated File A0 A Select File A4ok 9F 16GSM Dedicated File Perform A3A8 computation A A3A8 with 0x10 bytes 88ok RAND challenge 9F 0Cok, 0x0C bytes waiting A0 C Cget response C0 D C4 8F 23 C4 EB EC Perform A3A8 computation A A3A8 with 0x10 bytes 88ok RAND challenge 9F 0Cok, 0x0C bytes waiting A0 C Cget response C0 9B 8E FF 8A E A

41 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 41 SIM attacks Repeated authenticate, leaks Ki –(New SIMs have a limit (about 50k) on the number of times the authentication algorithm can be run) Side-channel attacks –Power consumption –Timing –Electromagnetic emanations

42 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 42 COMP-128 Updates COMP128-2 –54-bit Kc –Secret algorithm COMP128-3 –64-bit Kc –Secret algorithm Proposal for new A3A8 based on MILENAGE –Milenage based on Rijndael (AES) –Algorithm will be public New A3A8 requires –AuC software upgrade –New SIMs

43 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 43 A5/3 Based on the Kasumi algorithm –3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms. Kasumi derived from the MISTY algorithm, created by Mitsubishi. Specifications are publicly available on the 3GPP web site ( ).

44 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 44 Cellular Jamming Low-power private base station transmits a forward link overhead message Mobiles register with base station Base station never sends a page The FCC view on this: The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the Commission's rules do not permit the use of transmitters designed to prevent or jam the operation of wireless devices in hospitals, theaters and other locations. Section 302(a) of the Communications Act, 47 USC 302(a), prohibits the manufacture, importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of devices that fail to comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Based on the above, the operation of transmitters designed to jam wireless communications is a violation of 47 USC 301, 302(a), and 333. The manufacture, importation, sale or offer for sale, including advertising, of such transmitters is a violation of 47 USC 302(a). Parties in violations of these provisions may be subject to the penalties contained within 47 USC Fines for a first offense can range as high as $11,000 for each violation or imprisonment for up to one year. The equipment can also be seized and forfeited to the U.S. Government. These regulations apply to all transmitters that are designed to cause interference to, or prevent the operation of, other radio communication systems.

45 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 45 Satellite Networks Big LEOs Little LEOs Mobile Satellite Ventures INTELSAT INMARSAT VSAT GPS

46 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 46 Big LEO Constellation of satellites in Low Earth Orbit (as opposed to geosynchronous) Base stations in the sky Linked to network of ground stations Voice as primary service 1610 to MHz up to 2500 MHz down

47 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 47 Iridium $5 billion 66 satellites (plus spares) TDMA, processing on- board to up and down 2.4 kbps data service Service start November 1998 Bankruptcy in August 1999, only 55,000 customers

48 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 48 Iridium Satellite LLC Paid $25M for Iridium assets Relaunched commercial service in 2001 Large government contract ($72M/2 years via DISA) Dedicated gateway earth station in Hawaii Defense Information Systems Agency –Department of Defense –Department of State –Inter-satellite links Enough money to replenish satellites?

49 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 49 Globalstar Loral, Qualcomm 48 satellites in LEO Start of operations February 2000 Currently under bankruptcy protection Bent-pipe CDMA service Underpowered satellites –Recharge over oceans 9.6 kbps data

50 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 50 ICO $4.7 billion Hughes-built satellites 10 satellites in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) GSM-based New ICO Craig McCaw Merged with Teledesic

51 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 51 Orbcomm (Little LEO) 28 satellites 14 earth stations VHF operation Data only Store and Forward if ground station not in view GlobalGrams = X.400 Latency

52 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 52 Mobile Satellite Ventures Motient –AMSC-1 ($500M) –Spar Aerospace TMI –MSAT-1 (identical) Mobile satellite voice and data L-band Digital voice

53 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 53 Interception Gateways require tapping –FBI, CALEA requirements –Iridium agreement –Globalstar agreement –TMI on-demand access –National intelligence and police forces Test equipment Limited use of encryption Modifiable phone equipment

54 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 54 INTELSAT Was a consortium of nations as signatories Now privatized Large fleet in geostationary orbit Primarily telephone and television traffic Carries unencrypted voice, data and fax Used by US DoD for UAV datalink

55 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 55 INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization AOR, POR, IOR coverage L-band

56 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 56 Global Positioning System 24 satellites Selective Availability turned off May meter accuracy Can be jammed (denial of service) Can be spoofed

57 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 57 GPS Frequencies L1: MHz: Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code L2: MHz: Precise (P) or Y (encrypted) code L3: MHz: Nuclear burst detectors L4: MHz: Ionospheric correction (under study) L5: MHz: Civilian safety-of-life signal (proposed)

58 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 58 GPS Enhancements The new architecture also requires new user equipment and an upgraded ground control segment, as well as M-Code. All of those elements should be in place by 2008, when 18 satellites with M- Code - 12 IIRs and 6 IIFs - will be up.

59 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 59 GLONASS Global Orbital Navigation Satellite System 1606 to 1616 MHz Full operational status achieved once

60 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 60 Satellite Failures PanAmSat Galaxy 4 –Attitude control and backup failed –Major supplier of service to paging towers AT&T Telstar 401 –launched 1993, failed 11 January 1997 –abrupt failure, solar activity? (large solar flare 6 January 1997) Galaxy 7 –Primary control processor failed June1998. Secondary processor failed November –Suspected electrical shorts in spacecraft control processor (SCP). Solidaridad 1 –Primary SCP failed May Secondary SCP failed August Anik E1 –1996, Power Subsystem Failure, Partial Loss EchoStar 4 –1998, Solar Array Failed to Deploy, reduced electrical power available

61 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 61 Questions?

62 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 62 Satellite Glossary BEACON Modulated oscillator, usually containing telemetry. Sometimes referred to as a pilot. Used to locate a satellite and determine received signal strength. BEAM Uplink or downlink channel to or from the satellite. May cover a wide area, or be focused on a particular location (spot beam). BENT PIPE Big repeater in the sky. Simply repeats uplinked signal on downlink side, with amplification. Also called non-processing. DOWNLINK, UPLINK Downlink is signal from satellite to ground station. Uplink is signal from ground station to the satellite.

63 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 63 Satellite Glossary (cont) EOL End of Life. Satellite lifetimes, barring accident or other damaging incident, are determined by the amount of maneuvering fuel (typically hydrazine) on-board. When the fuel runs out the satellite can no longer be maneuvered to stay in it's assigned orbital location. The orbit then becomes inclined. Current satellites have an expected life of years. ECLIPSE Satellite's solar panels are blocked by the earth (22 days before and after spring and autumn equinox, maximum of 70 minutes) or the moon (irregular). EIRP Effective Isotropic Radiated Power. A measure of satellite transmitter strength, usually in dBw (decibels above one watt).

64 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 64 Satellite Glossary (cont) FDMA, TDMA, CDMA, DAMA Modulation schemes to allow resource (bandwidth) sharing. Frequency Division Muliple Access: standard for video. Time Division Multiple Access: standard for telephone, most data. Code Division Multiple Access: spread spectrum, originally military. Demand Assign Multiple Access: shared data systems, including VSAT. FEEDERLINK Communications link between the ground station and the satellite. This link is distinct from the user links. FOOTPRINT Geographic area on the earth covered by a particular satellite beam.

65 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 65 Satellite Glossary (cont) INCLINED ORBIT When maneuvering fuel runs out. Requires tracker at ground station. Traces a figure-eight pattern above and below the equator over 24 hours. INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization. Covers Atlantic (AOR East and West), Pacific (POR) and Indian (IOR) Oceans. Has spares in orbit, not always in contact with TT&C. LOOK ANGLE Elevation from a given location to a satellite. 90 degrees is directly overhead, 0 degrees is on the horizon. PSEUDOLITE Pseudo-satellite. Ground-based or airborne transmitter emitting satellite-like signals.

66 Black Hat Briefings July 31, 2002 Vulnerabilities of Cellular and Satellite- based Voice & Data Networks Page 66 Satellite Glossary (cont) TRANSPONDER Discrete frequency slot assigned to an uplink/downlink. TT&C Telemetry, Tracking and Command. Ground Station monitoring and controlling satellite operation. TWT Traveling-Wave Tube amplifier. Has nearly flat response across a wide bandwidth. Newer satellites are using solid state amplifiers. VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal. Usually dedicated data links in a star configuration. Popular with gas stations for credit card verification; car dealers for sales information.


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